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Ive spent much of the last six weeks out on the ground, working with Iraqi and U.S. combat units, civilian reconstruction teams, Iraqi administrators and tribal and community leaders. Ive been away from e-mail a lot, so unable to post here at SWJ: but Id like to make up for that now by providing colleagues with a basic understanding of whats happening, right now, in Iraq.
This post is not about whether current ops are working for us, here on the ground, time will tell, though some observers elsewhere seem to have already made up their minds (on the basis of what evidence, Im not really sure). But for professional counterinsurgency operators such as our SWJ community, the thing to understand at this point is the intention and concept behind current ops in Iraq: if you grasp this, you can tell for yourself how the operations are going, without relying on armchair pundits. So in the interests of self-education (and cutting out the commentariat middlemensorry, guys) here is a field perspective on current operations.
Ten days ago, speaking with Austin Bay, I made the following comment:
I know some people in the media are already starting to sort of write off the surge and say Hey, hang on: weve been going since January, we havent seen a massive turnaround; it mustnt be working. What weve been doing to date is putting forces into position. We havent actually started what I would call the surge yet. All weve been doing is building up forces and trying to secure the population. And what I would say to people who say that its already failed is watch this space. Because youre going to see, in fairly short order, some changes in the way were operating that will make whats been happening over the past few months look like what it isjust a preliminary build up.
The meaning of that comment should be clear by now to anyone tracking what is happening in Iraq. On June 15th we kicked off a major series of division-sized operations in Baghdad and the surrounding provinces. As General Odierno said, we have finished the build-up phase and are now beginning the actual surge of operations. I have often said that we need to give this time. That is still true. But this is the end of the beginning: we are now starting to put things onto a viable long-term footing.
These operations are qualitatively different from what we have done before. Our concept is to knock over several insurgent safe havens simultaneously, in order to prevent terrorists relocating their infrastructure from one to another, and to create an operational synergy between what we're doing in Baghdad and what's happening outside. Unlike on previous occasions, we don't plan to leave these areas once theyre secured. These ops will run over months, and the key activity is to stand up viable local security forces in partnership with Iraqi Army and Police, as well as political and economic programs, to permanently secure them. The really decisive activity will be police work, registration of the population and counterintelligence in these areas, to comb out the insurgent sleeper cells and political cells that have "gone quiet" as we moved in, but which will try to survive through the op and emerge later. This will take operational patience, and it will be intelligence-led, and Iraqi government-led. It will probably not make the news (the really important stuff rarely does) but it will be the truly decisive action.
When we speak of "clearing" an enemy safe haven, we are not talking about destroying the enemy in it; we are talking about rescuing the population in it from enemy intimidation. If we don't get every enemy cell in the initial operation, that's OK. The point of the operations is to lift the pall of fear from population groups that have been intimidated and exploited by terrorists to date, then win them over and work with them in partnership to clean out the cells that remain as has happened in Al Anbar Province and can happen elsewhere in Iraq as well.
Looks like Clear, Hold, Build.
Which will work.
I just hope that we dont actually need the estimated 130,000 more troops to succeed.
I missed that, are you saying over and above what they have? I've not heard that. Patreaus has made it clear he'd like more, but knows that's a no go.
http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/iraq/attack/consequences/2003/0228pentagoncontra.htmMr. Wolfowitz,.........calling the recent estimate by Gen. Eric K. Shinseki of the Army that several hundred thousand troops would be needed in postwar Iraq, "wildly off the mark.
Clear Hold Build is a Condoleezza idea from Tal Afar, and there were suggestions of duplicating the efforts, but in order to successfully execute the strategy and secure Iraq, they would need an estimated total of another 150,000 troops.
So yeah that is over and above the 25,000+ that just arrived.
He knows thats not going to happen, but if we wanted this done, right, and quick, that is what would be needed.
And that I believe is what Shinseki said in the beginning.
http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/iraq/attack/consequences/2003/0228pentagoncontra.htm
