The issue was whether corporiations can give money to pay for ads that express political positions. If it's ads simply pro or con a candidate that's not what the supreme court was talking about. It was about advocating political positions. The court ruled that you can not take away people's free speech by not allowing them to promote their ads regarding a political position. From the actual ruling. http://www.supremecourtus.gov/opinions/06pdf/06-969.pdf page 4 In light of these considerations, a court should find that an ad is the functional equivalent of express advocacy only if the ad is susceptible of no reasonable interpretation other than as an appeal to vote for or against a specific candidate. WRTLs three ads are plainly not thefunctional equivalent of express advocacy under this test. First, their content is consistent with that of a genuine issue ad: They focus and take a position on a legislative issue and exhort the public to adoptthat position and to contact public officials with respect to the matter.Second, their content lacks indicia of express advocacy: They do notmention an election, candidacy, political party, or challenger; andthey take no position on a candidates character, qualifications, orfitness for office. Pp. 1522.2. Because WRTLs ads are not express advocacy or its functional equivalent, and because appellants identify no interest sufficientlycompelling to justify burdening WRTLs speech, BCRA §203 is uncon-stitutional as applied to the ads. The section can be constitutionally applied only if it is narrowly tailored to further a compelling interest. E.g., McConnell, supra, at 205. None of the interests that might jus-tify regulating WRTLs ads are sufficiently compelling. Although the Court has long recognized the governmental interest in preventing corruption and the appearance of corruption in election campaigns, Buckley, 424 U. S., at 45, it has invoked this interest as a reason for upholding contribution limits, id., at 2627, and suggested that itmight also justify limits on electioneering expenditures posing thesame dangers as large contributions, id., at 45. McConnell arguablyapplied this interest to ads that were the functional equivalent of express advocacy. See 540 U. S., at 204206. But to justify regula-tion of WRTLs ads, this interest must be stretched yet another stepto ads that are not the functional equivalent of express advocacy. Is-sue ads like WRTLs are not equivalent to contributions, and the cor-ruption interest cannot justify regulating them. A second possible compelling interest lies in addressing the corrosive and distorting ef-fects of immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated withthe help of the corporate form and that have little or no correlation tothe publics support for the corporations political ideas. Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U. S. 652, 660. McConnell held that this interest justifies regulating the functional equivalent of campaign speech, 540 U. S., at 205206. This interest cannot be ex-tended further to apply to genuine issue ads like WRTLs, see, e.g., id., at 206, n. 88, because doing so would call into question thisCourts holdings that the corporate identity of a speaker does not strip corporations of all free speech rights. WRTL I reinforced the va-lidity of this point by holding §203 susceptible to as-applied chal-lenges. 546 U. S., at 411412. Pp. 2328.