- Aug 10, 2009
- 168,037
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- #1
But is this significant for America's future: good or bad? I personally think that not "believing in God" for many is replaced with a sense of personal spirituality, a connection with 'otherness' beyond our every day world. I do not think that it supports a special sense of "secularization" in America.
Sociologist Mark Chaves, on the basis of data derived from the General Social Survey and the National Congregational Study—both highly respected sources—looked at trends in American religion from 1972 to 2008. He finds remarkable stability and consistency with religion in the United States, but also important, even if gradual, signs of decline. For example, in the 1950s, almost everyone—99 percent of the population—reported believing in God, while by 2008 that number had declined steadily to 92 percent.1 He finds no support for any increase in traditional religious belief or practice, concluding that: “If there is a trend, it is toward less religion.”2 Such a trend is confirmed by more recent research and firmly reinforced by the finding that traditional religious belief in the United States has been declining with each generation since the early 20th century.3
Chaves, American Religion.
1 Chaves, American Religion: Contemporary Trends, 11. Also see Mark Chaves, “Secularization and Religious Revival: Evidence from U.S. Church Attendance Rates, 1972-1986,” Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 28, 4 (1989): 464-477.
2 Chaves, American Religion: Contemporary Trends, 110.
3. Tobin Grant, “Measuring Aggregate Religiosity in the United States, 1952-2005,” Sociological Spectrum 28, 5 (2008): 460-476; Robert D. Putnam, and David E. Campbell, American Grace: How Religion Divides and Unites Us (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2010); Philip Schwadel, “Period and Cohort Effects on Religious Nonaffiliation and Disaffiliation: A Research Note,” Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 49, 2 (2010): 311-319; Cary Funk and Greg Smith, “Nones” on the Rise: One-in-five Adults Have No Religious Affiliation (Washington: Pew Research, 2012); Philip Schwadel, “Changes in Americans’ Strength of Religious Affiliation, 1974-2010,” Sociology of Religion 74, 1 (2013): 107-128; David Voas and Mark Chaves, “Is the United States a Counterexample to the Secularization Thesis,” American Journal of Sociology 121, 5 (March 2016): 1517-1556; Jean M. Twenge, Ryne A. Sherman, Julie J. Exline, and Joshua B. Grubbs, “Declines in American Adults’ Religious Participation and Beliefs, 1972-2014,” Sage Open 6, 1 (2016) at SAGE Journals: Your gateway to world-class journal research; and Aaron Gullickson, “The Diverging Beliefs and Practices of the Religiously Affiliated and Unaffiliated in the United States,” Sociological Science 5, 16 (2018): 361-379. Within this literature there is disagreement about the significance of this decline and whether or not it supports a secularization thesis. See Michael Hout and Claude S. Fischer, “Why More Americans Have No Religious Preference: Politics and Generations,” American Sociological Review 67, 2 (2002): 165-190; Gerald Marwell and N.J. Demerath III, “’Secularization’ by Any other Name,” American Sociological Review 68, 2 (2003): 314-316; Michael Hout and Claude S. Fischer, “O Be Some Other Name: Reply to Marwell and Demerath,” American Sociological Review 68, 2 (2003): 316-318; Michael Hout and Claude S. Fischer, “Explaining Why More Americans Have No Religious Preference: Political Backlash and Generational Succession, 1987-2012,” Sociological Science 1, 24 (2014): 423-447; Landon Schnabel and Sean Bock, “The Persistence and Exceptional Intensity of American Religion: A Response to Recent Research,” Sociological Science 4, 28 (2017): 686-700.
Sociologist Mark Chaves, on the basis of data derived from the General Social Survey and the National Congregational Study—both highly respected sources—looked at trends in American religion from 1972 to 2008. He finds remarkable stability and consistency with religion in the United States, but also important, even if gradual, signs of decline. For example, in the 1950s, almost everyone—99 percent of the population—reported believing in God, while by 2008 that number had declined steadily to 92 percent.1 He finds no support for any increase in traditional religious belief or practice, concluding that: “If there is a trend, it is toward less religion.”2 Such a trend is confirmed by more recent research and firmly reinforced by the finding that traditional religious belief in the United States has been declining with each generation since the early 20th century.3
Chaves, American Religion.
1 Chaves, American Religion: Contemporary Trends, 11. Also see Mark Chaves, “Secularization and Religious Revival: Evidence from U.S. Church Attendance Rates, 1972-1986,” Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 28, 4 (1989): 464-477.
2 Chaves, American Religion: Contemporary Trends, 110.
3. Tobin Grant, “Measuring Aggregate Religiosity in the United States, 1952-2005,” Sociological Spectrum 28, 5 (2008): 460-476; Robert D. Putnam, and David E. Campbell, American Grace: How Religion Divides and Unites Us (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2010); Philip Schwadel, “Period and Cohort Effects on Religious Nonaffiliation and Disaffiliation: A Research Note,” Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 49, 2 (2010): 311-319; Cary Funk and Greg Smith, “Nones” on the Rise: One-in-five Adults Have No Religious Affiliation (Washington: Pew Research, 2012); Philip Schwadel, “Changes in Americans’ Strength of Religious Affiliation, 1974-2010,” Sociology of Religion 74, 1 (2013): 107-128; David Voas and Mark Chaves, “Is the United States a Counterexample to the Secularization Thesis,” American Journal of Sociology 121, 5 (March 2016): 1517-1556; Jean M. Twenge, Ryne A. Sherman, Julie J. Exline, and Joshua B. Grubbs, “Declines in American Adults’ Religious Participation and Beliefs, 1972-2014,” Sage Open 6, 1 (2016) at SAGE Journals: Your gateway to world-class journal research; and Aaron Gullickson, “The Diverging Beliefs and Practices of the Religiously Affiliated and Unaffiliated in the United States,” Sociological Science 5, 16 (2018): 361-379. Within this literature there is disagreement about the significance of this decline and whether or not it supports a secularization thesis. See Michael Hout and Claude S. Fischer, “Why More Americans Have No Religious Preference: Politics and Generations,” American Sociological Review 67, 2 (2002): 165-190; Gerald Marwell and N.J. Demerath III, “’Secularization’ by Any other Name,” American Sociological Review 68, 2 (2003): 314-316; Michael Hout and Claude S. Fischer, “O Be Some Other Name: Reply to Marwell and Demerath,” American Sociological Review 68, 2 (2003): 316-318; Michael Hout and Claude S. Fischer, “Explaining Why More Americans Have No Religious Preference: Political Backlash and Generational Succession, 1987-2012,” Sociological Science 1, 24 (2014): 423-447; Landon Schnabel and Sean Bock, “The Persistence and Exceptional Intensity of American Religion: A Response to Recent Research,” Sociological Science 4, 28 (2017): 686-700.
I never made that claim. Jones condemned religious society for that very problem (which I did not deny), and I asked for a moral and just society without religion from Jones.
