So How Are We Doing? Take A Look

[Annie]

http://qando.net/details.aspx?Entry=4096

The beginning, take a look at the whole thing:

Iraq’s security picture: Is it really improving?
Posted by: McQ on Monday, June 19, 2006

The Department of Defense has issued it’s latest report to Congress on progress in Iraq. The report (here in pdf) covers three integrated areas which are critical to our success in Iraq. They are:

• Political: helping the Iraqi people forge a broadly supported compact for democratic government.

• Economic: assisting the Iraqi government in establishing the foundations for a sound economy with the capacity to deliver essential services.

• Security: developing the capacity of Iraqis to secure their country while carrying out a campaign to defeat the terrorists and neutralize the insurgency.

It is on those three pillars that the US strategy for the stabilization of Iraq are built. For instance, it is often charged that there is no plan for the political portion of the operation. That’s simply not true. That doesn’t mean all is well, and Gen. Barry McCaffery noted in his report that improvement was necessary. But that doesn’t mean a plan isn’t in existence. And despite our problems in that area, progress is definitely being made. If you’re still not convinced consider this graphic:

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As you can see, the Constitution replaced the next Transitional Administrative Law on May 20th. Now, under “The Way Ahead” you see the next significant milestones toward a completely functional governmental structure.

The report also covers the developing economic situation as well. But I’ll leave it to you to read that.

What I want to concentrate on is the security environment. As stated under the security bullet above, our mission is to help the Iraqis “secure their country while carrying out a campaign to defeat the terrorists and neutralize the insurgency”. As you’ll see, good progress is indeed being reported.

However, before we go on, do note the differentiation between “terrorists” and “insurgents” made in the report. Iraqis who fight the government (rejectionists) or the coalition are considered “insurgents”. Foreign fighters such as al Qaeda and members of known terrorist groups such as Ansar al Sunna are considered terrorists. Terrorists comprise a much smaller group than the insurgents.

Now to the security environment as reported:

The Security Environment. Anti-Iraqi forces—extremists and terrorists—continue to fail in their campaign to derail the political process, to alienate the Iraqi people from democratic governance and security institutions, and to foment civil war. They attack Iraqi civilians, officials, and Security Forces with a goal of undermining the legitimately elected Government of Iraq and the democratic process.

The February 22 bombing of the Golden Mosque of Samarra produced an upsurge in sectarian and militia violence but did not produce the civil war hoped for by its perpetrators. Iraqi government and religious leaders were united in condemning the attacks and in restraining sectarian unrest. The Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) also played a key role, operating effectively and with restraint. The performance of the ISF was critical to halting the spread of violence, keeping the perpetrators of the bombing from achieving their broader strategic goal.

Although polls indicated that a majority of Iraqis were concerned that sectarian violence could spread to become civil war, the same polls indicated that perceptions of neighborhood safety remained relatively unchanged. This view reflects data that indicate that more than 80% of terrorist attacks were concentrated in just 4 of Iraq’s 18 provinces. Twelve provinces, containing more than 50% of the population, experienced only 6% of all attacks.

There are some significant points raised in here. The anti-Iraqi forces continue to fail in their goals while the government and its forces grow stronger. And with the recent death of Zarqawi, and the subsequent roll up of hundreds of his operatives in follow-on raids, AQI has been badly if not critically hurt. That is a significant move toward our one goal, under the “Security” bullet, of “defeating the terrorists”.

Note the second paragraph of “The Security Environment” statement. This particular incident was the ISF’s first test. And it passed it. Also note in paragraph 3 that 80% of the terrorist attacks are located in 4 of Iraq’s provinces. So the violence is mostly located in a few select areas, mostly Sunni.

All of that leads into the particular area I wanted to highlight. In the area of preparing Iraq to take care of itself, where are we in terms of security? How far have we come?

The report goes into some considerable detail and provides some graphics which help illustrate that status. Because of the graphics, I’m going to go below the fold for this.

But I’ll entice you with a little evidence that perhaps it is improving dramatically and, despite the critics who claim that Iraqis aren’t doing enough, the facts presented don’t bear out that claim.

Over the first quarter of 2006, the increased responsibilities of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and heightened sectarian tension (especially in Baghdad) have led to an apparent shift between the percentage of attacks directed against Coalition forces and those targeting ISF and civilians.

Is the insurgency recognizing the emerging power of the ISF? Probably. That and the fact that it is more visible and taking more of a lead help explain the evident shift.

Look at this graphic on the numbers of attacks in each past period: