Retiring the A-10

Uh, actually not. In reality, the vast majority of missiles that Ukraine has been using are Soviet-Russian made. It is only in recent months that they have been using US made missiles, and so far only defensive ones. It was only last month also that they finally started to arm their bombers with UK made missiles.

I have absolutely no idea why in the heck people seem to believe that Ukraine is using "US missiles", as there is barely any US made equipment there at all. The vast majority is Soviet or Russian made stuff they had started the war with, or acquired from former Warsaw Pact nations that still had a lot of it on hand. One can not simply send a bunch of US made NATO equipment over and expect it to be simply bolted onto Warsaw Pact equipment and expect it to work.

Ya got some links?
 
Ya got some links?

That most of their missiles are Russian?

Hell, that should be obvious, as Russia has been their major source of arms and military equipment since they became independent in 1991 (plus they were still a major exporter of Soviet designed equipment even after independence). Just like their tanks, aircraft, rifles, and everything else, such as the S-300 which they also use.

As for how few and recent their acquisition of other missiles are, it is not like that has been a secret. Like this report from 12 May of this year about their first shipments of UK made cruise missiles.

The United Kingdom has delivered multiple “Storm Shadow” cruise missiles to Ukraine, giving the nation a new long-range strike capability in advance of a highly anticipated counteroffensive against Russian forces, multiple senior Western officials told CNN.

And that missiles have not been coming from the US, so far the only missiles we have sent have been defensive ones like the PATRIOT system or short range missiles.

American-made Patriot missiles have arrived in Ukraine, the country’s defense minister said Wednesday, providing Kyiv with a long-sought new shield against the Russian airstrikes that have devastated cities and civilian infrastructure.

The Pentagon in a statement said the U.S. will send 30 Bradley Fighting Vehicles and 25 of the armored Stryker vehicles to Ukraine, along with missiles for the High-Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) and the Patriot air defense systems. The package includes Javelin and high-speed anti-radiation (HARM) missiles, demolition munitions, obstacle-clearing equipment and a wide range of artillery rounds and other ammunition.

The above report is barely a week old.

But it is impossible to prove a negative,

But the Czechs and Bulgarians have sent them a lot more.

Amongst all the countries that have provided military support to Ukraine, the Czech Republic is often named in one breath with powers such as the U.S. and the United Kingdom. By early April 2022, the volume of military aid provided by Czechia to Ukraine already approached some $430 million, making the country one of the largest contributers of military aid in NATO. This aid has included anything from small arms and MANPADS to heavier weaponry like tanks, infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs), SAM systems, multiple rocket launchers (MRLs) and even Mi-24V attack helicopters.

And Croatia.

New Croatian RAK-SA-12 128mm multiple rocket launchers have been supplied to the Ukrainian Defense Forces.

And did I not specifically state that a hell of a lot was coming from Poland?

Few countries have offered Ukraine even half the extent of military support that Poland has provided. Polish military aid to Ukraine has so far encompassed well over 300 armoured fighting vehicles (AFVs), including over 250 tanks and some 110 pieces of self-propelled guns and multiple rocket launchers, amongst a host of other weapon types.

There is a reason why most of the equipment and weapons sent to Ukraine are of Russian design. It is the exact same equipment they have been using for decades, so there is no need to train them in their use. That is why when arming insurgents for decades the US has primarily armed them with the weapons they already knew. They shipped hundreds of thousands of AK-47s and ammunition to the Mujahedeen in Afghanistan because that was what they already knew. The only exception was the REDEYE then later STINGER missiles as they had nothing even close to those prior to that.

It is not like the equipment being sent there is any kind of a secret, it is all well known.


In fact, one of the most interesting things sent to Ukraine by the US was 20 Mi-17 HIP helicopters. Those were helicopters the US had bought for the Afghan Government, once again in keeping with sending a nation the equipment it was most familiar with instead of forcing them to go through the time and expense of learning a new system. And when Afghanistan fell, the US took those helicopters with them as they had paid for them. And last year, the US sent them to Ukraine.

But the Defense Department stayed the course, saying the Russian helicopters were relatively inexpensive, functioned well in Afghanistan’s desert expanses and high altitudes, and Afghan pilots knew how to fly them.

A decade later, neither Congress nor the Kremlin could have anticipated that those helicopters would be used against Russian forces by way of arms transfers engineered by the United States in response to Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine and the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan.

Do I really need to continue here? I actually have no problem citing my references, but a lot in here tend to get pissed off when a "wall of text" is posted so I generally avoid it.
 
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That most of their missiles are Russian?

Hell, that should be obvious, as Russia has been their major source of arms and military equipment since they became independent in 1991. Just like their tanks, aircraft, rifles, and everything else, such as the S-300 which they also use.

As for how few and recent their acquisition of other missiles are, it is not like that has been a secret. Like this report from 12 May of this year about their first shipments of UK made cruise missiles.



And that missiles have not been coming from the US, so far the only missiles we have sent have been defensive ones like the PATRIOT system or short range missiles.





The above report is barely a week old.

But it is impossible to prove a negative,

But the Czechs and Bulgarians have sent them a lot more.



And Croatia.



And did I not specifically state that a hell of a lot was coming from Poland?



There is a reason why most of the equipment and weapons sent to Ukraine are of Russian design. It is the exact same equipment they have been using for decades, so there is no need to train them in their use. That is why when arming insurgents for decades the US has primarily armed them with the weapons they already knew. They shipped hundreds of thousands of AK-47s and ammunition to the Mujahedeen in Afghanistan because that was what they already knew. The only exception was the REDEYE then later STINGER missiles as they had nothing even close to those prior to that.

It is not like the equipment being sent there is any kind of a secret, it is all well known.


In fact, one of the most interesting things sent to Ukraine by the US was 20 Mi-17 HIP helicopters. Those were helicopters the US had bought for the Afghan Government, once again in keeping with sending a nation the equipment it was most familiar with instead of forcing them to go through the time and expense of learning a new system. And when Afghanistan fell, the US took those helicopters with them as they had paid for them. And last year, the US sent them to Ukraine.



Do I really need to continue here? I actually have no problem citing my references, but a lot in here tend to get pissed off when a "wall of text" is posted so I generally avoid it.

Do you really need to be an asshole?
I just wanted to know since we've been hearing so much about the Javelin's taking out so many russian tanks.
 
And to expand on that a bit more, Ukraine is still one of the major suppliers to the world of Soviet era equipment. They actually made up almost 20% of the Soviet Arms manufacturing prior to the dissolving of the USSR.

Quite a few Soviet ICBMs and long range rockets were built by Yuzhmash (now Pivdenmash), a rocket and missile company near Dnipro.

Both Ukraine and Thailand have been using Oplot T-84 tanks, a Ukrainian model of the Russian T-80. Even the Russian T-80s they are using in Ukraine were built in Ukraine. The same plant near Kharkov was also building BTR-3 and BTR-4 for countries around the world.

Oh, and Antonov, the company that made the An-225? Ukraine once again. In fact, I saw that beast several times while I was in the Middle East, and it was incredible to see as the scale is almost impossible to describe. Sadly, the Russians destroyed it in February of 2022.

The Zenit rocket that Russia has often used to launch satellites into space the 3 decades? Yep, made in Ukraine.

And Ukraine has been a major supplier of engines and transmissions for the Chinese Navy. Primarily by Motor Sich, there was even an attempt in 2015 by China to take over that facility. However, mlike much else in Ukraine the Russians destroyed it last year.

Video footage showed Russian troops firing high-precision missiles into the air and reportedly destroying the Motor Sich engine plant in southeastern Ukraine.

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) said in a statement on May 25: "Demining and demilitarization operations at the seaport of Mariupol, liberated from Ukrainian militants, in the Donetsk People's Republic has been completed and is now operating on a normal basis.
 
Excuse me, you asked for references, I gave you references. Now you are calling me an asshole because I gave you references?

Look, whatever dude.

And you were an asshole about it.
You seem to think someone asking for clarification on something is an attack on you personally.
Which is rather strange considering you agreed with virtually all of my posts in the same thread.
 
Do you really need to be an asshole?
I just wanted to know since we've been hearing so much about the Javelin's taking out so many russian tanks.

You can never fault a person for being an asshole to you since you are predominately an asshole. You troll more than anything else looking for that "Loophole" so you can act like the sanctimonious asshole you appear to be.

Now, I am not saying you are a complete asshole but if you keep working at it, you just might reach that level.
 
You seem to think someone asking for clarification on something is an attack on you personally.

And I made no attack, I simply gave references.

Like others in here, you seem to be trying to read into my post much more than I ever said. Here is a clue about me, I do not act that way, I do not act in such a petty way. You asked for references, and as I said I was more than happy to provide them. However, in case you had not noticed a great many in here will never provide references no matter what, and tend to get rather uppity when somebody does.

Myself, I actually normally provide them. I am actually a believer that people should be informed and not just run off with things they believe without any basis in fact. Nothing I said was an attack on you in any way, and I was not being snarky at all when I said I was happy to provide references. I actually do believe that people should be questioned and asked to back up their claims. Even if it is me that is being questioned and asked for references. Because I do not hide behind what so many in here try to do by saying simply "because I said so, so you have to believe me".

I largely did in this case because I knew it would be a wall of text, and not "prove" that the majority of Ukrainian weapons are of Russian manufacture. As I said, you can not prove a negative. But what I did was lay down the case for the fact that the vast majority of their weapons are of Soviet or Russian design and manufacture, as well as they themselves are a leading manufacturer of those weapons themselves. And that the majority of what they have gotten as I said came from other former members of the Soviet Union or their satellites (like Poland, Czech Republic, etc), and are excess stocks or systems that are being replaced that were of Russian manufacture.

Like the Mi-17 helicopters that the US sent to them that had originally been sent to Afghanistan. That is just common sense, to send somebody equipment they are familiar with instead of equipment they had never worked with before. That greatly reduces the time needed to get them into use, and their efficiency when they are used. And notice, that is the exact same logic that the DoD used when they purchased those helicopters for Afghanistan in the first place instead of securing US made ones like some Congress Critters wanted.
 
So much garbage being tossed in this thread, but I haven't time to deal with it for now.
So back to topic/OP;

Air Power for the Future: The Case for the A-10C​

SELECT EXCERPTS:
....
Commentary
Author’s Note: The United States Air Force’s decision to divest the A-10C “Warthog” has larger ramifications for future wars than just an airframe.
The service plans to drastically reduce its capability and capacity to provide Close Air Support (CAS) to ground forces, leaving the sons and daughters of America and her allies to fight without a dedicated CAS aircraft for the first time since Vietnam.

History First\​

The venerable “Warthog” is viewed by some as a Cold War relic that only exists as a jobs program for congressional representatives. This is myopic.

With nearly four decades in service, the A-10C stems from the lessons (re)learned after Vietnam. From inception, the A-10C was a purpose-built CAS platform with demonstrated battlefield survivability. Because of its rugged design paired with heavy and diverse payloads of modern stand-off decoys and weapons, each A-10C delivers more firepower to support ground forces than its fighter counterparts. Further, its AAR-47 missile warning system is especially effective at defeating nearly all Man-Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS).

I spent a 24-year career as a Marine infantry 0fficer, later transitioning to Marine Special Operations Command (MARSOC), commanding at the Team, Platoon, and Company levels in both Joint and Combined combat environments.

On Sept. 26, 2007, my platoon was on the receiving end of a complex ambush against an entrenched enemy. We fought our way out, often engaging enemy fighters inside of 100 meters and sometimes at hand-grenade range. In a difficult and violent action, we broke the back of the enemy’s assault.

We used two A-10Cs to destroy the enemy element isolated in a trench line. The A-10C’s impressive firepower and danger-close delivery of bombs facilitated the extrication of my 35-member assault force, without a single U.S. casualty. This simply would not have been possible without the A-10C working in close consonance with my Joint Terminal Attack Controller (JTAC); a trained air support employment specialist.

I’m a living testament to the A-10C’s utility.

The Issue​

In its 2023 budget, the Air Force revealed a 5-year plan to eliminate its A-10C CAS aircraft without an adequate replacement and to cut Terminal Air Control Party Specialist/Joint Terminal Attack Controller (TACP/ JTAC) manning by 50 percent.

The USAF is a staunchly fighter-oriented culture where platforms like the F-35 and the NGAD fighter are touted as machines that will provide CAS and fight enemy aircraft with equal aplomb, but the Air Force’s plan will divest nearly all close support expertise, crippling America’s ability to employ airpower in close proximity to friendly forces on the ground. Ground troops would be supported by a small, expensive fleet of fragile aircraft that are far less effective at CAS than the A-10C. In low-intensity conflicts, it will cost lives. In major combat operations, it risks losing battles.

Problem Framing​

The U.S. is terrible at predicting the next battlespace and future wars. Having a robust quiver of options is better than eliminating a proven platform like the A-10C. Paradoxically, if the USAF follows its own doctrine to justify getting rid of the A-10C, this only bolsters the case for keeping it.

No aircraft engages the enemy alone. Much like ground forces use “combined arms” (tanks, artillery, infantry, and aviation) to prevail on land, the Air Force uses “Force Packaging” to win in the air. The four major threats to aircraft over a modern battlefield are:

> Air (enemy fighters);
> Radar-guided Surface-Air Missiles (SAMs)
> Air Defense Artillery (ADA), and;
> Man-portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS)

The Air Force spends a lot of taxpayer dollars to ensure its fighter team (F-16; F-15EX; F-22; and F-35) can kill or negate enemy aircraft and radar SAMs, but the sensitive skins, engines, and reduced capacity for flares make these aircraft extremely vulnerable to ADA and MANPADS. In contrast, the A-10C is by far the most survivable aircraft against ADA and MANPADS threats found directly above the battlefield and is the only CAS platform specifically designed to protect ground forces in battle.
...
Further, the A-10C was designed to operate from expeditionary airstrips. This works to the A-10C’s advantage in peer conflicts. Advanced fighter aircraft require concrete or asphalt surfaces of at least 8,000 feet in length. Countries like China will use any weapon they can, like ballistic and cruise missiles, to negate aircraft carriers and airfields capable of supporting fighters. Alternatively, the A-10C can island hop around the Pacific with a small support package and operate from 5,000 to 6,000 feet of dirt, grass, or even a short stretch of highway.

The A-10C thrives using a combination of force packaging and intelligent tactics, as evidenced in the 2016 deployment of the A-10C to support U.S. forces in Syria. Although Air Force leadership and beltway pundits would prefer Congress forget about the A-10C operating within multiple surface-to-air missile engagement zones and merging with Russian fighters during Operation Inherent Resolve, the A-10C proved itself on the modern battlefield.

Dollars and Sense​

The decision to divest the A-10C is not new; the platform is always considered for retirement when the USAF talks of modernization. The Air Force’s voracious spending habits force an ever-smaller fleet of overpriced aircraft; a single F-35 costs nearly $145 million, which doesn’t account for the billions of dollars spent researching and developing emerging design technologies. Once procured, F-35 operating costs are more than double that of the A-10C, with sustainment costs three times budget expectations.

The A-10C needs a tech refresh, but the aircraft is paid for, and there is little to suggest that the A-10C can’t maintain its relevance with approximately $3 million each in modernization and upgrades. That is pennies on the dollar compared to the F-35; the 10-year cost to replace A-10Cs with F-35s is $68 billion. The USAF, just ten years after the initial fielding of the F-35, spent $4 billion dollars on the research and development of an engine it no longer plans to procure. For comparison, it cost less than $1 billion to build and install new wings on the entire A-10C fleet, and another $1 billion could create an all-new, digitally-enhanced A-10EX, capable of employing next-generation weapons, locating threat systems, and acting as an over-the-horizon communications node.
...

AND, quite a bit more worthwhile in the article, but the above should give clue enough to click and read the rest. I hope.
 
And it takes one passing AC-130J to handle all of those in a matter of minutes and then they can move on to another support. If the A-10 can operate in that area then the AC-130 can also and the AC was purpose built for CAS way back in 1967. This is why they aren't buying any more A-10s but the AC is being purchased as quickly as possible. And then let's not forget the COIN Aircraft done by the AT-6E. There isn't a mission left for the A-10.
FWIW, the weeny AT-6E;
 
I was being sarcastic and you jumped on it like it was true. BTW, I know why they tried to do it and it had to do with how they were forced to use the P-38 and make them fly with the Bombers. The loss rate was 11-1 because the P-38 didn't have the time to gain the power, speed or altitude it needed to fight. Of course, the P-38 was outnumbered 11-1 meaning, even with the conditions, the P-38 had a 1-1 kill rate. Buy 1944, the P-38 had an 11-1 kill rate the other direction. Of course, that includes all Theaters.

Now, Magat, ago back to your own world where the rest of us don't exist or you can sell us to your buddies for a bag of chips.
This pile of garbage shows so much ignorance it's embarrassing.

1) USAAF started bombing German occupied Europe in late 1942 sending bombers without escort fighters because;
A) The misconception that with 10+ .50 caliber machine guns scattered around the aircraft it could "fight it's way through enemy fighters/interceptors".
B) Political pressure to start doing something offensive to the Germans.
C) There weren't many available fighters to use for escort missions, initially.

2) Of the fighters on inventory at the time;
A) P-39 lacked turbochargers to operate beyond about 15,000 feet so couldn't go as high as the bombers. Also was short ranged (short legged).
B) P-40 had already shown it's limitations as a dogfighter, and was also short legged even with drop tank.
C) The P-47 was still in development and P-51 was just out of the napkin sketch stage.
D) The P-38 was the only realistic option available, though it was also having some "teething" problems becoming combat effective. But for awhile, it was the only choice and performed well enough at the time, but never were there enough numbers of them. Especially with demands for them in the PTO as well.

3) Fighter escort of bomber formations had a few basics that were essential;
A) Usually the fighter escort would fly at slightly higher altitude and ahead of the bomber formation. The fighter escort also had to fly at the low end of it's cruise speeds to not get ahead of the bombers, and sometimes would fly a weave pattern as well.
B) Once enemy interceptors were sighted, the fighters could then accelerate and dive down upon the enemy fighters. Unfortunately, in early days of operations there was a tendency for this to result in the fighter escort getting distant enough from the bomber formations that a later wave of interceptors could swoop in without opposition. Was long before escort pilots had hammered home to them that they were not to go off for dogfight glory and abandon the bombers.
C) In early stages of the air campaign there were never enough escort fighters it seemed, but eventually the numbers increased, as did tactics and better management of engagement techniques towards the interceptors.
D) Fighter escort had no effect on anti-aircraft artillery - AAA - Flak. Flak remained a heavy attrition of bombers until the last months of the war.
E) In case you haven't figured out already, with fighter escort joining up with the bomber formations BEFORE crossing into enemy air defense zones, the escorts already had 'power, speed, and altitude' to perform their mission.

4) The P-38 presents an interesting situation better served via a separate post ...
 
Using the Wiki article for a good start point herewith selected excerpts. The Lockheed P-38 Lightning had an interesting and varied career in World War Two and remains unique in appearance, performance, and record for it's time. It's long been one of my most favorite aircraft of WWII and in general.
...
The Lockheed P-38 Lightning is an American single-seat, twin piston-engined fighter aircraft that was used during World War II. Developed for the United States Army Air Corps (USAAC) by the Lockheed Corporation, the P-38 incorporated a distinctive twin-boom design with a central nacelle containing the cockpit and armament. Along with its use as a general fighter, the P-38 was used in various aerial combat roles, including as a highly effective fighter-bomber, a night fighter, and a long-range escort fighter when equipped with drop tanks.[4] The P-38 was also used as a bomber-pathfinder, guiding streams of medium and heavy bombers, or even other P-38s equipped with bombs, to their targets.[5] Used in the aerial reconnaissance role, the P-38 accounted for 90 percent of the aerial film captured over Europe.[6] Although it was not designated a heavy fighter or a bomber destroyer by the USAAC, the P-38 filled those roles and more; unlike German heavy fighters crewed by two or three airmen, the P-38 with its lone pilot was nimble enough to compete with single-engine fighters.[7]

The P-38 was used most successfully in the Pacific Theater of Operations and the China-Burma-India Theater of Operations as the aircraft of America's top aces, Richard Bong (40 victories), Thomas McGuire (38 victories), and Charles H. MacDonald (27 victories). In the South West Pacific theater, the P-38 was the primary long-range fighter of United States Army Air Forces until the introduction of large numbers of P-51D Mustangs toward the end of the war.[8][page needed] Unusual for an early-war fighter design, both engines were supplemented by turbosuperchargers, making it one of the earliest Allied fighters capable of performing well at high altitudes.[9] The turbosuperchargers also muffled the exhaust, making the P-38's operation relatively quiet.[10] The Lightning was extremely forgiving in-flight and could be mishandled in many ways, but the rate of roll in early versions was low relative to other contemporary fighters; this was addressed in later variants with the introduction of hydraulically boosted ailerons.[11] The P-38 was the only American fighter aircraft in large-scale production throughout American involvement in the war, from the Attack on Pearl Harbor to Victory over Japan Day.[12]
...
The Lockheed Corporation designed the P-38 in response to a February 1937 specification from the United States Army Air Corps (USAAC). Circular Proposal X-608 was a set of aircraft performance goals authored by First Lieutenants Benjamin S. Kelsey and Gordon P. Saville for a twin-engined, high-altitude "interceptor" having "the tactical mission of interception and attack of hostile aircraft at high altitude."[13] Forty years later, Kelsey explained that Saville and he drew up the specification using the word "interceptor" as a way to bypass the inflexible Army Air Corps requirement for pursuit aircraft to carry no more than 500 lb (230 kg) of armament including ammunition, and to bypass the USAAC restriction of single-seat aircraft to one engine. Kelsey was looking for a minimum of 1,000 lb (450 kg) of armament.[14] Kelsey and Saville aimed to get a more capable fighter, better at dog fighting and at high-altitude combat. Specifications called for a maximum airspeed of at least 360 mph (580 km/h) at altitude, and a climb to 20,000 ft (6,100 m) within six minutes,[15] the toughest set of specifications USAAC had ever presented. The unbuilt Vultee XP1015 was designed to the same requirement, but was not advanced enough to merit further investigation. A similar proposal for a single-engined fighter was issued at the same time, Circular Proposal X-609, in response to which the Bell P-39 Airacobra was designed.[16] Both proposals required liquid-cooled Allison V-1710 engines with turbosuperchargers and gave extra points for tricycle landing gear.

Lockheed formed a secretive engineering team to implement the project apart from the main factory; this approach later became known as Skunk Works.[17][18] The Lockheed design team, under the direction of Hall Hibbard and Clarence "Kelly" Johnson, considered a range of twin-engined configurations, including both engines in a central fuselage with push–pull propellers.[19]
...
The Lockheed design incorporated tricycle undercarriage and a bubble canopy, and featured two 1,000 hp (750 kW) turbosupercharged 12-cylinder Allison V-1710 engines fitted with counter-rotating propellers to eliminate the effect of engine torque, with the turbochargers positioned behind the engines, the exhaust side of the units exposed along the dorsal surfaces of the booms.[27] Counter-rotation was achieved by the use of "handed" engines; the crankshafts of the engines turned in opposite directions, a relatively easy task for the V-1710 modular-design aircraft powerplant.

The P-38 was the first American fighter to make extensive use of stainless steel and smooth, flush-riveted, butt-jointed aluminum skin panels.[28][page needed] It was also the first military airplane to fly faster than 400 mph (640 km/h) in level flight.[29][30]
[IIRC, the P-38 was the only aircraft of that era with the props spinning in opposite direction to each other. A trained and skilled pilot could turn tighter than any single engine fighter by slight retard one throttle and slightly advance the other, causing the engines/props to swing the aircraft around quicker than the rudders and ailerons. See image below;]
330px-Repairs_to_P-38_by_459th_Fighter_Squadron_at_Chittagong%2C_India_-_January_1945.jpg

...

Range extension​

The strategic bombing proponents within the USAAF, nicknamed the Bomber Mafia by their ideological opponents, had established in the early 1930s a policy against research to create long-range fighters, which they thought would not be practical; this kind of research was not to compete for bomber resources. Aircraft manufacturers understood that they would not be rewarded if they installed subsystems on their fighters to enable them to carry drop tanks to provide more fuel for extended range. Lieutenant Kelsey, acting against this policy, risked his career in late 1941 when he convinced Lockheed to incorporate such subsystems in the P-38E model, without putting his request in writing. It is possible that Kelsey was responding to Colonel George William Goddard's observation that the US sorely needed a high-speed, long-range photo reconnaissance plane. Along with a change order specifying some P-38Es be produced with guns replaced by photoreconnaissance cameras, to be designated the F-4-1-LO, Lockheed began working out the problems of drop-tank design and incorporation. After the attack on Pearl Harbor, eventually about 100 P-38Es were sent to a modification center near Dallas, Texas, or to the new Lockheed assembly plant B-6 (today the Burbank Airport), to be fitted with four K-17 aerial photography cameras. All of these aircraft were also modified to be able to carry drop tanks. P-38Fs were modified, as well. Every Lightning from the P-38G onward was capable of being fitted with drop tanks straight off the assembly line.[65]
...
The first unit to receive P-38s was the 1st Fighter Group. After the attack on Pearl Harbor, the unit joined the 14th Pursuit Group in San Diego to provide West Coast defense.[68]


Entry to the war​

The first Lightning to see active service was the F-4 version, a P-38E in which the guns were replaced by four K17 cameras.[69] They joined the 8th Photographic Squadron in Australia on 4 April 1942.[42] Three F-4s were operated by the Royal Australian Air Force in this theater for a short period beginning in September 1942.

On 29 May 1942, 25 P-38s began operating in the Aleutian Islands in Alaska. The fighter's long range made it well-suited to the campaign over the almost 1,200-mile (1,900 km)-long island chain, and it was flown there for the rest of the war. The Aleutians were some of the most rugged environments available for testing the new aircraft under combat conditions. More Lightnings were lost due to severe weather and other conditions than enemy action; cases occurred where Lightning pilots, mesmerized by flying for hours over gray seas under gray skies, simply flew into the water. On 9 August 1942, two P-38Es of the 343rd Fighter Group, 11th Air Force, at the end of a 1,000-mile (1,600 km) long-range patrol, happened upon a pair of Japanese Kawanishi H6K "Mavis" flying boats and destroyed them,[42] making them the first Japanese aircraft to be shot down by Lightnings.
...
After the Battle of Midway, the USAAF began redeploying fighter groups to Britain as part of Operation Bolero and Lightnings of the 1st Fighter Group were flown across the Atlantic via Iceland. On 14 August 1942, Second Lieutenant Elza Shahan of the 27th Fighter Squadron, and Second Lieutenant Joseph Shaffer of the 33rd Squadron operating out of Iceland shot down a Focke-Wulf Fw 200 Condor over the Atlantic. Shaffer, flying either a P-40C or a P-39, scored the first hit, causing a fire on the Condor; Shahan in his P-38F finished it off with a high-speed gunnery pass.[70] This was the first Luftwaffe aircraft destroyed by the USAAF.[71]

After 347 sorties with no enemy contact, the 1st and 14th Fighter Groups transferred from the UK to the 12th Air Force in North Africa as part of the force being built up for Operation Torch. The Lightning's long range allowed the pilots to fly their fighters over the Bay of Biscay, skirting neutral Spain and Portugal to refuel in Morocco. The P-38s were initially based at Tafaroui Airfield in Algeria alongside P-40 Warhawks and the rest of the 12th Air Force. P-38s were first involved in North African combat operations on 11 November 1942. The first North African P-38 kill was on 22 November, when Lieutenant Mark Shipman of the 14th downed an Italian airplane with twin engines. Shipman later made two more kills – a Messerschmitt Bf 109 fighter and a very large Me 323 Gigant transport.[72]

Early results in the Mediterranean Theater of Operations were mixed. Some P-38 pilots scored multiple kills to become aces, while many others were shot down due to inexperience or tactical strictures. Overall, the P-38 suffered its highest losses in the Mediterranean Theater. The primary function of the P-38 in North Africa was to escort bombers,[73] but the fighters also targeted transport aircraft, and later in the campaign, they were sometimes tasked with ground-attack missions. When tied to bomber-escort duties, the P-38 squadrons were vulnerable to attack from above by German fighters, who selected the most advantageous position and timing. The initial tactical doctrine of the American units was for the P-38s to fly near the bombers at all times rather than to defend aggressively or to fly ahead and clear the airspace for the bombers, and many American pilots were downed because of this limitation. Losses mounted, and all available P-38s in the UK were flown over to North Africa to restore squadron strength.[72] After this painful experience, the American leadership changed tactics, and in February 1943, the P-38s were given free rein in their battles.[74]
...
The Mediterranean Theater had the first aerial combat between German fighters and P-38s. German fighter pilot appraisal of the P-38 was mixed. Some observers dismissed the P-38 as an easy kill, while others gave it high praise, a deadly enemy worthy of respect. Johannes Steinhoff, commander of JG 77 in North Africa, said that the unit's old Bf 109s were "perhaps, a little faster" than the P-38, but a dogfight with the twin-engined fighter was daunting because its turning radius was much smaller, and it could quickly get on the tail of the Bf 109. ...
...

Western Europe​

Experiences over Germany had shown a need for long-range escort fighters to protect the Eighth Air Force's heavy-bomber operations. The P-38Hs of the 55th Fighter Group were transferred to the Eighth in England in September 1943, and were joined by the 20th Fighter Group, 364th Fighter Group, and 479th Fighter Group soon after. P-38s and Spitfires escorted Flying Fortress raids over Europe.[92]
...
After evaluation tests at Farnborough, the P-38 was kept in fighting service in Europe for a while longer. Although many failings were remedied with the introduction of the P-38J, by September 1944, all but one of the Lightning groups in the Eighth Air Force had converted to the P-51 Mustang. The Eighth Air Force continued to conduct reconnaissance missions using the F-5 variant.[68]
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The P-38 was used most extensively and successfully in the Pacific Theater, where it proved more suited, combining exceptional range with the reliability of two engines for long missions over water. The P-38 was used in a variety of roles, especially escorting bombers at altitudes of 18,000–25,000 ft (5,500–7,600 m). The P-38 was credited with destroying more Japanese aircraft than any other USAAF fighter.[3] Freezing cockpit temperatures were not a problem at low altitude in the tropics. In fact, the cockpit was often too hot since opening a window while in flight caused buffeting by setting up turbulence through the tailplane. Pilots taking low-altitude assignments often flew stripped down to shorts, tennis shoes, and parachute. While the P-38 could not out-turn the A6M Zero and most other Japanese fighters when flying below 200 mph (320 km/h), its superior speed coupled with a good rate of climb meant that it could use energy tactics, making multiple high-speed passes at its target. In addition, its tightly grouped guns were even more deadly to lightly armored Japanese warplanes than to German aircraft. The concentrated, parallel stream of bullets allowed aerial victory at much longer distances than fighters carrying wing guns. Dick Bong, the United States' highest-scoring World War II air ace (40 victories in P-38s), flew directly at his targets to ensure he hit them, in some cases flying through the debris of his target (and on one occasion colliding with an enemy aircraft, which was claimed as a "probable" victory). The twin Allison engines performed admirably in the Pacific.

General George C. Kenney, commander of the USAAF 5th Air Force operating in New Guinea, could not get enough P-38s; they had become his favorite fighter in November 1942 when one squadron, the 39th Fighter Squadron of the 35th Fighter Group, joined his assorted P-39s and P-40s. The Lightnings established local air superiority with their first combat action on 27 December 1942.[100][101][102][103][104] Kenney sent repeated requests to Arnold for more P-38s, and was rewarded with occasional shipments, but Europe was a higher priority in Washington.[105] Despite their small force, Lightning pilots began to compete in racking up scores against Japanese aircraft.
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450px-P38_Lightning.jpg

 
So much garbage being tossed in this thread, but I haven't time to deal with it for now.
So back to topic/OP;

Air Power for the Future: The Case for the A-10C​

SELECT EXCERPTS:
....
Commentary
Author’s Note: The United States Air Force’s decision to divest the A-10C “Warthog” has larger ramifications for future wars than just an airframe.
The service plans to drastically reduce its capability and capacity to provide Close Air Support (CAS) to ground forces, leaving the sons and daughters of America and her allies to fight without a dedicated CAS aircraft for the first time since Vietnam.

History First\​

The venerable “Warthog” is viewed by some as a Cold War relic that only exists as a jobs program for congressional representatives. This is myopic.

With nearly four decades in service, the A-10C stems from the lessons (re)learned after Vietnam. From inception, the A-10C was a purpose-built CAS platform with demonstrated battlefield survivability. Because of its rugged design paired with heavy and diverse payloads of modern stand-off decoys and weapons, each A-10C delivers more firepower to support ground forces than its fighter counterparts. Further, its AAR-47 missile warning system is especially effective at defeating nearly all Man-Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS).

I spent a 24-year career as a Marine infantry 0fficer, later transitioning to Marine Special Operations Command (MARSOC), commanding at the Team, Platoon, and Company levels in both Joint and Combined combat environments.

On Sept. 26, 2007, my platoon was on the receiving end of a complex ambush against an entrenched enemy. We fought our way out, often engaging enemy fighters inside of 100 meters and sometimes at hand-grenade range. In a difficult and violent action, we broke the back of the enemy’s assault.

We used two A-10Cs to destroy the enemy element isolated in a trench line. The A-10C’s impressive firepower and danger-close delivery of bombs facilitated the extrication of my 35-member assault force, without a single U.S. casualty. This simply would not have been possible without the A-10C working in close consonance with my Joint Terminal Attack Controller (JTAC); a trained air support employment specialist.

I’m a living testament to the A-10C’s utility.

The Issue​

In its 2023 budget, the Air Force revealed a 5-year plan to eliminate its A-10C CAS aircraft without an adequate replacement and to cut Terminal Air Control Party Specialist/Joint Terminal Attack Controller (TACP/ JTAC) manning by 50 percent.

The USAF is a staunchly fighter-oriented culture where platforms like the F-35 and the NGAD fighter are touted as machines that will provide CAS and fight enemy aircraft with equal aplomb, but the Air Force’s plan will divest nearly all close support expertise, crippling America’s ability to employ airpower in close proximity to friendly forces on the ground. Ground troops would be supported by a small, expensive fleet of fragile aircraft that are far less effective at CAS than the A-10C. In low-intensity conflicts, it will cost lives. In major combat operations, it risks losing battles.

Problem Framing​

The U.S. is terrible at predicting the next battlespace and future wars. Having a robust quiver of options is better than eliminating a proven platform like the A-10C. Paradoxically, if the USAF follows its own doctrine to justify getting rid of the A-10C, this only bolsters the case for keeping it.

No aircraft engages the enemy alone. Much like ground forces use “combined arms” (tanks, artillery, infantry, and aviation) to prevail on land, the Air Force uses “Force Packaging” to win in the air. The four major threats to aircraft over a modern battlefield are:

> Air (enemy fighters);
> Radar-guided Surface-Air Missiles (SAMs)
> Air Defense Artillery (ADA), and;
> Man-portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS)

The Air Force spends a lot of taxpayer dollars to ensure its fighter team (F-16; F-15EX; F-22; and F-35) can kill or negate enemy aircraft and radar SAMs, but the sensitive skins, engines, and reduced capacity for flares make these aircraft extremely vulnerable to ADA and MANPADS. In contrast, the A-10C is by far the most survivable aircraft against ADA and MANPADS threats found directly above the battlefield and is the only CAS platform specifically designed to protect ground forces in battle.
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Further, the A-10C was designed to operate from expeditionary airstrips. This works to the A-10C’s advantage in peer conflicts. Advanced fighter aircraft require concrete or asphalt surfaces of at least 8,000 feet in length. Countries like China will use any weapon they can, like ballistic and cruise missiles, to negate aircraft carriers and airfields capable of supporting fighters. Alternatively, the A-10C can island hop around the Pacific with a small support package and operate from 5,000 to 6,000 feet of dirt, grass, or even a short stretch of highway.

The A-10C thrives using a combination of force packaging and intelligent tactics, as evidenced in the 2016 deployment of the A-10C to support U.S. forces in Syria. Although Air Force leadership and beltway pundits would prefer Congress forget about the A-10C operating within multiple surface-to-air missile engagement zones and merging with Russian fighters during Operation Inherent Resolve, the A-10C proved itself on the modern battlefield.

Dollars and Sense​

The decision to divest the A-10C is not new; the platform is always considered for retirement when the USAF talks of modernization. The Air Force’s voracious spending habits force an ever-smaller fleet of overpriced aircraft; a single F-35 costs nearly $145 million, which doesn’t account for the billions of dollars spent researching and developing emerging design technologies. Once procured, F-35 operating costs are more than double that of the A-10C, with sustainment costs three times budget expectations.

The A-10C needs a tech refresh, but the aircraft is paid for, and there is little to suggest that the A-10C can’t maintain its relevance with approximately $3 million each in modernization and upgrades. That is pennies on the dollar compared to the F-35; the 10-year cost to replace A-10Cs with F-35s is $68 billion. The USAF, just ten years after the initial fielding of the F-35, spent $4 billion dollars on the research and development of an engine it no longer plans to procure. For comparison, it cost less than $1 billion to build and install new wings on the entire A-10C fleet, and another $1 billion could create an all-new, digitally-enhanced A-10EX, capable of employing next-generation weapons, locating threat systems, and acting as an over-the-horizon communications node.
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AND, quite a bit more worthwhile in the article, but the above should give clue enough to click and read the rest. I hope.

You are wrong on a few points.

The A-10C is paid for but it's showing heavy wear and tear. The highest use of any aircraft is the Attack bird. You can replace the wings, tail surfaces, avionics and more but the one thing you can't replace is the air frame. The only way to fix those tired old birds is to make brand new one. The Gigs needed haven't existed for at least 30 years. It's cheaper to build a whole new aircraft which they have done.

CAS can only be done if you own the skies. The "Dustup" you were involved in didn't have to worry about fighters the enemy had considering they were; shot down, destroyed on the ground or flown to Iran.

You are wrong about the A-10C being the only purpose built AC for CAS. We have to go back to when I served on the AC-130. The Surprise Package was first used in combat in 1967 and by 1969 what grew out of that was the Specter. I was with Specter. Sometimes, you can build a weapon system so terrifying that you are afraid to use it for the intended purpose. The AC-130 is one of those systems. Starting out, they were worried that if the AC was off a fraction, it could not only take out the enemy but the friendlies. Sometime in 1971, they got over that fear. The AC was actually flying the missions that the A-10C would be good at which was to destroy supplies coming down the Ho Chi Ming trail. By late 1971, it began covering CAS as well. But you have to understand, the B-57G did a safer job at vehicle destroying since the US did NOT completely own the skies. Most of the time, you picked the bird for the mission but that isn't always possible. During a downed aircrew, EVERYTHING became CAS. It was almost a relay. The fast movers got there first and attacked the enemy moving in on "Their" prize. Then the A-7s then the A-1s and then finally, the Cobras and the Rescue Choppers. You honestly believe that today a lone A-10C will fly to the rescue by itself for a downed aircrew? The A-10 will be one of the last to get there and hopefully, the enemy will be well on the way of being stopped. An AH-64E or the AH-1Z can do the same job. Both of those are still in production.

As for replacement for the A-10C, the AT-6E has been introduced in the AF while the Navy has their own A-29. The A-10C has already been replaced for the last mission that it was uniguely able to fly. And it was taken over by a Prop Job. The 30mm cannon has been replaced by the 50cals.
 
It really is, as almost nothing posted is of any kind of factual nature and backed up with references, simply what that poster believes and we are all expected to just believe it because they say so.

Every thing on the A-10 that I've posted has been common knowledge for the last 20 years.
 
And you were an asshole about it.
You seem to think someone asking for clarification on something is an attack on you personally.
Which is rather strange considering you agreed with virtually all of my posts in the same thread.
The Army brought back peeling their own potatoes just to give him something to do by himself and keep him away from the other troops.
 

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