North Korea: Can the US Win?

[TheTechnologist]

This thread covers 3 basic areas:

• HARTS
• KN06
• Submarines laying sea-mines

There is a concept most people over-look when discussing anything strategy related: Theory of Victory.

Spoiler Alert, the US doesn't really have a theory of victory in North Korea, but we can get to that later. However, this problem is significant because without a theory of victory there is no way to determine what the appropriate tactical and strategic responses should be. Arguably the US theory of victory in North Korea is to maintain a status quo. A theory of victory framework people often think of is "complete destruction of North Korea" which I suppose means reunification of North Korea on US-South Korean terms unconditionally.

That goes out the window, because China would not accept this outcome, they do have a theory of victory, and if I can post URLs I could link to the lecture sources about what North Korea and Chinese Theory of Victory are. The reason this is worth mentioning is their Theory of Victory is far easier to achieve than the US's. Theirs is to simply keep the Status Quo, which is easy enough, because it's the situation that exists now, and the only alternatives seem to box the US into wars it can't afford or is unwilling to fight.

Enough of that though, on to the meat-and-potatoes. Can the US win a war with North Korea?

Why are the 3 bullet points significant?

1. HARTS - Hardened Artillery Sites. These sites form the nucleus of North Korea's visible strategy to deal with US-ROK forces. In brief, North Korean corps are 2x larger than US corps, and are half comprised of artillery units. What this means is that each corps is expected to act independently with a common objective, like links in a chain, regardless of any command or control in place. North Korea chose this operational strategy because they expected that their top leadership would be decapitated, a decapitating strike will not do anything though to stop North Korea's corps from acting independently and working toward their objectives.
   
   The HARTS themselves form the stronghold around which these Corps and these Artillery units exist. They are frequently built, rebuilt and relocated, and they face away (to the North) from the DMZ. They are positional warfare (think WW1 trench warfare) on steroids. Their survivability against bombing is regarded as high.
   
   Time and space is critical in warfighting, and HARTS buys a lot of time and space. The US for instance may have 500 fighter-bombers in theater. If a turn around time for their sorties is 1 hour, that's only 500 sorties an hour. If a HARTS can survive several hits, and if there are 10,000 HARTS, you can quickly see that these bombing sorties are INSUFFICIENT to deal with the amount of artillery shells North Korea can fire at South Korea and the DMZ.
   
   This gives the North Koreans a significant advantage in forcing the US-ROK into a positional war, a trench war, along the DMZ.
   
   These HARTS extend up the coast line, reducing the possibility of a meaningful amphibious landing. But will be further reinforced by sea-mines, which will be discussed in #3.
   
   
2. KN06 - A more modern, S-300, phased array radar version of anti-Air missiles. This missile is arguably capable of tracking F-22, F-35, and possibly can be incorporated with civilian Air Traffic radars to track B-2 bombers also. The specifics on the KN06 are difficult to figure out (I just couldn't find good available sources on it specifically) looks like the general assumption is it will perform like the S-300, but that the phased array radar is the critical piece and it is difficult to tell but assumed that it is similar in capability of Nebo-M. But the Nebo-M system is a 3 part system capable of tracking B-2 stealth. Likely the North Koreans have the ability to track complex stealth targets like F-22, and F-35. But not to engage B-2s and would have to rely upon a different radar for that that is not integrated to their fire-control systems.
   
   The effectiveness therefore is hard to determine, but the North Koreans are well trained. If their systems are effective, they will be used and used well.
   
   This again, buys time and space for their decision process and their ground armies.
   
   It blunts the impact of US-ROK air forces in striking North Korean targets especially command and control targets which are critical.
   
   It rules out almost completely any chance at destroying North Korea's strategic targets such as Nuclear tipped missiles.
   
   Us Air supremacy may be possible, but would take more time until the KN06 threat is dealt with.
   
   
3. Submarine laid Sea-Mines. This threat is an overlooked mainstay of North Korean strategy. They have 50,000 mines that are modern, in the Korean War they used mines including deep sea bottom laying magnetic activated mines which were of Soviet design. Now they have a more robust and modern equivalent in mine technology that can be most certainly based on China and Russia designs.
   
   The problem the North Koreans and Russians faced in the Korean war was laying the mines when the US had blue-water supremacy. They could effectively mine harbors and prevent invasions like at Wonsan, but they had trouble layering mine fields in depth.
   
   It is self-evident that North Korea's reliance upon a submarine that can't be useful in anti-submarine and surface fleet engagements, but is great at creeping and very silent when running at only a few knots, that their Submarines are intended to circumvent this problem and lay sea-mines in open waters or maybe more strategically.
   
   Such as mining the straits of Korea and Japan, and mining further out on the sea-beds in order to try and do as much threat to the US Navy.
   
   North Korea probably considers that the US is much less likely to tolerate Naval losses than air or ground force casualties. Naval losses are so dramatic and singular, and the US has had barely any damage done by enemy action to its Navy since WW2 that losing a troop ship killing 10,000 marines to a sea-mine would be unfathomable casualty rate in modern US calculation.
   
   Because of this, and experience in Korea shows, the US treats mines like nuclear weapons, and spends all its efforts on ensuring mine-sweeping is finished before moving in troop ships.
   
   This is so significant that it delayed an invasion in Wonsan by 2 weeks, afterwhich the invasion was no longer necessary because of ground developments.
   
   Putting it all together
   
   
   So what does all this mean?
   
   There's a lot of hear-say about what the US can do in North Korea, but the real facts on the ground is...not much.
   
   Going to war in North Korea will be starting a WW1-type war, which was how the Korean war ended, stuck in trenches on the now-DMZ. The geography favors this. And the only way around this is to do amphibious landings, which North Korea has coastal defenses in depth, and multiplied by the effect of sea-mines, which they can lay more effectively using their Submarine's only advantage, stealth.
   
   The air power is thus the US-ROK next best bet, but it is much more limited than it was in Iraq or in the middle east in general, where the US has complete supremacy. At least in the beginning of the war, the skies would be contested because of the KN06. Until those threats have spent their ammunition (North Korea has around 450 missiles), or those threats are destroyed, they will make sorties very dangerous.
   
   There is not enough B52 and B-2s to make any meaningful conventional impact. Their sortie turnarounds are enormous, a B52 flying out of Guam will take 1 full day to do a bombing run.
   
   North Korea has 10s of thousands of targets to bomb. So you can see how these turn around times are not useful in large scale action.
   
   Conclusion

Because of this, I think the US cannot win a war in North Korea. Because this does not meet the criteria of any reasonable US "theory of victory". There is no middle ground where the US goes to war and North Korea conditionally surrenders like the Emperor of Japan, keeping their President Kim Jong Un, but losing their Nuclear Weapons, and returning to a Status Quo.

Since that theory of victory is off the table, it is arguable that given the above problems, the US cannot achieve its only practical theory of victory, total destruction of North Korea, with any reasonable cost.

The cost is so enormous, without factoring in variables such as Chemical, Biological, and Nuclear weapons.

North Korea can Nuke Guam, can Nuke Hawaii, this delays US response even further.

Can North Korean forces push into South Korea? If there's no positional war, can they push to Busan?

If they push to Busan can the US reinforce the Peninsula or will Sea-mines have too great an impact?

Etc.

These problems alone raise the costs so high, that the American people would not tolerate a victory and the US economy may not be able to suffer it.

This conventional problem alone is why North Korea has not been dealt with in 50 years, and why it won't be dealt with now except by a madman who clearly has no understanding of Strategy, costs, and what the end-game should look like in the first place.

Nice work of fantasy.

There are so many factual errors in your post that it would take days to sort them out.

You're welcome to try. But by all means, I'll just take your non-word for it (since you haven't even provided one tid-bit of contrary point of view).

 

[Admiral Rockwell Tory]

Didnt nk shoot missiles onto their own populace?
Sounds like it would be an easy win. We all just sit back and drink yager bombs

Didn't US warplanes crash onto people's houses in suburbs? Yes, happens all the time.

Guess the US is a "sheet" show as you call it?

Ooh ooh! Remember when a US munitions ship BLEW-UP in harbor killing hundreds and destroying a square mile of a US major port during WW2?

Guess the Germans and Japs had that war in the bag!

There is a big difference in dropping a plane on a house and a nuclear missile.

Remember that time the US dropped an Actual Nuclear Bomb on the runway during take off?

You people are clowns, and I mean that sincerely, did you believe everything Hitler said?

Nuclear bombs don't go off when you drop them. What does that have to do with what I said?

What does Hitler have to do with anything?

Can you carry on a discussion or should we all just put you on "ignore" now?

 

[TheTechnologist]

This thread covers 3 basic areas:

• HARTS
• KN06
• Submarines laying sea-mines

There is a concept most people over-look when discussing anything strategy related: Theory of Victory.

Spoiler Alert, the US doesn't really have a theory of victory in North Korea, but we can get to that later. However, this problem is significant because without a theory of victory there is no way to determine what the appropriate tactical and strategic responses should be. Arguably the US theory of victory in North Korea is to maintain a status quo. A theory of victory framework people often think of is "complete destruction of North Korea" which I suppose means reunification of North Korea on US-South Korean terms unconditionally.

That goes out the window, because China would not accept this outcome, they do have a theory of victory, and if I can post URLs I could link to the lecture sources about what North Korea and Chinese Theory of Victory are. The reason this is worth mentioning is their Theory of Victory is far easier to achieve than the US's. Theirs is to simply keep the Status Quo, which is easy enough, because it's the situation that exists now, and the only alternatives seem to box the US into wars it can't afford or is unwilling to fight.

Enough of that though, on to the meat-and-potatoes. Can the US win a war with North Korea?

Why are the 3 bullet points significant?

1. HARTS - Hardened Artillery Sites. These sites form the nucleus of North Korea's visible strategy to deal with US-ROK forces. In brief, North Korean corps are 2x larger than US corps, and are half comprised of artillery units. What this means is that each corps is expected to act independently with a common objective, like links in a chain, regardless of any command or control in place. North Korea chose this operational strategy because they expected that their top leadership would be decapitated, a decapitating strike will not do anything though to stop North Korea's corps from acting independently and working toward their objectives.
   
   The HARTS themselves form the stronghold around which these Corps and these Artillery units exist. They are frequently built, rebuilt and relocated, and they face away (to the North) from the DMZ. They are positional warfare (think WW1 trench warfare) on steroids. Their survivability against bombing is regarded as high.
   
   Time and space is critical in warfighting, and HARTS buys a lot of time and space. The US for instance may have 500 fighter-bombers in theater. If a turn around time for their sorties is 1 hour, that's only 500 sorties an hour. If a HARTS can survive several hits, and if there are 10,000 HARTS, you can quickly see that these bombing sorties are INSUFFICIENT to deal with the amount of artillery shells North Korea can fire at South Korea and the DMZ.
   
   This gives the North Koreans a significant advantage in forcing the US-ROK into a positional war, a trench war, along the DMZ.
   
   These HARTS extend up the coast line, reducing the possibility of a meaningful amphibious landing. But will be further reinforced by sea-mines, which will be discussed in #3.
   
   
2. KN06 - A more modern, S-300, phased array radar version of anti-Air missiles. This missile is arguably capable of tracking F-22, F-35, and possibly can be incorporated with civilian Air Traffic radars to track B-2 bombers also. The specifics on the KN06 are difficult to figure out (I just couldn't find good available sources on it specifically) looks like the general assumption is it will perform like the S-300, but that the phased array radar is the critical piece and it is difficult to tell but assumed that it is similar in capability of Nebo-M. But the Nebo-M system is a 3 part system capable of tracking B-2 stealth. Likely the North Koreans have the ability to track complex stealth targets like F-22, and F-35. But not to engage B-2s and would have to rely upon a different radar for that that is not integrated to their fire-control systems.
   
   The effectiveness therefore is hard to determine, but the North Koreans are well trained. If their systems are effective, they will be used and used well.
   
   This again, buys time and space for their decision process and their ground armies.
   
   It blunts the impact of US-ROK air forces in striking North Korean targets especially command and control targets which are critical.
   
   It rules out almost completely any chance at destroying North Korea's strategic targets such as Nuclear tipped missiles.
   
   Us Air supremacy may be possible, but would take more time until the KN06 threat is dealt with.
   
   
3. Submarine laid Sea-Mines. This threat is an overlooked mainstay of North Korean strategy. They have 50,000 mines that are modern, in the Korean War they used mines including deep sea bottom laying magnetic activated mines which were of Soviet design. Now they have a more robust and modern equivalent in mine technology that can be most certainly based on China and Russia designs.
   
   The problem the North Koreans and Russians faced in the Korean war was laying the mines when the US had blue-water supremacy. They could effectively mine harbors and prevent invasions like at Wonsan, but they had trouble layering mine fields in depth.
   
   It is self-evident that North Korea's reliance upon a submarine that can't be useful in anti-submarine and surface fleet engagements, but is great at creeping and very silent when running at only a few knots, that their Submarines are intended to circumvent this problem and lay sea-mines in open waters or maybe more strategically.
   
   Such as mining the straits of Korea and Japan, and mining further out on the sea-beds in order to try and do as much threat to the US Navy.
   
   North Korea probably considers that the US is much less likely to tolerate Naval losses than air or ground force casualties. Naval losses are so dramatic and singular, and the US has had barely any damage done by enemy action to its Navy since WW2 that losing a troop ship killing 10,000 marines to a sea-mine would be unfathomable casualty rate in modern US calculation.
   
   Because of this, and experience in Korea shows, the US treats mines like nuclear weapons, and spends all its efforts on ensuring mine-sweeping is finished before moving in troop ships.
   
   This is so significant that it delayed an invasion in Wonsan by 2 weeks, afterwhich the invasion was no longer necessary because of ground developments.
   
   Putting it all together
   
   
   So what does all this mean?
   
   There's a lot of hear-say about what the US can do in North Korea, but the real facts on the ground is...not much.
   
   Going to war in North Korea will be starting a WW1-type war, which was how the Korean war ended, stuck in trenches on the now-DMZ. The geography favors this. And the only way around this is to do amphibious landings, which North Korea has coastal defenses in depth, and multiplied by the effect of sea-mines, which they can lay more effectively using their Submarine's only advantage, stealth.
   
   The air power is thus the US-ROK next best bet, but it is much more limited than it was in Iraq or in the middle east in general, where the US has complete supremacy. At least in the beginning of the war, the skies would be contested because of the KN06. Until those threats have spent their ammunition (North Korea has around 450 missiles), or those threats are destroyed, they will make sorties very dangerous.
   
   There is not enough B52 and B-2s to make any meaningful conventional impact. Their sortie turnarounds are enormous, a B52 flying out of Guam will take 1 full day to do a bombing run.
   
   North Korea has 10s of thousands of targets to bomb. So you can see how these turn around times are not useful in large scale action.
   
   Conclusion

Because of this, I think the US cannot win a war in North Korea. Because this does not meet the criteria of any reasonable US "theory of victory". There is no middle ground where the US goes to war and North Korea conditionally surrenders like the Emperor of Japan, keeping their President Kim Jong Un, but losing their Nuclear Weapons, and returning to a Status Quo.

Since that theory of victory is off the table, it is arguable that given the above problems, the US cannot achieve its only practical theory of victory, total destruction of North Korea, with any reasonable cost.

The cost is so enormous, without factoring in variables such as Chemical, Biological, and Nuclear weapons.

North Korea can Nuke Guam, can Nuke Hawaii, this delays US response even further.

Can North Korean forces push into South Korea? If there's no positional war, can they push to Busan?

If they push to Busan can the US reinforce the Peninsula or will Sea-mines have too great an impact?

Etc.

These problems alone raise the costs so high, that the American people would not tolerate a victory and the US economy may not be able to suffer it.

This conventional problem alone is why North Korea has not been dealt with in 50 years, and why it won't be dealt with now except by a madman who clearly has no understanding of Strategy, costs, and what the end-game should look like in the first place.

This all runs on the assumption that the modern N-Korean forces are capable of taking on the most highly trained, highly funded army in the world. By a ridiculous margin by the way. The US hasn't been beaten in conventional warfare, ever ( I don't count Vietnam as conventional since it was guerrilla warfare). The problem lies in the fact that a conventional war were the losing side has nuclear capability will NOT stay conventional. The question is not Theory of victory, it is Risk Reward and that question should make everybody think twice before advocating escalating this situation, something the current administration is hell bent on doing, or so it seems.

Whenever someone says "most highly trained" ... think back to Iraq. The US lost that war, Iraq is now an Iranian proxy and without Iran, ISIS would never have been defeated.

 

[TheTechnologist]

Didnt nk shoot missiles onto their own populace?
Sounds like it would be an easy win. We all just sit back and drink yager bombs

Didn't US warplanes crash onto people's houses in suburbs? Yes, happens all the time.

Guess the US is a "sheet" show as you call it?

Ooh ooh! Remember when a US munitions ship BLEW-UP in harbor killing hundreds and destroying a square mile of a US major port during WW2?

Guess the Germans and Japs had that war in the bag!

There is a big difference in dropping a plane on a house and a nuclear missile.

Remember that time the US dropped an Actual Nuclear Bomb on the runway during take off?

You people are clowns, and I mean that sincerely, did you believe everything Hitler said?

Nuclear bombs don't go off when you drop them. What does that have to do with what I said?

What does Hitler have to do with anything?

Can you carry on a discussion or should we all just put you on "ignore" now?

As you said, Nuclear bombs don't go off when you drop them. You think North Korea is any closer to accidentally nuking itself than the US is?

Hitler = you're gullible and believe every trash blowing in the wind.

You clearly believe US propaganda...look at those silly North Koreans, dropping missiles on their own houses.

Pay no attention to the US dropping a MOTHER FING NUCLEAR BOMB out of an airplane.

 

[TNHarley]

Didnt nk shoot missiles onto their own populace?
Sounds like it would be an easy win. We all just sit back and drink yager bombs

Didn't US warplanes crash onto people's houses in suburbs? Yes, happens all the time.

Guess the US is a "sheet" show as you call it?

Ooh ooh! Remember when a US munitions ship BLEW-UP in harbor killing hundreds and destroying a square mile of a US major port during WW2?

Guess the Germans and Japs had that war in the bag!

There is a big difference in dropping a plane on a house and a nuclear missile.

Remember that time the US dropped an Actual Nuclear Bomb on the runway during take off?

You people are clowns, and I mean that sincerely, did you believe everything Hitler said?

Nuclear bombs don't go off when you drop them. What does that have to do with what I said?

What does Hitler have to do with anything?

Can you carry on a discussion or should we all just put you on "ignore" now?

As you said, Nuclear bombs don't go off when you drop them. You think North Korea is any closer to accidentally nuking itself than the US is?

Hitler = you're gullible and believe every trash blowing in the wind.

You clearly believe US propaganda...look at those silly North Koreans, dropping missiles on their own houses.

Pay no attention to the US dropping a MOTHER FING NUCLEAR BOMB out of an airplane.

has that happened lately?

 

[Aba Incieni]

Look for the NK's to hold their wooden rifles and yell Bang! as they starve to death in the first week.

 

[forkup]

This thread covers 3 basic areas:

• HARTS
• KN06
• Submarines laying sea-mines

There is a concept most people over-look when discussing anything strategy related: Theory of Victory.

Spoiler Alert, the US doesn't really have a theory of victory in North Korea, but we can get to that later. However, this problem is significant because without a theory of victory there is no way to determine what the appropriate tactical and strategic responses should be. Arguably the US theory of victory in North Korea is to maintain a status quo. A theory of victory framework people often think of is "complete destruction of North Korea" which I suppose means reunification of North Korea on US-South Korean terms unconditionally.

That goes out the window, because China would not accept this outcome, they do have a theory of victory, and if I can post URLs I could link to the lecture sources about what North Korea and Chinese Theory of Victory are. The reason this is worth mentioning is their Theory of Victory is far easier to achieve than the US's. Theirs is to simply keep the Status Quo, which is easy enough, because it's the situation that exists now, and the only alternatives seem to box the US into wars it can't afford or is unwilling to fight.

Enough of that though, on to the meat-and-potatoes. Can the US win a war with North Korea?

Why are the 3 bullet points significant?

1. HARTS - Hardened Artillery Sites. These sites form the nucleus of North Korea's visible strategy to deal with US-ROK forces. In brief, North Korean corps are 2x larger than US corps, and are half comprised of artillery units. What this means is that each corps is expected to act independently with a common objective, like links in a chain, regardless of any command or control in place. North Korea chose this operational strategy because they expected that their top leadership would be decapitated, a decapitating strike will not do anything though to stop North Korea's corps from acting independently and working toward their objectives.
   
   The HARTS themselves form the stronghold around which these Corps and these Artillery units exist. They are frequently built, rebuilt and relocated, and they face away (to the North) from the DMZ. They are positional warfare (think WW1 trench warfare) on steroids. Their survivability against bombing is regarded as high.
   
   Time and space is critical in warfighting, and HARTS buys a lot of time and space. The US for instance may have 500 fighter-bombers in theater. If a turn around time for their sorties is 1 hour, that's only 500 sorties an hour. If a HARTS can survive several hits, and if there are 10,000 HARTS, you can quickly see that these bombing sorties are INSUFFICIENT to deal with the amount of artillery shells North Korea can fire at South Korea and the DMZ.
   
   This gives the North Koreans a significant advantage in forcing the US-ROK into a positional war, a trench war, along the DMZ.
   
   These HARTS extend up the coast line, reducing the possibility of a meaningful amphibious landing. But will be further reinforced by sea-mines, which will be discussed in #3.
   
   
2. KN06 - A more modern, S-300, phased array radar version of anti-Air missiles. This missile is arguably capable of tracking F-22, F-35, and possibly can be incorporated with civilian Air Traffic radars to track B-2 bombers also. The specifics on the KN06 are difficult to figure out (I just couldn't find good available sources on it specifically) looks like the general assumption is it will perform like the S-300, but that the phased array radar is the critical piece and it is difficult to tell but assumed that it is similar in capability of Nebo-M. But the Nebo-M system is a 3 part system capable of tracking B-2 stealth. Likely the North Koreans have the ability to track complex stealth targets like F-22, and F-35. But not to engage B-2s and would have to rely upon a different radar for that that is not integrated to their fire-control systems.
   
   The effectiveness therefore is hard to determine, but the North Koreans are well trained. If their systems are effective, they will be used and used well.
   
   This again, buys time and space for their decision process and their ground armies.
   
   It blunts the impact of US-ROK air forces in striking North Korean targets especially command and control targets which are critical.
   
   It rules out almost completely any chance at destroying North Korea's strategic targets such as Nuclear tipped missiles.
   
   Us Air supremacy may be possible, but would take more time until the KN06 threat is dealt with.
   
   
3. Submarine laid Sea-Mines. This threat is an overlooked mainstay of North Korean strategy. They have 50,000 mines that are modern, in the Korean War they used mines including deep sea bottom laying magnetic activated mines which were of Soviet design. Now they have a more robust and modern equivalent in mine technology that can be most certainly based on China and Russia designs.
   
   The problem the North Koreans and Russians faced in the Korean war was laying the mines when the US had blue-water supremacy. They could effectively mine harbors and prevent invasions like at Wonsan, but they had trouble layering mine fields in depth.
   
   It is self-evident that North Korea's reliance upon a submarine that can't be useful in anti-submarine and surface fleet engagements, but is great at creeping and very silent when running at only a few knots, that their Submarines are intended to circumvent this problem and lay sea-mines in open waters or maybe more strategically.
   
   Such as mining the straits of Korea and Japan, and mining further out on the sea-beds in order to try and do as much threat to the US Navy.
   
   North Korea probably considers that the US is much less likely to tolerate Naval losses than air or ground force casualties. Naval losses are so dramatic and singular, and the US has had barely any damage done by enemy action to its Navy since WW2 that losing a troop ship killing 10,000 marines to a sea-mine would be unfathomable casualty rate in modern US calculation.
   
   Because of this, and experience in Korea shows, the US treats mines like nuclear weapons, and spends all its efforts on ensuring mine-sweeping is finished before moving in troop ships.
   
   This is so significant that it delayed an invasion in Wonsan by 2 weeks, afterwhich the invasion was no longer necessary because of ground developments.
   
   Putting it all together
   
   
   So what does all this mean?
   
   There's a lot of hear-say about what the US can do in North Korea, but the real facts on the ground is...not much.
   
   Going to war in North Korea will be starting a WW1-type war, which was how the Korean war ended, stuck in trenches on the now-DMZ. The geography favors this. And the only way around this is to do amphibious landings, which North Korea has coastal defenses in depth, and multiplied by the effect of sea-mines, which they can lay more effectively using their Submarine's only advantage, stealth.
   
   The air power is thus the US-ROK next best bet, but it is much more limited than it was in Iraq or in the middle east in general, where the US has complete supremacy. At least in the beginning of the war, the skies would be contested because of the KN06. Until those threats have spent their ammunition (North Korea has around 450 missiles), or those threats are destroyed, they will make sorties very dangerous.
   
   There is not enough B52 and B-2s to make any meaningful conventional impact. Their sortie turnarounds are enormous, a B52 flying out of Guam will take 1 full day to do a bombing run.
   
   North Korea has 10s of thousands of targets to bomb. So you can see how these turn around times are not useful in large scale action.
   
   Conclusion

Because of this, I think the US cannot win a war in North Korea. Because this does not meet the criteria of any reasonable US "theory of victory". There is no middle ground where the US goes to war and North Korea conditionally surrenders like the Emperor of Japan, keeping their President Kim Jong Un, but losing their Nuclear Weapons, and returning to a Status Quo.

Since that theory of victory is off the table, it is arguable that given the above problems, the US cannot achieve its only practical theory of victory, total destruction of North Korea, with any reasonable cost.

The cost is so enormous, without factoring in variables such as Chemical, Biological, and Nuclear weapons.

North Korea can Nuke Guam, can Nuke Hawaii, this delays US response even further.

Can North Korean forces push into South Korea? If there's no positional war, can they push to Busan?

If they push to Busan can the US reinforce the Peninsula or will Sea-mines have too great an impact?

Etc.

These problems alone raise the costs so high, that the American people would not tolerate a victory and the US economy may not be able to suffer it.

This conventional problem alone is why North Korea has not been dealt with in 50 years, and why it won't be dealt with now except by a madman who clearly has no understanding of Strategy, costs, and what the end-game should look like in the first place.

This all runs on the assumption that the modern N-Korean forces are capable of taking on the most highly trained, highly funded army in the world. By a ridiculous margin by the way. The US hasn't been beaten in conventional warfare, ever ( I don't count Vietnam as conventional since it was guerrilla warfare). The problem lies in the fact that a conventional war were the losing side has nuclear capability will NOT stay conventional. The question is not Theory of victory, it is Risk Reward and that question should make everybody think twice before advocating escalating this situation, something the current administration is hell bent on doing, or so it seems.

Whenever someone says "most highly trained" ... think back to Iraq. The US lost that war, Iraq is now an Iranian proxy and without Iran, ISIS would never have been defeated.

Iraq was not conventional, something you are describing here. In Iraq the US fell victim to the risk reward equation. The US wasn't willing to pay the price in money, international standing, and loss of life it would take to pacify the country. Again guerrilla warfare.

 

[Staidhup]

Regardless there are no winners in a nuclear war. The midget is playing a dangerous game of brinkmanship in the hope the US will capitulate and remove trade sanctions as other fumbling administrations have done. What he fails to understand is that the US has no desire or need to deal with NK, they themselves are a financial mess and the last thing we need is to prop up another failing country. Eventually the midget and his government will collapse, all on their very own.

 

[Wyatt earp]

This thread covers 3 basic areas:

• HARTS
• KN06
• Submarines laying sea-mines

There is a concept most people over-look when discussing anything strategy related: Theory of Victory.

Spoiler Alert, the US doesn't really have a theory of victory in North Korea, but we can get to that later. However, this problem is significant because without a theory of victory there is no way to determine what the appropriate tactical and strategic responses should be. Arguably the US theory of victory in North Korea is to maintain a status quo. A theory of victory framework people often think of is "complete destruction of North Korea" which I suppose means reunification of North Korea on US-South Korean terms unconditionally.

That goes out the window, because China would not accept this outcome, they do have a theory of victory, and if I can post URLs I could link to the lecture sources about what North Korea and Chinese Theory of Victory are. The reason this is worth mentioning is their Theory of Victory is far easier to achieve than the US's. Theirs is to simply keep the Status Quo, which is easy enough, because it's the situation that exists now, and the only alternatives seem to box the US into wars it can't afford or is unwilling to fight.

Enough of that though, on to the meat-and-potatoes. Can the US win a war with North Korea?

Why are the 3 bullet points significant?

1. HARTS - Hardened Artillery Sites. These sites form the nucleus of North Korea's visible strategy to deal with US-ROK forces. In brief, North Korean corps are 2x larger than US corps, and are half comprised of artillery units. What this means is that each corps is expected to act independently with a common objective, like links in a chain, regardless of any command or control in place. North Korea chose this operational strategy because they expected that their top leadership would be decapitated, a decapitating strike will not do anything though to stop North Korea's corps from acting independently and working toward their objectives.
   
   The HARTS themselves form the stronghold around which these Corps and these Artillery units exist. They are frequently built, rebuilt and relocated, and they face away (to the North) from the DMZ. They are positional warfare (think WW1 trench warfare) on steroids. Their survivability against bombing is regarded as high.
   
   Time and space is critical in warfighting, and HARTS buys a lot of time and space. The US for instance may have 500 fighter-bombers in theater. If a turn around time for their sorties is 1 hour, that's only 500 sorties an hour. If a HARTS can survive several hits, and if there are 10,000 HARTS, you can quickly see that these bombing sorties are INSUFFICIENT to deal with the amount of artillery shells North Korea can fire at South Korea and the DMZ.
   
   This gives the North Koreans a significant advantage in forcing the US-ROK into a positional war, a trench war, along the DMZ.
   
   These HARTS extend up the coast line, reducing the possibility of a meaningful amphibious landing. But will be further reinforced by sea-mines, which will be discussed in #3.
   
   
2. KN06 - A more modern, S-300, phased array radar version of anti-Air missiles. This missile is arguably capable of tracking F-22, F-35, and possibly can be incorporated with civilian Air Traffic radars to track B-2 bombers also. The specifics on the KN06 are difficult to figure out (I just couldn't find good available sources on it specifically) looks like the general assumption is it will perform like the S-300, but that the phased array radar is the critical piece and it is difficult to tell but assumed that it is similar in capability of Nebo-M. But the Nebo-M system is a 3 part system capable of tracking B-2 stealth. Likely the North Koreans have the ability to track complex stealth targets like F-22, and F-35. But not to engage B-2s and would have to rely upon a different radar for that that is not integrated to their fire-control systems.
   
   The effectiveness therefore is hard to determine, but the North Koreans are well trained. If their systems are effective, they will be used and used well.
   
   This again, buys time and space for their decision process and their ground armies.
   
   It blunts the impact of US-ROK air forces in striking North Korean targets especially command and control targets which are critical.
   
   It rules out almost completely any chance at destroying North Korea's strategic targets such as Nuclear tipped missiles.
   
   Us Air supremacy may be possible, but would take more time until the KN06 threat is dealt with.
   
   
3. Submarine laid Sea-Mines. This threat is an overlooked mainstay of North Korean strategy. They have 50,000 mines that are modern, in the Korean War they used mines including deep sea bottom laying magnetic activated mines which were of Soviet design. Now they have a more robust and modern equivalent in mine technology that can be most certainly based on China and Russia designs.
   
   The problem the North Koreans and Russians faced in the Korean war was laying the mines when the US had blue-water supremacy. They could effectively mine harbors and prevent invasions like at Wonsan, but they had trouble layering mine fields in depth.
   
   It is self-evident that North Korea's reliance upon a submarine that can't be useful in anti-submarine and surface fleet engagements, but is great at creeping and very silent when running at only a few knots, that their Submarines are intended to circumvent this problem and lay sea-mines in open waters or maybe more strategically.
   
   Such as mining the straits of Korea and Japan, and mining further out on the sea-beds in order to try and do as much threat to the US Navy.
   
   North Korea probably considers that the US is much less likely to tolerate Naval losses than air or ground force casualties. Naval losses are so dramatic and singular, and the US has had barely any damage done by enemy action to its Navy since WW2 that losing a troop ship killing 10,000 marines to a sea-mine would be unfathomable casualty rate in modern US calculation.
   
   Because of this, and experience in Korea shows, the US treats mines like nuclear weapons, and spends all its efforts on ensuring mine-sweeping is finished before moving in troop ships.
   
   This is so significant that it delayed an invasion in Wonsan by 2 weeks, afterwhich the invasion was no longer necessary because of ground developments.
   
   Putting it all together
   
   
   So what does all this mean?
   
   There's a lot of hear-say about what the US can do in North Korea, but the real facts on the ground is...not much.
   
   Going to war in North Korea will be starting a WW1-type war, which was how the Korean war ended, stuck in trenches on the now-DMZ. The geography favors this. And the only way around this is to do amphibious landings, which North Korea has coastal defenses in depth, and multiplied by the effect of sea-mines, which they can lay more effectively using their Submarine's only advantage, stealth.
   
   The air power is thus the US-ROK next best bet, but it is much more limited than it was in Iraq or in the middle east in general, where the US has complete supremacy. At least in the beginning of the war, the skies would be contested because of the KN06. Until those threats have spent their ammunition (North Korea has around 450 missiles), or those threats are destroyed, they will make sorties very dangerous.
   
   There is not enough B52 and B-2s to make any meaningful conventional impact. Their sortie turnarounds are enormous, a B52 flying out of Guam will take 1 full day to do a bombing run.
   
   North Korea has 10s of thousands of targets to bomb. So you can see how these turn around times are not useful in large scale action.
   
   Conclusion

Because of this, I think the US cannot win a war in North Korea. Because this does not meet the criteria of any reasonable US "theory of victory". There is no middle ground where the US goes to war and North Korea conditionally surrenders like the Emperor of Japan, keeping their President Kim Jong Un, but losing their Nuclear Weapons, and returning to a Status Quo.

Since that theory of victory is off the table, it is arguable that given the above problems, the US cannot achieve its only practical theory of victory, total destruction of North Korea, with any reasonable cost.

The cost is so enormous, without factoring in variables such as Chemical, Biological, and Nuclear weapons.

North Korea can Nuke Guam, can Nuke Hawaii, this delays US response even further.

Can North Korean forces push into South Korea? If there's no positional war, can they push to Busan?

If they push to Busan can the US reinforce the Peninsula or will Sea-mines have too great an impact?

Etc.

These problems alone raise the costs so high, that the American people would not tolerate a victory and the US economy may not be able to suffer it.

This conventional problem alone is why North Korea has not been dealt with in 50 years, and why it won't be dealt with now except by a madman who clearly has no understanding of Strategy, costs, and what the end-game should look like in the first place.

USA would win easily

 

[TheTechnologist]

Also, the US cannot Nuke North Korea, the winds blow into the heart of China, you would be Nuking China.

Also, North Korea builds bunkers for Nuclear attack, their subway system is 360 feet under ground in granite bedrock.

Good luck Nuking North Korea off the map.

The US has no such protections, and even one single Nuke hitting New York City might destroy the US.

The US cannot suffer a 25% GDP loss as its financial center is vaporized and 10 million people are incinerated.

First of all- there is no evidence that NK could even hit New York- while the United States can hit any part of NK.

Certainly I agree with you regarding the risk of using Nukes in NK in regards to China- would that matter to Trump? Who knows.

The risk of a NK nuclear missile hitting the mainland United States right now is minimal- and we do have THAAD and AEGIS systems to counter the few missiles they would likely be able to even try.

But regardless of how many people NK stuffs into subways- NK cannot survive having most of its surface blasted away and irradiated. Hopefully the NK leadership realizes that too.

Regarding THAAD/AEGIS, it's completely insufficient for ICBMs, THAAD is "terminal", it can only hit incoming weapons. It's designed to buy decision space for US commanders regarding South Korea, not to defend US from Nuclear attack.

AEGIS theoretically can, probably not, and isn't necessarily positioned correctly.

ICBMs have numerous potential countermeasures for that anyway, such as trajectory wobble.

 

[Admiral Rockwell Tory]

This thread covers 3 basic areas:

• HARTS
• KN06
• Submarines laying sea-mines

There is a concept most people over-look when discussing anything strategy related: Theory of Victory.

Spoiler Alert, the US doesn't really have a theory of victory in North Korea, but we can get to that later. However, this problem is significant because without a theory of victory there is no way to determine what the appropriate tactical and strategic responses should be. Arguably the US theory of victory in North Korea is to maintain a status quo. A theory of victory framework people often think of is "complete destruction of North Korea" which I suppose means reunification of North Korea on US-South Korean terms unconditionally.

That goes out the window, because China would not accept this outcome, they do have a theory of victory, and if I can post URLs I could link to the lecture sources about what North Korea and Chinese Theory of Victory are. The reason this is worth mentioning is their Theory of Victory is far easier to achieve than the US's. Theirs is to simply keep the Status Quo, which is easy enough, because it's the situation that exists now, and the only alternatives seem to box the US into wars it can't afford or is unwilling to fight.

Enough of that though, on to the meat-and-potatoes. Can the US win a war with North Korea?

Why are the 3 bullet points significant?

1. HARTS - Hardened Artillery Sites. These sites form the nucleus of North Korea's visible strategy to deal with US-ROK forces. In brief, North Korean corps are 2x larger than US corps, and are half comprised of artillery units. What this means is that each corps is expected to act independently with a common objective, like links in a chain, regardless of any command or control in place. North Korea chose this operational strategy because they expected that their top leadership would be decapitated, a decapitating strike will not do anything though to stop North Korea's corps from acting independently and working toward their objectives.
   
   The HARTS themselves form the stronghold around which these Corps and these Artillery units exist. They are frequently built, rebuilt and relocated, and they face away (to the North) from the DMZ. They are positional warfare (think WW1 trench warfare) on steroids. Their survivability against bombing is regarded as high.
   
   Time and space is critical in warfighting, and HARTS buys a lot of time and space. The US for instance may have 500 fighter-bombers in theater. If a turn around time for their sorties is 1 hour, that's only 500 sorties an hour. If a HARTS can survive several hits, and if there are 10,000 HARTS, you can quickly see that these bombing sorties are INSUFFICIENT to deal with the amount of artillery shells North Korea can fire at South Korea and the DMZ.
   
   This gives the North Koreans a significant advantage in forcing the US-ROK into a positional war, a trench war, along the DMZ.
   
   These HARTS extend up the coast line, reducing the possibility of a meaningful amphibious landing. But will be further reinforced by sea-mines, which will be discussed in #3.
   
   
2. KN06 - A more modern, S-300, phased array radar version of anti-Air missiles. This missile is arguably capable of tracking F-22, F-35, and possibly can be incorporated with civilian Air Traffic radars to track B-2 bombers also. The specifics on the KN06 are difficult to figure out (I just couldn't find good available sources on it specifically) looks like the general assumption is it will perform like the S-300, but that the phased array radar is the critical piece and it is difficult to tell but assumed that it is similar in capability of Nebo-M. But the Nebo-M system is a 3 part system capable of tracking B-2 stealth. Likely the North Koreans have the ability to track complex stealth targets like F-22, and F-35. But not to engage B-2s and would have to rely upon a different radar for that that is not integrated to their fire-control systems.
   
   The effectiveness therefore is hard to determine, but the North Koreans are well trained. If their systems are effective, they will be used and used well.
   
   This again, buys time and space for their decision process and their ground armies.
   
   It blunts the impact of US-ROK air forces in striking North Korean targets especially command and control targets which are critical.
   
   It rules out almost completely any chance at destroying North Korea's strategic targets such as Nuclear tipped missiles.
   
   Us Air supremacy may be possible, but would take more time until the KN06 threat is dealt with.
   
   
3. Submarine laid Sea-Mines. This threat is an overlooked mainstay of North Korean strategy. They have 50,000 mines that are modern, in the Korean War they used mines including deep sea bottom laying magnetic activated mines which were of Soviet design. Now they have a more robust and modern equivalent in mine technology that can be most certainly based on China and Russia designs.
   
   The problem the North Koreans and Russians faced in the Korean war was laying the mines when the US had blue-water supremacy. They could effectively mine harbors and prevent invasions like at Wonsan, but they had trouble layering mine fields in depth.
   
   It is self-evident that North Korea's reliance upon a submarine that can't be useful in anti-submarine and surface fleet engagements, but is great at creeping and very silent when running at only a few knots, that their Submarines are intended to circumvent this problem and lay sea-mines in open waters or maybe more strategically.
   
   Such as mining the straits of Korea and Japan, and mining further out on the sea-beds in order to try and do as much threat to the US Navy.
   
   North Korea probably considers that the US is much less likely to tolerate Naval losses than air or ground force casualties. Naval losses are so dramatic and singular, and the US has had barely any damage done by enemy action to its Navy since WW2 that losing a troop ship killing 10,000 marines to a sea-mine would be unfathomable casualty rate in modern US calculation.
   
   Because of this, and experience in Korea shows, the US treats mines like nuclear weapons, and spends all its efforts on ensuring mine-sweeping is finished before moving in troop ships.
   
   This is so significant that it delayed an invasion in Wonsan by 2 weeks, afterwhich the invasion was no longer necessary because of ground developments.
   
   Putting it all together
   
   
   So what does all this mean?
   
   There's a lot of hear-say about what the US can do in North Korea, but the real facts on the ground is...not much.
   
   Going to war in North Korea will be starting a WW1-type war, which was how the Korean war ended, stuck in trenches on the now-DMZ. The geography favors this. And the only way around this is to do amphibious landings, which North Korea has coastal defenses in depth, and multiplied by the effect of sea-mines, which they can lay more effectively using their Submarine's only advantage, stealth.
   
   The air power is thus the US-ROK next best bet, but it is much more limited than it was in Iraq or in the middle east in general, where the US has complete supremacy. At least in the beginning of the war, the skies would be contested because of the KN06. Until those threats have spent their ammunition (North Korea has around 450 missiles), or those threats are destroyed, they will make sorties very dangerous.
   
   There is not enough B52 and B-2s to make any meaningful conventional impact. Their sortie turnarounds are enormous, a B52 flying out of Guam will take 1 full day to do a bombing run.
   
   North Korea has 10s of thousands of targets to bomb. So you can see how these turn around times are not useful in large scale action.
   
   Conclusion

Because of this, I think the US cannot win a war in North Korea. Because this does not meet the criteria of any reasonable US "theory of victory". There is no middle ground where the US goes to war and North Korea conditionally surrenders like the Emperor of Japan, keeping their President Kim Jong Un, but losing their Nuclear Weapons, and returning to a Status Quo.

Since that theory of victory is off the table, it is arguable that given the above problems, the US cannot achieve its only practical theory of victory, total destruction of North Korea, with any reasonable cost.

The cost is so enormous, without factoring in variables such as Chemical, Biological, and Nuclear weapons.

North Korea can Nuke Guam, can Nuke Hawaii, this delays US response even further.

Can North Korean forces push into South Korea? If there's no positional war, can they push to Busan?

If they push to Busan can the US reinforce the Peninsula or will Sea-mines have too great an impact?

Etc.

These problems alone raise the costs so high, that the American people would not tolerate a victory and the US economy may not be able to suffer it.

This conventional problem alone is why North Korea has not been dealt with in 50 years, and why it won't be dealt with now except by a madman who clearly has no understanding of Strategy, costs, and what the end-game should look like in the first place.

Nice work of fantasy.

There are so many factual errors in your post that it would take days to sort them out.

You're welcome to try. But by all means, I'll just take your non-word for it (since you haven't even provided one tid-bit of contrary point of view).

What is the most modern submarine in the NK fleet?

What is the most modern bomber in the NK Air Force?

Where did you get the idea that any Navy transports could carry 10,000 Marines?

What type of sea mines are effective against ships that never come close to shore or choke points?

Why did you ignore the B-1 since that is our primary conventional bomber?

That should keep you busy for a little while.

 

[Wyatt earp]

 

[TheTechnologist]

This thread covers 3 basic areas:

• HARTS
• KN06
• Submarines laying sea-mines

There is a concept most people over-look when discussing anything strategy related: Theory of Victory.

Spoiler Alert, the US doesn't really have a theory of victory in North Korea, but we can get to that later. However, this problem is significant because without a theory of victory there is no way to determine what the appropriate tactical and strategic responses should be. Arguably the US theory of victory in North Korea is to maintain a status quo. A theory of victory framework people often think of is "complete destruction of North Korea" which I suppose means reunification of North Korea on US-South Korean terms unconditionally.

That goes out the window, because China would not accept this outcome, they do have a theory of victory, and if I can post URLs I could link to the lecture sources about what North Korea and Chinese Theory of Victory are. The reason this is worth mentioning is their Theory of Victory is far easier to achieve than the US's. Theirs is to simply keep the Status Quo, which is easy enough, because it's the situation that exists now, and the only alternatives seem to box the US into wars it can't afford or is unwilling to fight.

Enough of that though, on to the meat-and-potatoes. Can the US win a war with North Korea?

Why are the 3 bullet points significant?

1. HARTS - Hardened Artillery Sites. These sites form the nucleus of North Korea's visible strategy to deal with US-ROK forces. In brief, North Korean corps are 2x larger than US corps, and are half comprised of artillery units. What this means is that each corps is expected to act independently with a common objective, like links in a chain, regardless of any command or control in place. North Korea chose this operational strategy because they expected that their top leadership would be decapitated, a decapitating strike will not do anything though to stop North Korea's corps from acting independently and working toward their objectives.
   
   The HARTS themselves form the stronghold around which these Corps and these Artillery units exist. They are frequently built, rebuilt and relocated, and they face away (to the North) from the DMZ. They are positional warfare (think WW1 trench warfare) on steroids. Their survivability against bombing is regarded as high.
   
   Time and space is critical in warfighting, and HARTS buys a lot of time and space. The US for instance may have 500 fighter-bombers in theater. If a turn around time for their sorties is 1 hour, that's only 500 sorties an hour. If a HARTS can survive several hits, and if there are 10,000 HARTS, you can quickly see that these bombing sorties are INSUFFICIENT to deal with the amount of artillery shells North Korea can fire at South Korea and the DMZ.
   
   This gives the North Koreans a significant advantage in forcing the US-ROK into a positional war, a trench war, along the DMZ.
   
   These HARTS extend up the coast line, reducing the possibility of a meaningful amphibious landing. But will be further reinforced by sea-mines, which will be discussed in #3.
   
   
2. KN06 - A more modern, S-300, phased array radar version of anti-Air missiles. This missile is arguably capable of tracking F-22, F-35, and possibly can be incorporated with civilian Air Traffic radars to track B-2 bombers also. The specifics on the KN06 are difficult to figure out (I just couldn't find good available sources on it specifically) looks like the general assumption is it will perform like the S-300, but that the phased array radar is the critical piece and it is difficult to tell but assumed that it is similar in capability of Nebo-M. But the Nebo-M system is a 3 part system capable of tracking B-2 stealth. Likely the North Koreans have the ability to track complex stealth targets like F-22, and F-35. But not to engage B-2s and would have to rely upon a different radar for that that is not integrated to their fire-control systems.
   
   The effectiveness therefore is hard to determine, but the North Koreans are well trained. If their systems are effective, they will be used and used well.
   
   This again, buys time and space for their decision process and their ground armies.
   
   It blunts the impact of US-ROK air forces in striking North Korean targets especially command and control targets which are critical.
   
   It rules out almost completely any chance at destroying North Korea's strategic targets such as Nuclear tipped missiles.
   
   Us Air supremacy may be possible, but would take more time until the KN06 threat is dealt with.
   
   
3. Submarine laid Sea-Mines. This threat is an overlooked mainstay of North Korean strategy. They have 50,000 mines that are modern, in the Korean War they used mines including deep sea bottom laying magnetic activated mines which were of Soviet design. Now they have a more robust and modern equivalent in mine technology that can be most certainly based on China and Russia designs.
   
   The problem the North Koreans and Russians faced in the Korean war was laying the mines when the US had blue-water supremacy. They could effectively mine harbors and prevent invasions like at Wonsan, but they had trouble layering mine fields in depth.
   
   It is self-evident that North Korea's reliance upon a submarine that can't be useful in anti-submarine and surface fleet engagements, but is great at creeping and very silent when running at only a few knots, that their Submarines are intended to circumvent this problem and lay sea-mines in open waters or maybe more strategically.
   
   Such as mining the straits of Korea and Japan, and mining further out on the sea-beds in order to try and do as much threat to the US Navy.
   
   North Korea probably considers that the US is much less likely to tolerate Naval losses than air or ground force casualties. Naval losses are so dramatic and singular, and the US has had barely any damage done by enemy action to its Navy since WW2 that losing a troop ship killing 10,000 marines to a sea-mine would be unfathomable casualty rate in modern US calculation.
   
   Because of this, and experience in Korea shows, the US treats mines like nuclear weapons, and spends all its efforts on ensuring mine-sweeping is finished before moving in troop ships.
   
   This is so significant that it delayed an invasion in Wonsan by 2 weeks, afterwhich the invasion was no longer necessary because of ground developments.
   
   Putting it all together
   
   
   So what does all this mean?
   
   There's a lot of hear-say about what the US can do in North Korea, but the real facts on the ground is...not much.
   
   Going to war in North Korea will be starting a WW1-type war, which was how the Korean war ended, stuck in trenches on the now-DMZ. The geography favors this. And the only way around this is to do amphibious landings, which North Korea has coastal defenses in depth, and multiplied by the effect of sea-mines, which they can lay more effectively using their Submarine's only advantage, stealth.
   
   The air power is thus the US-ROK next best bet, but it is much more limited than it was in Iraq or in the middle east in general, where the US has complete supremacy. At least in the beginning of the war, the skies would be contested because of the KN06. Until those threats have spent their ammunition (North Korea has around 450 missiles), or those threats are destroyed, they will make sorties very dangerous.
   
   There is not enough B52 and B-2s to make any meaningful conventional impact. Their sortie turnarounds are enormous, a B52 flying out of Guam will take 1 full day to do a bombing run.
   
   North Korea has 10s of thousands of targets to bomb. So you can see how these turn around times are not useful in large scale action.
   
   Conclusion

Because of this, I think the US cannot win a war in North Korea. Because this does not meet the criteria of any reasonable US "theory of victory". There is no middle ground where the US goes to war and North Korea conditionally surrenders like the Emperor of Japan, keeping their President Kim Jong Un, but losing their Nuclear Weapons, and returning to a Status Quo.

Since that theory of victory is off the table, it is arguable that given the above problems, the US cannot achieve its only practical theory of victory, total destruction of North Korea, with any reasonable cost.

The cost is so enormous, without factoring in variables such as Chemical, Biological, and Nuclear weapons.

North Korea can Nuke Guam, can Nuke Hawaii, this delays US response even further.

Can North Korean forces push into South Korea? If there's no positional war, can they push to Busan?

If they push to Busan can the US reinforce the Peninsula or will Sea-mines have too great an impact?

Etc.

These problems alone raise the costs so high, that the American people would not tolerate a victory and the US economy may not be able to suffer it.

This conventional problem alone is why North Korea has not been dealt with in 50 years, and why it won't be dealt with now except by a madman who clearly has no understanding of Strategy, costs, and what the end-game should look like in the first place.

USA would win easily

Nikki Haley thought "Bimono" was a country. That says all we need to know about your analysis.

 

[Admiral Rockwell Tory]

Didnt nk shoot missiles onto their own populace?
Sounds like it would be an easy win. We all just sit back and drink yager bombs

Didn't US warplanes crash onto people's houses in suburbs? Yes, happens all the time.

Guess the US is a "sheet" show as you call it?

Ooh ooh! Remember when a US munitions ship BLEW-UP in harbor killing hundreds and destroying a square mile of a US major port during WW2?

Guess the Germans and Japs had that war in the bag!

There is a big difference in dropping a plane on a house and a nuclear missile.

Remember that time the US dropped an Actual Nuclear Bomb on the runway during take off?

You people are clowns, and I mean that sincerely, did you believe everything Hitler said?

Nuclear bombs don't go off when you drop them. What does that have to do with what I said?

What does Hitler have to do with anything?

Can you carry on a discussion or should we all just put you on "ignore" now?

As you said, Nuclear bombs don't go off when you drop them. You think North Korea is any closer to accidentally nuking itself than the US is?

Hitler = you're gullible and believe every trash blowing in the wind.

You clearly believe US propaganda...look at those silly North Koreans, dropping missiles on their own houses.

Pay no attention to the US dropping a MOTHER FING NUCLEAR BOMB out of an airplane.

Let me clue you in a little. I served in the Navy as a nuclear weapons officer. I am not gullible. I have probably forgotten more than you will ever know on this topic. I also specialized in AAW and ASW.

Let's see your bona fides.

 

[TheTechnologist]

This thread covers 3 basic areas:

• HARTS
• KN06
• Submarines laying sea-mines

There is a concept most people over-look when discussing anything strategy related: Theory of Victory.

Spoiler Alert, the US doesn't really have a theory of victory in North Korea, but we can get to that later. However, this problem is significant because without a theory of victory there is no way to determine what the appropriate tactical and strategic responses should be. Arguably the US theory of victory in North Korea is to maintain a status quo. A theory of victory framework people often think of is "complete destruction of North Korea" which I suppose means reunification of North Korea on US-South Korean terms unconditionally.

That goes out the window, because China would not accept this outcome, they do have a theory of victory, and if I can post URLs I could link to the lecture sources about what North Korea and Chinese Theory of Victory are. The reason this is worth mentioning is their Theory of Victory is far easier to achieve than the US's. Theirs is to simply keep the Status Quo, which is easy enough, because it's the situation that exists now, and the only alternatives seem to box the US into wars it can't afford or is unwilling to fight.

Enough of that though, on to the meat-and-potatoes. Can the US win a war with North Korea?

Why are the 3 bullet points significant?

1. HARTS - Hardened Artillery Sites. These sites form the nucleus of North Korea's visible strategy to deal with US-ROK forces. In brief, North Korean corps are 2x larger than US corps, and are half comprised of artillery units. What this means is that each corps is expected to act independently with a common objective, like links in a chain, regardless of any command or control in place. North Korea chose this operational strategy because they expected that their top leadership would be decapitated, a decapitating strike will not do anything though to stop North Korea's corps from acting independently and working toward their objectives.
   
   The HARTS themselves form the stronghold around which these Corps and these Artillery units exist. They are frequently built, rebuilt and relocated, and they face away (to the North) from the DMZ. They are positional warfare (think WW1 trench warfare) on steroids. Their survivability against bombing is regarded as high.
   
   Time and space is critical in warfighting, and HARTS buys a lot of time and space. The US for instance may have 500 fighter-bombers in theater. If a turn around time for their sorties is 1 hour, that's only 500 sorties an hour. If a HARTS can survive several hits, and if there are 10,000 HARTS, you can quickly see that these bombing sorties are INSUFFICIENT to deal with the amount of artillery shells North Korea can fire at South Korea and the DMZ.
   
   This gives the North Koreans a significant advantage in forcing the US-ROK into a positional war, a trench war, along the DMZ.
   
   These HARTS extend up the coast line, reducing the possibility of a meaningful amphibious landing. But will be further reinforced by sea-mines, which will be discussed in #3.
   
   
2. KN06 - A more modern, S-300, phased array radar version of anti-Air missiles. This missile is arguably capable of tracking F-22, F-35, and possibly can be incorporated with civilian Air Traffic radars to track B-2 bombers also. The specifics on the KN06 are difficult to figure out (I just couldn't find good available sources on it specifically) looks like the general assumption is it will perform like the S-300, but that the phased array radar is the critical piece and it is difficult to tell but assumed that it is similar in capability of Nebo-M. But the Nebo-M system is a 3 part system capable of tracking B-2 stealth. Likely the North Koreans have the ability to track complex stealth targets like F-22, and F-35. But not to engage B-2s and would have to rely upon a different radar for that that is not integrated to their fire-control systems.
   
   The effectiveness therefore is hard to determine, but the North Koreans are well trained. If their systems are effective, they will be used and used well.
   
   This again, buys time and space for their decision process and their ground armies.
   
   It blunts the impact of US-ROK air forces in striking North Korean targets especially command and control targets which are critical.
   
   It rules out almost completely any chance at destroying North Korea's strategic targets such as Nuclear tipped missiles.
   
   Us Air supremacy may be possible, but would take more time until the KN06 threat is dealt with.
   
   
3. Submarine laid Sea-Mines. This threat is an overlooked mainstay of North Korean strategy. They have 50,000 mines that are modern, in the Korean War they used mines including deep sea bottom laying magnetic activated mines which were of Soviet design. Now they have a more robust and modern equivalent in mine technology that can be most certainly based on China and Russia designs.
   
   The problem the North Koreans and Russians faced in the Korean war was laying the mines when the US had blue-water supremacy. They could effectively mine harbors and prevent invasions like at Wonsan, but they had trouble layering mine fields in depth.
   
   It is self-evident that North Korea's reliance upon a submarine that can't be useful in anti-submarine and surface fleet engagements, but is great at creeping and very silent when running at only a few knots, that their Submarines are intended to circumvent this problem and lay sea-mines in open waters or maybe more strategically.
   
   Such as mining the straits of Korea and Japan, and mining further out on the sea-beds in order to try and do as much threat to the US Navy.
   
   North Korea probably considers that the US is much less likely to tolerate Naval losses than air or ground force casualties. Naval losses are so dramatic and singular, and the US has had barely any damage done by enemy action to its Navy since WW2 that losing a troop ship killing 10,000 marines to a sea-mine would be unfathomable casualty rate in modern US calculation.
   
   Because of this, and experience in Korea shows, the US treats mines like nuclear weapons, and spends all its efforts on ensuring mine-sweeping is finished before moving in troop ships.
   
   This is so significant that it delayed an invasion in Wonsan by 2 weeks, afterwhich the invasion was no longer necessary because of ground developments.
   
   Putting it all together
   
   
   So what does all this mean?
   
   There's a lot of hear-say about what the US can do in North Korea, but the real facts on the ground is...not much.
   
   Going to war in North Korea will be starting a WW1-type war, which was how the Korean war ended, stuck in trenches on the now-DMZ. The geography favors this. And the only way around this is to do amphibious landings, which North Korea has coastal defenses in depth, and multiplied by the effect of sea-mines, which they can lay more effectively using their Submarine's only advantage, stealth.
   
   The air power is thus the US-ROK next best bet, but it is much more limited than it was in Iraq or in the middle east in general, where the US has complete supremacy. At least in the beginning of the war, the skies would be contested because of the KN06. Until those threats have spent their ammunition (North Korea has around 450 missiles), or those threats are destroyed, they will make sorties very dangerous.
   
   There is not enough B52 and B-2s to make any meaningful conventional impact. Their sortie turnarounds are enormous, a B52 flying out of Guam will take 1 full day to do a bombing run.
   
   North Korea has 10s of thousands of targets to bomb. So you can see how these turn around times are not useful in large scale action.
   
   Conclusion

Because of this, I think the US cannot win a war in North Korea. Because this does not meet the criteria of any reasonable US "theory of victory". There is no middle ground where the US goes to war and North Korea conditionally surrenders like the Emperor of Japan, keeping their President Kim Jong Un, but losing their Nuclear Weapons, and returning to a Status Quo.

Since that theory of victory is off the table, it is arguable that given the above problems, the US cannot achieve its only practical theory of victory, total destruction of North Korea, with any reasonable cost.

The cost is so enormous, without factoring in variables such as Chemical, Biological, and Nuclear weapons.

North Korea can Nuke Guam, can Nuke Hawaii, this delays US response even further.

Can North Korean forces push into South Korea? If there's no positional war, can they push to Busan?

If they push to Busan can the US reinforce the Peninsula or will Sea-mines have too great an impact?

Etc.

These problems alone raise the costs so high, that the American people would not tolerate a victory and the US economy may not be able to suffer it.

This conventional problem alone is why North Korea has not been dealt with in 50 years, and why it won't be dealt with now except by a madman who clearly has no understanding of Strategy, costs, and what the end-game should look like in the first place.

Nice work of fantasy.

There are so many factual errors in your post that it would take days to sort them out.

You're welcome to try. But by all means, I'll just take your non-word for it (since you haven't even provided one tid-bit of contrary point of view).

What is the most modern submarine in the NK fleet?

What is the most modern bomber in the NK Air Force?

Where did you get the idea that any Navy transports could carry 10,000 Marines?

What type of sea mines are effective against ships that never come close to shore or choke points?

Why did you ignore the B-1 since that is our primary conventional bomber?

That should keep you busy for a little while.

Sinpo class Submarine. Recently built too so at peak performance, if its built off the Romeo-design then it's not much noisier than modern Nuclears. But no where near as quiet as modern Diesels.

NK doesn't invest in an air-force it sees it as a waste of money, and it is for their strategic purpose. They invest in anti-air capabilities, not strategic bombing abilities.

If the 3 US Troop ships cannot pack 10,000 troops on it, its even more useless than if it could. So you're not exactly winning points for yourself here.

The strait of Korea never is deeper than 600 feet, for instance, so the strait can be closed. And it is the most heavily trafficked strait in the world.

What kind of ships so blue water are that useful?

Missile frigates won't have the fire power to stop massive ground battles. Air craft carriers? 3 of them at best? Not much fire power either.

Conventional bombing isn't ignored at all, it's all lumped into the problem of sortie turn around times. The US just doesn't have the ability to bring enough conventional fire power to bear in North Korea. Turn around times are massive. And the forces involved aren't huge armies in open deserts with no cost to lost-time.

All of South Korea could be devastated in a single sortie turn around time.

 

[TheTechnologist]

Didn't US warplanes crash onto people's houses in suburbs? Yes, happens all the time.

Guess the US is a "sheet" show as you call it?

Ooh ooh! Remember when a US munitions ship BLEW-UP in harbor killing hundreds and destroying a square mile of a US major port during WW2?

Guess the Germans and Japs had that war in the bag!

There is a big difference in dropping a plane on a house and a nuclear missile.

Remember that time the US dropped an Actual Nuclear Bomb on the runway during take off?

You people are clowns, and I mean that sincerely, did you believe everything Hitler said?

Nuclear bombs don't go off when you drop them. What does that have to do with what I said?

What does Hitler have to do with anything?

Can you carry on a discussion or should we all just put you on "ignore" now?

As you said, Nuclear bombs don't go off when you drop them. You think North Korea is any closer to accidentally nuking itself than the US is?

Hitler = you're gullible and believe every trash blowing in the wind.

You clearly believe US propaganda...look at those silly North Koreans, dropping missiles on their own houses.

Pay no attention to the US dropping a MOTHER FING NUCLEAR BOMB out of an airplane.

Let me clue you in a little. I served in the Navy as a nuclear weapons officer. I am not gullible. I have probably forgotten more than you will ever know on this topic. I also specialized in AAW and ASW.

Let's see your bona fides.

I don't present bona fides on the internet because I can make anything up as can you.

But I am published in this field for a think tank, probably more bona fide than you. But we can let the argumentum speak for itself. If you think your Nuclear weapons instruction qualifies you for a top-down look at North Korea's conventional capabilities by all means...explain why you think the KN 06 isn't as capable as the S-300, or something.

 

[Wyatt earp]

This thread covers 3 basic areas:

• HARTS
• KN06
• Submarines laying sea-mines

There is a concept most people over-look when discussing anything strategy related: Theory of Victory.

Spoiler Alert, the US doesn't really have a theory of victory in North Korea, but we can get to that later. However, this problem is significant because without a theory of victory there is no way to determine what the appropriate tactical and strategic responses should be. Arguably the US theory of victory in North Korea is to maintain a status quo. A theory of victory framework people often think of is "complete destruction of North Korea" which I suppose means reunification of North Korea on US-South Korean terms unconditionally.

That goes out the window, because China would not accept this outcome, they do have a theory of victory, and if I can post URLs I could link to the lecture sources about what North Korea and Chinese Theory of Victory are. The reason this is worth mentioning is their Theory of Victory is far easier to achieve than the US's. Theirs is to simply keep the Status Quo, which is easy enough, because it's the situation that exists now, and the only alternatives seem to box the US into wars it can't afford or is unwilling to fight.

Enough of that though, on to the meat-and-potatoes. Can the US win a war with North Korea?

Why are the 3 bullet points significant?

1. HARTS - Hardened Artillery Sites. These sites form the nucleus of North Korea's visible strategy to deal with US-ROK forces. In brief, North Korean corps are 2x larger than US corps, and are half comprised of artillery units. What this means is that each corps is expected to act independently with a common objective, like links in a chain, regardless of any command or control in place. North Korea chose this operational strategy because they expected that their top leadership would be decapitated, a decapitating strike will not do anything though to stop North Korea's corps from acting independently and working toward their objectives.
   
   The HARTS themselves form the stronghold around which these Corps and these Artillery units exist. They are frequently built, rebuilt and relocated, and they face away (to the North) from the DMZ. They are positional warfare (think WW1 trench warfare) on steroids. Their survivability against bombing is regarded as high.
   
   Time and space is critical in warfighting, and HARTS buys a lot of time and space. The US for instance may have 500 fighter-bombers in theater. If a turn around time for their sorties is 1 hour, that's only 500 sorties an hour. If a HARTS can survive several hits, and if there are 10,000 HARTS, you can quickly see that these bombing sorties are INSUFFICIENT to deal with the amount of artillery shells North Korea can fire at South Korea and the DMZ.
   
   This gives the North Koreans a significant advantage in forcing the US-ROK into a positional war, a trench war, along the DMZ.
   
   These HARTS extend up the coast line, reducing the possibility of a meaningful amphibious landing. But will be further reinforced by sea-mines, which will be discussed in #3.
   
   
2. KN06 - A more modern, S-300, phased array radar version of anti-Air missiles. This missile is arguably capable of tracking F-22, F-35, and possibly can be incorporated with civilian Air Traffic radars to track B-2 bombers also. The specifics on the KN06 are difficult to figure out (I just couldn't find good available sources on it specifically) looks like the general assumption is it will perform like the S-300, but that the phased array radar is the critical piece and it is difficult to tell but assumed that it is similar in capability of Nebo-M. But the Nebo-M system is a 3 part system capable of tracking B-2 stealth. Likely the North Koreans have the ability to track complex stealth targets like F-22, and F-35. But not to engage B-2s and would have to rely upon a different radar for that that is not integrated to their fire-control systems.
   
   The effectiveness therefore is hard to determine, but the North Koreans are well trained. If their systems are effective, they will be used and used well.
   
   This again, buys time and space for their decision process and their ground armies.
   
   It blunts the impact of US-ROK air forces in striking North Korean targets especially command and control targets which are critical.
   
   It rules out almost completely any chance at destroying North Korea's strategic targets such as Nuclear tipped missiles.
   
   Us Air supremacy may be possible, but would take more time until the KN06 threat is dealt with.
   
   
3. Submarine laid Sea-Mines. This threat is an overlooked mainstay of North Korean strategy. They have 50,000 mines that are modern, in the Korean War they used mines including deep sea bottom laying magnetic activated mines which were of Soviet design. Now they have a more robust and modern equivalent in mine technology that can be most certainly based on China and Russia designs.
   
   The problem the North Koreans and Russians faced in the Korean war was laying the mines when the US had blue-water supremacy. They could effectively mine harbors and prevent invasions like at Wonsan, but they had trouble layering mine fields in depth.
   
   It is self-evident that North Korea's reliance upon a submarine that can't be useful in anti-submarine and surface fleet engagements, but is great at creeping and very silent when running at only a few knots, that their Submarines are intended to circumvent this problem and lay sea-mines in open waters or maybe more strategically.
   
   Such as mining the straits of Korea and Japan, and mining further out on the sea-beds in order to try and do as much threat to the US Navy.
   
   North Korea probably considers that the US is much less likely to tolerate Naval losses than air or ground force casualties. Naval losses are so dramatic and singular, and the US has had barely any damage done by enemy action to its Navy since WW2 that losing a troop ship killing 10,000 marines to a sea-mine would be unfathomable casualty rate in modern US calculation.
   
   Because of this, and experience in Korea shows, the US treats mines like nuclear weapons, and spends all its efforts on ensuring mine-sweeping is finished before moving in troop ships.
   
   This is so significant that it delayed an invasion in Wonsan by 2 weeks, afterwhich the invasion was no longer necessary because of ground developments.
   
   Putting it all together
   
   
   So what does all this mean?
   
   There's a lot of hear-say about what the US can do in North Korea, but the real facts on the ground is...not much.
   
   Going to war in North Korea will be starting a WW1-type war, which was how the Korean war ended, stuck in trenches on the now-DMZ. The geography favors this. And the only way around this is to do amphibious landings, which North Korea has coastal defenses in depth, and multiplied by the effect of sea-mines, which they can lay more effectively using their Submarine's only advantage, stealth.
   
   The air power is thus the US-ROK next best bet, but it is much more limited than it was in Iraq or in the middle east in general, where the US has complete supremacy. At least in the beginning of the war, the skies would be contested because of the KN06. Until those threats have spent their ammunition (North Korea has around 450 missiles), or those threats are destroyed, they will make sorties very dangerous.
   
   There is not enough B52 and B-2s to make any meaningful conventional impact. Their sortie turnarounds are enormous, a B52 flying out of Guam will take 1 full day to do a bombing run.
   
   North Korea has 10s of thousands of targets to bomb. So you can see how these turn around times are not useful in large scale action.
   
   Conclusion

Because of this, I think the US cannot win a war in North Korea. Because this does not meet the criteria of any reasonable US "theory of victory". There is no middle ground where the US goes to war and North Korea conditionally surrenders like the Emperor of Japan, keeping their President Kim Jong Un, but losing their Nuclear Weapons, and returning to a Status Quo.

Since that theory of victory is off the table, it is arguable that given the above problems, the US cannot achieve its only practical theory of victory, total destruction of North Korea, with any reasonable cost.

The cost is so enormous, without factoring in variables such as Chemical, Biological, and Nuclear weapons.

North Korea can Nuke Guam, can Nuke Hawaii, this delays US response even further.

Can North Korean forces push into South Korea? If there's no positional war, can they push to Busan?

If they push to Busan can the US reinforce the Peninsula or will Sea-mines have too great an impact?

Etc.

These problems alone raise the costs so high, that the American people would not tolerate a victory and the US economy may not be able to suffer it.

This conventional problem alone is why North Korea has not been dealt with in 50 years, and why it won't be dealt with now except by a madman who clearly has no understanding of Strategy, costs, and what the end-game should look like in the first place.

USA would win easily

Nikki Haley thought "Bimono" was a country. That says all we need to know about your analysis.

And that has to do with what? Btw have you been to all 57 states yet?

 

[Indeependent]

I think the problem we keep forgetting is that most North Koreans are probably normal.
They just have the misfortune of having an insanely violent person in charge of their armed forces.

 

[TheTechnologist]

This thread covers 3 basic areas:

• HARTS
• KN06
• Submarines laying sea-mines

There is a concept most people over-look when discussing anything strategy related: Theory of Victory.

Spoiler Alert, the US doesn't really have a theory of victory in North Korea, but we can get to that later. However, this problem is significant because without a theory of victory there is no way to determine what the appropriate tactical and strategic responses should be. Arguably the US theory of victory in North Korea is to maintain a status quo. A theory of victory framework people often think of is "complete destruction of North Korea" which I suppose means reunification of North Korea on US-South Korean terms unconditionally.

That goes out the window, because China would not accept this outcome, they do have a theory of victory, and if I can post URLs I could link to the lecture sources about what North Korea and Chinese Theory of Victory are. The reason this is worth mentioning is their Theory of Victory is far easier to achieve than the US's. Theirs is to simply keep the Status Quo, which is easy enough, because it's the situation that exists now, and the only alternatives seem to box the US into wars it can't afford or is unwilling to fight.

Enough of that though, on to the meat-and-potatoes. Can the US win a war with North Korea?

Why are the 3 bullet points significant?

1. HARTS - Hardened Artillery Sites. These sites form the nucleus of North Korea's visible strategy to deal with US-ROK forces. In brief, North Korean corps are 2x larger than US corps, and are half comprised of artillery units. What this means is that each corps is expected to act independently with a common objective, like links in a chain, regardless of any command or control in place. North Korea chose this operational strategy because they expected that their top leadership would be decapitated, a decapitating strike will not do anything though to stop North Korea's corps from acting independently and working toward their objectives.
   
   The HARTS themselves form the stronghold around which these Corps and these Artillery units exist. They are frequently built, rebuilt and relocated, and they face away (to the North) from the DMZ. They are positional warfare (think WW1 trench warfare) on steroids. Their survivability against bombing is regarded as high.
   
   Time and space is critical in warfighting, and HARTS buys a lot of time and space. The US for instance may have 500 fighter-bombers in theater. If a turn around time for their sorties is 1 hour, that's only 500 sorties an hour. If a HARTS can survive several hits, and if there are 10,000 HARTS, you can quickly see that these bombing sorties are INSUFFICIENT to deal with the amount of artillery shells North Korea can fire at South Korea and the DMZ.
   
   This gives the North Koreans a significant advantage in forcing the US-ROK into a positional war, a trench war, along the DMZ.
   
   These HARTS extend up the coast line, reducing the possibility of a meaningful amphibious landing. But will be further reinforced by sea-mines, which will be discussed in #3.
   
   
2. KN06 - A more modern, S-300, phased array radar version of anti-Air missiles. This missile is arguably capable of tracking F-22, F-35, and possibly can be incorporated with civilian Air Traffic radars to track B-2 bombers also. The specifics on the KN06 are difficult to figure out (I just couldn't find good available sources on it specifically) looks like the general assumption is it will perform like the S-300, but that the phased array radar is the critical piece and it is difficult to tell but assumed that it is similar in capability of Nebo-M. But the Nebo-M system is a 3 part system capable of tracking B-2 stealth. Likely the North Koreans have the ability to track complex stealth targets like F-22, and F-35. But not to engage B-2s and would have to rely upon a different radar for that that is not integrated to their fire-control systems.
   
   The effectiveness therefore is hard to determine, but the North Koreans are well trained. If their systems are effective, they will be used and used well.
   
   This again, buys time and space for their decision process and their ground armies.
   
   It blunts the impact of US-ROK air forces in striking North Korean targets especially command and control targets which are critical.
   
   It rules out almost completely any chance at destroying North Korea's strategic targets such as Nuclear tipped missiles.
   
   Us Air supremacy may be possible, but would take more time until the KN06 threat is dealt with.
   
   
3. Submarine laid Sea-Mines. This threat is an overlooked mainstay of North Korean strategy. They have 50,000 mines that are modern, in the Korean War they used mines including deep sea bottom laying magnetic activated mines which were of Soviet design. Now they have a more robust and modern equivalent in mine technology that can be most certainly based on China and Russia designs.
   
   The problem the North Koreans and Russians faced in the Korean war was laying the mines when the US had blue-water supremacy. They could effectively mine harbors and prevent invasions like at Wonsan, but they had trouble layering mine fields in depth.
   
   It is self-evident that North Korea's reliance upon a submarine that can't be useful in anti-submarine and surface fleet engagements, but is great at creeping and very silent when running at only a few knots, that their Submarines are intended to circumvent this problem and lay sea-mines in open waters or maybe more strategically.
   
   Such as mining the straits of Korea and Japan, and mining further out on the sea-beds in order to try and do as much threat to the US Navy.
   
   North Korea probably considers that the US is much less likely to tolerate Naval losses than air or ground force casualties. Naval losses are so dramatic and singular, and the US has had barely any damage done by enemy action to its Navy since WW2 that losing a troop ship killing 10,000 marines to a sea-mine would be unfathomable casualty rate in modern US calculation.
   
   Because of this, and experience in Korea shows, the US treats mines like nuclear weapons, and spends all its efforts on ensuring mine-sweeping is finished before moving in troop ships.
   
   This is so significant that it delayed an invasion in Wonsan by 2 weeks, afterwhich the invasion was no longer necessary because of ground developments.
   
   Putting it all together
   
   
   So what does all this mean?
   
   There's a lot of hear-say about what the US can do in North Korea, but the real facts on the ground is...not much.
   
   Going to war in North Korea will be starting a WW1-type war, which was how the Korean war ended, stuck in trenches on the now-DMZ. The geography favors this. And the only way around this is to do amphibious landings, which North Korea has coastal defenses in depth, and multiplied by the effect of sea-mines, which they can lay more effectively using their Submarine's only advantage, stealth.
   
   The air power is thus the US-ROK next best bet, but it is much more limited than it was in Iraq or in the middle east in general, where the US has complete supremacy. At least in the beginning of the war, the skies would be contested because of the KN06. Until those threats have spent their ammunition (North Korea has around 450 missiles), or those threats are destroyed, they will make sorties very dangerous.
   
   There is not enough B52 and B-2s to make any meaningful conventional impact. Their sortie turnarounds are enormous, a B52 flying out of Guam will take 1 full day to do a bombing run.
   
   North Korea has 10s of thousands of targets to bomb. So you can see how these turn around times are not useful in large scale action.
   
   Conclusion

Because of this, I think the US cannot win a war in North Korea. Because this does not meet the criteria of any reasonable US "theory of victory". There is no middle ground where the US goes to war and North Korea conditionally surrenders like the Emperor of Japan, keeping their President Kim Jong Un, but losing their Nuclear Weapons, and returning to a Status Quo.

Since that theory of victory is off the table, it is arguable that given the above problems, the US cannot achieve its only practical theory of victory, total destruction of North Korea, with any reasonable cost.

The cost is so enormous, without factoring in variables such as Chemical, Biological, and Nuclear weapons.

North Korea can Nuke Guam, can Nuke Hawaii, this delays US response even further.

Can North Korean forces push into South Korea? If there's no positional war, can they push to Busan?

If they push to Busan can the US reinforce the Peninsula or will Sea-mines have too great an impact?

Etc.

These problems alone raise the costs so high, that the American people would not tolerate a victory and the US economy may not be able to suffer it.

This conventional problem alone is why North Korea has not been dealt with in 50 years, and why it won't be dealt with now except by a madman who clearly has no understanding of Strategy, costs, and what the end-game should look like in the first place.

USA would win easily

Nikki Haley thought "Bimono" was a country. That says all we need to know about your analysis.

And that has to do with what? Btw have you been to all 57 states yet?

It has to do with your quality of judgement.

 

[Aba Incieni]

What did the NK soldier say to the other?

I'll split that grain of rice with you.