Silhouette
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- Jul 15, 2013
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Kennedy wrote the Opinion on behalf of the Court. He's a middle grounder.
Kagan and Breyer however are steeped liberals. They're just barely to the right of Ginsburg. So their opinions are a bit more deserving of the microscope in this situation because as future challenges check back in with this case, they must acknowledge that even the liberal opinion concurs.
Kagan wrote this but Breyer concurred. https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/17pdf/16-111_j4el.pdf
On what would be the next page after page 18 on the Opinion of the Court written by Kennedy.
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Pages 1-2
“It is a general rule that [religious and philosophical] objections do not allow business owners and other actors in the economy and in society to deny protected persons equal access to goods and services under a neutral and generally applicable public accommodations law.” Ante, at 9. But in upholding that principle, state actors cannot show hostility to religious views; rather, they must give those views “neutral and respectful consideration.” Ante, at 12. I join the Court’s opinion in full because I believe the Colorado Civil Rights Commission did not satisfy that obligation. I write separately to elaborate on one of the bases for the Court’s holding.
The Court partly relies on the “disparate consideration of Phillips’ case compared to the cases of [three] other bakers” who “objected to a requested cake on the basis of conscience.” Ante, at 14, 18. In the latter cases, a customer named William Jack sought “cakes with images that conveyed disapproval of same-sex marriage, along with religious text”; the bakers whom he approached refused to make them. Ante, at 15; see post, at 3 (GINSBURG, J., dissenting) (further describing the requested cakes). Those bakers prevailed before the Colorado Civil Rights Division and Commission, while Phillips—who objected for religious reasons to baking a wedding cake for a same-sex couple—did not. The Court finds that the legal reasoning of the state agencies differed in significant ways as between the Jack cases and the Phillips case. See ante, at 15. And the Court takes especial note of the suggestion made by the Colorado Court of Appeals, in comparing those cases, that the state agencies found the message Jack requested “offensive [in] nature.” Ante, at 16 (internal quotation marks omitted). As the Court states, a “principled rationale for the difference in treatment” cannot be “based on the government’s own assessment of offensiveness.” Ibid.
Page 4
Colorado can treat a baker who discriminates based on sexual orientation differently from a baker who does not discriminate on that or any other prohibited ground. But only, as the Court rightly says, if the State’s decisions are not infected by religious hostility or bias. I accordingly concur.
********
So what I'm reading here is what looks like a punt back to Colorado to retool their language and handling of the Christian baker.
But what has Kagan (the uber-liberal, remember) really said and laid down in concrete with respect to "the message" to Colorado and the baker? Kagan said "you will be nice to Christians and respectful, and considerate of their beliefs of conscience." And "no government may make the determination what is considered offensive to a person of faith". And "no government can punish a person of faith in the marketplace using hostility towards their religion or bias". Egads! A LIBERAL championed religious freedoms???
What I'm reading between the lines is, at least from Kagan, that she is sending a message "down below" that state or local governments cannot launch attacks or punitive measures on people of faith based on those people's legitimate rejection of participating in an act that would make them abdicate their faith.
More simply put, even the ,most liberal blue Justice on the Court just right of Ginsburg said "people of faith in business can object to participation in gay weddings without punishment. They must be respected as such and left the fuck alone".
Discuss.
Kagan and Breyer however are steeped liberals. They're just barely to the right of Ginsburg. So their opinions are a bit more deserving of the microscope in this situation because as future challenges check back in with this case, they must acknowledge that even the liberal opinion concurs.
Kagan wrote this but Breyer concurred. https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/17pdf/16-111_j4el.pdf
On what would be the next page after page 18 on the Opinion of the Court written by Kennedy.
********
Pages 1-2
“It is a general rule that [religious and philosophical] objections do not allow business owners and other actors in the economy and in society to deny protected persons equal access to goods and services under a neutral and generally applicable public accommodations law.” Ante, at 9. But in upholding that principle, state actors cannot show hostility to religious views; rather, they must give those views “neutral and respectful consideration.” Ante, at 12. I join the Court’s opinion in full because I believe the Colorado Civil Rights Commission did not satisfy that obligation. I write separately to elaborate on one of the bases for the Court’s holding.
The Court partly relies on the “disparate consideration of Phillips’ case compared to the cases of [three] other bakers” who “objected to a requested cake on the basis of conscience.” Ante, at 14, 18. In the latter cases, a customer named William Jack sought “cakes with images that conveyed disapproval of same-sex marriage, along with religious text”; the bakers whom he approached refused to make them. Ante, at 15; see post, at 3 (GINSBURG, J., dissenting) (further describing the requested cakes). Those bakers prevailed before the Colorado Civil Rights Division and Commission, while Phillips—who objected for religious reasons to baking a wedding cake for a same-sex couple—did not. The Court finds that the legal reasoning of the state agencies differed in significant ways as between the Jack cases and the Phillips case. See ante, at 15. And the Court takes especial note of the suggestion made by the Colorado Court of Appeals, in comparing those cases, that the state agencies found the message Jack requested “offensive [in] nature.” Ante, at 16 (internal quotation marks omitted). As the Court states, a “principled rationale for the difference in treatment” cannot be “based on the government’s own assessment of offensiveness.” Ibid.
Page 4
Colorado can treat a baker who discriminates based on sexual orientation differently from a baker who does not discriminate on that or any other prohibited ground. But only, as the Court rightly says, if the State’s decisions are not infected by religious hostility or bias. I accordingly concur.
********
So what I'm reading here is what looks like a punt back to Colorado to retool their language and handling of the Christian baker.
But what has Kagan (the uber-liberal, remember) really said and laid down in concrete with respect to "the message" to Colorado and the baker? Kagan said "you will be nice to Christians and respectful, and considerate of their beliefs of conscience." And "no government may make the determination what is considered offensive to a person of faith". And "no government can punish a person of faith in the marketplace using hostility towards their religion or bias". Egads! A LIBERAL championed religious freedoms???
What I'm reading between the lines is, at least from Kagan, that she is sending a message "down below" that state or local governments cannot launch attacks or punitive measures on people of faith based on those people's legitimate rejection of participating in an act that would make them abdicate their faith.
More simply put, even the ,most liberal blue Justice on the Court just right of Ginsburg said "people of faith in business can object to participation in gay weddings without punishment. They must be respected as such and left the fuck alone".
Discuss.
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