Destiny and Free Will

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Christianity teaches God gave us free will and yet at the same time it states God is omniscient/omnipotent. If our destiny or future has been predetermined by God, how can we have free will?

 

[theword]

Christianity teaches God gave us free will and yet at the same time it states God is omniscient/omnipotent. If our destiny or future has been predetermined by God, how can we have free will?

God never said man has free will. The religious Jews and Romans added their religious ideas to the original writings of the prophets and saints to control their people and make a living off of them. This was all planned and created by our Creator, God, as a delusion to keep His people deceived from the Truth while He draws out His servant from this delusion and lets us prophets and saints know what's going on.

The prophecies are about the flesh perishing during this age and the saints coming with "good news" that ALL God's people will be saved from this world as their flesh perishes. The religious people couldn't understand the prophecies so they didn't get changed much, at least not enough for our Creator to teach the deeper meanings of them to us saints.

Everything was created by our Creator, even our decisions.

Acts 17: 24-31
24: The God who made the world and everything in it, being Lord of heaven and earth, does not live in shrines made by man,
25: nor is he served by human hands, as though he needed anything, since he himself gives to all men life and breath and everything.

 

[Quantum Windbag]

Christianity teaches God gave us free will and yet at the same time it states God is omniscient/omnipotent. If our destiny or future has been predetermined by God, how can we have free will?

Christianity teaches nothing of the sort.

 

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Christianity teaches nothing of the sort.

Can you elaborate because it seems to be mentioned quite a bit in these forums. Also, here is a link to various scriptural references.

God's Sovereignty vs. Free Will

 

[pacer]

Well then let me rephrase the question.

Does Christianity teach/state/suggest/imply God gaves us free will?

 

[Quantum Windbag]

Christianity teaches nothing of the sort.

Can you elaborate because it seems to be mentioned quite a bit in these forums. Also, here is a link to various scriptural references.

God's Sovereignty vs. Free Will

Elaborate on something that isn't actually in the Bible? Or on something that is?

 

[daws101]

theological determinism VS FREE WILL

Free will and theological determinism[edit]

Main article: Free will


A simplified taxonomy of philosophical positions regarding free will and theological determinism.[7]
There are various implications for metaphysical libertarian free will as consequent of theological determinism and its philosophical interpretation.
Strong theological determinism is not compatible with metaphysical libertarian free will, and is a form of hard theological determinism (equivalent to theological fatalism below). It claims that free will does not exist, and God has absolute control over a person's actions. Hard theological determinism is similar in implication to hard determinism, although it does not invalidate compatibilist free will.[7] Hard theological determinism is a form of theological incompatibilism (see figure, top left).
Weak theological determinism is either compatible or incompatible with metaphysical libertarian free will depending upon one's philosophical interpretation of omniscience - and as such is interpreted as either a form of hard theological determinism (known as theological fatalism), or as soft theological determinism (terminology used for clarity only). Soft theological determinism claims that humans have free will to choose their actions, holding that God, whilst knowing their actions before they happen, does not affect the outcome. God's providence is "compatible" with voluntary choice. Soft theological determinism is known as theological compatibilism (see figure, top right).
A rejection of theological determinism (or divine foreknowledge) is classified as theological incompatibilism also (see figure, bottom), and is relevant to a more general discussion of free will.[7]
The basic argument for theological fatalism in the case of weak theological determinism is as follows;
Assume divine foreknowledge or omniscience
Infallible foreknowledge implies destiny (it is known for certain what one will do)
Destiny eliminates alternate possibility (one cannot do otherwise)
Assert incompatibility with metaphysical libertarian free will
This argument is very often accepted as a basis for theological incompatibilism: denying either libertarian free will or divine foreknowledge (omniscience) and therefore theological determinism. On the other hand, theological compatibilism must attempt to find problems with it. The formal version of the argument rests on a number of premises, many of which have received some degree of contention. Theological compatibilist responses have included;
Deny the truth value of future contingents, as proposed for example by Aristotle (although this denies foreknowledge and therefore theological determinism).
Assert differences in non-temporal knowledge (space-time independence), an approach taken for example by Boethius,[8] Thomas Aquinas,[9] and C. S. Lewis.[10]
Deny the Principle of Alternate Possibilities: "If you cannot do otherwise when you do an act, you do not act freely". For example, a human observer could in principle have a machine that could detect what will happen in the future, but the existence of this machine or their use of it has no influence on the outcomes of events.[11]

Theological determinism - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

 

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The question of free will, moral liberty, or the liberum arbitrium of the Schoolmen, ranks amongst the three or four most important philosophical problems of all time. It ramifies into ethics, theology, metaphysics, and psychology. The view adopted in response to it will determine a man's position in regard to the most momentous issues that present themselves to the human mind. On the one hand, does man possess genuine moral freedom, power of real choice, true ability to determine the course of his thoughts and volitions, to decide which motives shall prevail within his mind, to modify and mould his own character? Or, on the other, are man's thoughts and volitions, his character and external actions, all merely the inevitable outcome of his circumstances? Are they all inexorably predetermined in every detail along rigid lines by events of the past, over which he himself has had no sort of control? This is the real import of the free-will problem.
Relation of the question to different branches of philosophy

(1) Ethically, the issue vitally affects the meaning of most of our fundamental moral terms and ideas. Responsibility, merit, duty, remorse, justice, and the like, will have a totally different significance for one who believes that all man's acts are in the last resort completely determined by agencies beyond his power, from that which these terms bear for the man who believes that each human being possessed of reason can by his own free will determine his deliberate volitions and so exercise a real command over his thoughts, his deeds, and the formation of his character.

(2) Theology studies the questions of the existence, nature and attributes of God, and His relations with man. The reconciliation of God's fore-knowledge and universal providential government of the world with the contingency of human action, as well as the harmonizing of the efficacy of supernatural grace with the free natural power of the creature, has been amongst the most arduous labours of the theological student from the days of St. Augustine down to the present time.

(3) Causality, change, movement, the beginning of existence, are notions which lie at the very heart of metaphysics. The conception of the human will as a free cause involves them all.

(4) Again, the analysis of voluntary action and the investigation of its peculiar features are the special functions of Psychology. Indeed, the nature of the process of volition and of all forms of appetitive or conative activity is a topic that has absorbed a constantly increasing space in psychological literature during the past fifty years.

(5) Finally, the rapid growth of sundry branches of modern science, such as physics, biology, sociology, and the systematization of moral statistics, has made the doctrine of free will a topic of the most keen interest in many departments of more positive knowledge.

CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA: Free Will

 

[Intense]

God is absolute Master, by His grace, of all the determinations of the will;
man remains free, even under the action of grace;
the reconciliation of these two truths rests on the manner of the Divine government.
CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA: Teaching of St. Augustine of Hippo

 

[Connery]

Christianity teaches God gave us free will and yet at the same time it states God is omniscient/omnipotent. If our destiny or future has been predetermined by God, how can we have free will?

The fact that I can chose to believe or not believe in Christianity evinces my free will.

 

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I understand, Connery, but if even our choice to believe or not to believe is pre-determined by God, how can we say we have free will?

 

[Connery]

I understand, Connery, but if even our choice to believe or not to believe is pre-determined by God, how can we say we have free will?

Whose is to say that we have no choice but to believe in Christianity? There are many other religions or belief systems available to all of us, we can chose what we believe in or not at all. We can even make up our own belief system, many have done that. These are all examples of "free will".

 

[Newby]

I understand, Connery, but if even our choice to believe or not to believe is pre-determined by God, how can we say we have free will?

Where do you get that notion from?

 

[PainefulTruth]

The question of free will, moral liberty, or the liberum arbitrium of the Schoolmen, ranks amongst the three or four most important philosophical problems of all time.

I think it is THE prime philosophical topic. It is the reason that God (if It exists) created the natural, rational universe. What other purpose could it serve? What else could God not have done without it?

An interactive God providing revelations and making Itself known to exist would automatically negate any moral free will.

On the one hand, does man possess genuine moral freedom, power of real choice, true ability to determine the course of his thoughts and volitions, to decide which motives shall prevail within his mind, to modify and mould his own character? Or, on the other, are man's thoughts and volitions, his character and external actions, all merely the inevitable outcome of his circumstances? Are they all inexorably predetermined in every detail along rigid lines by events of the past, over which he himself has had no sort of control? This is the real import of the free-will problem.

Yes, we are influenced by our genetic heritage, but any of that can be overridden by will....our free will, if that will is strong enough. Yes, any pedophile can summon the will to override his propensities. No, I'm not arguing that actual psychotic meltdowns don't occur.

 

[hortysir]

Christianity teaches God gave us free will and yet at the same time it states God is omniscient/omnipotent. If our destiny or future has been predetermined by God, how can we have free will?

Your eternity isn't predetermined

 

[pacer]

Your eternity isn't predetermined

In other words, the all knowing God does not know whether I am destined for heaven or hell? I cannot grasp the concept of an eternal life...never to end...never EVER!

 

[hortysir]

Your eternity isn't predetermined

In other words, the all knowing God does not know whether I am destined for heaven or hell? I cannot grasp the concept of an eternal life...never to end...never EVER!

You, also, can't grasp the concept of a loving father that wants you to come to Him because you want to and love Him, so......

 

[daws101]

God is absolute Master, by His grace, of all the determinations of the will;
man remains free, even under the action of grace;
the reconciliation of these two truths rests on the manner of the Divine government.
CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA: Teaching of St. Augustine of Hippo

I guess the extreme bias of those publications is not a problem for you.

 

[daws101]

I understand, Connery, but if even our choice to believe or not to believe is pre-determined by God, how can we say we have free will?

Where do you get that notion from?

Theological Determinism

Theological determinism comes in two varieties. The first is based on the notion of foreknowledge: if God is an omniscient being, and if omniscience applies to the future (as well as to the past and present), then the future is known by God. But in that case, the future can only be what God knows it to be. No alternatives are possible. If God knows that it is going to rain tomorrow, then, regardless of what the weather forecast might be, it will definitely rain tomorrow. And if God knows that Jerry Falwell will decide to become an atheist sometime next week, then that is what inevitably must happen.

The second kind of theological determinism follows from the concept of divine preordination: if God is the ultimate cause behind everything, then He has preordained all that will ever occur, and once again there can be no deviation from the future's pre-set pattern. The preordination of the future is by definition a kind of determinism, so there is no arguing against it if one accepts the premise. (This is a type of causal determinism; the first kind of theological determinism is not.)

Theological determinism depends, of course, on whether or not God exists. Since there is no evidence for the existence of a supreme being, this kind of determinism is not logically compelling. And even if one accepts God's existence, it does not necessarily follow that God has preordained the future, or that He his omniscient, or that omniscience applies to the future. But for those with orthodox religious views things are not so simple. The notion of foreknowledge, at least, is essential to the orthodox concept of a supreme being. And yet the orthodox also wish to maintain the existence of free will, and thus reject determinism (though there are exceptions which are "orthodox" enough, e.g. Calvinism).

Now, some argue that knowledge of the future does not necessitate the future in any way: I may know that you are going to do x tomorrow, but that does not mean that you aren't freely choosing to do it. Whether or not this is right depends on how strongly we interpret what it means to have knowledge. If knowledge is supposed to imply certainty, then I cannot know that you are going to do x tomorrow unless I can somehow foretell the future. I may have very good reasons to believe that you will do x, and it may turn out that you will do x. But if it was the case that you might not have done x, then I did not really know.

One may of course use the term "knowledge" in a less strict sense in which the above would no longer apply. But when it comes to God's knowledge, as usually understood, there seems no doubt that it ought to be absolutely certain knowledge. God is after all supposed to be infallible.

Another common attempt to resolve the problem of foreknowledge is to claim that God exists outside of time. From this extra-temporal vantage point, God does not know the future beforehand. There is no "before" or "after" for God. Instead, He observes all of existence — past, present and future — as we observe the present. And as a result, His knowledge of the future is not foreknowledge, and so does not conflict with human freedom.

The "outside of time" argument is not easy to analyze because, so far as I can tell, no one knows what it really means to be outside of time. I believe the best way to tackle the argument is to consider how our situation is changed, if at all, on the supposition that God is in fact extra-temporal. God may be outside of time, but we're not. Now, for us the important thing is whether our future is something which is known. Wherever God is, if He knows our future, then from the vantage point of our present selves the future is in fact known. Our situation therefore has not changed in any way. The important thing is not how God possesses knowledge of the future, but that there is such knowledge. And if the future is in fact known, the conclusion that it is determined is unavoidable.

If the foregoing is not completely satisfactory (for as already mentioned the notion of extra-temporality is rather mysterious, so any discussion involving it is open to varying interpretations), there is another argument along the same lines. God, at least on most orthodox views, supposedly interacts with the world. But if there is such interaction with the world, then it must occur at particular points in time. And at those times, from our perspective, God certainly appears to have knowledge of our future.

Since I reject its premises, I do not accept theological determinism (the argument is valid, but not sound). Theological determinism is nevertheless important in that it reveals an inconsistency between the orthodox notions of foreknowledge and free will.
Theological Determinism

 

[hortysir]

Great copy/paste Daws



Any original thoughts lately?