Follow along with the video below to see how to install our site as a web app on your home screen.
Note: This feature currently requires accessing the site using the built-in Safari browser.
But presiding as federal entities "blessing" the redacted proposal is sending a message to the Public "the fed blesses gay marriage"....before the hearing on whether or not the fed should bless gay marriage...regardless of which state this happened in...
Nope, sorry. All elected judicial seats are subject to appointment if vacated in between elections.The ruling was over elected judges, so it applies only there.
Insane that you would deduce that an appointed judge was above the law. Just insane.
Again, you're just making shit up. The Caperton ruling doesn't say any of that. And it cites the extraordinary situation in Capterton specifically as the reason for their ruling against judge Olsen.Nope, sorry. All elected judicial seats are subject to appointment if vacated in between elections.The ruling was over elected judges, so it applies only there.
Insane that you would deduce that an appointed judge was above the law. Just insane.
Nope, the campaign-contribution angle was extraneous to the premise that was Upheld, which said that any bias at all displayed by any judge anywhere, anytime is unacceptable.. From there Ted Olsen argued that campaign contributions could foster bias. But he could've equally argued with equal success on that premise that close blood relation, or bad prior business relations or any other reasonable suspicion of bias between judge and party to a case would create conditions for recusal.Justices of the Supreme Court are neither elected or accept campaign contributions which was the entire crux of the case you're trying to foolishly apply to Kagan and Ginsberg. Your imagination is running wild again Sil.
Nice try though. Kagan and Ginsburg have to recuse themselves. A "reasonable suspicion of bias" in this case would be that it is about whether or not the fed should preside over states on the question of gay marriage; and then presiding as a federal entity at the end of the line responsible for justice, presiding over a gay marriage in (doesn't matter which one) a state, while the matter is pending and yet to be heard.
Again, you're just making shit up. .Nope, sorry. All elected judicial seats are subject to appointment if vacated in between elections.The ruling was over elected judges, so it applies only there.
Insane that you would deduce that an appointed judge was above the law. Just insane.
Nope, the campaign-contribution angle was extraneous to the premise that was Upheld, which said that any bias at all displayed by any judge anywhere, anytime is unacceptable.. From there Ted Olsen argued that campaign contributions could foster bias. But he could've equally argued with equal success on that premise that close blood relation, or bad prior business relations or any other reasonable suspicion of bias between judge and party to a case would create conditions for recusal.Justices of the Supreme Court are neither elected or accept campaign contributions which was the entire crux of the case you're trying to foolishly apply to Kagan and Ginsberg. Your imagination is running wild again Sil.
All you do is ad hominem from your vacuum of a sentient rebuttal...When replying to Silhouette, that is rather redundant.
All she does is make shit up.
All you do is ad hominem from your vacuum of a sentient rebuttal...When replying to Silhouette, that is rather redundant.
All she does is make shit up.
Meanwhile, this is not made up:
Nope, the campaign-contribution angle was extraneous to the premise that was Upheld, which said that any bias at all displayed by any judge anywhere, anytime is unacceptable.. From there Ted Olsen argued that campaign contributions could foster bias. But he could've equally argued with equal success on that premise that close blood relation, or bad prior business relations or any other reasonable suspicion of bias between judge and party to a case would create conditions for recusal.
Nice try though. Kagan and Ginsburg have to recuse themselves. A "reasonable suspicion of bias" in this case would be that it is about whether or not the fed should preside over states on the question of gay marriage; and then presiding as a federal entity at the end of the line responsible for justice, presiding over a gay marriage in (doesn't matter which one) a state, while the matter is pending and yet to be heard.
All you do is ad hominem from your vacuum of a sentient rebuttal...When replying to Silhouette, that is rather redundant.
All she does is make shit up.
Meanwhile, this is not made up:
Nope, the campaign-contribution angle was extraneous to the premise that was Upheld, which said that any bias at all displayed by any judge anywhere, anytime is unacceptable.. From there Ted Olsen argued that campaign contributions could foster bias. But he could've equally argued with equal success on that premise that close blood relation, or bad prior business relations or any other reasonable suspicion of bias between judge and party to a case would create conditions for recusal.
Nice try though. Kagan and Ginsburg have to recuse themselves. A "reasonable suspicion of bias" in this case would be that it is about whether or not the fed should preside over states on the question of gay marriage; and then presiding as a federal entity at the end of the line responsible for justice, presiding over a gay marriage in (doesn't matter which one) a state, while the matter is pending and yet to be heard.
All that they could claim at this point is that they didn't know this particular question of law was approaching, or likely to approach their docket in the near future. That's all they have at this point. Which of course is a lie because they peformed gay marriages right in the heat of the debate as federal appeals were making their way Upward. Which then has crossed from malfaesance directly into arrogance. IMHO both of them so doing, and so timed are now exposed to impeachment as well. It was and is pure arrogance.
That's why I brought up the hypothetical and didactic example of Scalia doing a photo op for breaking ground on the Keystone Pipeline right as a case is pending to decide whether the fed should mandate a right of way for the Keystone Pipeline through all states whether or not they want it. Even though the photo op was done in a state that had approved the easement, it would send a message of clear bias to those states arguing that they didn't want the Pipeline coming through. You would scream bloody murder about Scalia if he pulled such a stunt
All you do is ad hominem from your vacuum of a sentient rebuttal...When replying to Silhouette, that is rather redundant.
All she does is make shit up.
Meanwhile, this is not made up:t
You're just mad because you know if Scalia posed for a photo op in a state that made the Keystone Pipeline easement through there legal, on the eve of a SCOTUS Hearing on whether all the other states who didn't want it must be forced to have it, you would flip a nut. And you'd have a right to be angry about that level of arrogance from a US Supreme Court Justice.
Nope, sorry. All elected judicial seats are subject to appointment if vacated in between elections.The ruling was over elected judges, so it applies only there.
Insane that you would deduce that an appointed judge was above the law. Just insane.
The Tumey Court concluded that the Due Process Clause incorporated the common-law rule that a judge must recuse himself when he has “a direct, personal, substantial, pecuniary interest” in a case. Ibid. This rule reflects the maxim that “[n]o man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause; because his interest would certainly bias his judgment, and, not improbably, corrupt his integrity.” The Federalist No. 10, p. 59 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (J. Madison); see Frank, Disqualification of Judges, 56 Yale L. J. 605, 611–612 (1947) (same). Under this rule, “disqualification for bias or prejudice was not permitted”; those matters were left to statutes and judicial codes. Lavoie, supra, at 820; see also Part IV, infra (discussing judicial codes). Personal bias or prejudice “alone would not be sufficient basis for imposing a constitutional requirement under the Due Process Clause.” Lavoie, supra, at 820.
As new problems have emerged that were not discussed at common law, however, the Court has identified additional instances which, as an objective matter, require recusal. These are circumstances “in which experience teaches that the probability of actual bias on the part of the judge or decisionmaker is too high to be constitutionally tolerable.” Withrow, 421 U. S., at 47. To place the present case in proper context, two instances where the Court has required recusal merit further discussion.
A
The first involved the emergence of local tribunals where a judge had a financial interest in the outcome of a case, although the interest was less than what would have been considered personal or direct at common law.
This was the problem addressed in Tumey. There, the mayor of a village had the authority to sit as a judge (with no jury) to try those accused of violating a state law prohibiting the possession of alcoholic beverages. Inherent in this structure were two potential conflicts. First, the mayor received a salary supplement for performing judicial duties, and the funds for that compensation derived from the fines assessed in a case. No fines were assessed upon acquittal. The mayor-judge thus received a salary supplement only if he convicted the defendant. 273 U. S., at 520. Second, sums from the criminal fines were deposited to the village’s general treasury fund for village improvements and repairs. Id., at 522.
The Court held that the Due Process Clause required disqualification “both because of [the mayor-judge’s] direct pecuniary interest in the outcome, and because of his official motive to convict and to graduate the fine to help the financial needs of the village.” Id., at 535. It so held despite observing that “[t]here are doubtless mayors who would not allow such a consideration as $12 costs in each case to affect their judgment in it.” Id., at 532. The Court articulated the controlling principle:
“Every procedure which would offer a possible temptation to the average man as a judge to forget the burden of proof required to convict the defendant, or which might lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear and true between the State and the accused, denies the latter due process of law.” Ibid.
The Court was thus concerned with more than the traditional common-law prohibition on direct pecuniary interest. It was also concerned with a more general concept of interests that tempt adjudicators to disregard neutrality.
This concern with conflicts resulting from financial incentives was elaborated in Ward v. Monroeville, 409 U. S. 57 (1972) , which invalidated a conviction in another mayor’s court. In Monroeville, unlike in Tumey, the mayor received no money; instead, the fines the mayor assessed went to the town’s general fisc. The Court held that “[t]he fact that the mayor [in Tumey] shared directly in the fees and costs did not define the limits of the principle.” 409 U. S., at 60. The principle, instead, turned on the “ ‘possible temptation’ ” the mayor might face; the mayor’s “executive responsibilities for village finances may make him partisan to maintain the high level of contribution [to those finances] from the mayor’s court.” Ibid. As the Court reiterated in another case that Term, “the [judge’s] financial stake need not be as direct or positive as it appeared to be in Tumey.” Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U. S. 564, 579 (1973) (an administrative board composed of optometrists had a pecuniary interest of “sufficient substance” so that it could not preside over a hearing against competing optometrists).
That ruling dealt with elected judges and campaign contributions. Prior SCOTUS decision dealt with other [pecuniary] issues. None of which is a fact in your assertion..
Nice try though. Kagan and Ginsburg have to recuse themselves..
"Nope, the campaign-contribution angle was extraneous to the premise that was Upheld, which said that any bias at all displayed by any judge anywhere, anytime is unacceptable.. From there Ted Olsen argued that campaign contributions could foster bias. But he could've equally argued with equal success on that premise that close blood relation, or bad prior business relations or any other reasonable suspicion of bias between judge and party to a case would create conditions for recusal.
Nice try though. Kagan and Ginsburg have to recuse themselves. A "reasonable suspicion of bias" in this case would be that it is about whether or not the fed should preside over states on the question of gay marriage; and then presiding as a federal entity at the end of the line responsible for justice, presiding over a gay marriage in (doesn't matter which one) a state, while the matter is pending and yet to be heard.
All that they could claim at this point is that they didn't know this particular question of law was approaching, or likely to approach their docket in the near future. That's all they have at this point.
You know that the Supreme Court will likely reverse the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, affirming the judgments of the four Federal district courts that measures seeking to deny same-sex couples access to marriage law violate the 14th Amendment.It is the APPEARANCE of a FEDERAL ENTITY PRESIDING OVER a gay marriage WHILE THE QUESTION OF "SHOULD THE FED PRESIDE OVER ALL 50 STATES ON GAY MARRIAGE" is still PENDING. NEVERMIND that where they did it was "technically legal". "Gay marriage" is not a right. It isn't. Behaviors are regulated at the state level. It is no more of a "right" than 13 year olds marrying in New Hampshire. Let's say Justice Ginsburg decided to preside over a couple of 13 year olds marrying in New Hampshire just as cases questioning whether or not 13 year olds should enjoy the "right" (against states wishes) to marry in all 50 states were making their way up to her court.
Everyone would be screaming out "INJUSTICE!!" Yet you pretend to not see the EXACT parallel in the examples of the Keystone Pipeline and the 13 year olds in New Hampshire.
I KNOW you know this.
You know that the Supreme Court will likely reverse the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, affirming the judgments of the four Federal district courts that measures seeking to deny same-sex couples access to marriage law violate the 14th Amendment.
Consequently, you fabricate this ridiculous and unfounded contrivance in a pathetic effort to undermine that likely ruling.
It is the APPEARANCE of a FEDERAL ENTITY PRESIDING OVER a gay marriage WHILE THE QUESTION OF "SHOULD THE FED PRESIDE OVER ALL 50 STATES ON GAY MARRIAGE" is still PENDING.
