The AR-15 was originally designed as the Armalite AR-15 (aka the M-16):
ArmaLite AR-15 - Wikipedia
This was designed as a military weapon with devastating firepower - far greater than any reasonable civilian weapon.
"had to penetrate a standard U.S.
M1 helmet at 500 yards (460 meters) and retain a velocity in excess of the speed of sound, while matching or exceeding the wounding ability of the .30 Carbine cartridge"
That doesn't sound like a defensive weapon or a hunting rifle now does it?
No, it doesn’t.
But whatever its original intent doesn’t justify banning AR 15s.
That a law might be Constitutional doesn’t necessarily mean it’s a good law or its enactment is warranted.
The Ar-15 was not designed for civilian use - there is no reasonable justification for civilians to have one.
In the words of Justice Scalia:
" “Like most rights, the right secured by the Second Amendment is not unlimited…”. It is “…not a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose.”"
The AR-15 falls under the category of "any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose"
Wrong.
The Supreme Court has made no such ruling; the High Court has never ruled on the constitutionality of AWBs, it has made no determination as to whether an AR 15 is ‘in common use,’ where its possession is entitled to Constitutional protections, or ‘dangerous and unusual,’ whose possession is outside of the scope of the Second Amendment.
Moreover, citizens are not required to ‘justify’ the exercising of a fundamental right as a ‘prerequisite’ to indeed do so; citizens have the right to possess firearms – including AR 15s – without having to justify or legitimize owning such a weapon where they are lawfully allowed to do so.
That’s the mistake conservatives make: they come up with ridiculous reasons in an attempt to ‘justify’ owning an AR 15 – when no such ‘justification’ is needed.
The supreme court has, however, ruled what guns are protected by the second amendment.
He is lying...all of those things clayton claimed have been addressed in Heller and Caetano.....and Scalia specifically named the AR-15 as protected, and rifles like it, in his opinion in Friedman v Highland Park...
Caetano.....dangerous and unusual attack by guys like clayton...
https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/15pdf/14-10078_aplc.pdf
Opinion of the Court[edit]
In a per curiam decision, the Supreme Court vacated the ruling of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court.
[7] Citing District of Columbia v. Heller[8] and McDonald v. City of Chicago,[9] the Court began its opinion by stating that "the Second Amendment extends, prima facie, to all instruments that constitute bearable arms, even those that were not in existence at the time of the founding" and that "the Second Amendment right is fully applicable to the States".[6]
The Court then identified three reasons why the Massachusetts court's opinion contradicted prior rulings by the United States Supreme Court.[1]
First, the Massachusetts court said that stun guns could be banned because they "were not in common use at the time of the Second Amendment’s enactment", but the Supreme Court noted that this contradicted Heller's conclusion that Second Amendment protects "arms ... that were not in existence at the time of the founding”.[10]
Second, the Massachusetts court said that stun guns were "dangerous per se at common law and unusual" because they were "a thoroughly modern invention", but the Supreme Court held that this was also inconstant with Heller.[11]
Third, the Massachusetts court said that stun guns could be banned because they were not "readily adaptable to use in the military", but the Supreme Court held that Heller rejected the argument that "only those weapons useful in warfare" were protected by the Second Amendment.[12]
-----
----As to “dangerous,” the court below held that a weapon is “dangerous per se” if it is “ ‘designed and constructed to produce death or great bodily harm’ and ‘for the purpose of bodily assault or defense.’” 470 Mass., at 779, 26 N. E. 3d, at 692 (quoting Commonwealth v. Appleby, 380 Mass. 296, 303, 402 N. E. 2d 1051, 1056 (1980)).
That test may be appropriate for applying statutes criminalizing assault with a dangerous weapon. See ibid., 402 N. E. 2d, at 1056. But it cannot be used to identify arms that fall outside the Second Amendment. First, the relative dangerousness of a weapon is irrelevant when the weapon belongs to a class of arms commonly used for lawful purposes. See Heller, supra, at 627 (contrasting “‘dangerous and unusual weapons’” that may be banned with protected “weapons . . . ‘in common use at the time’”).
Second, even in cases where dangerousness might be relevant, the Supreme Judicial Court’s test sweeps far too broadly.
Heller defined the “Arms” covered by the Second Amendment to include “‘any thing that a man wears for his defence, or takes into his hands, or useth in wrath to cast at or strike another.’” 554 U. S., at 581.
Under the decision below, however, virtually every covered arm would qualify as “dangerous.” Were there any doubt on this point, one need only look at the court’s first example of “dangerous per se” weapons: “firearms.” 470 Mass., at 779, 26 N. E. 3d, at 692.
If Heller tells us anything, it is that firearms cannot be categorically prohibited just because they are dangerous. 554 U. S., at 636. A fortiori, stun guns that the Commonwealth’s own witness described as “non-lethal force,” Tr. 27, cannot be banned on that basis.---------
The court also opined that a weapon’s unusualness depends on whether “it is a weapon of warfare to be used by the militia.” 470 Mass., at 780, 26 N. E. 3d, at 693. It asserted that we followed such an approach in Miller and “approved its use in Heller.” 470 Mass., at 780, 26 N. E. 3d, at 693.
But Heller actually said that it would be a “startling reading” of Miller to conclude that “only those weapons useful in warfare are protected.” 554 U. S., at 624.
Instead, Miller and Heller recognized that militia members traditionally reported for duty carrying “the sorts of lawful weapons that they possessed at home,” and that the Second Amendment therefore protects such weapons as a class, regardless of any particular weapon’s suitability for military use.
554 U. S., at 627; see id., at 624–625. Indeed, Heller acknowledged that advancements in military technology might render many commonly owned weapons ineffective in warfare. Id., at 627–628. But such “modern developments . . . cannot change our interpretation of the right.” Ibid.
In any event, the Supreme Judicial Court’s assumption that stun guns are unsuited for militia or military use is untenable.
https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/07pdf/07-290.pdf
Some have made the argument, bordering on the frivolous, that only those arms in existence in the 18th century are protected by the Second Amendment.
We do not interpret constitutional rights that way. Just as the First Amendment protects modern forms of communications, e.g., Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U. S. 844, 849 (1997), and the Fourth Amendment applies to modern forms of search, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U. S. 27, 35–36 (2001),
the Second Amendment extends, prima facie, to all instruments that constitute bearable arms, even those that were not in existence at the time of the founding.
https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/15pdf/15-133_7l48.pdf
That analysis misreads Heller. The question under Heller is not whether citizens have adequate alternatives available for self-defense.
Rather, Heller asks whether the law bans types of firearms commonly used for a lawful purpose—regardless of whether alternatives exist. 554 U. S., at 627–629. And Heller draws a distinction between such firearms and weapons specially adapted to unlawful uses and not in common use, such as sawed-off shotguns. Id., at 624–625.
The City’s ban is thus highly suspect because it broadly prohibits common semiautomatic firearms used for lawful purposes.
Roughly five million Americans own AR-style semiautomatic rifles. See 784 F. 3d, at 415, n. 3. The overwhelming majority of citizens who own and use such rifles do so for lawful purposes, including self-defense and target shooting. See ibid. Under our precedents, that is all that is needed for citizens to have a right under the Second Amendment to keep such weapons. See McDonald, 561 U. S., at 767–768; Heller, supra, at 628–629.
