It looks as if the topic of this thread has been changed. Here, let's get back to the meat and potatoes. The legal discussion of whether or not Ginsburg and Kagan were required to recuse themselves. "Only the probability of bias" or even just the "suspicion of bias" need be present to mandate their recusal. These arguments were supported by the maker prevailing upon them. I'd say presiding as a federal entity "blessing" a gay wedding qualifies..
If that is the issue before the court and that Justice has performed opposite sex marriages, sure. It means they have already made up their minds and cannot rule on the merits.
Yup. The Court even ruled in 2009 that this was the case. The case name was "Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co"
Here are excerpts from the arguments that won
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/08-22.pdf :
(page 3 attorney Ted Olsen for petitioners) "
Olsen: "A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a fundamental constitutional right. That means not only the absence of actual bias, but a guarantee against even the probability of an unfair tribunal."
Scalia: "Who says? Have we ever held that?"
Olsen: "You have said that in the Murchison case and in a number of cases, Your Honor....the language of the Murchison case specifically says so. The Court said in that case: "A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process. Fairness, of course, requires an absence of actual bias in the trial of cases, but our system of law has always endeavored to prevent even the probability of unfairness." ...(page 4 continues Olsen).."
the Court has said that frequently, not only the probability of bias, the appearance of bias, the likelihood of bias, the inherent suspicion of bias. The Court has repeatedly said that in the context -- a series of contexts or cases...It's probable cause, Mr. Chief Justice (speaking to Roberts now). The Court frequently decides questions involving due process, equal protection, probable cause, speedy trial, on the basis not of mathematical certainty, but in this case
where an objective observer (page 5 continuing) would come to the conclusion -- knowing all of the facts, would come to the conclusion that a judge or jurist would probably be biased against that individual or in favor of his opponent, that would be sufficient under the Due Process Clause, we submit.
Ginsburg:
"Does it mean the same thing as likelihood of bias?"
Olsen: "The Court --
the Court, Justice Ginsburg, has used the changes interchangeably. We think the probably -- the "probable" standard is the one we would advance to this Court. But the -- but
the seminal case, the Tumey case, said that even if there was a possibility -- any procedure where there would be a possible temptation for the judge not to hold the balance nice, clear, and true, would be the standard. But -- and the Aetna --
in the Aetna v. Lavoie case not very many years ago, the Court repeated that standard, and that standard has been repeated again and again.
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Because both Kagan and Ginsburg performed "gay marriages" while the question was hotly contested & pending and on it's way up on appeal as to whether or not the fed (they as the embodiement thereof due to their Office) should preside over the states in approval of gay marriage, they both were required by their own 2009 Finding to have recused themselves from presiding over April 2015's Hearing.