An Independent Assessment of New START
Proponents of the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) suggest that the new Treaty not be judged against the standards of Cold War strategic arms treaties because contemporary conditions no longer require the treaty characteristics that Cold War conditions demanded of those earlier treaties. Even accepting that point, New START may be evaluated against other sets of standards. Those used in this brief assessment include the specific claims made on its behalf by the Obama Administration, in addition to comparisons to the postCold War 2002 Moscow Treaty and the 1994 START I Treaty (both treaties ran concurrently through December 2009).
The Claimed 30 Percent Reduction of Strategic Warheads
The Obama Administration has made claims on behalf of New START that are based on comparisons to the Bush Administrations Moscow Treaty or to START I. For example, the Obama Administration claims that New START will reduce by 30 percent the number of deployed strategic warheads now permitted by the Moscow Treaty. If ratified by the U.S. Senate, New START would limit deployed strategic warheads to 1,550, while the Moscow Treaty limits the number of operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons to the range of 1,7002,200. Despite the superficial comparison (1,550 to 2,200 warheads) suggesting that New START reduces the number of deployed strategic warheads by 30 percent, such a comparison is deceiving, as will be discussed below. In general, the Moscow Treaty limitations running concurrently with the original START I Treaty required deeper reductions and were more restrictive than those contained in the New START treaty. (New START, if ratified, will supersede the Moscow Treaty.)[1]
In fact, despite Obama Administration claims to the contrary, New STARTs counting rules and apparent lapses will permit increases in Russian strategic force levels above the 1,7002,200 deployed warhead limit of the Moscow Treaty. RIA Novosti, an official news agency of the Russian Federation, already has reported that given New STARTs counting rules, Russia will be able to retain 2,100 strategic nuclear warheads under New START, not 1,550.[2] Russia will be able to deploy even higher numbers under New START if it follows through on announced modernization programs, particularly the new heavy bomber. In addition Russia could deploy strategic nuclear systems that were limited or prohibited under START I, but appear not to be limited whatsoever under New START.
If Russia exploits the legal lapses in New START, there is no actual limit in the new Treaty on the number of strategic nuclear warheads that can be deployed. The number of Russias strategic nuclear warheads would be limited only by the financial resources it is able to devote to strategic forces, not by New START warhead ceilingswhich would be the case without this new Treaty.
One of the biggest of these lapses is the bomber weapon counting rule. It is much more permissive than under the Moscow Treaty. Unlike the Moscow Treaty, which counts all nuclear warheads present at heavy bomber bases,[3] New START has a counting or attribution rule of one warhead per bomber.[4] That is, regardless of the actual number of weapons carried by a bomber or deployed at each base, each bomber will be counted as having a single weapon under New STARTs 1,550 ceiling. This allows the deployment of a large number of uncounted bomber warheads. Even with existing bombers, as RIA Novosti reported, Under the Treaty, one nuclear warhead will be counted for each deployed heavy bomber which can carry 12-24 missiles or bombs, depending on its type.[5] There is no limit to the number of bomber weapons that may be carried by a bomber under New START because it omits the START I limit of 1620 long-range nuclear air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) per bomber.[6] It also omits the START prohibition on arsenal aircraft that can carry very large numbers of nuclear long-range cruise missiles.[7] This New START counting rule alone would permit Russia legally to deploy hundreds of nuclear warheads over New STARTs supposed ceiling of 1,550 deployed warheads, and the number could be much higher if a new bomber is deployed. The repeated claims of a 30 percent reduction in the number of permitted warheads under New START are false
