...In the end even this newly leaked NIE notes Iran is not really dropping its dreams of the atomic bomb:
The estimate does say that Irans ultimate goal is still to develop the capability to produce nuclear weapon.
The new report concludes that if Iran were to end the freeze of its weapons program, it would still be at least two years before Tehran would have enough highly enriched uranium to produce a nuclear bomb. But it says it is still very unlikely Iran could produce enough of the material by then.
Instead, the N.I.E. concludes it is more likely Iran could have a bomb by the early part to the middle of the next decade. The report states that the State Departments Bureau of Intelligence and Research judges Iran is unlikely to achieve this goal before 2013, because of foreseeable technical and programmatic problems.
Well, this is good news if true. Sadly it is intelligence and therefore fraught with potential errors. The question is whether this situation can be verified by independent inspectors! That will be the real test. I hope Iran has come to its senses. And my guess is there may be a lot of classified aspects of this we will not know for decades to come. It seems awfully convenient that we get a big never mind as Iran is working to get out from under all that international pressure!
For those interested here is the
actual report (well caveated). H/T Kevin Drum.
Major Addendum - Must Read!: There is a reason people outside of government should realize that they cannot simply glance at a government report and pretend to grasp it. Government jargon is as complex and nuanced as that in any scientific field. It takes years to truly master. So why am I not surprised all the amateurs are misreading the report? Here is what is said about the three levels of confidence in the reported findings:
High confidence generally indicates that our judgments are based on high-quality information, and/or that the nature of the issue makes it possible to render a solid judgment. A high confidence judgment is not a fact or a certainty, however, and such judgments still carry a risk of being wrong.
Moderate confidence generally means that the information is credibly sourced and plausible but not of sufficient quality or corroborated sufficiently to warrant a higher level of confidence.
Low confidence generally means that the informations credibility and/or plausibility is questionable, or that the information is too fragmented or poorly corroborated to make solid analytic inferences, or that we have significant concerns or problems with the sources.
Read these VERY CAREFULLY to understand the conclusions. They basically fall into
(1) Highly probably but small chance it could be wrong; (2) Who the hell knows, its possible and some hints are there; and (3) Not likely. With only three levels this is all you get. So anything in the Medium Confidence category is really a guess.
Now look at the reports conclusions and it has two flavors. First is whether Iran stepped down from developing nuclear weapons in 2003 (after we invaded Iraq [hint, hint]):
We judge with high confidence that in fall 2003, Tehran halted its nuclear weapons program;
We assess with high confidence that until fall 2003, Iranian military entities were working under government direction to develop nuclear weapons.
We judge with high confidence that the halt lasted at least several years.
OK, we spooked them by taking out Saddam so damn fast they stood back for a while from building their bombs. But are they STILL suspended in their activities (given Ahmedinejads and the UNs IAEAs recent statements this is an important question!). Apparently we do not know!
We assess with moderate confidence Tehran had not restarted its nuclear weapons program as of mid-2007, but we do not know whether it currently intends to develop nuclear weapons.
The NIE is quite clear. We know they stopped, we have no intel on whether they are still stopped or not. The reporting that Iran has stopped as of now is not accurate. Here is the scary part - Iran is still processing fuel! They dont NEED to process fuel for Nuclear Energy. Russia has offered to SELL THEM fuel if they return the spent fuel so it cannot be used to make weapons. Note this when reading this next finding:
C. We assess centrifuge enrichment is how Iran probably could first produce enough fissile material for a weapon, if it decides to do so. Iran resumed its declared centrifuge enrichment activities in January 2006, despite the continued halt in the nuclear weapons program. Iran made significant progress in 2007 installing centrifuges at Natanz, but we judge with moderate confidence it still faces significant technical problems operating them.
And there are more indicators Iran has simply decided to proceed with technology that is dual use - civilian and military - as a way to hide their intentions. Note that the NIE concludes with confidence Iran wants nuclear weapons. And one way to proceed is to do so under the cover of dual use programs:
D. Iranian entities are continuing to develop a range of technical capabilities that could be applied to producing nuclear weapons, if a decision is made to do so. For example, Irans civilian uranium enrichment program is continuing. We also assess with high confidence that since fall 2003, Iran has been conducting research and development projects with commercial and conventional military applicationssome of which would also be of limited use for nuclear weapons.
The fact is this is not the slam-dunk assessment it is reported to be. The centrifuges are the key. With Russias offer on the table to provide civil energy ready fuel the centrifuges are not needed for Irans civil energy needs. But the NIE is confident this unnecessary effort is continuing? Why is it continuing? Folks, they just dont know for sure and that is the bottom line. They know it was stopped in 2003, but they dont know if it has been restarted under dual use cover.
Posted by AJStrata on Monday, December 3rd, 2007 at 1:52 pm.
