Report on Human Rights Practices for 1997--Iran
On December 14, Ebrahim Yazdi, Secretary-General of the Freedom Movement (IFM) since 1995, was arrested on unknown charges and detained in Evin prison in Tehran. Yazdi was Minister of Foreign Affairs for the Islamic Republic's first government after the 1979 revolution. He tried to run in recent presidential and parliamentary elections but was denied permission by the regime. Yazdi had made public statements that may have been considered insulting to the Supreme Leader and joined some 50 others in signing an open letter to President Khatami urging the regime to respect the rights of dissident clerics. He was released on December 25, but faces charges of "desecrating religious sanctities," according to press reports.
Although the Government claimed to have released Abbas Amir Entezam early in 1996, he is still detained. Initially arrested in 1979 on charges of espionage and condemned to life in prison, he is now held under house arrest.
Adherents of the Baha'i faith continue to face arbitrary arrest and detention. The Government appears to adhere to a practice of keeping a small number of Baha'is in detention at any given time. According to the Special Representative and Baha'i groups, at least 21 Baha'is are currently in Iranian prisons, including 2 men convicted of apostasy and sentenced to death. Two other Baha'i men are in prison and sentenced to death for espionage and Zionist activities. Eleven Baha'is were arrested between May and December, two on unknown charges, one for proselytizing a Muslim, four for holding Baha'i meetings, and four for working without permits (see Section 2.c.).
Although reliable statistics are not available, observers believe that scores or hundreds of Iranians are currently imprisoned for their political beliefs.
The Government does not use forced exile, but many dissidents leave Iran because they feel threatened. Amnesty International reported in June that at least three dissident senior religious figures have been held under house arrest. The clerics include Ayatollah Hassan Tabataei-Qomi, under house arrest for more than 13 years; Ayatollah Mohammad Sadeq Rowhani, under house arrest for more than 12 years; and Ayatollah Yasub al-Din Rastgari, under house arrest since late 1996. Additionally, the ayatollahs' followers reportedly have been detained and tortured.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The court system is not independent and is subject to government and religious influence.
Iran has two court systems: The traditional courts, which adjudicate civil and criminal offenses; and the Islamic Revolutionary Courts, established in 1979 to try political offenses, narcotics crimes, and "crimes against God."
Many aspects of the prerevolutionary judicial system survive in the civil and criminal courts. For example defendants have the right to a public trial, may choose their own lawyer, and have the right of appeal. Trials are adjudicated by panels of judges. There is no jury system. If a situation is not addressed by statutes enacted after the 1979 revolution, the Government advises judges to give precedence to Islamic law rather than rely on statues enacted during the Shah's regime. The courts are subject to political influence. The Revolutionary Courts may consider cases normally in the jurisdiction of the civil and criminal courts, and also may overturn their decisions. Criteria for assigning cases to either system of courts appear to be arbitrary and unsystematic. The Supreme Court has limited authority to review cases.
Trials in the Revolutionary Courts are not fair. A law authorizes judges to act as prosecutor and judge in the same case, and judges are appointed for their ideological beliefs. Often, pretrial detention is prolonged and defendants lack access to attorneys. When legal help is available, attorneys are rarely given time to prepare an effective defense. Indictments are often for undefined offenses such as "antirevolutionary behavior," "moral corruption," and "siding with global arrogance." Defendants do not have the right to confront their accusers or to appeal. Secret or summary trials of 5 minutes are not uncommon. Others are show trials intended to highlight a coerced public confession. A woman's testimony is worth only half that of a man making it difficult for a woman to prove a case against a male defendant. In addition, the families of female victims of violent crime reportedly must pay the assailant's court costs.
The Government often charges members of religious minorities with crimes such as drug offenses or apostasy. Ayatollah Mohammad Yazdi, the head of the judiciary, stated in 1996 that Baha'ism was an espionage organization. In January it was learned that the Supreme Court of Iran had confirmed the death sentences against Zabihullah Mahrami and Musa Talabi, two Baha'is convicted of apostasy (see Sections 2.c. and 5). In January Hedayatollah Zendehdel, a Jewish businessman who converted to Islam, was hanged, having been charged in July 1996 with espionage and economic fraud during the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war.
No estimates are available on the number of political prisoners. However, the Government often arrests persons on questionable criminal charges, usually drug trafficking or espionage, when their actual "offenses" are political.
f. Arbitrary Interference With Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence
The Constitution states that "reputation, life, property, (and) dwelling(s)" are protected from trespass except as "provided by law." However, security forces enter homes and offices, monitor telephone conversations, and open mail without court authorization.
The Basijis, other security forces, and the Ansar-e Hezbollah monitor the social activities of citizens. Such organizations may harass or arrest women whose clothing does not cover the hair and all of the body except the hands and face, or those who wear makeup. Vigilante violence may include attacks on young people believed to be too foreign in their dress or activities, invading private homes, and abusing unmarried couples. Women also have been beaten if caught without proper clothing in public or in private houses when men are present. Enforcement appears to be very arbitrary, varying widely with the political climate and the individuals involved.
In the past, prison guards have intimidated family members of detainees (see Section 1.c.). Iranian opposition figures living abroad have reported harassment of their relatives in Iran.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
The Constitution provides for the freedom of the press, except when published ideas are "contrary to Islamic principles, or are detrimental to public rights." In practice the Government restricts freedom of speech and the press. However, since his August inauguration, President Khatami has publicly stated his intention to loosen constraints on freedom of expression, and some signs of this have been observed.
The Government exerts strong control over most media, particularly publications. Some newspapers are associated with factions in the Government. They reflect different views and criticize the Government, but are prohibited from criticizing the concept of velayat-e faqih, or rule by a supreme religious leader, or from promoting the rights of ethnic minorities.
Complaints against journalists, editors, and publishers are frequently levied by public officials and even rival publications, and the offending writer is often subject to a trial, with fines, suspension from journalistic activities, lashings, and imprisonment being common punishments if found guilty of offenses ranging from propaganda against the State to insulting the leadership of the Islamic Republic. Ansar-e Hezbollah have in the past attacked the offices of liberal publications and bookstores without interference from the police or prosecution by the courts.
The record on freedom of expression has been mixed this year. President Khatami has publicly stated his intention to loosen constraints on freedom of expression, and in October, after his inauguration, it was reported that a year-long ban on the Iranian-Armenian monthly Araz had been lifted. The journal was to resume publication in Tehran with the support of the Ministry of Islamic Culture and Guidance. Also in October, the 2 1/2 year ban on Jahan-e Eslam newspaper was lifted, and the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance blocked the reissue of the blacklist Hoviyyat, citing it as hostile to Iranian intellectuals..
Faraj Sarkuhi, a magazine editor who had been critical of the Government and who disappeared in November 1996 while traveling to Germany, reappeared in Iran in late December 1996. He was subsequently arrested and detained in February on charges of espionage and attempting to leave the country illegally. Sarkuhi was denied permission to meet with family members, lawyers, or foreign diplomats who requested to see him, according to Human Rights Watch. In September he was convicted of "spreading antigovernment propaganda" and sentenced to a year in jail, including time already served. This sentence, lighter than some observers had expected, was variously interpreted as being influenced by Khatami's emphasis on openness, or by strong international pressure on Sarkuhi's behalf.
Despite Khatami's public commitment to increased openness, many constraints remain. In particular, criticism of the Supreme Leader or of the principle of rule by a religious leader tend to generate a stern, immediate response from the Government. In November, Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri called into question the Supreme Leader's authority. In the past, Khamenei had been attacked by other clerics on the grounds that he does not possess sufficient religious credential to serve as the senior Iranian religious authority. Montazeri's remarks sparked attacks on his residence by Ansar-e Hezbollah mobs. These events prompted Ebrahim Yazdi and 49 others to issue an open letter calling for the Government to respect Montazeri's rights (see Section 2.d.). Montazeri remains under house arrest.
At least nine publications were banned during the year, most before Khatami's inauguration. In March the Esfahan-based cultural magazine, Zayendeh Rud, was closed down. No reason was cited for this action. In May Ya Sarat al-Hoseyn was banned for insulting then-candidate Khatami, who had initially lodged the complaint against the publication. In July Sobh magazine was suspended for a month after its publisher was accused of scandalous reporting. In a July letter published in a newspaper, publisher and writer Abdolkarim Soroush confirmed that he had been banned from leaving the country and that his passport had been confiscated. In November Ansar-e Hezbollah thugs attempted to break up at least one of Soroush's lectures.
The Ministry of Islamic Culture and Guidance is also charged with vetting books prior to publication to ensure that they do not contain offensive material. However, some books and pamphlets critical of the Government are published without reprisal. It was announced in July that regulations on book censorship would be made available to publishers to help them "overcome potential problems more easily." The Ministry inspects foreign printed materials prior to their release on the market.
Human Rights Watch reports that in January Karamollah Tavahodi, a Kurdish writer living in Mashhad, was detained and sentenced to 1 year in prison because of the content of one of the volumes of his work, "The Historical Movement of Kurds in Khorassan." The book had been banned prior to his detention.
