2aguy
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- Jul 19, 2014
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Andrew Branca over at Legal Insurrection used his Law of Self Defense Podcast to explain why the gun possession charge against Rittenhouse needs to be dismissed...
He goes through it in detail.......
The first part of the law states you are in violation if you are under 18, possess an object, and that object is a weapon...
However,
The rest of the law states that for the above to actually apply, the following two parts must also exist..
1) you have to be hunting
2) you have to be under 16....
Rittenhouse did not meet either one of those, so as the law states..without those, the first part doesn't count......he wasn't hunting, and he is 17.....
This is why the law is a mess and is likely unConstitutionally vague.....and why the gun charge needs to be dismissed.
He goes through this in about 17 minutes
Here is the post at Law of Self Defense....
This gun charge has, indeed, become a sticky wicket, largely because of the alleged ambiguity created by the Wisconsin legislature in drafting that statute, by the failure of the relevant Wisconsin Criminal Jury Instructions to accurately reflect the plain statutory language, and by the fecklessness of the prosecution in this case.
Also, because Kyleās claim of self-defense, compelling against the felony charges against him, is irrelevant as a defense to this particular misdemeanor charge. There is no self-defense justification for willfully violating a gun possession law. (Some of you may be thinking that an excuse defense of necessity or lesser harms might apply hereāit would not, for reasons Iāll explain below.)
The relevant part of §948.60 reads:
(2)(a) (a) Any person under 18 years of age who possesses or goes armed with a dangerous weapon is guilty of a Class A misdemeanor.
If that was the only statutory language that applies to Kyle, itās pretty much an open and shut conviction. He was admittedly under 18, and he was in possession of an AR-15 style rifle, which certainly qualifies under Wisconsin law as a dangerous weapon (ādangerous weaponā means any firearm, per section (1) of that same statute, §948.60).
Indeed, the jury instruction that has been drafted with respect to §948.60(a)(2)ā2176 Possession of a Dangerous Weapon by a Childāand specifically reflects this apparent simplicity of construction, defining for the jury the elements that the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt in order to find guilt:
But that is not the entire legal analysis. There is more, and it is found later in that same statute §948.60, in paragraph (3)(c). That section reads in relevant part:
(c) This section applies only to a person under 18 years of age who possesses or is armed with a rifle or a shotgun if the person is ⦠not in compliance with ss. 29.304 and 29.593.
So, unless Kyle was ānot in complianceā with §29.304 and §29.593, the §948.60 gun possession statute would seem to not apply to him at allāthat is, he would be legally exempt from the provisions of §948.60 entirely.
So, what are §29.304 and §29.593?
The second of those, §29.593 sets out the conditions that must be met to be certified to engage in certain hunting activities. With respect to these conditions the State correctly points out that Kyle has not met any of these conditionsāand therefore, they argue, Kyle is ānot in complianceā with §29.593.
The first defense counter-argument here could be that that §29.593 applies to hunting activities, and Kyle was not engaged in hunting activities, and therefore §29.593 ought not apply to his circumstances at all.
Perhaps a stronger counter-argument, however, is that the plain reading of §948.60(3)(c) says it applies only āif the person is not in compliance with ss. 29.304 and 29.593.ā It does not read āss. 29.304 or29.593.ā
So, even if Kyle can be said to be ānot in complianceā with §29.593, was he also ānot in complianceā with §29.304?
If we take a closer look at §29.304, we see that it is also a hunting-related statute, but one that involves restrictions on hunting and use of firearms by persons under 16 years of age.
Wait a minuteāhow can Kyle be ānot in complianceā with a statute that applies only to āpersons under 16 years of ageā? He was, after all, 17 years old at the time of these events.
Well, thatās precisely the position of the defense here. They argue that Kyle is legally exempt from the provisions of §29.304, period, because he falls outside the statuteās age range. And if heās exempt, he canāt be ānot in compliance.ā
And if he canāt be ānot in compliance with ss. 29.304,ā he is exempt from §948.60(a)(2) āunlawful possession of a dangerous weapon because of the requirement of paragraph §948.60(3)(c), which on the facts of this case would require non-compliance with §29.304.
The Stateās counter-argument to this plain reading of the statutory language is that, well, the legislature titled §948.60 āPossession of a dangerous weapon by a person under 18,ā so they must have meant some application to āpersons under 18.ā After all, Kyle was admittedly under 18 at the time of these events
We may not understand exactly what the legislature was trying to get at, the State is arguing, but surely they were getting at somethingāand therefore we should ignore the plain statutory language, and subject Kyle to criminal sanction under this statute.
In effect, the Stateās argument here is, pay no attention to the plain reading of the statutory language behind the curtain, because I am the great and powerful ADA Oz! Really, itās ridiculousāand ridiculous ought have no role in a court of law where criminal sanctions and personal liberty are at stake.
He goes through it in detail.......
The first part of the law states you are in violation if you are under 18, possess an object, and that object is a weapon...
However,
The rest of the law states that for the above to actually apply, the following two parts must also exist..
1) you have to be hunting
2) you have to be under 16....
Rittenhouse did not meet either one of those, so as the law states..without those, the first part doesn't count......he wasn't hunting, and he is 17.....
This is why the law is a mess and is likely unConstitutionally vague.....and why the gun charge needs to be dismissed.
He goes through this in about 17 minutes
Here is the post at Law of Self Defense....
Ambiguous Gun Charge & Treacherous Jury Instructions
That still leaves Kyle, however, with one remaining charge: Count 6, the possession of a dangerous weapon by a person-under-18 charge, under §948.60(a)(2). This is a mere misdemeanor charge, and if convicted Kyle is punishable by up to 9 months in jail (presumably lessened by any time served prior to trial).This gun charge has, indeed, become a sticky wicket, largely because of the alleged ambiguity created by the Wisconsin legislature in drafting that statute, by the failure of the relevant Wisconsin Criminal Jury Instructions to accurately reflect the plain statutory language, and by the fecklessness of the prosecution in this case.
Also, because Kyleās claim of self-defense, compelling against the felony charges against him, is irrelevant as a defense to this particular misdemeanor charge. There is no self-defense justification for willfully violating a gun possession law. (Some of you may be thinking that an excuse defense of necessity or lesser harms might apply hereāit would not, for reasons Iāll explain below.)
The relevant part of §948.60 reads:
(2)(a) (a) Any person under 18 years of age who possesses or goes armed with a dangerous weapon is guilty of a Class A misdemeanor.
If that was the only statutory language that applies to Kyle, itās pretty much an open and shut conviction. He was admittedly under 18, and he was in possession of an AR-15 style rifle, which certainly qualifies under Wisconsin law as a dangerous weapon (ādangerous weaponā means any firearm, per section (1) of that same statute, §948.60).
Indeed, the jury instruction that has been drafted with respect to §948.60(a)(2)ā2176 Possession of a Dangerous Weapon by a Childāand specifically reflects this apparent simplicity of construction, defining for the jury the elements that the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt in order to find guilt:
- The defendant possessed an object.
- The object was a dangerous weapon.
- The defendant had not attained the age of 18 years at the time (he) (she) allegedly possessed a dangerous weapon.
But that is not the entire legal analysis. There is more, and it is found later in that same statute §948.60, in paragraph (3)(c). That section reads in relevant part:
(c) This section applies only to a person under 18 years of age who possesses or is armed with a rifle or a shotgun if the person is ⦠not in compliance with ss. 29.304 and 29.593.
So, unless Kyle was ānot in complianceā with §29.304 and §29.593, the §948.60 gun possession statute would seem to not apply to him at allāthat is, he would be legally exempt from the provisions of §948.60 entirely.
So, what are §29.304 and §29.593?
The second of those, §29.593 sets out the conditions that must be met to be certified to engage in certain hunting activities. With respect to these conditions the State correctly points out that Kyle has not met any of these conditionsāand therefore, they argue, Kyle is ānot in complianceā with §29.593.
The first defense counter-argument here could be that that §29.593 applies to hunting activities, and Kyle was not engaged in hunting activities, and therefore §29.593 ought not apply to his circumstances at all.
Perhaps a stronger counter-argument, however, is that the plain reading of §948.60(3)(c) says it applies only āif the person is not in compliance with ss. 29.304 and 29.593.ā It does not read āss. 29.304 or29.593.ā
So, even if Kyle can be said to be ānot in complianceā with §29.593, was he also ānot in complianceā with §29.304?
If we take a closer look at §29.304, we see that it is also a hunting-related statute, but one that involves restrictions on hunting and use of firearms by persons under 16 years of age.
Wait a minuteāhow can Kyle be ānot in complianceā with a statute that applies only to āpersons under 16 years of ageā? He was, after all, 17 years old at the time of these events.
Well, thatās precisely the position of the defense here. They argue that Kyle is legally exempt from the provisions of §29.304, period, because he falls outside the statuteās age range. And if heās exempt, he canāt be ānot in compliance.ā
And if he canāt be ānot in compliance with ss. 29.304,ā he is exempt from §948.60(a)(2) āunlawful possession of a dangerous weapon because of the requirement of paragraph §948.60(3)(c), which on the facts of this case would require non-compliance with §29.304.
The Stateās counter-argument to this plain reading of the statutory language is that, well, the legislature titled §948.60 āPossession of a dangerous weapon by a person under 18,ā so they must have meant some application to āpersons under 18.ā After all, Kyle was admittedly under 18 at the time of these events
We may not understand exactly what the legislature was trying to get at, the State is arguing, but surely they were getting at somethingāand therefore we should ignore the plain statutory language, and subject Kyle to criminal sanction under this statute.
In effect, the Stateās argument here is, pay no attention to the plain reading of the statutory language behind the curtain, because I am the great and powerful ADA Oz! Really, itās ridiculousāand ridiculous ought have no role in a court of law where criminal sanctions and personal liberty are at stake.
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