Modbert
Daydream Believer
- Sep 2, 2008
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Origins of the debt showdown - The Washington Post
[ame=http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bd2B6SjMh_w&ob=av3n]‪Gnarls Barkley - Crazy‬‏ - YouTube[/ame]
The freshmen also heard from GOP pollster Frank Luntz, who offered numbers showing that a majority of Americans did not want the debt limit raised. That sparked lengthy discussions, according to several of those in attendance. The freshmen “left basically saying that if they were going to raise it, ‘We absolutely have to get something in return,’ ” FreedomWorks spokesman Adam Brandon recalled.
About that time, Rep. Jason Chaffetz went to Cantor’s office to chat. Chaffetz, a Utah sophomore, had developed a close bond with Cantor and McCarthy.
Chaffetz asked Cantor: Now that we control the House, how do we use our power?
Cantor didn’t hesitate.
“He said, ‘One of the biggest things that’s going to happen is that we have to deal with the debt ceiling,’ ” Chaffetz recalled in a recent interview. “He, in particular, knew a long time ago that that was going to be a big deal.”
That was a sharper message than Boehner’s, and it had come from his number two.
The leadership, having made the debt limit into a rallying cry, was trying to make sure that the newcomers didn’t push too far. “Leaders like me would try to tell them: Look, no, really, we think it could be bad,” Ryan said. “They’d look at it with suspicion . . . If there was any semi-credible source saying default wouldn’t be so bad, they clung to that.”
Ryan told the newcomers that he learned to work within the system without sacrificing his principles, and he tried to persuade them that they could do the same. He counseled them to be patient, to accept partial victory.
“You have to get a mandate from the country that’s big enough” — control of House, Senate, White House — “to do what we want to do,” he recalled telling them. “We don’t have that kind of mandate right now.”
On Thursday, July 21, Obama’s senior advisers met at the White House with top aides to Boehner and Cantor. For two hours, they went line by line through the emerging agreement. It felt like they were “very close” to the promised land, a senior administration official said.
That afternoon, Obama called Boehner and gave him a choice: If you want aggressive entitlement cuts, I need more revenue. But if you can’t stomach extra revenue, we can dial back the entitlement cuts and still do something important.
The call went well, according to Democrats in the room. That evening, Obama met with Democratic leaders and told them to prepare for tough cuts to Medicare and Medicaid.
Twenty-four hours later, the deal was dead. Once again, Boehner walked away. Worse, from the administration’s point of view, Boehner’s rhetoric was growing harsher, at times echoing the most uncompromising voices in his new majority.
For Republican leaders, there was pride in a hand well played. “I think some of our members may have thought the default issue was a hostage you might take a chance at shooting,” Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.) said. “Most of us didn’t think that. What we did learn is this — it’s a hostage that’s worth ransoming.”
Chaffetz, who voted against both Boehner’s first proposal and the final bill, said he was well aware of how the leadership had used his and others’ willingness to let a default happen as a negotiating chip, and said he didn’t mind at all. “We weren’t kidding around, either,” he said. “We would have taken it down.”
[ame=http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bd2B6SjMh_w&ob=av3n]‪Gnarls Barkley - Crazy‬‏ - YouTube[/ame]