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Although I suppose one might argue that (assuming the pro-lifers are correct) by killing the 'life' this early on you assure the soul a place in heaven because the soul is still innocent. Whereas if you let the soul live its entire life you run the risk that it will become damned
this argument is irrelevant to the murder of a child
this argument is irrelevant to the murder of a child
True. The picture is meant to be emotionally inflammatory, and like most emotional/inflammatory arguments it doesn't make for a very good argument.
And further, even if one agreed that by the stage shown in the picture, there is a 'person,' it doesn't come close to getting you back to the point of conception, which is where the pro-life argument leads.
A photograph of a single cell doesn't have much emotional value, however.
Is that so? If a being is self-aware and possesses the capacity to form preferences and desires about its future, it is a person. Something along these lines has been accepted as criteria for personhood by Enlightenment philosophers.
and your argument leads to murdering baby's viable outside of the womb
well your enlightened philosophers who ever they may be... can kiss my ass
only after quickening, does this occur....that's around 3-4 months....no ..there are no studies required.. brainwaves can be measured.. movements monitored reaction to events out of the womb..attempts to comfort them self's through suckling witnessed on ultra sound...and of course the frantic panicked avoidance of the suction hose and then the silent scream..we know all of this already
the intent was not to allow the murder of the unborn..and you know it
so according to you then approx a third of all abortions are unconstitutional ?
can you verify this ?
We cannot, however, establish that the fetus is human life of significant moral value as easily. The embryo lacks moral value entirely because it does not have a single trait of personhood.
It is not self-aware, (meaning that it does not have the capacity to view itself as a distinct entity existing over time), it does not have the capability to form rational moral preferences about its future, and it lacks the capacity to feel pain. It does not possess the capacity to feel pain until it is a late fetus.
Hence, the reason that the killing of an embryo or fetus is not morally equivalent to the murder of an older human is because the embryo or fetus (Ill say fetus for convenience) is not a self-aware being, and does not possess certain necessary traits of personhood, such as the aforementioned self-consciousness, rationality, and for a long time, the capacity to feel pleasure and pain.
A fetus does not have the same claim to life as a being that possesses those characteristics, and a fetus lacks personhood.
Many nonhuman animals possess greater traits of personhood than a fetus does, and it is considered morally acceptable to kill those animals because they taste good.
Hence, killing a fetus that lacks the capacity to make rational preferences, (such as the desire to live) is not morally equivalent to killing a being which does possess the capacity to make rational preferences, because killing the latter would deny and prevent the satisfaction of such preferences, which is antithetical to Enlightenment values of liberty and self-determination.
It is more wrong to drop a chicken into a pot of boiling water than it would be an egg.
Recall that just about every cell on your body is a potential person. Recall that the existence of potential persons is thwarted by celibacy and contraception, and you do not consider those things to be morally wrong. (Presumably.) The argument regarding the potential personhood of a fetus certainly does not get you very far.
The feminist author Judith Jarvis Thomson has used the following analogy to justify abortion. A famous violinist is stricken with a disease, and requires an extremely rare blood type to survive. You have the blood type, and so a society of music lovers kidnaps you, and attaches your circulatory system to that of the violinist. You could get up and leave if you want to, but if you do, the violinist will die. However, if you remain connected to the violinist for nine months, he will fully recover. Is it morally acceptable for you to disconnect yourself from the violinist? Thomson holds that it is.
Most conservatives consider it acceptable to place rat traps in a rat infested area to prevent the rodents from gnawing through food and other supplies. A single rat can probably incur damage of a few dollars, whereas an inconveniently timed pregnancy can incur damages of thousands of dollars.
Ultimately, we must consider the interests of a woman in not going through nine months of disability and a painful childbirth, as well as whatever economic difficulties an inconveniently timed childbirth may bring outweigh whatever rudimentary interests a fetus that is not a self-aware or rational being has.
I've posted this elsewhere, and it was originally a response to something that someone else said, but I'll repost it again here because I enjoy discussing it.
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The utilitarian justification is one of interests, highly regarded within preference utilitarianism. Most liberal arguments fall short when it comes to addressing conservative opposition to abortion. But the justification based on interests is remarkably successful in this regard.
The typical opposition to abortion is that it destroys innocent human life. Liberals usually object that the fetus is not "human life." I think this is the wrong issue to be addressing. We can establish that the fetus is human life, just as multitudes of cells throughout the human body are "human life." We cannot, however, establish that the fetus is human life of significant moral value as easily. The embryo lacks moral value entirely because it does not have a single trait of personhood. It is not self-aware, (meaning that it does not have the capacity to view itself as a distinct entity existing over time), it does not have the capability to form rational moral preferences about its future, and it lacks the capacity to feel pain. It does not possess the capacity to feel pain until it is a late fetus.
Hence, the reason that the killing of an embryo or fetus is not morally equivalent to the murder of an older human is because the embryo or fetus (Ill say fetus for convenience) is not a self-aware being, and does not possess certain necessary traits of personhood, such as the aforementioned self-consciousness, rationality, and for a long time, the capacity to feel pleasure and pain. A fetus does not have the same claim to life as a being that possesses those characteristics, and a fetus lacks personhood. Many nonhuman animals possess greater traits of personhood than a fetus does, and it is considered morally acceptable to kill those animals because they taste good.
As for the common claim that a fetus is a potential person, a potential person does not possess the same moral rights as an actual person. It does not hold that a potential X is equivalent to a current X. While a being is a fetus, it does not possess self-consciousness, that is, the capacity to view itself as a distinct entity over time. It may someday possess self-consciousness and other traits of personhood, such as rationality and the capacity to feel pleasure and pain, but at the moment, it does not. Hence, killing a fetus that lacks the capacity to make rational preferences, (such as the desire to live) is not morally equivalent to killing a being which does possess the capacity to make rational preferences, because killing the latter would deny and prevent the satisfaction of such preferences, which is antithetical to Enlightenment values of liberty and self-determination.
It is more wrong to drop a chicken into a pot of boiling water than it would be an egg. It is more wrong to chop down a venerable oak tree than to pull out an acorn. Recall that just about every cell on your body is a potential person. Recall that the existence of potential persons is thwarted by celibacy and contraception, and you do not consider those things to be morally wrong. (Presumably.) The argument regarding the potential personhood of a fetus certainly does not get you very far.
The feminist author Judith Jarvis Thomson has used the following analogy to justify abortion. A famous violinist is stricken with a disease, and requires an extremely rare blood type to survive. You have the blood type, and so a society of music lovers kidnaps you, and attaches your circulatory system to that of the violinist. You could get up and leave if you want to, but if you do, the violinist will die. However, if you remain connected to the violinist for nine months, he will fully recover. Is it morally acceptable for you to disconnect yourself from the violinist? Thomson holds that it is.
To me, this is the wrong example to be using becase the fetus lacks personhood. A better example would be if your circulatory system were attached to that of a rat, and the rat would die if you got up and disconnected yourself. Would disconnecting yourself be acceptable in this instance? I suspect that most conservatives would agree, and the only morally relevant difference between the fetus and the rat is that the rat possesses more traits of personhood than the fetus does.
Most conservatives consider it acceptable to place rat traps in a rat infested area to prevent the rodents from gnawing through food and other supplies. A single rat can probably incur damage of a few dollars, whereas an inconveniently timed pregnancy can incur damages of thousands of dollars. Conservatives may argue that the two situations are not comparable, and to some extent this is true, as a rat is a more advanced being than an early embryo or even a late fetus. It possesses a rudimentary level of self-consciousness and is capable of feeling pain.
Ultimately, we must consider the interests of a woman in not going through nine months of disability and a painful childbirth, as well as whatever economic difficulties an inconveniently timed childbirth may bring outweigh whatever rudimentary interests a fetus that is not a self-aware or rational being has.
No, I mentioned the case of this view being explicitly based on a religious tenet. Since the judicial system is so influential when it comes to interpretations of law, and whether or not those interpretations violate the Establishment Clause, they would be likely to reject an explicitly religious tenet that has no basis in secular ethics. Even legislators from the most scarlet red districts are likely to at least pretend that there's some ethical justification for their position outside of religion.
I said nothing of "viable human beings," but was referring to personhood. This does not provide a rationale for euthanizing those with standard mental disabilities, as many can still derive enjoyment from their lives. But yes, it ought to be permissible to euthanize those who lack self-awareness and are in a coma or persistent vegetative state unless they have articulated a prior objection to this. If they have said nothing one way or the other, it ought to be permissible to euthanize them because it makes little difference to them if they are euthanized in a day or in twenty years, whereas it could make a substantial difference to those who would benefit from the resources otherwise diverted to coma patients, and perhaps even their organs if they are harvested.
This is a descriptive observation, not a prescriptive recommendation. The fact that the state currently has a definition of personhood that would seem to include fetuses in some sense does not mean that that definition is ethically sound, just as the state's definition of Dred Scott as a nonperson was not ethically sound.
I don't know.
Most of the people I know who are pro-life will tell you plainly that it stems ultimately from religious beliefs.
The reason there can be no resolution in the abortion debate is that the two sides have vastly different underlying fundamental assumptions, and there is no real way to reconcile the two.
Why is moral value necessarily tied to traits of personhood? I see the correlation but I think you need to spend more time on this connection and not just assume it to be self-evident.
Are these traits or capabilities necessary in your opinion to qualify a human for the right to continue living?
Are you sure that it is not just the fact that we can't identify as easily with a preborn child because we don't share common characteristics? In other words, because we have little in common, it is much easier to disregard or feel less distress over their plight. Much the same as I feel more *personal* distress over the abuse or murder of a neighborhood child than I do the deaths of children in a village in Africa. Both are abhorrent but I relate more easily to and thus am more morally compelled by one rather than the other. It's an issue of perspective.
Why should a fetus' claim to life be dependent on their self-awareness. I understand this argument in the context of the death of the mother in that one can agree that a mother's right to continue living is greater than a fetus' right to live if the two are mutually exclusive. However, the *vast* majority of abortions are conducted based on preference, not necessity.
That is a fact. What is your problem with it?
So the morality of killing a living being is dependent on its ability to recognize its own existence? Would that not imply that it is more acceptable to kill a person in their sleep versus after a bout of torture? I'm using this example to demonstrate that the inherent premise is probably not as sound as one might first think.
Are you a vegetarian? Do you eat chicken?
I agree that there are difficulties with the potential personhood argument that make it less effective to those with their minds already made up in favor of abortion. That being said, the above examples are frankly a bit silly in the context of the word 'potential.' Your implication here is that a skin cell is the same type of potential as the development of a healthy fetus into a more advanced 'person.' You know very well that those are two entirely different forms of the word 'potential.' It's rather underhanded (I won't quite say deceitful) to equate the prevention of potential human life via condoms or abstinence to the termination of potential human life via abortion.
I would question the motives of a person that did disconnect themselves from the violinist. If they had nothing better to do, it is poor form on their part to let the other person die. That being said, pregnancy is a different creature altogether because while sex gives pleasure as an important side effect, its primary evolutionary goal is obviously procreation. It's rather hard to get pregnant without sex. Thus, the violinist example has a few glaring holes.
I'm rather perturbed that we are equating the cost of human life with the damage on foodstuffs that rats can wreak. Take a step back for a minute and reexamine precisely what we are discussing. This is a human life, not a rat. I'm surprised that your own experiences with fatherhood haven't given you a different view.
My position is somewhat utilitarian in nature. The interests of society at whole are damned when human life is reduced to a quantifiable value. Thus, when the interests of the mother in terms of preference are placed above those of allowing a viable human life to continue, society as a whole has suffered.
When the American Bald Eagle was an endangered species, and it was a crime to kill them, did you know that if you destroyed the bald eagle's eggs, they were equally protected as the living eagle itself and the same crime?
I was just wondering how that fit in to all of this...?
Care
Once again, whether the belief that humans are humans regardless how small (straight from Dr. Seuss) has its origin in religion or simply an inate respect for all things living should have absolutely nothing to do with whether it's considered a "valid" opinion or worthy of being held up by law.
The separation of law and state does not mean anything which smacks of religion is therefore "bad" and must be ignored or eliminated. The separation of law and state is simply there to assure that the GOVERNMENT does not dictate to citizens what religion they must worship, and punish those who don't.
It has nothing to do with whether or not people are influenced by their religious beliefs and therefore vote accordingly.
Anti-christians seem to think that "the separation of church and state" means we cannot incorporate anything into law which has been referred to in the Bible or which is taken up as a cause by constituents. They are wrong, of course. Separation of church and state simply means our government is not authorized to force a particular relgion upon us. Period. It doesn't mean we can't listen to those of certain religious groups and, if they vote winningly, apply their laws.
The fact is, many who aren't Christian also think abortion is a horror which should be eliminated. You don't get to trample all over the desires of the MAJORITY OF THE PEOPLE in a democracy simply because you hear a few Christians stating it's not Christian. It doesn't matter. The fact is, if voters don't want it, it ain't happening. What their religion is has nothing to do with it.
In fact, separation of church and state exists just so we can prevent anti-Christian zealots, just as much as we can prevent Christian zealots, from taking over the government and discriminating against those who don't have the same core beliefs. Which is why it's so alarming to hear people say "we can't make abortion illegal because the Christians want us to." That has nothing to do with the separation of church and state, and in fact is a violation of that very precept because you are bringing church into law and declaring that someone of a particular relgion has no voice because of their religion.
Although I suppose one might argue that (assuming the pro-lifers are correct) by killing the 'life' this early on you assure the soul a place in heaven because the soul is still innocent. Whereas if you let the soul live its entire life you run the risk that it will become damned
