Stratfor: Turkey as a Regional Power

[ekrem]

First: I am in full knowledge, that i might hijack the forum with all related to Turkey.
Second: It all gets to a piss-contest.
Third: Time for Words is over, and i will return to the board once we moved into Iraq.

Maybe my stance has produced "negative" feelings. But this should not lead you to intentional misreading/miscalculation of everything my country related in this Region and the will and potential of my country to change faith of this region.
After you read the Stratfor article, i will write something in strategic context and will try to summarize up what strategic goals are and which direction Turkey will go.
And therefore effect the region fundamentally against or to the will of neighbour states or Superpower does not matter, it WILL happen. We have every instrument to do.

After that i will maybe return to the board once this process has practically started (we are already in that process) with first step, North-Iraq.

Turkey as a Regional Power
October 23, 2007 20 30 GMT


Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) guerrillas based in northern Iraq ambushed Turkish troops near the border Oct. 21, killing 12 soldiers and suffering 23 casualties in the ensuing firefight, according to the Turkish government. For its part, the PKK said it captured eight Turkish troops, though Ankara has not confirmed the claim.

Based on prior PKK attacks, the Turkish parliament last week authorized the use of force in Iraq. This latest attack, therefore, was clearly designed to challenge that decision. Even before the dust had settled Oct. 21, Iraqi President Jalal Talabani, a Kurd, rejected an earlier demand from Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan that Baghdad shut down all PKK camps in Iraqi territory and hand over PKK leaders. Talabani said Iraq cannot solve Turkey's problem, given that PKK leaders hide out in rugged mountains and even the "mighty" Turkish military has failed to kill or capture them. Specifically, he said, "The handing over of PKK leaders to Turkey is a dream that will never be realized."

If that position holds, it is difficult to imagine that the Turks won't move into northern Iraq and re-establish the sphere of influence and security they had during the Saddam Hussein era. The United States is working furiously to satisfy Turkey by taking responsibility for controlling the PKK. It is not clear whether the United States can deliver, nor is it clear whether the Turks are prepared to rely on the United States. Some move into Iraq is likely, in our mind, but even if it doesn't happen in this particular case, tensions between Turkey and the United States will remain. More important, Turkey's willingness to play a secondary role in the region is declining.

This is not really new. The Turks refused to allow the United States to invade Iraq from Turkish territory, even though Washington offered them free room to maneuver in northern Iraq in exchange for their cooperation. The Turks, however, were not unhappy with the status quo in Iraq. They also were concerned about the consequences of an American invasion and were not eager to be seen as a tool of the United States in the Islamic world.

At the same time, the Turks did not want a rupture with the United States -- given that the relationship has been the foundation of Turkish foreign policy since World War II. The refusal of the European Union to admit Turkey in particular made it necessary for Ankara to preserve its relationship with Washington. Therefore, although the invasion was problematic for the Turks, they have cooperated with the United States, allowing a large portion of the supplies for U.S. troops in Iraq to come through Turkey.

The Turkish balancing act on Iraq has pivoted on one fundamental national security consideration: that the autonomy given to Iraq's Kurds remains limited. The Kurdish nationality crosses existing borders -- into Iraq, Turkey, Iran and, to a lesser extent, Syria -- and represents a geographically coherent, self-aware nation without a state. Historically, the Kurds generally were compelled to be part of larger empires, including the Ottoman Empire. When that empire collapsed -- leaving Turkey as its successor -- these other countries contained Kurdish lands, with more than half of the Kurds living in Turkey. The Turks, dealing with the collapse of their empire and the building of a new nation-state, feared that Kurdish independence would lead to the disintegration of that nation-state. Therefore, they had -- and continue to maintain -- a fixed policy to suppress Kurdish nationalism.

From the Turkish point of view, the greatest danger is that an independent Kurdistan will be created in Iran or Iraq, and that the homeland will be used to base and support Kurds seeking independence from Turkey. In fact, each of these countries -- and outside powers such as the United States, Soviet Union and United Kingdom -- have used the Kurds as a tool to apply pressure on Turkey, Iran or Iraq at various times. They have used Kurdish separatism as a threat, and then normally double-crossed the Kurds, making a broader deal with the nation-state in question.

The evolution of events in Iraq is particularly alarming to the Turks. Hussein was not necessarily to the Turks' liking, but he did pursue one policy that was identical to that of the Turks: He opposed Kurdish independence. The U.S. policy after Desert Storm was to use the Iraqi Kurds against Hussein -- and the United States helped carve out an area of Iraqi Kurdistan that he could not reach. The Turks, uneasy with this arrangement, entered Iraq in the 1990s to create a buffer zone against the Kurds. The United States did not object to this move because it increased the pressure on Hussein.

In looking at current U.S. strategy in Iraq, the Turks have drawn two conclusions. The first is that the United States, focused on Iraq's Sunni and Shiite areas, has little interest in controlling the Kurdish region -- the one area that is fairly unambiguously pro-American. The second is that the Iranians and Shia want an Iraq divided into three regions -- or even independent states -- and that a U.S. policy designed to create a federal state with a strong central government will fail.

Therefore, Turkey's perception is that it already is dealing with the post-war world, one in which an increasingly bold Iraqi Kurdistan is pursuing a policy of expanding Kurdish autonomy by facilitating a guerrilla war in Turkey. The PKK's actions in recent weeks confirm this view in their mind. They also believe they cannot deal with the Kurdish challenge defensively, and therefore they must defend by attacking. Hence, the creation of a security zone in Iraq.

From the Kurds' point of view, if there ever was a moment to assert their national rights, this is it. However, their highly risky gamble is that the United States will not chance an anti-American uprising in Iraq's Kurdish areas and so will limit the extent to which Turkey can intervene. Moreover, with the United States at odds with Iran, it might support a Kurdish uprising there. Hence, though the stakes are high, the Kurdish gamble is not irrational.

The Kurds in Iraq are correct in their view that the United States does not want conflict in the one area in Iraq that is not anti-American. They also are correct that this is a unique moment for them. But they are betting that the Turks don't recognize the danger and thus will place their interests second to those of the United States -- which is more concerned with stability in Iraqi Kurdistan than with suppressing attacks in Turkey's Kurdish areas. Although this might have been true of Turkey 10 years ago, it no longer is true today. The U.S.-Turkish relationship has flipped. The United States needs Turkey more than Turkey needs the United States -- for reasons beyond getting supplies to Iraq.

Al Qaeda's geopolitical threat has subsided, no uprising capable of effecting regime change has occurred in the Islamic world and the threat of a unified Islamic world has vastly decreased. Meanwhile, the grand strategy of the United States has remained the same. It played Hitler against Stalin, Mao against Brezhnev and is now playing Sunni against Shi'i. The Sunni threat having subsided, the Shiite and Iranian threats remain. The current U.S. task is to build an anti-Iranian coalition. Regardless of whether the Europeans approve sanctions against Iran, its neighbors are important -- and one of the most important is Turkey. However, given that Turkey and Iran have a common interest in preventing an independent Kurdish nation anywhere, the more the United States supports the Iraqi Kurds, the greater the danger of an Iranian-Turkish alliance. At the moment, that is the last thing the United States wants to see, which is why the resolution on Turkish responsibility for Armenian genocide in the U.S. Congress could not possibly have come at a worse moment.

But that is atmospherics. When we look beyond al Qaeda and beyond Iran -- a country that has been unable to create substantial spheres of influence for many centuries -- we see a single country that is likely to begin bringing order to the region: Turkey. Turkey is the heir to the Ottoman Empire, which at various points dominated the eastern Mediterranean, North Africa, the Arabian Peninsula, the Caucasus and deep into Russia. Its collapse after World War I created an oddity -- an inward-looking state in Asia Minor. Cautious in World War II and strictly aligned with the United States during the Cold War, Turkey played a passive role: It either sat things out or allowed its strategic territory to be used.

The situation has changed dramatically. In 2006, Turkey had the 18th largest economy in the world -- larger than that of any other Muslim country, including Saudi Arabia -- and the economy has been growing at a rate of between 5 percent and 7 percent a year for five years. Most important, Turkey is not a purely export-oriented country. It has developed a substantial middle class that buys the products it produces. It has a substantial and competent military and is handling the stresses between institutions and ideologies well.

It also is surrounded by chaos. Apart from Iraq to the south, there is profound instability in the Caucasus to the north and the Balkans to the northwest. The southern region from the Levant to the Persian Gulf is tremendously tense. The stability of Egypt -- and therefore the eastern Mediterranean -- after President Hosni Mubarak departs is in question. Turkey's longtime rival, Greece, no longer presents the challenge it once did. Moreover, the European Union's effective rejection of Turkey has freed the country from many of the constraints that its membership hopes might have imposed.

Turkey has a vested interest in stabilizing the region. It no longer regards the United States as a stabilizing force, and it sees Europe as a collective entity and individual nations as both hostile and impotent. It views the Russians as a long-term threat to its interests and sees Russia's potential return to Turkey's frontier as a long-term challenge. As did the Ottomans, it views Iran as a self-enclosed backwater. It is far more interested in the future of Syria and Iraq, its relationship with its ally, Israel, and ultimately the future of the Arabian Peninsula.

In other words, Turkey should be viewed as a rapidly emerging regional power -- or, in the broadest sense, as beginning the process of recreating a regional hegemon of enormous strategic power, based in Asia Minor but projecting political, economic and military forces in a full circle. Its willingness to rely on the United States to guarantee its national security ended in 2003. It is prepared to cooperate with the United States on issues of mutual interest, but not as a subordinate power.

This emergence, in our view, is in the very early stages. Just as Turkey's economy and its internal politics have undergone dramatic changes in the past five years, so have its foreign policies. The Turks are cautiously reaching out and influencing events throughout the region. In one sense, the intervention in Iraq would simply be a continuation of policies followed in the 1990s. But in the current context, it would represent more: a direct assertiveness of its natural interests independent of the United States.

Looked at broadly, three things have happened. First, the collapse of Yugoslavia drew Turkey into a region where it had traditional interest. Second, the collapse and resurrection of Russian power has made Turkey look northward to the Caucasus. Finally, the chaos in the Arab world has drawn Turkey southward. Limits on Turkish behavior from Europe and the United States have been dramatically reduced as a result of Western strategy. Turkey believes it needs to bring order to regions where the United States and Europe have proven either ineffective or hostile to Turkish interests.

Considering the future of the region, the only power in a position to assert its consistent presence is Turkey. Iran, its nearest competitor, is neither in competition with Turkey, nor does it have a fraction of its power -- nuclear weapons or not. Turkey has historically dominated the region, though not always to the delight of others there. Nevertheless, its historical role has been to pick up the pieces left by regional chaos. In our view, it is beginning to move down that road.

Its current stance on the Kurdish issue is merely a first step. What makes that position important is that Turkey is pursuing its interests indifferent to European or American views. Additionally, the reversal of dependency between the United States and Turkey is ultimately more important than whether Turkey goes into Iraq. The U.S. invasion of Iraq kicked off many processes in the world and created many windows of opportunity. Watching Turkey make its moves, we wonder less about the direction it is going than about the limits of its ambition.

http://www.stratfor.com/products/premium/read_article.php?id=297234

 

[William Joyce]

The Turks should return the Hagia Sophia to the Christians. I'll give them 10 days... then lob a big fat nuke at Ankara.

 

[trobinett]

The Turks should return the Hagia Sophia to the Christians. I'll give them 10 days... then lob a big fat nuke at Ankara.

Ya know, if canavar is any example, I'm with ya on this William.

 

[ekrem]

So, where to begin?
Let me begin with USA.
A status of an US dog like Israel, Egypt, Saudi-Arabia is not our destiny and we will not be.

If attacking Iraq was against our interests, not even the Superpower can force us to it. Same thing applies to potential Iran war.
The ultimate maxim is Turkish interest.
That is the friction going on between Turkey and USA. USA wants Turkey as its dog, Turkey acting for USA interests.
This arrogance of USA is documentated by Wolfowitz style in the aftermath of parliament decision in March 2003 demanding apologies from Turkish nation in live interview in CNN-Turk.

Wolfowitz effectively demanded an apology, saying: “Lets have a Turkey that steps up and says we made a mistake. We should have known how bad things were in Iraq but we know now. Let’s figure out how we can be as helpful as possible to the Americans.”

http://www.wsws.org/articles/2003/may2003/turk-m24.shtml

So what this all about was is not the subject here, but there were serious negotiations between USA and Turkey. And it seems USA did not gave what Turkey wanted for Turkey being part of US War Machinery to change the region.
Turkey thought, and is ultimatively proven right when we look to US quagmire, that USA can not do without Turkey.
USA thought it can anyway and relied on the Kurdish card. By doing so multiplying the friction between Turkey and USA.

By playing the Kurdish card and signalizing to Turkey that things will chage against our interests in the region, Turkey arranged immediately with Iran and Syria which also are directly effected by this Kurdish Card.
Ideology, frictions and de-facto war status between Iran, Syria and Turkey changed overnight.
With this also came Turkish economic expansion into these former foe countries.
And there is still huge potential.

USA is in shit in Iraq. But the bigger shit is waiting in Iran. Therefore it needs the Kurds. Bombing from above is no solution as Mullahs will stay with same ideology.
Without regime change, USA can bomb Iran in 2 year frequency it will only force them to build their facilities even deeper into ground.
What counts is the availibility of knowledge and the intention to utilize this knowledge. You can not bomb away this knowledge and also not that INTENTION as long as Mullahs stay.

The easiest way for USA is Turkey joining US War Machinery against Iran.
We would finish them off very quickly. But we won't, especially not after happenings since 2003, your arrogance to Turkish deaths and your motives to lie about Turkish history in your senate regarding Armenians.
So your only option is indeed the Kurds. You have self-restricted yourself on the weakest option available to people, who despite your US financed propaganda about "Happy Kurdistan" are people from the mountains without any infrastructure, power protection and so on.
Also they are going to be owned big time by Turkey.

That said, we can progress in discussion from 3 possibilities:
a) USA will attack Iran big time, forceing Regime change
b) USA will strike Iran by air
c) USA arranges with reality of nuclear Iran

Turkey will watch and keep its ressources in human, material and money terms in pocket. Invasion of North-Iraq is no big issue.
What happens in Iran is not directly in our interest zone. Where we have interest in Iran is the North-Western part which has acces to Caspian Sea.
This area will anyway fall into Turkish influence zone. There live about 15-25 Million Azeri Turks there, which have direct ethnic roots to Turkey and Azerbaijan and we all speak same language. Turkey will have de-facto boarder to Caspian Sea through South-Azerbaijan cementing a block of over 100 mio Turks with same ethnicity and same language from Istanbul-Bakü-Tebriz.
Behind Caspian Sea is even a bigger Turkic world stretching to the boarders of China. Allthough these Turkic tribes speak different dialects then those Turks Oghuz tribe west of Caspian Sea, which are also described as "Western Turks".


If the USA wants to free "Iran" and therefore also South-Azerbaijan with USA ressources and in the outcome expand Turkey's power without Turkey shot one bullet, so be it. It does not happen every day, that GI's die for Turkish interests.

What USA has to live with is that Turkey will from day to day play bigger role as Big Boss in this area. Of course not also limited to Mid-East area, but pivotal to our area in all directions. The only serious barrier is lying in the North with Russia.
In long-term Russia and Turkey might be opponents, but till there is many time not closeing door for possible strategic cooperation in the meanwhile. Especially when Turkey-USA relations get irreperably out of order.
And these signs are emergingly visible. The most painful outcome of this would be
a) Russia and Turkey (the only 2 geographical options in Energy ressource transfer to the west) playing coordinated Energy monopol.
b) disarming of Black Sea under "Blackseafor"-Plattform and therefore multiplying Russian influence by stationing Russian fleet in Syria. As long as Turkish navy outnumbers Russian Black Sea fleet and Turkey does not disarm Black-Sea as biggest Navy power, Russia will never come down to warm waters.

So the question is whether USA is a barrier to Turkish interest projection in the Mid-East or it is not. Currently it is big time. If it will be further once Turkey moves into Iraq, we will see. But pragmatism to new situation is likely from Washington.

Turkey has huge duty. It is to modernize the Sunnite world with Turkish understanding of Islam. For this we have to bind these economies to ours.
We have the industrial capability for this. 65% of industrial exports from North-Africa and Mid-East region come from Turkey.
Through economic exchange (one-way direction, as Sunnites have almost nothing to export except Oil and oil derivate industry products), we get also a tool of influence. By exorting to them we also strengthen our finances.
It is a win-win-win-win situation. Next steps will be things like importing brainpower to Turkish universities from Sunnite world rather them going to distant cultures.
Turkey it is ideal, freedom combined with local culture. From state-supervised brothels to state-controlled mosques.
You do not belive which charisma potential Turkey has to Muslim world. Off course the moderate part. To radicalists like Al-Qaeda, a country like Turkey, is their worse nightmare. So no matter what, Turkish fight against Al-Qaeda etc. will go on.
This binds us to USA interests. But a country like Turkey can not limit itself as War Machinery against Islamic terrorism.

From Iran every year come over 1 Mio tourists. Most of them young people and believe me even in the Turkish air-machines the veils fall of.
Iran in 2006 for a while stopped tourism to Turkish coast cities like Antalya and Bodrum but revised the ban after Turkish pressure:
http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/haber.aspx?id=4370721&tarih=2006-05-06

In Iranian power politics, there are even used videos of Iranian parliamentarians who are caught on video enjoying turkish belly dancers for power politics to discredit the other side. In this case it was Iranian cultural minister Esfandiyar Rahim Maşaie. The video was burned on CD and spreaded in Iranian parliament. He was then fined from Ahmadinajad with money fee.
Here the video and news:
http://www.milliyet.com.tr/2007/01/03/son/sondun12.asp:

But let me stay more on strategic things and more related to Turkey:
The North-Iraqi Kurds will fall under Turkish power umbrella. It is the next step of North-Iraq already being totally dependent on Turkish economy. That boom in "Kurdistan" is related to Turkish economy and Turkish businessman.
The USA is for now an obstacle for Turkey expanding its infuence into North-Iraq and therefore also to Sunnite regions in Iraq.
This is temporarily.
And Barzani with its acts and linguistic has made very clear that he will not play the Turkish dog. Talabani-Clan is pragmatist and they will. So Barzani either sticks to its role or killed.
In the end, if Iran does not get attacked it is also that what USA wants.
I am sure USA does not want a land-locked North-Iraq fall under Mullah power zone opening from there to the world. Not as if we would allow Iran anyway, they have nothing to search in North-Iraq.
USA currently thinks it has something to search in North-Iraq. How long we all will see. If Iraq is being divided it will be not against our interest, but to our interests.
Everything else is baseless thoughts of gray-haired congressmen in USA.
Turkey is the reality on ground.

Before i go to much Megalomaniac (near future) i exit with another
Stratfor Analysis from July about Turkish Power pojection.
It is exactly of what i am talking about and very good like the introduceing article from stratfor.
Maybe, despite past user-conflicts, this gives you a picture about Turkish role in the region. GunnyL phrases alike (Camel Turkey) or roomy alike people, who according to theirself piss against the wind and say everything to Turkey related "bastard", i am so sick of.
I think both articles and aditional provided personal views give you exact outlook of Turkish action and Turkish role and implications fro USA interests.
Maybe once i return i can also come up with extending links/analyses of Turkish steps regarding Syria,Israel and other pivotal regions.
If Turkey cooperates with USA or Turkey puts USA a foot so it falls over it, we will see based on developments of USA pragmatism once Turkey moves into North-Iraq.
Finished.

The Geopolitics of Turkey
July 31, 2007 17 58 GMT
By George Friedman

The broader issue is not the PKK, but Kurdish independence. The Kurds are a distinct ethnic group divided among Turkey, Iran, Iraq and, to a small extent, Syria. The one thing all of these countries have agreed on historically is they have no desire to see an independent Kurdistan. Even though each has, on occasion, used Kurdish dissidents in other countries as levers against those countries, there always has been a regional consensus against a Kurdish state.
Therefore, the news that Turkey is considering targeting the PKK is part of the broader issue. The evolution of events in Iraq has created an area that is now under the effective governance of the Iraqi Kurds. Under most scenarios, the Iraqi Kurds will retain a high degree of autonomy. Under some scenarios, the Kurds in Iraq could become formally independent, creating a Kurdish state. Besides facing serious opposition from Iraq's Sunni and Shiite factions, that state would be a direct threat to Turkey and Iran, since it would become, by definition, the nucleus of a Kurdish state that would lay claim to other lands the Kurds regard as theirs.
This is one of the reasons Turkey was unwilling to participate in the U.S. invasion of Iraq. The Americans grew close to the Kurds in Iraq during Operation Desert Storm, helping augment the power of an independent militia, the peshmerga, that allowed the Iraqi Kurds to carve out a surprising degree of independence within Saddam Hussein's Iraq. The Turks were never comfortable with this policy and sent troops into Iraq in the 1990s to strike against the PKK and pre-empt any moves toward more extensive autonomy. Before the war started in 2003, however, the Turks turned down a U.S. offer to send troops into northern Iraq in exchange for allowing the United States to use Turkish territory to launch into Iraq. This refusal caused Turkey to lose a great deal of its mobility in the region.
The Turks, therefore, are tremendously concerned by the evolution of events in Iraq. Whether northern Iraq simply evolves into an autonomous region in a federal Iraq or becomes an independent state as Iraq disintegrates is almost immaterial. It will become a Kurdish homeland and it will exist on the Turkish border. And that, from the Turkish point of view, represents a strategic threat to Turkey.
Turkey, then, is flexing its muscles along the Iraqi border. Given that Turkey did not participate in the 2003 invasion, the American attitude toward Ankara has been complex, to say the least. On one hand, there was a sense of being let down by an old ally. On the other hand, given events in Iraq and U.S. relations with Iran and Syria, the United States was not in a position to completely alienate a Muslim neighbor of Iraq.
As time passed and the situation in Iraq worsened, the Americans became even less able to isolate Turkey. That is partly because its neutrality was important and partly because the United States was extremely concerned about Turkish reactions to growing Kurdish autonomy. For the Turks, this was a fundamental national security issue. If they felt the situation were getting out of hand in the Kurdish regions, they might well intervene militarily. At a time when the Kurds comprised the only group in Iraq that was generally pro-American, the United States could hardly let the Turks mangle them.
On the other hand, the United States was hardly in a position to stop the Turks. The last thing the United States wanted was a confrontation with the Turks in the North, for military as well as political reasons. Yet, the other last thing it wanted was for other Iraqis to see that the United States would not protect them.
Stated differently, the United States had no solution to the Turkish-Kurdish equation. So what the United States did was a tap dance -- by negotiating a series of very temporary solutions that kept the Turks from crossing the line and kept the Kurds intact. The current crisis is over the status of the PKK in northern Iraq and, to a great degree, over Turkish concerns that Iraqi Kurds will gain too much autonomy, not to mention over concerns about the future status of the oil-rich city of Kirkuk. The United States may well be ready to support the Turks in rooting out PKK separatists, but it is not prepared to force the Iraqi Kurds to give them up. So it will try to persuade them to give them up voluntarily. This negotiating process will buy time, though at this point the American strategy in Iraq generally has been reduced to buying time.
All of this goes beyond the question of Iraq or an independent Kurdistan. The real question concerns the position of Turkey as a regional power in the wake of the Iraq war. This is a vital question because of Iran. The assumption we have consistently made is that, absent the United States, Iran would become the dominant regional power and would be in a position, in the long term, to dominate the Arabian Peninsula, shifting not only the regional balance of power but also potentially the global balance as well.
That analysis assumes that Turkey will play the role it has played since World War I -- an insular, defensive power that is cautious about making alliances and then cautious within alliances. In that role, Turkey is capable of limited assertiveness, as against the Greeks in Cyprus, but is not inclined to become too deeply entangled in the chaos of the Middle Eastern equation -- and when it does become involved, it is in the context of its alliance with the United States.
That is not Turkey's traditional role. Until the fall of the Ottomans at the end of World War I, and for centuries before then, Turkey was both the dominant Muslim power and a major power in North Africa, Southeastern Europe and the Middle East. Turkey was the hub of a multinational empire that as far back as the 15th century dominated the Mediterranean and Black seas. It was the economic pivot of three continents, facilitating and controlling the trading system of much of the Eastern Hemisphere.
Turkey's contraction over the past 90 years or so is not the normal pattern in the region, and had to do with the internal crisis in Turkey since the fall of the Ottomans, the emergence of French and British power in the Middle East, followed by American power and the Cold War, which locked Turkey into place. During the Cold War, Turkey was trapped between the Americans and Soviets, and expansion of its power was unthinkable. Since then, Turkey has been slowly emerging as a key power.
One of the main drivers in this has been the significant growth of the Turkish economy. In 2006, Turkey had the 18th highest gross domestic product (GDP) in the world, and it has been growing at between 5 percent and 8 percent a year for more than five years. It ranks just behind Belgium and ahead of Sweden in GDP. It has the largest economy of any Muslim country -- including Saudi Arabia. And it has done this in spite of, or perhaps because of, not having been admitted to the European Union. While per capita GDP lags, it is total GDP that measures weight in the international system. China, for example, is 109th in per capita GDP. Its international power rests on it being fourth in total GDP.
Turkey is not China, but in becoming the largest Muslim economy, as well as the largest economy in the eastern Mediterranean, Southeastern Europe, the Middle East, the Caucasus and east to the Hindu Kush, Turkey is moving to regain its traditional position of primacy in the region. Its growth is still fragile and can be disrupted, but there is no question that it has become the leading regional economy, as well as one of the most dynamic. Additionally, Turkey's geographic position greatly enables it to become Europe's primary transit hub for energy supplies, especially at a time when Europe is trying to reduce its dependence on Russia.
This obviously has increased its regional influence. In the Balkans, for example, where Turkey historically has been a dominant power, the Turks have again emerged as a major influence over the region's two Muslim states -- and have managed to carve out for themselves a prominent position as regards other countries in the region as well. The country's economic dynamism has helped reorient some of the region away from Europe, toward Turkey. Similarly, Turkish economic influence can be felt elsewhere in the region, particularly as a supplement to its strategic relationship with Israel.
Turkey's problem is that in every direction it faces, its economic expansion is blocked by politico-military friction. So, for example, its influence in the Balkans is blocked by its long-standing friction with Greece. In the Caucasus, its friction with Armenia limits its ability to influence events. Tensions with Syria and Iraq block Syrian influence to the south. To the east, a wary Iran that is ideologically opposed to Turkey blocks Ankara's influence.
As Turkey grows, an interesting imbalance has to develop. The ability of Greece, Armenia, Syria, Iraq and Iran to remain hostile to Turkey decreases as the Turkish economy grows. Ideology and history are very real things, but so is the economic power of a dynamic economy. As important, Turkey's willingness to accept its highly constrained role indefinitely, while its economic -- and therefore political -- influence grows, is limited. Turkey's economic power, coupled with its substantial regional military power, will over time change the balance of power in each of the regions Turkey faces.
Not only does Turkey interface with an extraordinary number of regions, but its economy also is the major one in each of those regions, while Turkish military power usually is pre-eminent as well. When Turkey develops economically, it develops militarily. It then becomes the leading power -- in many regions. That is what it means to be a pivotal power.
In 2003, the United States was cautious with Turkey, though in the final analysis it was indifferent. It no longer can be indifferent. The United States is now in the process of planning the post-Iraq war era, and even if it does retain permanent bases in Iraq -- dubious for a number of reasons -- it will have to have a regional power to counterbalance Iran. Iran has always been aware of and cautious with Turkey, but never as much as now -- while Turkey is growing economically and doing the heavy lifting on the Kurds. Iran does not want to antagonize the Turks.
The United States and Iran have been talking -- just recently engaging in seven hours of formal discussions. But Iran, betting that the United States will withdraw from Iraq, is not taking the talks as seriously as it might. The United States has few levers to use against Iran. It is therefore not surprising that it has reached out to the biggest lever.
In the short run, Turkey, if it works with the United States, represents a counterweight to Iran, not only in general, but also specifically in Iraq. From the American point of view, a Turkish invasion of northern Iraq would introduce a major force native to the region that certainly would give Iran pause in its behavior in Iraq. This would mean the destruction of Kurdish hopes for independence, though the United States has on several past occasions raised and then dashed Kurdish hopes. In this sense, Novak's article makes a great deal of sense. The PKK would provide a reasonable excuse for a Turkish intervention in Iraq, both in the region and in Turkey. Anything that blocks the Kurds will be acceptable to the Turkish public, and even to Iran.
It is the longer run that is becoming interesting, however. If the United States is not going to continue counterbalancing Iran in the region, then it is in Turkey's interest to do so. It also is increasingly within Turkey's reach. But it must be understood that, given geography, the growth of Turkish power will not be confined to one direction. A powerful and self-confident Turkey has a geographical position that inevitably reflects all the regions that pivot around it.
For the past 90 years, Turkey has not played its historic role. Now, however, economic and politico-military indicators point to Turkey's slow reclamation of that role. The rumors about Turkish action against the PKK have much broader significance. They point to a changing role for Turkey -- and that will mean massive regional changes over time.

https://www.stratfor.org/products/premium/read_article.php?id=293204

 

[trobinett]

If ya look up posturing in the dictionary, you see posts like the above.

canavar, if spewing the BS, and pasting the propaganda, that you've been posting for the last few months makes you feel better, well, good for ya.

Personally, your only deluding yourself..............

 

[Gunny]

If ya look up posturing in the dictionary, you see posts like the above.

canavar, if spewing the BS, and pasting the propaganda, that you've been posting for the last few months makes you feel better, well, good for ya.

Personally, your only deluding yourself..............

Trying to talk sense into him is like trying to reason with my ex ... ain't going to happen.

Canavar is a warmongering idiot. So much so, he has let common sense completely escape him. He comes on here bowing his chest up talking shit like a chihuahua yapping at a pit bull.

If Turkey attacks a terrorist organization, who gives a shit? If Turkey attacks US forces, Turkey will relive WWI. Simple as that.

 

[doniston]

The Turks should return the Hagia Sophia to the Christians. I'll give them 10 days... then lob a big fat nuke at Ankara.

More stupodoty rears it's ugly head. I am very glad you are not in a position to follow thru.-----yes, I said stupodoty