Palestinian Authority Back in Control?

[flacaltenn]

You'd never know it from the discussions in this forum, but Egypt brokered a re-unification deal between the Gaza Hamas Govt and the PA about 7 months ago. This comes after SIX failed attempts since 2008 to reconcile the 2 sides. This an attempt to get Hamas to relinquish EXCLUSIVE control over Gaza and work to end the embargoes with a new unity govt.

Fatah returned to Gaza to hold PA cabinet meetings and establish plans for joint security of Gaza about 7 months ago. This was all news to me as I was cruising YouTube last night for background on the "city-state" concept.

 

[Dogmaphobe]

Two different tribes who can't quite decide upon the best method for killing Jews have now reconciled some differences to be more united in their agenda.

This will change the essential dynamic how?

 

[Sixties Fan]

[ What reconciliation? The PA still does not have control of the
crossing or anything else for that matter ]

Hamas claims PA bombed its own prime minister to ‘kill reconciliation’

Hamas leader: Group still seeking reconciliation with Fatah

 

[Sixties Fan]

Egypt fails to gather PA, Hamas for reconciliation talks

 

[flacaltenn]

[ What reconciliation? The PA still does not have control of the
crossing or anything else for that matter ]

Hamas claims PA bombed its own prime minister to ‘kill reconciliation’

Hamas leader: Group still seeking reconciliation with Fatah

Yeah --- this may be the SHORTEST thread I ever started. Just discovered that what happened 7 months only seems to have lasted about one month..

Abbas’ sanctions on Gaza are bad news for both the Palestinians and Israel

It was simple logic: Egypt managed to get the bitter rivals in one room, but demanded that they avoid discussing the biggest obstacle—handing the security control over the Gaza Strip to the Palestinian Authority and disarming the military wings.

So the organizations’ leaders sat around one table in Cairo and then in Gaza, shook hands, raised them in the air with a big smile, posed for photographs and promised that this time it’s for real, that this time it will work out. But the elephant in the room was too
big,

It took Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas only several days to declare from every stage that the Hezbollah model in Lebanon would not be duplicated in the Gaza Strip. Different Palestinian officials asserted in closed briefings that not a single worker in Hamas’ security apparatuses would be incorporated into the Palestinian security apparatuses. Hamas, for its part, presented a very simple model: Anything above the ground would be under the Palestinian government’s responsibility, and anything underground would be under Hamas’ responsibility. Make no mistake—the word “underground” doesn’t refer to the tunnels alone, but to everything that has to do with the organization’s military wing, the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades.

But plans are one thing, and reality is another thing. Hamas did hand the control over the crossings to the PA, dismantle its front posts near the Erez and Karni crossings and give the PA control over the Rafah Crossing (which remained almost permanently closed), and the Palestinian government ministers in Ramallah did receive control over their ministries in Gaza, at least on paper—but that’s more or less where it ended.


Signs of escalation
Many believed that from this point, the reconciliation process would slowly die down, but then two explosions occurred: A physical explosion in the form of a roadside bomb that was detonated near Palestinian Prime Minister Rami Hamdallah’s convoy, and the second explosion in the form of Abbas’ verbal attack on Hamas at a Palestinian leadership meeting in Ramallah. Not only has Abbas failed to lift most of the sanctions he imposed on the strip before the reconciliation agreement, but last week he even announced he would step up the measures against Gaza and Hamas. Further sanctions in the current unstable situation in the Gaza Strip will clearly deepen the crisis and the civilians’ distress. Ending the reconciliation agreement on a violent note is bad news for the Palestinians, but for Israel too.

 

[flacaltenn]

But the other thing I did not know was how brutal the PA was to Gazans for all those years. It was the West Bank PA that chronically caused the water/electricity shortages by not paying the BILLS !!! And the PA was a active participant in many embargoed items.

 

[P F Tinmore]

[ What reconciliation? The PA still does not have control of the
crossing or anything else for that matter ]

Hamas claims PA bombed its own prime minister to ‘kill reconciliation’

Hamas leader: Group still seeking reconciliation with Fatah

Yeah --- this may be the SHORTEST thread I ever started. Just discovered that what happened 7 months only seems to have lasted about one month..

Abbas’ sanctions on Gaza are bad news for both the Palestinians and Israel

It was simple logic: Egypt managed to get the bitter rivals in one room, but demanded that they avoid discussing the biggest obstacle—handing the security control over the Gaza Strip to the Palestinian Authority and disarming the military wings.

So the organizations’ leaders sat around one table in Cairo and then in Gaza, shook hands, raised them in the air with a big smile, posed for photographs and promised that this time it’s for real, that this time it will work out. But the elephant in the room was too
big,

It took Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas only several days to declare from every stage that the Hezbollah model in Lebanon would not be duplicated in the Gaza Strip. Different Palestinian officials asserted in closed briefings that not a single worker in Hamas’ security apparatuses would be incorporated into the Palestinian security apparatuses. Hamas, for its part, presented a very simple model: Anything above the ground would be under the Palestinian government’s responsibility, and anything underground would be under Hamas’ responsibility. Make no mistake—the word “underground” doesn’t refer to the tunnels alone, but to everything that has to do with the organization’s military wing, the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades.

But plans are one thing, and reality is another thing. Hamas did hand the control over the crossings to the PA, dismantle its front posts near the Erez and Karni crossings and give the PA control over the Rafah Crossing (which remained almost permanently closed), and the Palestinian government ministers in Ramallah did receive control over their ministries in Gaza, at least on paper—but that’s more or less where it ended.


Signs of escalation
Many believed that from this point, the reconciliation process would slowly die down, but then two explosions occurred: A physical explosion in the form of a roadside bomb that was detonated near Palestinian Prime Minister Rami Hamdallah’s convoy, and the second explosion in the form of Abbas’ verbal attack on Hamas at a Palestinian leadership meeting in Ramallah. Not only has Abbas failed to lift most of the sanctions he imposed on the strip before the reconciliation agreement, but last week he even announced he would step up the measures against Gaza and Hamas. Further sanctions in the current unstable situation in the Gaza Strip will clearly deepen the crisis and the civilians’ distress. Ending the reconciliation agreement on a violent note is bad news for the Palestinians, but for Israel too.

Indeed, the security forces have been the division since 2007 and that problem has its roots going back to Oslo. The security forces were established to be under the authority of the president but under the ultimate control of Israel. These forces regularly violate domestic and international law and the rights of the Palestinians. They give no security to the Palestinians.

These are the forces that Hamas ran out of Gaza in 2007 and they really do not want them back.

 

[flacaltenn]

[ What reconciliation? The PA still does not have control of the
crossing or anything else for that matter ]

Hamas claims PA bombed its own prime minister to ‘kill reconciliation’

Hamas leader: Group still seeking reconciliation with Fatah

Yeah --- this may be the SHORTEST thread I ever started. Just discovered that what happened 7 months only seems to have lasted about one month..

Abbas’ sanctions on Gaza are bad news for both the Palestinians and Israel

It was simple logic: Egypt managed to get the bitter rivals in one room, but demanded that they avoid discussing the biggest obstacle—handing the security control over the Gaza Strip to the Palestinian Authority and disarming the military wings.

So the organizations’ leaders sat around one table in Cairo and then in Gaza, shook hands, raised them in the air with a big smile, posed for photographs and promised that this time it’s for real, that this time it will work out. But the elephant in the room was too
big,

It took Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas only several days to declare from every stage that the Hezbollah model in Lebanon would not be duplicated in the Gaza Strip. Different Palestinian officials asserted in closed briefings that not a single worker in Hamas’ security apparatuses would be incorporated into the Palestinian security apparatuses. Hamas, for its part, presented a very simple model: Anything above the ground would be under the Palestinian government’s responsibility, and anything underground would be under Hamas’ responsibility. Make no mistake—the word “underground” doesn’t refer to the tunnels alone, but to everything that has to do with the organization’s military wing, the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades.

But plans are one thing, and reality is another thing. Hamas did hand the control over the crossings to the PA, dismantle its front posts near the Erez and Karni crossings and give the PA control over the Rafah Crossing (which remained almost permanently closed), and the Palestinian government ministers in Ramallah did receive control over their ministries in Gaza, at least on paper—but that’s more or less where it ended.


Signs of escalation
Many believed that from this point, the reconciliation process would slowly die down, but then two explosions occurred: A physical explosion in the form of a roadside bomb that was detonated near Palestinian Prime Minister Rami Hamdallah’s convoy, and the second explosion in the form of Abbas’ verbal attack on Hamas at a Palestinian leadership meeting in Ramallah. Not only has Abbas failed to lift most of the sanctions he imposed on the strip before the reconciliation agreement, but last week he even announced he would step up the measures against Gaza and Hamas. Further sanctions in the current unstable situation in the Gaza Strip will clearly deepen the crisis and the civilians’ distress. Ending the reconciliation agreement on a violent note is bad news for the Palestinians, but for Israel too.

Indeed, the security forces have been the division since 2007 and that problem has its roots going back to Oslo. The security forces were established to be under the authority of the president but under the ultimate control of Israel. These forces regularly violate domestic and international law and the rights of the Palestinians. They give no security to the Palestinians.

These are the forces that Hamas ran out of Gaza in 2007 and they really do not want them back.

Those PA security forces had TOTAL control of the major Pali cities before the Civil War. And the courts that went with them. With very little interference from Israel. That's WHY Israel in 2004 started the process to give COMPLETE authority in Gaza. Of course, that was a disaster when Hamas turned from a welfare org into a warfare org.

And the PA SINCE THEN has been right along side Egypt, Jordan, Israel and much of the world in ISOLATING and PUNISHING Gaza.

 

[Hollie]

[ What reconciliation? The PA still does not have control of the
crossing or anything else for that matter ]

Hamas claims PA bombed its own prime minister to ‘kill reconciliation’

Hamas leader: Group still seeking reconciliation with Fatah

Yeah --- this may be the SHORTEST thread I ever started. Just discovered that what happened 7 months only seems to have lasted about one month..

Abbas’ sanctions on Gaza are bad news for both the Palestinians and Israel

It was simple logic: Egypt managed to get the bitter rivals in one room, but demanded that they avoid discussing the biggest obstacle—handing the security control over the Gaza Strip to the Palestinian Authority and disarming the military wings.

So the organizations’ leaders sat around one table in Cairo and then in Gaza, shook hands, raised them in the air with a big smile, posed for photographs and promised that this time it’s for real, that this time it will work out. But the elephant in the room was too
big,

It took Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas only several days to declare from every stage that the Hezbollah model in Lebanon would not be duplicated in the Gaza Strip. Different Palestinian officials asserted in closed briefings that not a single worker in Hamas’ security apparatuses would be incorporated into the Palestinian security apparatuses. Hamas, for its part, presented a very simple model: Anything above the ground would be under the Palestinian government’s responsibility, and anything underground would be under Hamas’ responsibility. Make no mistake—the word “underground” doesn’t refer to the tunnels alone, but to everything that has to do with the organization’s military wing, the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades.

But plans are one thing, and reality is another thing. Hamas did hand the control over the crossings to the PA, dismantle its front posts near the Erez and Karni crossings and give the PA control over the Rafah Crossing (which remained almost permanently closed), and the Palestinian government ministers in Ramallah did receive control over their ministries in Gaza, at least on paper—but that’s more or less where it ended.


Signs of escalation
Many believed that from this point, the reconciliation process would slowly die down, but then two explosions occurred: A physical explosion in the form of a roadside bomb that was detonated near Palestinian Prime Minister Rami Hamdallah’s convoy, and the second explosion in the form of Abbas’ verbal attack on Hamas at a Palestinian leadership meeting in Ramallah. Not only has Abbas failed to lift most of the sanctions he imposed on the strip before the reconciliation agreement, but last week he even announced he would step up the measures against Gaza and Hamas. Further sanctions in the current unstable situation in the Gaza Strip will clearly deepen the crisis and the civilians’ distress. Ending the reconciliation agreement on a violent note is bad news for the Palestinians, but for Israel too.

Indeed, the security forces have been the division since 2007 and that problem has its roots going back to Oslo. The security forces were established to be under the authority of the president but under the ultimate control of Israel. These forces regularly violate domestic and international law and the rights of the Palestinians. They give no security to the Palestinians.

These are the forces that Hamas ran out of Gaza in 2007 and they really do not want them back.

Indeed, what we see are the tribal rivalries that divide two mini-caliphates vying for ultimate control of the UNRWA welfare fraud.

 

[P F Tinmore]

[ What reconciliation? The PA still does not have control of the
crossing or anything else for that matter ]

Hamas claims PA bombed its own prime minister to ‘kill reconciliation’

Hamas leader: Group still seeking reconciliation with Fatah

Yeah --- this may be the SHORTEST thread I ever started. Just discovered that what happened 7 months only seems to have lasted about one month..

Abbas’ sanctions on Gaza are bad news for both the Palestinians and Israel

It was simple logic: Egypt managed to get the bitter rivals in one room, but demanded that they avoid discussing the biggest obstacle—handing the security control over the Gaza Strip to the Palestinian Authority and disarming the military wings.

So the organizations’ leaders sat around one table in Cairo and then in Gaza, shook hands, raised them in the air with a big smile, posed for photographs and promised that this time it’s for real, that this time it will work out. But the elephant in the room was too
big,

It took Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas only several days to declare from every stage that the Hezbollah model in Lebanon would not be duplicated in the Gaza Strip. Different Palestinian officials asserted in closed briefings that not a single worker in Hamas’ security apparatuses would be incorporated into the Palestinian security apparatuses. Hamas, for its part, presented a very simple model: Anything above the ground would be under the Palestinian government’s responsibility, and anything underground would be under Hamas’ responsibility. Make no mistake—the word “underground” doesn’t refer to the tunnels alone, but to everything that has to do with the organization’s military wing, the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades.

But plans are one thing, and reality is another thing. Hamas did hand the control over the crossings to the PA, dismantle its front posts near the Erez and Karni crossings and give the PA control over the Rafah Crossing (which remained almost permanently closed), and the Palestinian government ministers in Ramallah did receive control over their ministries in Gaza, at least on paper—but that’s more or less where it ended.


Signs of escalation
Many believed that from this point, the reconciliation process would slowly die down, but then two explosions occurred: A physical explosion in the form of a roadside bomb that was detonated near Palestinian Prime Minister Rami Hamdallah’s convoy, and the second explosion in the form of Abbas’ verbal attack on Hamas at a Palestinian leadership meeting in Ramallah. Not only has Abbas failed to lift most of the sanctions he imposed on the strip before the reconciliation agreement, but last week he even announced he would step up the measures against Gaza and Hamas. Further sanctions in the current unstable situation in the Gaza Strip will clearly deepen the crisis and the civilians’ distress. Ending the reconciliation agreement on a violent note is bad news for the Palestinians, but for Israel too.

Indeed, the security forces have been the division since 2007 and that problem has its roots going back to Oslo. The security forces were established to be under the authority of the president but under the ultimate control of Israel. These forces regularly violate domestic and international law and the rights of the Palestinians. They give no security to the Palestinians.

These are the forces that Hamas ran out of Gaza in 2007 and they really do not want them back.

Those PA security forces had TOTAL control of the major Pali cities before the Civil War. And the courts that went with them. With very little interference from Israel. That's WHY Israel in 2004 started the process to give COMPLETE authority in Gaza. Of course, that was a disaster when Hamas turned from a welfare org into a warfare org.

And the PA SINCE THEN has been right along side Egypt, Jordan, Israel and much of the world in ISOLATING and PUNISHING Gaza.

Nice deflection.

 

[Hollie]

[ What reconciliation? The PA still does not have control of the
crossing or anything else for that matter ]

Hamas claims PA bombed its own prime minister to ‘kill reconciliation’

Hamas leader: Group still seeking reconciliation with Fatah

Yeah --- this may be the SHORTEST thread I ever started. Just discovered that what happened 7 months only seems to have lasted about one month..

Abbas’ sanctions on Gaza are bad news for both the Palestinians and Israel

It was simple logic: Egypt managed to get the bitter rivals in one room, but demanded that they avoid discussing the biggest obstacle—handing the security control over the Gaza Strip to the Palestinian Authority and disarming the military wings.

So the organizations’ leaders sat around one table in Cairo and then in Gaza, shook hands, raised them in the air with a big smile, posed for photographs and promised that this time it’s for real, that this time it will work out. But the elephant in the room was too
big,

It took Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas only several days to declare from every stage that the Hezbollah model in Lebanon would not be duplicated in the Gaza Strip. Different Palestinian officials asserted in closed briefings that not a single worker in Hamas’ security apparatuses would be incorporated into the Palestinian security apparatuses. Hamas, for its part, presented a very simple model: Anything above the ground would be under the Palestinian government’s responsibility, and anything underground would be under Hamas’ responsibility. Make no mistake—the word “underground” doesn’t refer to the tunnels alone, but to everything that has to do with the organization’s military wing, the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades.

But plans are one thing, and reality is another thing. Hamas did hand the control over the crossings to the PA, dismantle its front posts near the Erez and Karni crossings and give the PA control over the Rafah Crossing (which remained almost permanently closed), and the Palestinian government ministers in Ramallah did receive control over their ministries in Gaza, at least on paper—but that’s more or less where it ended.


Signs of escalation
Many believed that from this point, the reconciliation process would slowly die down, but then two explosions occurred: A physical explosion in the form of a roadside bomb that was detonated near Palestinian Prime Minister Rami Hamdallah’s convoy, and the second explosion in the form of Abbas’ verbal attack on Hamas at a Palestinian leadership meeting in Ramallah. Not only has Abbas failed to lift most of the sanctions he imposed on the strip before the reconciliation agreement, but last week he even announced he would step up the measures against Gaza and Hamas. Further sanctions in the current unstable situation in the Gaza Strip will clearly deepen the crisis and the civilians’ distress. Ending the reconciliation agreement on a violent note is bad news for the Palestinians, but for Israel too.

Indeed, the security forces have been the division since 2007 and that problem has its roots going back to Oslo. The security forces were established to be under the authority of the president but under the ultimate control of Israel. These forces regularly violate domestic and international law and the rights of the Palestinians. They give no security to the Palestinians.

These are the forces that Hamas ran out of Gaza in 2007 and they really do not want them back.

Those PA security forces had TOTAL control of the major Pali cities before the Civil War. And the courts that went with them. With very little interference from Israel. That's WHY Israel in 2004 started the process to give COMPLETE authority in Gaza. Of course, that was a disaster when Hamas turned from a welfare org into a warfare org.

And the PA SINCE THEN has been right along side Egypt, Jordan, Israel and much of the world in ISOLATING and PUNISHING Gaza.

Nice deflection.

Nice sidestep with the usual, goofy youtube video but the fact is, those islamic terrorists at the top of UNRWA welfare fraud syndicate have amassed huge personal fortunes by exploiting a UN agency that is out of control.

 

[flacaltenn]

[ What reconciliation? The PA still does not have control of the
crossing or anything else for that matter ]

Hamas claims PA bombed its own prime minister to ‘kill reconciliation’

Hamas leader: Group still seeking reconciliation with Fatah

Yeah --- this may be the SHORTEST thread I ever started. Just discovered that what happened 7 months only seems to have lasted about one month..

Abbas’ sanctions on Gaza are bad news for both the Palestinians and Israel

It was simple logic: Egypt managed to get the bitter rivals in one room, but demanded that they avoid discussing the biggest obstacle—handing the security control over the Gaza Strip to the Palestinian Authority and disarming the military wings.

So the organizations’ leaders sat around one table in Cairo and then in Gaza, shook hands, raised them in the air with a big smile, posed for photographs and promised that this time it’s for real, that this time it will work out. But the elephant in the room was too
big,

It took Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas only several days to declare from every stage that the Hezbollah model in Lebanon would not be duplicated in the Gaza Strip. Different Palestinian officials asserted in closed briefings that not a single worker in Hamas’ security apparatuses would be incorporated into the Palestinian security apparatuses. Hamas, for its part, presented a very simple model: Anything above the ground would be under the Palestinian government’s responsibility, and anything underground would be under Hamas’ responsibility. Make no mistake—the word “underground” doesn’t refer to the tunnels alone, but to everything that has to do with the organization’s military wing, the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades.

But plans are one thing, and reality is another thing. Hamas did hand the control over the crossings to the PA, dismantle its front posts near the Erez and Karni crossings and give the PA control over the Rafah Crossing (which remained almost permanently closed), and the Palestinian government ministers in Ramallah did receive control over their ministries in Gaza, at least on paper—but that’s more or less where it ended.


Signs of escalation
Many believed that from this point, the reconciliation process would slowly die down, but then two explosions occurred: A physical explosion in the form of a roadside bomb that was detonated near Palestinian Prime Minister Rami Hamdallah’s convoy, and the second explosion in the form of Abbas’ verbal attack on Hamas at a Palestinian leadership meeting in Ramallah. Not only has Abbas failed to lift most of the sanctions he imposed on the strip before the reconciliation agreement, but last week he even announced he would step up the measures against Gaza and Hamas. Further sanctions in the current unstable situation in the Gaza Strip will clearly deepen the crisis and the civilians’ distress. Ending the reconciliation agreement on a violent note is bad news for the Palestinians, but for Israel too.

Indeed, the security forces have been the division since 2007 and that problem has its roots going back to Oslo. The security forces were established to be under the authority of the president but under the ultimate control of Israel. These forces regularly violate domestic and international law and the rights of the Palestinians. They give no security to the Palestinians.

These are the forces that Hamas ran out of Gaza in 2007 and they really do not want them back.

Those PA security forces had TOTAL control of the major Pali cities before the Civil War. And the courts that went with them. With very little interference from Israel. That's WHY Israel in 2004 started the process to give COMPLETE authority in Gaza. Of course, that was a disaster when Hamas turned from a welfare org into a warfare org.

And the PA SINCE THEN has been right along side Egypt, Jordan, Israel and much of the world in ISOLATING and PUNISHING Gaza.

Nice deflection.

As this thread topic demonstrates, things changed WEEKLY with cooperation and negotiations in that place. THere's a few bright spots and a TON of disappointments. It got as good as it could get around 2004 and then went to crap.

 

[P F Tinmore]

[ What reconciliation? The PA still does not have control of the
crossing or anything else for that matter ]

Hamas claims PA bombed its own prime minister to ‘kill reconciliation’

Hamas leader: Group still seeking reconciliation with Fatah

Yeah --- this may be the SHORTEST thread I ever started. Just discovered that what happened 7 months only seems to have lasted about one month..

Abbas’ sanctions on Gaza are bad news for both the Palestinians and Israel

It was simple logic: Egypt managed to get the bitter rivals in one room, but demanded that they avoid discussing the biggest obstacle—handing the security control over the Gaza Strip to the Palestinian Authority and disarming the military wings.

So the organizations’ leaders sat around one table in Cairo and then in Gaza, shook hands, raised them in the air with a big smile, posed for photographs and promised that this time it’s for real, that this time it will work out. But the elephant in the room was too
big,

It took Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas only several days to declare from every stage that the Hezbollah model in Lebanon would not be duplicated in the Gaza Strip. Different Palestinian officials asserted in closed briefings that not a single worker in Hamas’ security apparatuses would be incorporated into the Palestinian security apparatuses. Hamas, for its part, presented a very simple model: Anything above the ground would be under the Palestinian government’s responsibility, and anything underground would be under Hamas’ responsibility. Make no mistake—the word “underground” doesn’t refer to the tunnels alone, but to everything that has to do with the organization’s military wing, the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades.

But plans are one thing, and reality is another thing. Hamas did hand the control over the crossings to the PA, dismantle its front posts near the Erez and Karni crossings and give the PA control over the Rafah Crossing (which remained almost permanently closed), and the Palestinian government ministers in Ramallah did receive control over their ministries in Gaza, at least on paper—but that’s more or less where it ended.


Signs of escalation
Many believed that from this point, the reconciliation process would slowly die down, but then two explosions occurred: A physical explosion in the form of a roadside bomb that was detonated near Palestinian Prime Minister Rami Hamdallah’s convoy, and the second explosion in the form of Abbas’ verbal attack on Hamas at a Palestinian leadership meeting in Ramallah. Not only has Abbas failed to lift most of the sanctions he imposed on the strip before the reconciliation agreement, but last week he even announced he would step up the measures against Gaza and Hamas. Further sanctions in the current unstable situation in the Gaza Strip will clearly deepen the crisis and the civilians’ distress. Ending the reconciliation agreement on a violent note is bad news for the Palestinians, but for Israel too.

Indeed, the security forces have been the division since 2007 and that problem has its roots going back to Oslo. The security forces were established to be under the authority of the president but under the ultimate control of Israel. These forces regularly violate domestic and international law and the rights of the Palestinians. They give no security to the Palestinians.

These are the forces that Hamas ran out of Gaza in 2007 and they really do not want them back.

Those PA security forces had TOTAL control of the major Pali cities before the Civil War. And the courts that went with them. With very little interference from Israel. That's WHY Israel in 2004 started the process to give COMPLETE authority in Gaza. Of course, that was a disaster when Hamas turned from a welfare org into a warfare org.

And the PA SINCE THEN has been right along side Egypt, Jordan, Israel and much of the world in ISOLATING and PUNISHING Gaza.

Nice deflection.

As this thread topic demonstrates, things changed WEEKLY with cooperation and negotiations in that place. THere's a few bright spots and a TON of disappointments. It got as good as it could get around 2004 and then went to crap.

Interesting. What were the bright spots and what were the clunkers?

 

[member]

[ What reconciliation? The PA still does not have control of the
crossing or anything else for that matter ]

Hamas claims PA bombed its own prime minister to ‘kill reconciliation’

Hamas leader: Group still seeking reconciliation with Fatah

Yeah --- this may be the SHORTEST thread I ever started. Just discovered that what happened 7 months only seems to have lasted about one month..

Abbas’ sanctions on Gaza are bad news for both the Palestinians and Israel

It was simple logic: Egypt managed to get the bitter rivals in one room, but demanded that they avoid discussing the biggest obstacle—handing the security control over the Gaza Strip to the Palestinian Authority and disarming the military wings.

So the organizations’ leaders sat around one table in Cairo and then in Gaza, shook hands, raised them in the air with a big smile, posed for photographs and promised that this time it’s for real, that this time it will work out. But the elephant in the room was too
big,

It took Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas only several days to declare from every stage that the Hezbollah model in Lebanon would not be duplicated in the Gaza Strip. Different Palestinian officials asserted in closed briefings that not a single worker in Hamas’ security apparatuses would be incorporated into the Palestinian security apparatuses. Hamas, for its part, presented a very simple model: Anything above the ground would be under the Palestinian government’s responsibility, and anything underground would be under Hamas’ responsibility. Make no mistake—the word “underground” doesn’t refer to the tunnels alone, but to everything that has to do with the organization’s military wing, the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades.

But plans are one thing, and reality is another thing. Hamas did hand the control over the crossings to the PA, dismantle its front posts near the Erez and Karni crossings and give the PA control over the Rafah Crossing (which remained almost permanently closed), and the Palestinian government ministers in Ramallah did receive control over their ministries in Gaza, at least on paper—but that’s more or less where it ended.


Signs of escalation
Many believed that from this point, the reconciliation process would slowly die down, but then two explosions occurred: A physical explosion in the form of a roadside bomb that was detonated near Palestinian Prime Minister Rami Hamdallah’s convoy, and the second explosion in the form of Abbas’ verbal attack on Hamas at a Palestinian leadership meeting in Ramallah. Not only has Abbas failed to lift most of the sanctions he imposed on the strip before the reconciliation agreement, but last week he even announced he would step up the measures against Gaza and Hamas. Further sanctions in the current unstable situation in the Gaza Strip will clearly deepen the crisis and the civilians’ distress. Ending the reconciliation agreement on a violent note is bad news for the Palestinians, but for Israel too.

Indeed, the security forces have been the division since 2007 and that problem has its roots going back to Oslo. The security forces were established to be under the authority of the president but under the ultimate control of Israel. These forces regularly violate domestic and international law and the rights of the Palestinians. They give no security to the Palestinians.

These are the forces that Hamas ran out of Gaza in 2007 and they really do not want them back.

These forces regularly violate domestic and international law and the rights of the Palestinians


i just love when a [non-muslim] white-man speaks about muslims and their rights and violations of this and that.



= go fuck yourself man-hole.

 

[flacaltenn]

Yeah --- this may be the SHORTEST thread I ever started. Just discovered that what happened 7 months only seems to have lasted about one month..

Abbas’ sanctions on Gaza are bad news for both the Palestinians and Israel

It was simple logic: Egypt managed to get the bitter rivals in one room, but demanded that they avoid discussing the biggest obstacle—handing the security control over the Gaza Strip to the Palestinian Authority and disarming the military wings.

So the organizations’ leaders sat around one table in Cairo and then in Gaza, shook hands, raised them in the air with a big smile, posed for photographs and promised that this time it’s for real, that this time it will work out. But the elephant in the room was too
big,

It took Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas only several days to declare from every stage that the Hezbollah model in Lebanon would not be duplicated in the Gaza Strip. Different Palestinian officials asserted in closed briefings that not a single worker in Hamas’ security apparatuses would be incorporated into the Palestinian security apparatuses. Hamas, for its part, presented a very simple model: Anything above the ground would be under the Palestinian government’s responsibility, and anything underground would be under Hamas’ responsibility. Make no mistake—the word “underground” doesn’t refer to the tunnels alone, but to everything that has to do with the organization’s military wing, the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades.

But plans are one thing, and reality is another thing. Hamas did hand the control over the crossings to the PA, dismantle its front posts near the Erez and Karni crossings and give the PA control over the Rafah Crossing (which remained almost permanently closed), and the Palestinian government ministers in Ramallah did receive control over their ministries in Gaza, at least on paper—but that’s more or less where it ended.


Signs of escalation
Many believed that from this point, the reconciliation process would slowly die down, but then two explosions occurred: A physical explosion in the form of a roadside bomb that was detonated near Palestinian Prime Minister Rami Hamdallah’s convoy, and the second explosion in the form of Abbas’ verbal attack on Hamas at a Palestinian leadership meeting in Ramallah. Not only has Abbas failed to lift most of the sanctions he imposed on the strip before the reconciliation agreement, but last week he even announced he would step up the measures against Gaza and Hamas. Further sanctions in the current unstable situation in the Gaza Strip will clearly deepen the crisis and the civilians’ distress. Ending the reconciliation agreement on a violent note is bad news for the Palestinians, but for Israel too.

Indeed, the security forces have been the division since 2007 and that problem has its roots going back to Oslo. The security forces were established to be under the authority of the president but under the ultimate control of Israel. These forces regularly violate domestic and international law and the rights of the Palestinians. They give no security to the Palestinians.

These are the forces that Hamas ran out of Gaza in 2007 and they really do not want them back.

Those PA security forces had TOTAL control of the major Pali cities before the Civil War. And the courts that went with them. With very little interference from Israel. That's WHY Israel in 2004 started the process to give COMPLETE authority in Gaza. Of course, that was a disaster when Hamas turned from a welfare org into a warfare org.

And the PA SINCE THEN has been right along side Egypt, Jordan, Israel and much of the world in ISOLATING and PUNISHING Gaza.

Nice deflection.

As this thread topic demonstrates, things changed WEEKLY with cooperation and negotiations in that place. THere's a few bright spots and a TON of disappointments. It got as good as it could get around 2004 and then went to crap.

Interesting. What were the bright spots and what were the clunkers?

That's the problem. You are so opinionated, but are totally clueless to history of the Pali Authority. Even the 6 or 8 attempts to unify the govt SINCE the Civil War (that you denied happening). All those attempts ended very badly. And the PA ITSELF got into the business of the Gaza blockade in a big way.

Until you KNOW anything useful about this history, I'm not wasting time educating you..

 

[P F Tinmore]

Even the 6 or 8 attempts to unify the govt SINCE the Civil War (that you denied happening).

It wasn't a "civil war." The US gave money and weapons to Fatah to overthrow the Hamas led Palestinian Authority.

 

[P F Tinmore]

All those attempts ended very badly.

What was the clunker?

 

[Hollie]

Even the 6 or 8 attempts to unify the govt SINCE the Civil War (that you denied happening).

It wasn't a "civil war." The US gave money and weapons to Fatah to overthrow the Hamas led Palestinian Authority.

The Islamics from competing tribes who were killed or tortured during that civil war might disagree with you.

 

[P F Tinmore]

Even the 6 or 8 attempts to unify the govt SINCE the Civil War (that you denied happening).

It wasn't a "civil war." The US gave money and weapons to Fatah to overthrow the Hamas led Palestinian Authority.

The Islamics from competing tribes who were killed or tortured during that civil war might disagree with you.

I notice you did not refute my post.

 

[Hollie]

Even the 6 or 8 attempts to unify the govt SINCE the Civil War (that you denied happening).

It wasn't a "civil war." The US gave money and weapons to Fatah to overthrow the Hamas led Palestinian Authority.

The Islamics from competing tribes who were killed or tortured during that civil war might disagree with you.

I notice you did not refute my post.

The dead Islamics as a result of the civil war did that for me.

I noticed you retreated with your usual cut and paste slogans.