harmonica
Diamond Member
- Sep 1, 2017
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...first off, Operation Market Garden 17 Sep 1944 was a LONG SHOT gamble
1. one MSR = easily cut/defended by even half trained-minimal forces-defense easier than offense
2. airborne forces landed far away from objectives/landed in piecemeal
3. gamble was against a well trained/disciplined/etc enemy
--less of a gamble against shitheads
ok--the critical point of the plan was to lay a ''carpet'' of airborne so the tanks/etc good roll over the carpet
...but Gen. Gavin wanted to secure the Groesbeek Heights BEFORE a ''major attack on the Nijmegen Bridge = causing THE critical delay.................????!!!!
it was the critical delay, but was only part of many errors
bad plan executed poorly against a well trained/etc foe = failure
was this critical? --my opinion is no....
as stated:
1. 1 MSR
2. dedicated/well trained enemy
3. forces not landed en masse
4. radios didn't work
5. 1st Airborne commander unable to communicate/separated from his unit!!!
etc etc
1. one MSR = easily cut/defended by even half trained-minimal forces-defense easier than offense
2. airborne forces landed far away from objectives/landed in piecemeal
3. gamble was against a well trained/disciplined/etc enemy
--less of a gamble against shitheads
ok--the critical point of the plan was to lay a ''carpet'' of airborne so the tanks/etc good roll over the carpet
...but Gen. Gavin wanted to secure the Groesbeek Heights BEFORE a ''major attack on the Nijmegen Bridge = causing THE critical delay.................????!!!!
it was the critical delay, but was only part of many errors
bad plan executed poorly against a well trained/etc foe = failure
was this critical? --my opinion is no....
as stated:
1. 1 MSR
2. dedicated/well trained enemy
3. forces not landed en masse
4. radios didn't work
5. 1st Airborne commander unable to communicate/separated from his unit!!!
etc etc
Divisional plan to allow a single battalion to proceed towards the Bridge immediately after landing.
they waited for seven hours before leaving the Heights. By this time the resistance ahead of them had considerably stiffened and no headway could be made.
Reasons for the FailureBy contrast, Nijmegen Bridge was the only way across the 400-yard wide River Waal to Arnhem, and without its capture the 1st Airborne Division would be cut-off behind two very large rivers and thirteen miles of hostile territory.