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We were surprisedsee post # 19How so?goes both ways--doesn't itMonday morning quarterbackingthey had ''peacetime'' mindset--after a war warning --after Tarantohttps://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/a-war-warning-is-sent-to-commanders-in-the-pacific
It was a failure from the top down, everyone believed Hawaii was too far away and too strong to be attacked.
Kimmel and Short were scapegoats.
Now one commander that was guilty as hell was MacArthur, he was told of the Japanese attack on Pearl and ordered to prepare his air forces accordingly and expect an attack from the Japanese. He acknowledged those orders then did nothing, the Army Air Corps in the Philippines was caught on the ground the same way (and in the same parked configurations) as in Hawaii but obviously he did not suffer the same fate as Kimmel and Short.
Also, specifically in Africa the main ground commander, Fredendall was still "stuck" in WWI with his thinking and also tended to play his subordinate commanders off against each other while making no real decisions. Things obviously changed when Patton replaced him.
We were litterally "An Army at Dawn" as Atkinson wrote about in an excellent book with the same title.
We also had a lot of learning to do in the pacific in all branches of service specifically with moribund attitudes and ideas at the upper echelons of military command and control.
.....--I remember reading in the mid 80's about how the Israelis defended against airplanes used as weapons ......but then after 9-11, many professionals never even thought of it ---well, I knew about them in the mid 80's as an mere E2 in the military....the professionals should've been thinking about that--just as Short and Kimmel should have known about Taranto = and know Pearl was vulnerable
so if we were surprised by 30 planes that would be different than being surprised by 350??!! --being surprised does not have different levelsWe were surprisedsee post # 19How so?goes both ways--doesn't itMonday morning quarterbackingthey had ''peacetime'' mindset--after a war warning --after Taranto
.....--I remember reading in the mid 80's about how the Israelis defended against airplanes used as weapons ......but then after 9-11, many professionals never even thought of it ---well, I knew about them in the mid 80's as an mere E2 in the military....the professionals should've been thinking about that--just as Short and Kimmel should have known about Taranto = and know Pearl was vulnerable
There were no significant directives out of the Navy warning of a serious threat of a Japanese carrier attack.
Taranto was twenty something planes. Pearl Harbor was 350 planes. The magnitude of the attack was unprecedented
Assembling that many carrier based planes and covering thousands of miles of ocean was unprecedentedso if we were surprised by 30 planes that would be different than being surprised by 350??!! --being surprised does not have different levelsWe were surprisedsee post # 19How so?goes both ways--doesn't itMonday morning quarterbacking
There were no significant directives out of the Navy warning of a serious threat of a Japanese carrier attack.
Taranto was twenty something planes. Pearl Harbor was 350 planes. The magnitude of the attack was unprecedented
....I'll say it again--in the mid 80s, I was aware of the use of airplanes used as weapons---but many professionals were surprised by 9-11 = they should not have been surprisedWe were surprisedsee post # 19How so?goes both ways--doesn't itMonday morning quarterbackingthey had ''peacetime'' mindset--after a war warning --after Taranto
.....--I remember reading in the mid 80's about how the Israelis defended against airplanes used as weapons ......but then after 9-11, many professionals never even thought of it ---well, I knew about them in the mid 80's as an mere E2 in the military....the professionals should've been thinking about that--just as Short and Kimmel should have known about Taranto = and know Pearl was vulnerable
There were no significant directives out of the Navy warning of a serious threat of a Japanese carrier attack.
Taranto was twenty something planes. Pearl Harbor was 350 planes. The magnitude of the attack was unprecedented
9/11: The Week BeforeThe attacks of September 11th, 2001 came as a surprise, shocking the world and immediately dominating the news around the world
but a carrier attack Was done beforeAssembling that many carrier based planes and covering thousands of miles of ocean was unprecedentedso if we were surprised by 30 planes that would be different than being surprised by 350??!! --being surprised does not have different levelsWe were surprisedsee post # 19How so?goes both ways--doesn't it
There were no significant directives out of the Navy warning of a serious threat of a Japanese carrier attack.
Taranto was twenty something planes. Pearl Harbor was 350 planes. The magnitude of the attack was unprecedented
We were surprised, it had never been done before.....or after
Assembling that many carrier based planes and covering thousands of miles of ocean was unprecedentedso if we were surprised by 30 planes that would be different than being surprised by 350??!! --being surprised does not have different levelsWe were surprisedsee post # 19How so?goes both ways--doesn't it
There were no significant directives out of the Navy warning of a serious threat of a Japanese carrier attack.
Taranto was twenty something planes. Pearl Harbor was 350 planes. The magnitude of the attack was unprecedented
We were surprised, it had never been done before.....or after
Milwaukee's Billy Mitchell predicted Pearl Harbor attackYears before Japanese military officers considered going to war with the United States, a Milwaukeean anticipated just such an attack.
....I'll say it again--in the mid 80s, I was aware of the use of airplanes used as weapons---but many professionals were surprised by 9-11 = they should not have been surprisedWe were surprisedsee post # 19How so?goes both ways--doesn't itMonday morning quarterbacking
There were no significant directives out of the Navy warning of a serious threat of a Japanese carrier attack.
Taranto was twenty something planes. Pearl Harbor was 350 planes. The magnitude of the attack was unprecedented
9/11: The Week BeforeThe attacks of September 11th, 2001 came as a surprise, shocking the world and immediately dominating the news around the world
YET they attacked the WTC before!!!!!
1993 World Trade Center Bombing Fast Facts - CNN
....maybe if you're a cab driver you would be surprised --but a professional military/defense person should not
And nobody believed himAssembling that many carrier based planes and covering thousands of miles of ocean was unprecedentedso if we were surprised by 30 planes that would be different than being surprised by 350??!! --being surprised does not have different levelsWe were surprisedsee post # 19How so?
There were no significant directives out of the Navy warning of a serious threat of a Japanese carrier attack.
Taranto was twenty something planes. Pearl Harbor was 350 planes. The magnitude of the attack was unprecedented
We were surprised, it had never been done before.....or afterMilwaukee's Billy Mitchell predicted Pearl Harbor attackYears before Japanese military officers considered going to war with the United States, a Milwaukeean anticipated just such an attack.
there was never a a sea battle before between BBs/dreadnoughts/etc?Assembling that many carrier based planes and covering thousands of miles of ocean was unprecedentedso if we were surprised by 30 planes that would be different than being surprised by 350??!! --being surprised does not have different levelsWe were surprisedsee post # 19How so?goes both ways--doesn't it
There were no significant directives out of the Navy warning of a serious threat of a Japanese carrier attack.
Taranto was twenty something planes. Pearl Harbor was 350 planes. The magnitude of the attack was unprecedented
We were surprised, it had never been done before.....or after
that's what separates the great leaders [ Yamamoto ] from the mediocreAssembling that many carrier based planes and covering thousands of miles of ocean was unprecedentedso if we were surprised by 30 planes that would be different than being surprised by 350??!! --being surprised does not have different levelsWe were surprisedsee post # 19How so?goes both ways--doesn't it
There were no significant directives out of the Navy warning of a serious threat of a Japanese carrier attack.
Taranto was twenty something planes. Pearl Harbor was 350 planes. The magnitude of the attack was unprecedented
We were surprised, it had never been done before.....or after
Yamamoto caught us with our pants downthe Japanese did the same at Midway--they did not think our carriers would be there
there was never a a sea battle before between BBs/dreadnoughts/etc?Assembling that many carrier based planes and covering thousands of miles of ocean was unprecedentedso if we were surprised by 30 planes that would be different than being surprised by 350??!! --being surprised does not have different levelsWe were surprisedsee post # 19How so?
There were no significant directives out of the Navy warning of a serious threat of a Japanese carrier attack.
Taranto was twenty something planes. Pearl Harbor was 350 planes. The magnitude of the attack was unprecedented
We were surprised, it had never been done before.....or after
Battle of Port Arthur - Wikipedia
Jutland
Battle of the Nile
that's what separates the great leaders [ Yamamoto ] from the mediocreAssembling that many carrier based planes and covering thousands of miles of ocean was unprecedentedso if we were surprised by 30 planes that would be different than being surprised by 350??!! --being surprised does not have different levelsWe were surprisedsee post # 19How so?
There were no significant directives out of the Navy warning of a serious threat of a Japanese carrier attack.
Taranto was twenty something planes. Pearl Harbor was 350 planes. The magnitude of the attack was unprecedented
We were surprised, it had never been done before.....or after
he was worried about the IJN carriers---but did nothing !!!....I'll say it again--in the mid 80s, I was aware of the use of airplanes used as weapons---but many professionals were surprised by 9-11 = they should not have been surprisedWe were surprisedsee post # 19How so?goes both ways--doesn't it
There were no significant directives out of the Navy warning of a serious threat of a Japanese carrier attack.
Taranto was twenty something planes. Pearl Harbor was 350 planes. The magnitude of the attack was unprecedented
9/11: The Week BeforeThe attacks of September 11th, 2001 came as a surprise, shocking the world and immediately dominating the news around the world
YET they attacked the WTC before!!!!!
1993 World Trade Center Bombing Fast Facts - CNN
....maybe if you're a cab driver you would be surprised --but a professional military/defense person should not
Maybe we should have put you in charge
You are never surprised by anything
Especially after the fact
[QUOTE“What!” exclaimed Kimmel, “you don’t know where [they] are?”][/QUOTE]Then Kimmel called for intelligence estimates on the location of Japanese aircraft carriers.
Pearl Harbor: Who Blundered? | AMERICAN HERITAGESternly, but with a suspicion of a twinkle in his eyes, Kimmel delivered himself of a masterpiece of unconscious irony.
“Do you mean to say they could be rounding Diamond Head and you wouldn’t know it?”
Once again hindsight is usually 20/20 and often assumptive when looking at motivations and reasons for actions, dis-actions. This is especially true when done so by non-historians and by historians who have no grasp of the psychologies and cultures of the period/people involved.exactly--but Taranto and the war warning ----- they should know military history--that's their job:Typically military thinking follows previous wars and as rightwinger said no one on our side expected a carrier attack, carrier use and tactics were still in their infancy and our Navy was still stuck on battleship war tactics. The Japanese attack on Pearl opened everyone's eyes.they had ''peacetime'' mindset--after a war warning --after Taranto..they were given a war warning, but they did not act like it.........
.....they acted as if they were in peacetime --all major ships in the harbor/no long range--[ any sort ] of air recon ....no type of air detection/alarm/warning system like they had in England
.....Sunday--a real military man [ someone with military sense ] would think Sunday a perfect day for an attack--especially after given a war warning
.....one military axiom is you don't act on what you think the enemy will do, but what he is capable of --so if you are stationed at Pearl, you should think ''can the Japanese attack Pearl?'' YES
...but many professional police/military/CIA/etc are not ''street'' smart---prime example is the Camp Chapman attack where the CIA brought a ''good'' foreigner into the circle---which is one of the most basic no-nos of spyingDespite the fact that so many in positions of command anticipated a Japanese attack, especially given the failure of diplomacy (Japan refused U.S. demands to withdraw from both the Axis pact and occupied territories in China and Indochina), no one expected Hawaii as the target.
https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/a-war-warning-is-sent-to-commanders-in-the-pacific
It was a failure from the top down, everyone believed Hawaii was too far away and too strong to be attacked.
Kimmel and Short were scapegoats.
Now one commander that was guilty as hell was MacArthur, he was told of the Japanese attack on Pearl and ordered to prepare his air forces accordingly and expect an attack from the Japanese. He acknowledged those orders then did nothing, the Army Air Corps in the Philippines was caught on the ground the same way (and in the same parked configurations) as in Hawaii but obviously he did not suffer the same fate as Kimmel and Short.
Also, specifically in Africa the main ground commander, Fredendall was still "stuck" in WWI with his thinking and also tended to play his subordinate commanders off against each other while making no real decisions. Things obviously changed when Patton replaced him.
We were litterally "An Army at Dawn" as Atkinson wrote about in an excellent book with the same title.
We also had a lot of learning to do in the pacific in all branches of service specifically with moribund attitudes and ideas at the upper echelons of military command and control.
.....--I remember reading in the mid 80's about how the Israelis defended against airplanes used as weapons ......but then after 9-11, many professionals never even thought of it ---well, I knew about them in the mid 80's as an mere E2 in the military....the professionals should've been thinking about that--just as Short and Kimmel should have known about Taranto = and know Pearl was vulnerable
Battle of Port Arthur - Wikipediacommencement of the Russo-Japanese War. It began with a surprise night attack by a squadron of Japanese destroyers
XXII. ACTION TAKEN BY ADMIRAL KIMMELEXTENT OF RECONNAISSANCEIn this connection it should be noted that Vice Admiral Bellinger, who on 7 December 1941 was commanding officer of Task Force 9, comprising the patrol planes of the Pacific Fleet, testified that he was unaware of the war warning until after the attack on Pearl Harbor (p. 498).
Admiral Smith said that following the 27 November war warning the establishment of aircraft patrols from Oahu would have been an appropriate defensive deployment to carry out the initial tasks assigned by the Pacific Fleet war plans (p. 372). However, he did not remember any discussions with Admiral Kimmel or Captain McMorris regarding the failure to direct such measures
and this is a way to keep them from being sabotaged = put them in the air
recon is not overt actsto take defensive deployment, Admiral McMorris said that they understood that Washington wanted to avoid any overt acts and that they were not so uncertain about this as to ask the Department for a clarification.
XXII. ACTION TAKEN BY ADMIRAL KIMMELEXTENT OF RECONNAISSANCE
He's making three common mistakes, one he's looking at it in retrospect, two he's projecting modern military knowledge on a past event and three he's assuming that everyone from the top brass down knew exactly what the orders meant (no room for individual leeway in implementing those orders) and with that in mind no pre-conceptions in the minds of the commanders and top brass all the way up to the president. Kimmel and Short were carrying out their orders as they understood them.....I'll say it again--in the mid 80s, I was aware of the use of airplanes used as weapons---but many professionals were surprised by 9-11 = they should not have been surprisedWe were surprisedsee post # 19How so?goes both ways--doesn't it
There were no significant directives out of the Navy warning of a serious threat of a Japanese carrier attack.
Taranto was twenty something planes. Pearl Harbor was 350 planes. The magnitude of the attack was unprecedented
9/11: The Week BeforeThe attacks of September 11th, 2001 came as a surprise, shocking the world and immediately dominating the news around the world
YET they attacked the WTC before!!!!!
1993 World Trade Center Bombing Fast Facts - CNN
....maybe if you're a cab driver you would be surprised --but a professional military/defense person should not
Maybe we should have put you in charge
You are never surprised by anything
Especially after the fact
Honestly, Yamamoto got lucky but not lucky enough. If our carriers had been in harbor that would have been it, our strike capabilities would have been massively curtailed and it could have been much longer before we had the capability to defend even our west coast let alone anything else.the Japanese did the same at Midway--they did not think our carriers would be there
there was never a a sea battle before between BBs/dreadnoughts/etc?Assembling that many carrier based planes and covering thousands of miles of ocean was unprecedentedso if we were surprised by 30 planes that would be different than being surprised by 350??!! --being surprised does not have different levelsWe were surprisedsee post # 19How so?
There were no significant directives out of the Navy warning of a serious threat of a Japanese carrier attack.
Taranto was twenty something planes. Pearl Harbor was 350 planes. The magnitude of the attack was unprecedented
We were surprised, it had never been done before.....or after
Battle of Port Arthur - Wikipedia
Jutland
Battle of the Nile
that's what separates the great leaders [ Yamamoto ] from the mediocreAssembling that many carrier based planes and covering thousands of miles of ocean was unprecedentedso if we were surprised by 30 planes that would be different than being surprised by 350??!! --being surprised does not have different levelsWe were surprisedsee post # 19How so?
There were no significant directives out of the Navy warning of a serious threat of a Japanese carrier attack.
Taranto was twenty something planes. Pearl Harbor was 350 planes. The magnitude of the attack was unprecedented
We were surprised, it had never been done before.....or after
How would Kimmel and Short have defended their actions to superiors if they were subjected to major terrorist attacks or sabotage and they explained they were defending against a possible multi carrier attack from thousands of miles away that never cameOnce again hindsight is usually 20/20 and often assumptive when looking at motivations and reasons for actions, dis-actions. This is especially true when done so by non-historians and by historians who have no grasp of the psychologies and cultures of the period/people involved.exactly--but Taranto and the war warning ----- they should know military history--that's their job:Typically military thinking follows previous wars and as rightwinger said no one on our side expected a carrier attack, carrier use and tactics were still in their infancy and our Navy was still stuck on battleship war tactics. The Japanese attack on Pearl opened everyone's eyes.they had ''peacetime'' mindset--after a war warning --after Taranto..they were given a war warning, but they did not act like it.........
.....they acted as if they were in peacetime --all major ships in the harbor/no long range--[ any sort ] of air recon ....no type of air detection/alarm/warning system like they had in England
.....Sunday--a real military man [ someone with military sense ] would think Sunday a perfect day for an attack--especially after given a war warning
.....one military axiom is you don't act on what you think the enemy will do, but what he is capable of --so if you are stationed at Pearl, you should think ''can the Japanese attack Pearl?'' YES
...but many professional police/military/CIA/etc are not ''street'' smart---prime example is the Camp Chapman attack where the CIA brought a ''good'' foreigner into the circle---which is one of the most basic no-nos of spyingDespite the fact that so many in positions of command anticipated a Japanese attack, especially given the failure of diplomacy (Japan refused U.S. demands to withdraw from both the Axis pact and occupied territories in China and Indochina), no one expected Hawaii as the target.
https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/a-war-warning-is-sent-to-commanders-in-the-pacific
It was a failure from the top down, everyone believed Hawaii was too far away and too strong to be attacked.
Kimmel and Short were scapegoats.
Now one commander that was guilty as hell was MacArthur, he was told of the Japanese attack on Pearl and ordered to prepare his air forces accordingly and expect an attack from the Japanese. He acknowledged those orders then did nothing, the Army Air Corps in the Philippines was caught on the ground the same way (and in the same parked configurations) as in Hawaii but obviously he did not suffer the same fate as Kimmel and Short.
Also, specifically in Africa the main ground commander, Fredendall was still "stuck" in WWI with his thinking and also tended to play his subordinate commanders off against each other while making no real decisions. Things obviously changed when Patton replaced him.
We were litterally "An Army at Dawn" as Atkinson wrote about in an excellent book with the same title.
We also had a lot of learning to do in the pacific in all branches of service specifically with moribund attitudes and ideas at the upper echelons of military command and control.
.....--I remember reading in the mid 80's about how the Israelis defended against airplanes used as weapons ......but then after 9-11, many professionals never even thought of it ---well, I knew about them in the mid 80's as an mere E2 in the military....the professionals should've been thinking about that--just as Short and Kimmel should have known about Taranto = and know Pearl was vulnerable
Battle of Port Arthur - Wikipediacommencement of the Russo-Japanese War. It began with a surprise night attack by a squadron of Japanese destroyers
XXII. ACTION TAKEN BY ADMIRAL KIMMELEXTENT OF RECONNAISSANCEIn this connection it should be noted that Vice Admiral Bellinger, who on 7 December 1941 was commanding officer of Task Force 9, comprising the patrol planes of the Pacific Fleet, testified that he was unaware of the war warning until after the attack on Pearl Harbor (p. 498).
Admiral Smith said that following the 27 November war warning the establishment of aircraft patrols from Oahu would have been an appropriate defensive deployment to carry out the initial tasks assigned by the Pacific Fleet war plans (p. 372). However, he did not remember any discussions with Admiral Kimmel or Captain McMorris regarding the failure to direct such measures
and this is a way to keep them from being sabotaged = put them in the air
recon is not overt actsto take defensive deployment, Admiral McMorris said that they understood that Washington wanted to avoid any overt acts and that they were not so uncertain about this as to ask the Department for a clarification.
XXII. ACTION TAKEN BY ADMIRAL KIMMELEXTENT OF RECONNAISSANCE
Also once again the Japanese attack on Pearl using carrier based aircraft IN SUCH HUGE NUMBERS was undreamed of by our top brass all the way up to the president. As for putting the plains in the air to protect from sabotage? You're making the same assumptive mistake most people make, projection of modern common sense tactics into the past. The 1942 tactic was to park the planes the way they were parked on the ground so they could be more easily watch by the sentries who were on duty.
If you look at the History link in my very first response it basically show what the so called "war warning" really was so it's obvious you're misreading what it meant to the people involved in 1942.
1. terrorists attacks do not win warsHow would Kimmel and Short have defended their actions to superiors if they were subjected to major terrorist attacks or sabotage and they explained they were defending against a possible multi carrier attack from thousands of miles away that never cameOnce again hindsight is usually 20/20 and often assumptive when looking at motivations and reasons for actions, dis-actions. This is especially true when done so by non-historians and by historians who have no grasp of the psychologies and cultures of the period/people involved.exactly--but Taranto and the war warning ----- they should know military history--that's their job:Typically military thinking follows previous wars and as rightwinger said no one on our side expected a carrier attack, carrier use and tactics were still in their infancy and our Navy was still stuck on battleship war tactics. The Japanese attack on Pearl opened everyone's eyes.they had ''peacetime'' mindset--after a war warning --after Tarantohttps://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/a-war-warning-is-sent-to-commanders-in-the-pacific
It was a failure from the top down, everyone believed Hawaii was too far away and too strong to be attacked.
Kimmel and Short were scapegoats.
Now one commander that was guilty as hell was MacArthur, he was told of the Japanese attack on Pearl and ordered to prepare his air forces accordingly and expect an attack from the Japanese. He acknowledged those orders then did nothing, the Army Air Corps in the Philippines was caught on the ground the same way (and in the same parked configurations) as in Hawaii but obviously he did not suffer the same fate as Kimmel and Short.
Also, specifically in Africa the main ground commander, Fredendall was still "stuck" in WWI with his thinking and also tended to play his subordinate commanders off against each other while making no real decisions. Things obviously changed when Patton replaced him.
We were litterally "An Army at Dawn" as Atkinson wrote about in an excellent book with the same title.
We also had a lot of learning to do in the pacific in all branches of service specifically with moribund attitudes and ideas at the upper echelons of military command and control.
.....--I remember reading in the mid 80's about how the Israelis defended against airplanes used as weapons ......but then after 9-11, many professionals never even thought of it ---well, I knew about them in the mid 80's as an mere E2 in the military....the professionals should've been thinking about that--just as Short and Kimmel should have known about Taranto = and know Pearl was vulnerable
Battle of Port Arthur - Wikipediacommencement of the Russo-Japanese War. It began with a surprise night attack by a squadron of Japanese destroyers
XXII. ACTION TAKEN BY ADMIRAL KIMMELEXTENT OF RECONNAISSANCEIn this connection it should be noted that Vice Admiral Bellinger, who on 7 December 1941 was commanding officer of Task Force 9, comprising the patrol planes of the Pacific Fleet, testified that he was unaware of the war warning until after the attack on Pearl Harbor (p. 498).
Admiral Smith said that following the 27 November war warning the establishment of aircraft patrols from Oahu would have been an appropriate defensive deployment to carry out the initial tasks assigned by the Pacific Fleet war plans (p. 372). However, he did not remember any discussions with Admiral Kimmel or Captain McMorris regarding the failure to direct such measures
and this is a way to keep them from being sabotaged = put them in the air
recon is not overt actsto take defensive deployment, Admiral McMorris said that they understood that Washington wanted to avoid any overt acts and that they were not so uncertain about this as to ask the Department for a clarification.
XXII. ACTION TAKEN BY ADMIRAL KIMMELEXTENT OF RECONNAISSANCE
Also once again the Japanese attack on Pearl using carrier based aircraft IN SUCH HUGE NUMBERS was undreamed of by our top brass all the way up to the president. As for putting the plains in the air to protect from sabotage? You're making the same assumptive mistake most people make, projection of modern common sense tactics into the past. The 1942 tactic was to park the planes the way they were parked on the ground so they could be more easily watch by the sentries who were on duty.
If you look at the History link in my very first response it basically show what the so called "war warning" really was so it's obvious you're misreading what it meant to the people involved in 1942.
yes and this is part of what I said about failure to provide a system for alarms/etcA couple of significant facts are often ignored in these Pearl Harbor discussions. One is that the relatively new technology of radar was in place and did indeed spot the incoming Japanese attack aircraft in time to warn of the approaching planes. Unfortunately and tragically, when the radar operators radioed in the warning, the officer in cha.ge misjudged it and judged the report of incoming aircraft as a flight of B-17's scheduled for delivery to Pearl that morning, even though they would be approaching Pearl from the exact opposite direction. ``
Another often ignored fact is that everyone believed Pearl Harbor was far to shallow to accommodate an attack by torpedoes. Unbeknown to American planners and intelligence, Japan had solved this problem by adding a specially designed fin to their torpedoes catching Pearl Harbor defenders completely off guard and susceptible to the torpedoes attack.
1. terrorists attacks do not win warsHow would Kimmel and Short have defended their actions to superiors if they were subjected to major terrorist attacks or sabotage and they explained they were defending against a possible multi carrier attack from thousands of miles away that never cameOnce again hindsight is usually 20/20 and often assumptive when looking at motivations and reasons for actions, dis-actions. This is especially true when done so by non-historians and by historians who have no grasp of the psychologies and cultures of the period/people involved.exactly--but Taranto and the war warning ----- they should know military history--that's their job:Typically military thinking follows previous wars and as rightwinger said no one on our side expected a carrier attack, carrier use and tactics were still in their infancy and our Navy was still stuck on battleship war tactics. The Japanese attack on Pearl opened everyone's eyes.they had ''peacetime'' mindset--after a war warning --after Taranto
.....--I remember reading in the mid 80's about how the Israelis defended against airplanes used as weapons ......but then after 9-11, many professionals never even thought of it ---well, I knew about them in the mid 80's as an mere E2 in the military....the professionals should've been thinking about that--just as Short and Kimmel should have known about Taranto = and know Pearl was vulnerable
Battle of Port Arthur - Wikipediacommencement of the Russo-Japanese War. It began with a surprise night attack by a squadron of Japanese destroyers
XXII. ACTION TAKEN BY ADMIRAL KIMMELEXTENT OF RECONNAISSANCEIn this connection it should be noted that Vice Admiral Bellinger, who on 7 December 1941 was commanding officer of Task Force 9, comprising the patrol planes of the Pacific Fleet, testified that he was unaware of the war warning until after the attack on Pearl Harbor (p. 498).
Admiral Smith said that following the 27 November war warning the establishment of aircraft patrols from Oahu would have been an appropriate defensive deployment to carry out the initial tasks assigned by the Pacific Fleet war plans (p. 372). However, he did not remember any discussions with Admiral Kimmel or Captain McMorris regarding the failure to direct such measures
and this is a way to keep them from being sabotaged = put them in the air
recon is not overt actsto take defensive deployment, Admiral McMorris said that they understood that Washington wanted to avoid any overt acts and that they were not so uncertain about this as to ask the Department for a clarification.
XXII. ACTION TAKEN BY ADMIRAL KIMMELEXTENT OF RECONNAISSANCE
Also once again the Japanese attack on Pearl using carrier based aircraft IN SUCH HUGE NUMBERS was undreamed of by our top brass all the way up to the president. As for putting the plains in the air to protect from sabotage? You're making the same assumptive mistake most people make, projection of modern common sense tactics into the past. The 1942 tactic was to park the planes the way they were parked on the ground so they could be more easily watch by the sentries who were on duty.
If you look at the History link in my very first response it basically show what the so called "war warning" really was so it's obvious you're misreading what it meant to the people involved in 1942.
2. they did not do that
3. the bigger threat was the carrier attack
4. there were multiple ways to guard against both
etc etc
