Hiroshima and Nagasaki - did they really end the war.

[martybegan]

But they did have a fairly effective airborne corps. Land a few divisions by air, secure an airfield, and then start flying in troops and material. They more than had the capability.

Also, keep in mind, securing their gains in China were the main reason why they were continuing the war. But the Kwantung army in Manchuria was swept up in days.

The only time two times an airhead was maintained soley by air resupply ended with mixed results. Crete for the germans was a disaster, and only the lack of british reinforcements prevented the airborne forces defeat. The lack of german seaborne reinforcement (it was sunk) almost ruined the sucessful invasion of the island, and it decimated the german paratrooop forces.

The other was the Arnhem landing of Market Garden, and there the airhead was defeated, even with airborne resupply, due to the inability of follow up ground forces to link up with the airborne troops in a short enough time period.

Goring promised Hitler his Luftwaffe could supply Sixth Army in the Stalingrad by air alone in November 1942. That effort failed miserably.

That is another good example. I was just limiting mine to attacks using airborne forces initially, but Stalingrad is a great example of the limits of air supply only.

 

[JakeStarkey]

The only time two times an airhead was maintained soley by air resupply ended with mixed results. Crete for the germans was a disaster, and only the lack of british reinforcements prevented the airborne forces defeat. The lack of german seaborne reinforcement (it was sunk) almost ruined the sucessful invasion of the island, and it decimated the german paratrooop forces.

The other was the Arnhem landing of Market Garden, and there the airhead was defeated, even with airborne resupply, due to the inability of follow up ground forces to link up with the airborne troops in a short enough time period.

Goring promised Hitler his Luftwaffe could supply Sixth Army in the Stalingrad by air alone in November 1942. That effort failed miserably.

That is another good example. I was just limiting mine to attacks using airborne forces initially, but Stalingrad is a great example of the limits of air supply only.

Even in our maneuvers in Alaska's interior, taking and supplying an airhead was a difficult and major task for supporting a battalion. Supporting the brigade and other elements from the lower 48 tasked and taxed everybody and every unit to the max.

I can't imagine what Goring was thinking.

 

[martybegan]

Goring promised Hitler his Luftwaffe could supply Sixth Army in the Stalingrad by air alone in November 1942. That effort failed miserably.

That is another good example. I was just limiting mine to attacks using airborne forces initially, but Stalingrad is a great example of the limits of air supply only.

Even in our maneuvers in Alaska's interior, taking and supplying an airhead was a difficult and major task for supporting a battalion. Supporting the brigade and other elements from the lower 48 tasked and taxed everybody and every unit to the max.

I can't imagine what Goring was thinking.

It was his inflated sense of ego that made him think it could be done. In the end the killer of 6th army was Hitler's decsion not to allow Paulus to try to break out and reach friendly lines.

 

[JakeStarkey]

That is another good example. I was just limiting mine to attacks using airborne forces initially, but Stalingrad is a great example of the limits of air supply only.

Even in our maneuvers in Alaska's interior, taking and supplying an airhead was a difficult and major task for supporting a battalion. Supporting the brigade and other elements from the lower 48 tasked and taxed everybody and every unit to the max.

I can't imagine what Goring was thinking.

It was his inflated sense of ego that made him think it could be done. In the end the killer of 6th army was Hitler's decsion not to allow Paulus to try to break out and reach friendly lines.

The Soviets had not developed, even by 1945, the ability to airlift and supply by air major units. By 1955, that had changed, as Soviet air doctrine had evolved, developed, and matured. I am glad we did not have to take them and their allies on in Europe during the 1970s or the North Koreans in the early 1980s. In many areas, they had more material, good doctrine, and better equipment. The enemy overestimated Reagan's will to party. His let'sgetouttahere in Beirut was far more representative of his behavior than let'sbeatupKhaddafibyair.

 

[Mr.Nick]

Not really.

This is one of the myths we Americans like to tell ourselves, but the Japanese Surrender had a lot more to do with the fact the USSR entered the Pacific War.

Japan's goal in 1945 was not to win. They knew they were done. It was to get a favorable peace. One that let them keep some of their gains in China. When the USSR entered the war on August 8th, and started rolling up their Armies in a few days, they knew they had no real options. Eithere Japan could be entirely occuppied by the US, or partioned like Germany.

And there were enough horror stories about what the soviets were doing in East Germany to make that an easy pick.

The bombs, on the other hand, didn't do that much damage. They were relatively low kilotons, we had devastated Japans cities with conventional bombing and killed far more people that way.

The Japanese were batshit crazy, however Little Boy and Fat Man put an end to their bullshit rein of terror.

You better believe it was the end of a brutal era.

 

[JoeB131]

The only time two times an airhead was maintained soley by air resupply ended with mixed results. Crete for the germans was a disaster, and only the lack of british reinforcements prevented the airborne forces defeat. The lack of german seaborne reinforcement (it was sunk) almost ruined the sucessful invasion of the island, and it decimated the german paratrooop forces.

The other was the Arnhem landing of Market Garden, and there the airhead was defeated, even with airborne resupply, due to the inability of follow up ground forces to link up with the airborne troops in a short enough time period.

i agree that control of China was the overall goal of the Japanese war strategy, but I think they would have pulled back to preserve thier home islands in the worst case scenario.

In the case of Crete, the Germans didn't enjoy complete air superiority. Also keep in mind, the entire Greek Campaign was thrown together at the last minute, as Hitler had to bail out Mussolini. It was not like the Germans had been planning this for months.

Germany also largely lacked heavy material lift capability. They didn't have big transports in large numbers.

Also, consider the scenario. Before we can launch Operation Olympic in the South of Japan, Russia launches an attack in the North. What do we do? Impede them? They are our allies. Or do we send a few thousand troop transports to Vladivostock and help them move troops?

The thing was, we didn't want the Soviets with a foothold in Japan, and we wanted to limit their foothold in China. (The Russians did in fact take all the captured Japanese weapons in Manchuria and eventually handed them over to Mao Zedong's forces. That ended badly for our allies.) An extended Pacific war would have been bad for us, and we knew it.

If you look at the end game as Us, Japan and the USSR all having their own agendas, the A-bomb becomes a lot less important.

Our goal was unconditional surrender.

Japan's goal was to secure a peace that allowed it to keep Korea, Taiwan, and Manchuria. They also wanted to keep the Emperor in place. Their hope was that the Russians could broker a peace, and America would be too engaged in Europe to fully commit all its forces to an invasion before public opinion tired of the war.

The Soviet Goal was to strengthen their position in the East, after renouncing the non-aggression pact with Japan.

When they invaded, they found Japanese Armies that were poorly supplied and not nearly as battle hardened as the divisions that had spent the last four years fighting the Nazis. They rolled up the Japanese Empire like a map.

I make note, again, that before the Soviet Entry, we made it a point that Hirohito was to be held as accountable as the other war criminals running Japan. Afterwards, we agreed to a peace that left him in place, and even allowed the defendents in the Tokyo trials to lie their asses off about his complicity.

Not something you do when you have the most awesome, fearsome weapon ever.

 

[Patrick2]

The japanese have only themselves to blame for the bombings. Here's Truman's statement (excerpt) issued august 6, 1945, 3 days before Hiroshima:

We are now prepared to obliterate more rapidly and completely every productive enterprise the Japanese have above ground in any city. We shall destroy their docks, their factories, and their communications. Let there be no mistake; we shall completely destroy Japan's power to make war.

It was to spare the Japanese people from utter destruction that the ultimatum of July 26 was issued at Potsdam. Their leaders promptly rejected that ultimatum. If they do not now accept our terms they may expect a rain of ruin from the air, the like of which has never been seen on this earth.

This is the most crystal clear warning anyone has ever gotten. The japanese ignored it - the rest is history.

 

[martybegan]

The only time two times an airhead was maintained soley by air resupply ended with mixed results. Crete for the germans was a disaster, and only the lack of british reinforcements prevented the airborne forces defeat. The lack of german seaborne reinforcement (it was sunk) almost ruined the sucessful invasion of the island, and it decimated the german paratrooop forces.

The other was the Arnhem landing of Market Garden, and there the airhead was defeated, even with airborne resupply, due to the inability of follow up ground forces to link up with the airborne troops in a short enough time period.

i agree that control of China was the overall goal of the Japanese war strategy, but I think they would have pulled back to preserve thier home islands in the worst case scenario.

In the case of Crete, the Germans didn't enjoy complete air superiority. Also keep in mind, the entire Greek Campaign was thrown together at the last minute, as Hitler had to bail out Mussolini. It was not like the Germans had been planning this for months.

Germany also largely lacked heavy material lift capability. They didn't have big transports in large numbers.

Also, consider the scenario. Before we can launch Operation Olympic in the South of Japan, Russia launches an attack in the North. What do we do? Impede them? They are our allies. Or do we send a few thousand troop transports to Vladivostock and help them move troops?

The thing was, we didn't want the Soviets with a foothold in Japan, and we wanted to limit their foothold in China. (The Russians did in fact take all the captured Japanese weapons in Manchuria and eventually handed them over to Mao Zedong's forces. That ended badly for our allies.) An extended Pacific war would have been bad for us, and we knew it.

If you look at the end game as Us, Japan and the USSR all having their own agendas, the A-bomb becomes a lot less important.

Our goal was unconditional surrender.

Japan's goal was to secure a peace that allowed it to keep Korea, Taiwan, and Manchuria. They also wanted to keep the Emperor in place. Their hope was that the Russians could broker a peace, and America would be too engaged in Europe to fully commit all its forces to an invasion before public opinion tired of the war.

The Soviet Goal was to strengthen their position in the East, after renouncing the non-aggression pact with Japan.

When they invaded, they found Japanese Armies that were poorly supplied and not nearly as battle hardened as the divisions that had spent the last four years fighting the Nazis. They rolled up the Japanese Empire like a map.

I make note, again, that before the Soviet Entry, we made it a point that Hirohito was to be held as accountable as the other war criminals running Japan. Afterwards, we agreed to a peace that left him in place, and even allowed the defendents in the Tokyo trials to lie their asses off about his complicity.

Not something you do when you have the most awesome, fearsome weapon ever.

The Japanese troops were very battle hardened. The problem was that they were basically a pure infantry force with artillery. Thier tanks were 1930's cast offs, and thier anti tank ability was close to zero. The soviet forces were tank heavy, rolling over the Japanese troops as they had no effective means of resistance.

Our agreement about Hirohito was only in the most basic terms. They still surrendered unconditonally and we could have changed our mind at any time, considering we were the only armed force during the occupation. MacAurthr was smart enough to realize he needed a figurehead to allow him control over the Japanese civillans, and he got that through the office of the emperor, who we made a consitutional monarch.

 

[JakeStarkey]

Nothing here gives any real evidence or argument that the nukes were not the major factor if Japan's unconditional surrender.

 

[Divine Wind]

The Japanese troops were very battle hardened. The problem was that they were basically a pure infantry force with artillery. Thier tanks were 1930's cast offs, and thier anti tank ability was close to zero. The soviet forces were tank heavy, rolling over the Japanese troops as they had no effective means of resistance.

How were the Soviet tanks at swimming across the Sea of Japan?