BenNatuf
Limit Authority
1 case, 1 set of evedence, 1 discovery, 1 violation. Not much subjective there.Take a look at the dissent and/or my post summarizing the dissent, above (somewhere). Jusice Ginsburg says this is not "one case." She points out that the record establishes more than sufficient enough of a pattern of Brady violations to trigger liability, entirely within this single case alone. It wasn't just withholding the results of the blood test.
The majority simply interpreted the evidence differently - an entirely subjective call that (golly, big surprise) went in favor of the Big Guy and screwed the Little Guy.
Yes I did, and I also read Alito's response to the dissent.
The dissent defers consideration of this question until
page 23 of its opinion. It first devotes considerable space
to allegations that Connicks prosecutors misunderstood
Brady when asked about it at trial, see post, at 1618
(opinion of GINSBURG, J.), and to supposed gaps in the
Brady guidance provided by Connicks office to prosecu-
tors, including deficiencies (unrelated to the specific Brady violation at issue in this case) in a policy manual pub-
lished by Connicks office three years after Thompsons
trial, see post, at 1821. None of that is relevant. Thomp-
sons failure-to-train theory at trial was not based on a
pervasive culture of indifference to Brady, but rather on
the inevitability of mistakes over enough iterations of
criminal trials. The District Court instructed the jury it
could find Connick deliberately indifferent if:
First: The District Attorney was certain that prosecu-
tors would confront the situation where they would
have to decide which evidence was required by the
constitution to be provided to an accused[;]
Second: The situation involved a difficult choice, or
one that prosecutors had a history of mishandling,
such that additional training, supervision, or monitor-
ing was clearly needed[; and]
Third: The wrong choice by a prosecutor in that
situation will frequently cause a deprivation of an ac-
cuseds constitutional rights. App. 828.
That theory of deliberate indifference would repeal the
law of Monell1 in favor of the Law of Large Numbers.
Brady mistakes are inevitable. So are all species of error
routinely confronted by prosecutors: authorizing a bad
warrant; losing a Batson2 claim; crossing the line in clos-
ing argument; or eliciting hearsay that violates the Con-
frontation Clause. Nevertheless, we do not have de facto
respondeat superior liability, Canton, 489 U. S., at 392,
for each such violation under the rubric of failure-to-train
simply because the municipality does not have a profes-
sional educational program covering the specific violation
in sufficient depth.3
http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/10pdf/09-571.pdf
It was one case, despite the assertion from Ginsburg that it was not. She was assuming facts not in evidence.
As I have said, I agree with her, and you. That does not make this decision wrong, even if I want it to be. It followed established precedent and was decided on the law, not the facts, or anyone's interpretation of the facts.
Will you agree with me that deciding whether or not the facts showed a sufficient enough "pattern of indifference" was a subjective call?