Why Is No One Clamoring for more ABMs to be built?

[Dayton3]

"Stop him now" how exactly? Putin's problems don't magically disappear if he succeeds in taking Ukraine. It was a desperate move to begin with, so yes, he has proven himself somewhat insane and prone to miscalculate. His future is bleak no matter what happens at this point. All he can sensibly do now is stop the war diplomatically, the sooner the better.

Putin can't do that. It would be an admission of defeat. Such a public admission would endanger not only Putin's political position but most likely his life as well.

 

[Grumblenuts]

^Too late.

some kind of uncertainty in reliability of missiles and warheads, that's why, may be, the next step of the peace-time escalation will be denouncing of test ban treaty and resuming of the actual nuclear tests and drills with the nuclear weapon usage. Or, if they are really provoked, they can just take their chances.

The ban was stupidly lifted by the U.S. and so by Russia immediately thereafter. However, testing had already proven a dumb idea for multiple reasons which simply can't be swept under a rug.

 

[Vrenn]

That simply isn't accurate, last summer they did tests during reentry that were successful.

Sure. If you have all the data beforehand. We might be able to stop a NK one but I doubt seriously if we could stop very many Russian ones.

 

[Grumblenuts]

A brief sampling of US Missile "Defense" History:

June 24, 1997. First fly-by test of the Boeing/TRW exoatmospheric kill vehicle for the NMD system. A lawsuit filed by a former TRW employee alleges that TRW misled defense officials about the results of the test.

February 1998. First report issued by commission chaired by retired Air Force Gen. Larry Welch on the status of US missile defense programs. The report is critical of BMDO's efforts, finding a "rush to failure" schedule.

January 20, 1999. DoD requests more funds for NMD and announces the delay of the target date for achieving initial operating capability from 2003 to 2005, also moving the deployment decision date to June 2000.

September 1999. The Welch panel again concludes that the Pentagon's approach is extremely high-risk after assessing the reconfigured NMD program.

July 14, 2001. The fourth intercept test (IFT-6) of the ground-based midcourse system successfully intercepts a mock warhead. Later reports find that this test, like others before it, was aided by the use of a homing beacon in the mock warhead.

December 3, 2001. In this test (IFT-7) the kill vehicle successfully intercepted the target. One decoy balloon was used. This test was a repeat of IFT-6.

December 15, 2004. This intercept test (IFT-13C) of the ground-based midcourse system failed when the booster carrying the interceptor failed to leave the ground in a launch from Kwajalein atoll. The interceptor was to hit a target coming out of Kodiak, Alaska.

February 13, 2005. This intercept test (IFT-14) was a repeat of the test on December 15, 2004, and the interceptor again failed to leave the silo.

December 5, 2008. In this intercept test (FTG-5) of the ground-based midcourse system an interceptor launched from Vandenberg Air Force Base, Calif., intercepted a target launched from Ft. Greely, Alaska. While an intercept did occur, the countermeasures that were used (two balloons) failed to deploy. And even if they had, the decoys were reported by MDA to be "less sophisticated than the countermeasures flown in 2002," so the interceptor would have been less challenged than with decoys in tests six years prior to FTG-5. See the UCS report Missile Defense Test FTG-05.

January 31, 2010. In this intercept test (FTG-6) a target missile was successfully launched from the U.S. Army’s Reagan Test Site at Kwajalein Atoll in the Republic of the Marshall Islands. Approximately six minutes later, an interceptor was successfully launched from Vandenberg Air Force Base, Calif. Both the target missile and interceptor performed normally after launch. However, the Sea-Based X-band radar did not perform as expected and the interception failed.

September 2012. The National Academy of Science releases a report entitled “Making Sense of Missile Defense,” which called the GMD system “deficient” with respect to all of the study’s fundamental principles for a cost-effective missile defense, and recommended a complete overhaul of the interceptors, sensors, and concept of operations.

September 30, 2014. The Ground-based Midcourse System turns 10 years old. On September 30, 2004 the George W. Bush administration declared that the GMD system had achieved a limited deployment option (LDO) capability, meaning the system was now capable of being turned on and used if necessary. Only five interceptors were in place that day: it would be almost exactly two years before an intercept test of the kind of interceptors that were fielded was even attempted. It was another year beyond that—on September 28, 2007—before an intercept test was successful. On this date, the intercept test record is seven successful intercepts out of 16 attempts.

January 2016. MDA performs a non-intercept test of the GMD system, meant to validate fixes and updates to the kill vehicle and to gather information about how well the system can discriminate target from decoys. While described by MDA as a success, later information came out that suggested that one of the motors on the kill vehicle did not restart after being shut down, and that the kill vehicle veered far off course from its nominal target.

December 2016. Congress scraps the 1999 Missile Defense Act language and removes the modifier “limited” from the missile defense mandate, opening the door to building missile defenses intended to defend not only against the anticipated limited missile capabilities of North Korea and Iran, but those of the peer and near-peer forces of Russia and China. Congress also calls for the MDA to begin research and development, and to test and evaluate space-based missile defense programs.

March 25, 2019. Successful GMD test FTG-15 pitted two interceptors against a target. It was the first test of “salvo” engagement and the first operational, rather than developmental, test of the system. The GMD system has now successfully destroyed its target in ten of 19 attempts.
---------------------
Clearly not a great "success" record. But notice how the supposed "success" rate improves somewhat with time since the test ban, increased abstraction, and spending. The previous wisdom "If it ain't broke, don't fix it." -- meaning the test ban -- has now morphed into "It's broke, we gotta fix it!" -- meaning "Missile Defense" -- i.e. "Let's return to good old Cold War proliferation." Now why would the MIC want that? Gee, I dunno! Perhaps they're insane?

Oh, I see I forgot to overstate the unspoken "obvious" again. Why test "live" missiles when you can get away with just "testing" dummies instead? Because "you" (meaning the Pentagon) get to control the narrative. "You" get to say things like "Success!" just because you designed and hit something you knew was coming and had long planned to hit in the first place. Buckshot's still relatively cheap, have you tried that yet? Would it really keep the actual thing from going KABOOM!?

 

[Silver Cat]

Well maybe because the detonation of even just 10 of Russia's 6000 nuclear charges never mind our own would be enough to destroy the entire global ecosystem. Soon after that there would be totally unavoidable Mass starvation and death from radiation poisoning. The word strategic should absolutely be banned from any use of connection with nuclear weapons because there is no strategy whatsoever. There is only destruction and death regardless of who pushes the button and that's for everybody including the button pusher.

Actually, there were thousands of nuclear bursts since 1945. Nothing bad happened.

 

[Dayton3]

Sure. If you have all the data beforehand. We might be able to stop a NK one but I doubt seriously if we could stop very many Russian ones.

What data do you think is required? We know where most all ICBMs would be launched from. We know what the targets would be in the United States.

You have the starting points of the missile's flight. You have the endpoints of their flights. What more do you need?

 

[Grumblenuts]

Actually, there were thousands of nuclear bursts since 1945. Nothing bad happened.

No weapons of mass destruction under here..

Nuclear electromagnetic pulse - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

No weapons of mass destruction over there..

Radioactive Fallout From Nuclear Weapons Testing | US EPA

After a nuclear explosion, debris and soil can mix with radionuclides. This mixture is sent up into the air and then falls back to Earth. It is called fallout and it typically contains hundreds of different radionuclides.

www.epa.gov

 

[Dayton3]

No weapons of mass destruction under here..

Nuclear electromagnetic pulse - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

No weapons of mass destruction over there..

Radioactive Fallout From Nuclear Weapons Testing | US EPA

After a nuclear explosion, debris and soil can mix with radionuclides. This mixture is sent up into the air and then falls back to Earth. It is called fallout and it typically contains hundreds of different radionuclides.

www.epa.gov

What are you talking about?

 

[Grumblenuts]

What are you talking about?

Poke claw at up arrows for context..

 

[Big Bend Texas]

Sure. If you have all the data beforehand. We might be able to stop a NK one but I doubt seriously if we could stop very many Russian ones.

And? The test was successful, you claimed otherwise.

It's a technology still in development because for over 30 years we were bound by the terms of the ABM treaty which prevented us from developing it.

Russia broke the treaty so we got back in full bore but you can't just snap your fingers and make it happen overnight.

 

[Big Bend Texas]

A brief sampling of US Missile "Defense" History:

June 24, 1997. First fly-by test of the Boeing/TRW exoatmospheric kill vehicle for the NMD system. A lawsuit filed by a former TRW employee alleges that TRW misled defense officials about the results of the test.

February 1998. First report issued by commission chaired by retired Air Force Gen. Larry Welch on the status of US missile defense programs. The report is critical of BMDO's efforts, finding a "rush to failure" schedule.

January 20, 1999. DoD requests more funds for NMD and announces the delay of the target date for achieving initial operating capability from 2003 to 2005, also moving the deployment decision date to June 2000.

September 1999. The Welch panel again concludes that the Pentagon's approach is extremely high-risk after assessing the reconfigured NMD program.

July 14, 2001. The fourth intercept test (IFT-6) of the ground-based midcourse system successfully intercepts a mock warhead. Later reports find that this test, like others before it, was aided by the use of a homing beacon in the mock warhead.

December 3, 2001. In this test (IFT-7) the kill vehicle successfully intercepted the target. One decoy balloon was used. This test was a repeat of IFT-6.

December 15, 2004. This intercept test (IFT-13C) of the ground-based midcourse system failed when the booster carrying the interceptor failed to leave the ground in a launch from Kwajalein atoll. The interceptor was to hit a target coming out of Kodiak, Alaska.

February 13, 2005. This intercept test (IFT-14) was a repeat of the test on December 15, 2004, and the interceptor again failed to leave the silo.

December 5, 2008. In this intercept test (FTG-5) of the ground-based midcourse system an interceptor launched from Vandenberg Air Force Base, Calif., intercepted a target launched from Ft. Greely, Alaska. While an intercept did occur, the countermeasures that were used (two balloons) failed to deploy. And even if they had, the decoys were reported by MDA to be "less sophisticated than the countermeasures flown in 2002," so the interceptor would have been less challenged than with decoys in tests six years prior to FTG-5. See the UCS report Missile Defense Test FTG-05.

January 31, 2010. In this intercept test (FTG-6) a target missile was successfully launched from the U.S. Army’s Reagan Test Site at Kwajalein Atoll in the Republic of the Marshall Islands. Approximately six minutes later, an interceptor was successfully launched from Vandenberg Air Force Base, Calif. Both the target missile and interceptor performed normally after launch. However, the Sea-Based X-band radar did not perform as expected and the interception failed.

September 2012. The National Academy of Science releases a report entitled “Making Sense of Missile Defense,” which called the GMD system “deficient” with respect to all of the study’s fundamental principles for a cost-effective missile defense, and recommended a complete overhaul of the interceptors, sensors, and concept of operations.

September 30, 2014. The Ground-based Midcourse System turns 10 years old. On September 30, 2004 the George W. Bush administration declared that the GMD system had achieved a limited deployment option (LDO) capability, meaning the system was now capable of being turned on and used if necessary. Only five interceptors were in place that day: it would be almost exactly two years before an intercept test of the kind of interceptors that were fielded was even attempted. It was another year beyond that—on September 28, 2007—before an intercept test was successful. On this date, the intercept test record is seven successful intercepts out of 16 attempts.

January 2016. MDA performs a non-intercept test of the GMD system, meant to validate fixes and updates to the kill vehicle and to gather information about how well the system can discriminate target from decoys. While described by MDA as a success, later information came out that suggested that one of the motors on the kill vehicle did not restart after being shut down, and that the kill vehicle veered far off course from its nominal target.

December 2016. Congress scraps the 1999 Missile Defense Act language and removes the modifier “limited” from the missile defense mandate, opening the door to building missile defenses intended to defend not only against the anticipated limited missile capabilities of North Korea and Iran, but those of the peer and near-peer forces of Russia and China. Congress also calls for the MDA to begin research and development, and to test and evaluate space-based missile defense programs.

March 25, 2019. Successful GMD test FTG-15 pitted two interceptors against a target. It was the first test of “salvo” engagement and the first operational, rather than developmental, test of the system. The GMD system has now successfully destroyed its target in ten of 19 attempts.
---------------------
Clearly not a great "success" record. But notice how the supposed "success" rate improves somewhat with time since the test ban, increased abstraction, and spending. The previous wisdom "If it ain't broke, don't fix it." -- meaning the test ban -- has now morphed into "It's broke, we gotta fix it!" -- meaning "Missile Defense" -- i.e. "Let's return to good old Cold War proliferation." Now why would the MIC want that? Gee, I dunno! Perhaps they're insane?

Oh, I see I forgot to overstate the unspoken "obvious" again. Why test "live" missiles when you can get away with just "testing" dummies instead? Because "you" (meaning the Pentagon) get to control the narrative. "You" get to say things like "Success!" just because you designed and hit something you knew was coming and had long planned to hit in the first place. Buckshot's still relatively cheap, have you tried that yet? Would it really keep the actual thing from going KABOOM!?

The warhead makes no difference, it's the delivery vehicle you are targeting.

As long as you have the same mass of the same shape and size every aspect of the intercept can be evaluated.

If you think the objective is to destroy the warhead, you don't understand anything about missile defense at all.

 

[Big Bend Texas]

Actually, there were thousands of nuclear bursts since 1945. Nothing bad happened.

Underground nuclear tests don't make fallout and reactor failures don't cause nuclear explosions.

We and the Russians and Chinese all agreed to cease above ground testing because of the damaging fallout.

Radiation damage occurs every time you are exposed, eventually even low level exposures can lead to radiation sickness.

 

[Dayton3]

Underground nuclear tests don't make fallout and reactor failures don't cause nuclear explosions.

Two caveats.

1) Underground nuclear tests do often release contaminated air to the atmosphere.

2) The radiation from nuclear reactor failures can be considerably more dangerous than that from weapons

 

[Big Bend Texas]

Two caveats.

1) Underground nuclear tests do often release contaminated air to the atmosphere.

2) The radiation from nuclear reactor failures can be considerably more dangerous than that from weapons

Very little leaks from underground testing when done properly so it can't spread very far.

A reactor melt down causes no where near the damage of a nuclear explosion, yes they can continue leaking radiation until they are sealed but without the blast it's not shooting or being sucked up into the jet stream like with an explosion.

 

[Dayton3]

Very little leaks from underground testing when done properly so it can't spread very far.

A reactor melt down causes no where near the damage of a nuclear explosion, yes they can continue leaking radiation until they are sealed but without the blast it's not shooting or being sucked up into the jet stream like with an explosion.

You do know that air burst nuclear explosions don't spread much in the way of nuclear contamination either don't you?

 

[Big Bend Texas]

You do know that air burst nuclear explosions don't spread much in the way of nuclear contamination either don't you?

They don't spread as much as a low level burst but it all depens on the elevation.

There is a vacuum formed in the wake of the blast which stirs huge volumes of dust and debris even from an air blast and that vacuum then draws it back to the site of the explosion and the thermals blow it up into the air. That's what forms the telltale "mushroom cloud".

Whatever nuclear contaminated material makes it to the Jetstream will be spread over a fair bit of the globe.

 

[Silver Cat]

They don't spread as much as a low level burst but it all depens on the elevation.

There is a vacuum formed in the wake of the blast which stirs huge volumes of dust and debris even from an air blast and that vacuum then draws it back to the site of the explosion and the thermals blow it up into the air. That's what forms the telltale "mushroom cloud".

Whatever nuclear contaminated material makes it to the Jetstream will be spread over a fair bit of the globe.

What is the lesser evil - have some food barely contaminated with Sr-90, or don't have food at all? The very fact of the nuclear war and world-wide economic collapse will kill billions. Survivors won't care about Sc-90, gluten or traces of fertilizers and pesticides in their food.

 

[Big Bend Texas]

What is the lesser evil - have some food barely contaminated with Sr-90, or don't have food at all? The very fact of the nuclear war and world-wide economic collapse will kill billions. Survivors won't care about Sc-90, gluten or traces of fertilizers and pesticides in their food.

We're not anywhere close to heading into a nuclear war, that kind of fearmongering is precisely why we're in the shape we are today.

Putin's an evil bastard but he's not stupid nor is he crazy, he knows that using nukes means the end of Russia, his friends, his family and himself.

He just thought the nuclear blackmail was going to work again and finally the Euro's are calling his bluff.

As a result we've watched him destroy his own army, prove how ineffective they are, and he's drained his war stocks badly of vehicles including aircraft, armor, ordinance, ammunition and everything else he'd need in a real war.

The sanctions will bankrupt him personally, and send his nation into a deep, deep, recession they won't be able to recover from for years and that means he won't be able to rebuild his military.

One of his biggest exports is weapons and their failures to take Ukraine militarily are going to badly hurt those arms sales and the Euro's are taking away his ability to blackmail them with threats of turning off the gas in the winter.

Biden is responsible for this invasion as much as Putin with a good share going to his former boss with both of them refusing to provide Ukraine with what they needed to prevent Russia from being willing to attempt it.

Only after his poll numbers hit their lowest point yet after the invasion began did someone in the WH kick him in the ass and convince him that if he wanted to save his presidency he'd better get off the fence and start sending whatever we could to at least give the pretense the US still has a leadership role in the world and that we're willing to stand up with smaller nations when totalitarian bullies want to engage in wars of conquest.

Trump on the other hand spent four years warning all of Europe this day would come if they did not divorce themselves from their dependency on Russian Energy imports. They laughed at him of course.

Who's laughing now?

Trump was the devil for daring to tell the Euro's that the US could no longer be the financier and primary force in NATO so they'd better start living up to their obligations and they were all insulted and all but chased him out of the room, then openly derided him behind his back.

Who's laughing now?

Trump was labeled a warmonger who would star WWIII standing up to Putin and Kim, Solemani, and Al Baghdadi.

Yet when we directly confronted Russia in Syria and bombed the shit out of their base and assets used to deploy chemical weapons on civilians he was labeled a fool and dangerous.

Yet Putin did nothing because he knew he could not win.

When a battalion of Russian Troops started an attack on our own troops in Syria , Trump gave them the greenlight to take whatever actions they deemed necessary to stop that threat.

Two hours later, that threat had been completely eliminated.

What did Putin do?

We'll be fine.

 

[Grumblenuts]

Alright, I've seen and entertained enough of this tough talk with zero links or quotes offered for backup, i.e. silly bullshit. Enjoy.

 

[Vrenn]

What data do you think is required? We know where most all ICBMs would be launched from. We know what the targets would be in the United States.

You have the starting points of the missile's flight. You have the endpoints of their flights. What more do you need?

No we don't. The Russians move their Portable ICBMs around all the time to make it more difficult. RT-2PM