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December 02, 2005
The Rise, Peak, Decline and Defeat of Iraq's Insurgency
The insurgency in Iraq has now dragged on for 30 months and the price is apparent in terms of financial cost and human lives. In addition, it's also caused a fair segment of the population to lose faith in the effort and question the ongoing commitment. I don't hesitate to say that a large segment of those who trumpet out body counts, invoke terms like "Vietnam" and "Quagmire", or call for exit strategies are doing so without understanding the strategy and successes achieved in Iraq. If you can't distinguish between places in Iraq like Husaybah, Mosul, Ramadi or Tal Afar, and can't give any kind of explanation of what is going on in those places and around Iraq in general beyond the car bomb and the IED, you are realistically in no position to make an educated decision about the correct course of action to pursue in Iraq. I can only imagine the perception that many Americans have of Iraq; some nation in the Middle East where jihadists multiply, the Iraqi security forces resemble the keystone cops, U.S. forces are helpless against roadside bombs, and the situation is so dire that only disengagement can solve the problem.
The following is by no means a comprehensive study on Iraq or intended to represent the full scale of the achievements and successes, but instead offers some basic perspective of what I see as an insurgency in transition from the third phase to the fourth phase, and ultimately defeat. The U.S. military will not be defeated, it is American public opinion that has been dragged onto the front lines of the battlefields, and therefore it is the American people that must remain resolved and steadfast, and be convinced that the situation in Iraq is winnable and real progress is being made.
I. The Rise (May 2003-March 2004 - 10 months)
The handling of the immediate post-major combat operations in Iraq has been heavily criticized. Specific points of contention include the choice to disband the Iraqi army, the number of U.S. troops used, equipment issued to those troops, and failure to identify the insurgency earlier and take measures to prevent or minimalize it. What Iraqi security forces there were performed poorly in combat, and they suffered from enemy infiltration and desertion. On a positive note, U.S. forces killed Uday and Qu'say Hussein in Mosul, and captured Saddam Hussein outside of Tikrit. The Iraqi interim governing council was also established, with the coalition provincial authority handling Iraq's government affairs.
U.S. Combat Deaths: 302
U.S. Combat Deaths per month: 30.2
U.S. Troops Wounded in Action: 2,200
U.S. Troops Wounded per month: 220.0
Insurgents estimated killed/detained: 15,750
Insurgents estimated killed/detained per month: 1,575
Iraqi Security Forces average: 55,000
II. The Peak (April 2004-November 2004 - 8 months)
The summer of 2004 was the darkest moment in fighting the insurgency, topped off by the death of 137 U.S. troops in November alone. The Abu Ghraib scandal broke, the American public came to the realization that there would be no quick victory and for the first time politicians in Washington began advocating exit strategies. The future of Iraq truly hung in the balance and success appeared unlikely at best. Coalition forces found themselves fighting not only Sunni insurgents and foreign jihadists, but Shi'ite militiamen loyal to Moqtada al-Sadr. One of the few sustaining sources was the transfer of power from U.S. authorities to an interim Iraqi government, and the knowledge that national elections in January were rapidly approaching, although a cloud of skepticism hung over those as well.
U.S. Combat Deaths: 530
U.S. Combat Deaths per month: 66.25
U.S. Troops Wounded in Action: 7,055
U.S. Troops Wounded per month: 881.88
Insurgents estimated killed/detained: 16,220
Insurgents estimated killed/detained per month: 2027.5
Iraqi Security Forces average: 96,000
III. The Decline (December 2004-November 2005 - 12 months)
In January the Iraqi's went to the polls and elected a temporary government. For the first time, many Iraqi's began to express support for both the new, elected goverment and the security forces. Tips from local citizens increased twenty fold, and U.S. and Iraqi offensives began eroding the network of safehouses and areas of immunity which insurgents and foreign terrorists were utilizing. In northern Iraq, as much as 80 percent of al Qaeda's leadership was killed or detained and following an earlier unsuccesful attempt to deny safe haven to terrorists in Tal Afar, the city was taken again in Operation Restoring Rights. A host of other operations focused on the ratline to the south along the Euphrates River. While insurgents once enjoyed the sanctuary of places like Fallujah, Hadithah, al Qa'im, Husaybah and Karabilah, they would quickly see their activities challenged on a more permanent basis. U.S. forces transfered security to the Iraqi's in large sections of Baghdad, in Karbalah and Najaf, and several other locations. Route Irish and Haifa Street, once among the most dangerous roads in Baghdad, are now among the safest. The Iraqi's succesfully wrote a constitution, managed to engage in dialogue to bring some Sunni groups aboard the political process, and passed it in a nationwide referendum vote. Iraq's security forces continued to grow both in raw numbers and operational capabilities, and numerous key leaders in the insurgency have been killed or captured.
U.S. Combat Deaths: 679
U.S. Combat Deaths per month: 56.58
U.S. Troops Wounded in Action: 6,084
U.S. Troops Wounded per month: 507.00
Insurgents estimated killed/detained: 25,500
Insurgents estimated killed/detained per month: 2125.0
Iraqi Security Forces average: 175,000
The number of Iraqi soldiers and police killed has declined for the fourth month in a row, from 304 in July to 176 in November.
The number of car bombings has declined for the fourth month in a row, from 136 in May to 60 in September.
Iraqi civilians killed has dropped from from the 1400-2500 range estimate in August, to the 285-675 range in October and November.
IV. The Defeat (December 2005-December 2007 - 24 months)
The final stage of this process will mark the defeat of the insurgency as a large security threat to Iraq, through both military firepower and political inclusion. National elections are being held in two weeks and the likelyhood that U.S. forces will drawdown their personnel numbers in 2006 remains strong. The Iraqi security forces continue to grow and improve and are now enabling coalition forces to pursue holding strategies in key locations. In the coming two years you will see a host of other cities, firebases, and infastructure security transfered over to Iraqi authorities. Ultimately 2006 is poised to be a transitional year with more achievements and successes, and more work remains. Certainly there will be violence in Iraq for a long period of time, but the tide has tipped on an insurgency that offers no political alternatives, is experiencing inner divisions between the different groups, has suffered tremendous losses of key leadership and other personnel, and is increasingly seeing their areas of operations challenged.
Note: All statistics cited above were taken from the Brookings Institute, a progressive thinktank in Washington D.C.
Posted by Mixed Humor at December 2, 2005 02:53 AM
The Ramadi Debacle
The media bites on al-Qaeda propaganda; Coalition forces execute another offensive in Ramadi.
By Bill Roggio
The reported mini-Tet offensive in Ramadi has turned out to be less than accurate. In fact, it has been anything but. The Associated Press reported a massive citywide insurgent attack, and Reuters and other news outlets quickly picked up on the story.
Captain Jeffery Pool, Public Affairs Officer for the 2nd Marine Division, disputed the claims in the harshest of terms, and rebuked the media for its mis characterization of events. Today I witnessed inaccurate reporting, use of unreliable sources, media using other media as sources, an active insurgent propaganda machine, and the pack journalism at its worse.
Cori Dauber, an Associate Professor of Communication Studies at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, looks at how old Associate Press Television Network footage was used to support the case for the faux Ramadi Uprising by all of the news networks, and little has been done to retract the charges.
The AP and other media organizations have bought into a sophisticated and clever al-Qaeda information operation designed to weaken support for the war in the United States and project an image of strength for the insurgency. After al-Qaedas defeat along the border, there is a dire need for them to do so.
Operation Shank begins in Ramadi
While the false Ramadi reports continue to filter down, Coalition forces launch the latest offensive in the city. Operation Shank is directed at an unspecified area of the city, and is made up of a battalion-sized assault force approximately 200 Iraqi Army soldiers from 1st Brigade, 7th Division and 300 Marines from 3rd Battalion, 7th Marine Regiment.
The Multinational Forces Iraq press release states this is the fifth such operation, but is in fact the sixth, as Operation Mountaineers preceded Operations Panthers, Bruins, Lions and Tigers. Ramadi will be subdued piecemeal. Since operations began in Ramadi, attacks have decreased by sixty percent.
Coalition successes do not come without a heavy price. Outside Fallujah, ten Marines of Regimental Combat Team 8 were killed and eleven injured while on a foot patrol. The MNF-I press release indicates the patrol was attacked with an IED fashioned from several large artillery shells, which makes sense as it is difficult to take such high casualties while patrolling without multiple explosives being employed. Thankfully seven of those wounded were able to immediately return to duty, indicating their wounds were minor. Our thoughts are with the four injured Marines and the families of those ten lost in the attack.
Events in Fallujah show that if you are looking for bad news in Iraq, there is no reason to propagate al-Qaeda propaganda or manufacture news from whole cloth.
December 2, 2005 04:25 PM
