Yes, There Was An After-War Plan

[Annie]

imperfect, but not absent. Links to all relevant areas at site:

http://www.qando.net/details.aspx?Entry=2069

Yes, Virginia, there was a Postwar Plan
Posted by: Jon Henke on Wednesday, June 22, 2005

Kevin Drum uses early/mid 2002 memos to prove—prove!—that the Bush administration didn't plan for the Iraq postwar phase...

Tonight I want to summarize what they say about the Bush administration's postwar plans:

* David Manning Memo: "From what [Condoleezza Rice] said, Bush has yet to find the answers to the big questions...what happens on the morning after?

....I think there is a real risk that the Administration underestimates the difficulties. They may agree that failure isn't an option, but this does not mean that they will avoid it."


* Straw Memo: "We have also to answer the big question — what will this action achieve? There seems to be a larger hole in this than on anything."


* Downing Street Memo: "There was little discussion in Washington of the aftermath after military action."



The message from these memos is is pretty clear: the administration didn't have any postwar plans. They figured they'd invade, mop up, and then leave.

Of course, the memos were written in 2002, so normally we'd simply assume that serious planning was done at a later date. However, the evidence indicates that the Bush administration never took postwar planning seriously, and the Downing Street Memos provide yet another data point to back this up.



Now, I'm sympathetic to claims that the Bush administration planned poorly, over-optimistically or inadequately for the Iraq postwar phase. I'd agree with many of those claims. I'd especially agree that we made some poor assumptions about the degree of international assistance in the postwar phase.

But it's no wonder that early/mid 2002 memos didn't specify the plan, because the full plan didn't come together until early 2003. From a February, 2003 Statement by Douglas Feith:

I am pleased to have this opportunity to talk with you today about efforts underway in the Defense Department and the U.S. Government to plan for Iraq in the post-conflict period, should war become necessary.

If U.S. and other coalition forces take military action in Iraq, they will, after victory, have contributions to make to the country’s temporary administration and the welfare of the Iraqi people. It will be necessary to provide humanitarian relief, organize basic services and work to establish security for the liberated Iraqis.
​

There follows a lot of speechifying about the US responsibility to the Iraqi people, the importance of "economic and political reconstruction, working to put Iraq on a path to become a prosperous and free country", and the US "commitment to stay and a commitment to leave". More importantly, though, was this rough outline of The Plan:

To prepare for all this, the President directed on January 20 the creation of a post-war planning office. Although located within the Policy organization in the Department of Defense, this office is staffed by officials detailed from departments and agencies throughout the government. Its job is detailed planning and implementation. The intention is not to theorize but to do practical work – to prepare for action on the ground, if and when the time comes for such work. In the event of war, most of the people in the office will deploy to Iraq. We have named it the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance and we describe it as an “expeditionary” office.

The Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance is charged with establishing links with the United Nations specialized agencies and with non-governmental organizations that will play a role in post-war Iraq. It will reach out also to the counterpart offices in the governments of coalition countries, and, in coordination with the President’s Special Envoy to the Free Iraqis, to the various Free Iraqi groups.

The immediate responsibility for administering post-war Iraq will fall upon the Commander of the U.S. Central Command, as the commander of the U.S. and coalition forces in the field. The purpose of the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance is to develop the detailed plans that he and his subordinates will draw on in meeting these responsibilities.

Various parts of the government have done a great deal of work on aspects of post-war planning for months now. Several planning efforts are underway.
​

Feith went on to list various agencies and task groups, along with their responsibilities in the postwar planning. You can read the full statement here.

Was it adequate? Well, no. Many of our assumptions about international assistance did not obtain in reality. The Iraqis were more wary of us, the insurgents were more persistent, and the hidden caches of weapons far more widespread. All of which meant that our best plans didn't survive contact with the enemy.

Well, that's not a military cliche for nothing.

But that's the nature of war, and to suggest that the administration "never seriously considered what to do with Iraq after the war" and "just figured they'd install some kind of friendly government and then get out" is pretty clearly contradicted by the Feith Statement. The only "criminal neglect" (to borrow from Drum) is the critics apparent unawareness of the postwar plans that did exist. Call them bad plans if you like, but let's not pretend they weren't there at all.

UPDATE:

For all of the relevant, notable portions of the Downing Street and associated British Memos see this post, where they've been aggregated. Or see this post for comparative analysis of the charges being made.

UPDATE II:

Reader Al notes that the administration's longstanding failure to adequately defend themselves might also be considered "criminal neglect". That's true, and it's a point I've been making for a very long time, most recently when noting that the detainees at Guantanamo Bay actually have received the tribunals required by the Geneva Convention.

That's something you'd think the administration might have mentioned.