WW II ~ Atom Bomb or Russia = Japan's Surrender in WWII ???

Stryder50

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Feb 8, 2021
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So this is a thread~topic started on another message board/forum with a somewhat history focus ~ only the political bias there means it could be subject to some distortions. Also, it would appear to be a topic of interest here; ... so presenting those posts of such there that I can redo here; without also doing those of others whom might not have approve of in put here ...

So my OP on the other site;
............

The following article link builds upon the old canard of the Regressive Leftist ideology that the USA didn't need to use the atomic bombs upon Japan to encourage a surrender and avoid the costs of actual invasion of Japan to end the war in the Pacific, during World War Two (WWII).

The issue and debate here would be how much did Soviet actions, three months after the end of the War in Europe, contribute to compelling Japan to surrender? Were Soviet Russia invasions in Manchuria, Korea, and Japan's Northern Islands key factors or just "icing on the cake" in form of opportunist land grabs?

The author of the article I'm about to link here would seem to be either a bit deficient in history or deliberately biased in understating the USA's role in defeating Japan. The USA spent those four years combating the best of quantity and quality of Japan's military, and compelling Japan to draw off some of the best of it's Northern Occupation Forces, thereby making the Soviet Russian efforts in mid-late 1945 much easier than they would have been.

Here's the article and link which is source to this thread topic. I'll do my more extensive slice-n-dice later when have more time, but present now for reference sake;
The Bomb Didn’t Beat Japan … Stalin Did
Have decades of nuclear policy been based on a lie?

...
The U.S. use of nuclear weapons against Japan during World War II has long been a subject of emotional debate. Initially, few questioned President Truman’s decision to drop two atomic bombs, on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. But, in 1965, historian Gar Alperovitz argued that, although the bombs did force an immediate end to the war, Japan’s leaders had wanted to surrender anyway and likely would have done so before the American invasion planned for Nov. 1. Their use was, therefore, unnecessary. Obviously, if the bombings weren’t necessary to win the war, then bombing Hiroshima and Nagasaki was wrong. In the years since, many others have joined the fray: some echoing Alperovitz and denouncing the bombings, others rejoining hotly that the bombings were moral, necessary, and life-saving.

Both schools of thought, however, assume that the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki with new, more powerful weapons did coerce Japan into surrendering on Aug. 9. They fail to question the utility of the bombing in the first place — to ask, in essence, did it work? The orthodox view is that, yes, of course, it worked. The United States bombed Hiroshima on Aug. 6 and Nagasaki on Aug. 9, when the Japanese finally succumbed to the threat of further nuclear bombardment and surrendered. The support for this narrative runs deep. But there are three major problems with it, and, taken together, they significantly undermine the traditional interpretation of the Japanese surrender.
...

The Bomb Didn’t Beat Japan … Stalin Did

Have decades of nuclear policy been based on a lie?
 
BTW and FWIW, here's the link to that other forum/thread on this same topic for those whom might what to see how others responded, which I can't present here ...
 
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WW II ~ Part Two ~ Atom Bomb or USSR, ... Etc. ,,,
Yet the USSR/Russia(Stalin) sought to acquire atomic bomb technology even though per the author of the above linked article, such wasn't an instrumental weapon.

I'd propose that since Japan had no central civilian government of major power, rather a split government between it's Army and Navy, the first few days after the first atomic bomb drop were spent debating if such a weapon were real.

Could one bomb from one bomber really do such level of damage ???

A few days later when the second bomb is dropped, that issue might be resolved, but then, how to conduct the "surrender"? Will Russia/USSR still be a viable third party to negotiate through?

Barely has the dust settled from the second atomic bomb drop and Stalin's Russia/USSR is charging into it's l;and grab to seize as much as possible before Japan does surrender.

Note that Russia/USSR spent three months in building up forces and logistics for honoring it's pledge to make war against Japan;

The Soviet Invasion of Manchuria led to Japan's Greatest Defeat

By Nathan N. Prefer To the Soviet military, it is known as the Manchurian Strategic Offensive Operation. Although it had […]

Q-Japans-Defeat-3-HT-Spr18.jpg


Riding in U.S. Lend-Lease amphibious DUWKs, Red Army troops advance to the U.S.S.R.- Manchuria border during Operation August Storm.


Soviet–Japanese War - Wikipedia

 
EXCERPT:
...
At the Tehran Conference in November 1943, Joseph Stalin agreed that the Soviet Union would enter the war against Japan once Germany was defeated. At the Yalta Conference in February 1945, Stalin agreed to Allied pleas to enter World War II in the Pacific Theater within three months of the end of the war in Europe. On 26 July, the US, the UK, and China made the Potsdam Declaration, an ultimatum calling for the Japanese surrender that if ignored would lead to their "prompt and utter destruction".

The commencement of the invasion fell between the US atomic bombings of Hiroshima on 6 August and Nagasaki on 9 August. Although Stalin had been told virtually nothing of the US and UK's atomic bomb program by Allied governments, the date of the invasion was foreshadowed by the Yalta agreement, the date of the German surrender, and the fact that, on 3 August, Marshal Vasilevsky reported to Stalin that, if necessary, he could attack on the morning of 5 August. The timing was well-planned and enabled the Soviet Union to enter the Pacific Theater on the side of the Allies, as previously agreed, before the war's end.[20] The invasion of the second largest Japanese island of Hokkaido was originally planned by the Soviets to be part of the territory taken.[21]

At 11 pm Trans-Baikal time on 8 August 1945, Soviet foreign minister Vyacheslav Molotov informed Japanese ambassador Naotake Satō that the Soviet Union had declared war on Japan, and that from 9 August the Soviet Government would consider itself to be at war with Japan.[22] At one minute past midnight Trans-Baikal time on 9 August 1945, the Soviets commenced their invasion simultaneously on three fronts to the east, west and north of Manchuria. The operation was subdivided into smaller operational and tactical parts:

...

Soviet–Japanese War - Wikipedia

 
It should be noted, as hinted above, that Soviet/USSR/Russian invasion of Japan depended upon use of USA/UK/Allied supplied amphibious vessels to make the over water landings and supply/support possible.

Another un-intended and indirect result of the USA/Allies taking on the lion-share of subduing Japan via an aerial bombardment campaign was the role of several hundreds of USA bombers, B-29s, in destroying Japanese cities. It should be noted that a handful of such Japanese cities were off the strategic bombing list so they could be future targets of the atomic bomb, and having little to no earlier bombing damage, would provide a gauge and scale on the lethal effects of this new weapon, the "atomic bomb".

More correctly "bombs" since one design used uranium and another used plutonium, hence to slightly divergent technological approaches in play here.

Atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki - Wikipedia



Atomic Bomb History

The atomic bomb, and nuclear bombs, are powerful weapons that use nuclear reactions as their source of explosive energy. Scientists first developed nuclear

Bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki - 1945

The first atomic bomb, Little Boy, was dropped on Japan on August 6, 1945.

Another interesting historical point of note is how at least three USAAF B-29 bombers arrived intact within Soviet territory prior to the USSR entering the war against Japan and these aircraft would provide templates by which the Soviets/USSR could develop, via back-engineer/copy, their own version of a high-altitude, pressurized strategic bomber aircraft to carry the atomic bombs of technology they also stole from the West/USA.
The Tu-4;

Tupolev Tu-4 - Wikipedia

 
Some further details for consideration, EXCERPTS;
...
Most of the components for Little Boy left San Francisco on the cruiser USS Indianapolis on 16 July and arrived on Tinian on 26 July. Four days later the ship was sunk by a Japanese submarine. The remaining components, which included six uranium-235 rings, were delivered by three C-54 Skymasters of the 509th Group's 320th Troop Carrier Squadron.[290] Two Fat Man assemblies travelled to Tinian in specially modified 509th Composite Group B-29s. The first plutonium core went in a special C-54.[291] In late April, a joint targeting committee of the Manhattan District and USAAF was established to determine which cities in Japan should be targets, and recommended Kokura, Hiroshima, Niigata, and Kyoto. At this point, Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson intervened, announcing that he would be making the targeting decision, and that he would not authorize the bombing of Kyoto on the grounds of its historical and religious significance. Groves therefore asked Arnold to remove Kyoto not just from the list of nuclear targets, but from targets for conventional bombing as well.[292] One of Kyoto's substitutes was Nagasaki.
...
Groves expected to have another atomic bomb ready for use on 19 August, with three more in September and a further three in October.[305] Two more Fat Man assemblies were readied, and scheduled to leave Kirtland Field for Tinian on 11 and 14 August.[304] At Los Alamos, technicians worked 24 hours straight to cast another plutonium core.[306] Although cast, it still needed to be pressed and coated, which would take until 16 August.[307] It could therefore have been ready for use on 19 August. On 10 August, Truman secretly requested that additional atomic bombs not be dropped on Japan without his express authority.[308] Groves suspended the third core's shipment on his own authority on 13 August.
...

Manhattan Project - Wikipedia



FWIW, I've seen at other sources that production numbers were planned to creep upward by 2-3 + each month after October.
 
......
Because the fault is mine, for not being clear enough in the OP.

The primary issue is;
... was Japan ready to surrender after the first atomic bomb, or even the second ? ...
... Or was Japan hoping to hold out and/or defeat an actual invasion by the West~USA&UK ?

In which case, how much did the USSR attacks and invasions either;
1) Compel Japan to finally surrender?
2) Encourage Japan to surrender sooner than it had planned/hoped to?

OR ... to put in other terms;
Were the USSR attacks and invasions a "deal breaker (maker?)" or a "deal accelerator" ???
 
.............
Well Ike wasn't alone in those reservations, within the limited number of persons whom knew of the atomic bombs and their potential. However, Ike wasn't directly involved in the recent events of the PTO where along with recent bloody assaults upon Iwo Jima and Okinawa, the USN had also been the focus of intense kamikaze air attacks. (Should be worth noting that the USSR was also spared the Kamikaze attacks.) Therefore Ike could be said to have lacked a full perspective of what was in store should the USA have to follow through with Operation Olympic and actually invade Japan Home Islands.

Note that to date it had taken actually invasion and conquer within Italy to get that nation to surrender and Germany had required an even more extensive invasion and total conquest, from both East and West, to finally surrender. Two out of three had shown to be fanatical enough to require extreme measures and there was no firm indication that the third ~ Japan would be any less so.

Hindsight is often close to 100% accurate; but foresight of the time and circumstances "back then" is rarely as much as a fifty~fifty coin toss.

The challenge to historians is to detach from the hindsight of "looking back" and knowing more than was available "back then" when the intel and knowledge of enemy resources and intent are less clear and knowable, such that one can objectively place themselves within proper context and perspective of what would have been know and could have been conceivable.

By the end of July and start of August 1945, to the USA, and West~UK, physical invasion of Japan was looking inevitable and due within the next month or so. The availability of a new and unique weapon with "game changing" potential was seen by most as an option worth deploying on a "Let's see what happens, what it can do." perspective.

Most whom are capable of the needed mental detachment to "Conflict Simulate~War Game" the situation of mid-Summer 1945 and upcoming invasion of Japan Home Islands, with it's huge costs in life, both military and civilian (both sides) would be inclined to try the option that might produce desired Victory Results at much lower costs, and sooner. Especially when all are likely "war-weary" and anxious to be "done with it".

...
Perhaps.

Let's start with an excerpt from your link showing USSR Pacific Fleet strengths;
...
... By August 1945, the Pacific Fleet consisted of two cruisers, one destroyer leader, ten destroyers, two torpedo boats, 19 patrol boats, 78 submarines, ten minelayers, 52 minesweepers, 49 "MO" anti-submarine boats (MO stands for Малый Охотник, or "little hunter"), 204 motor torpedo boats and 1459 war planes. ...
...

Pacific Fleet (Russia) - Wikipedia



First place to start would be the effectiveness of the gunnery and torpedo capabilities of these ships, especially compared to contemporaries of the USN in August 1945. I'd suspect such(USSR) were rather deficient.

"Two cruisers and less than a dozen destroyers" is a Task Force a bit short of anything the USN threw against the IJN during the numerous surface ship engagements against the IJN in the many battles of "The Slot" during the Solomon's (Guadalcanal ~ +) Campaign(s), and this Russian/USSR TF, if placed in such would likely have wound up wrecks on Iron Bottom Sound had they been there (and engaged).

POINT here is that if the USA/UK~USN hadn't spent four years reducing IJN/IJA resources, and had any handful of typical IJN crusiers (CL/CA) and destroyers (DD) along with air cover, been able to contest the USSR over water amphib operations, likely most of the USSR naval forces and transports/landing craft would have been sunk! BTW, likely any real amphib vessels in the USSR inventory for these operations would have come from USA Lend-Lease stocks.
...
 
.............
Well Ike wasn't alone in those reservations, within the limited number of persons whom knew of the atomic bombs and their potential. However, Ike wasn't directly involved in the recent events of the PTO where along with recent bloody assaults upon Iwo Jima and Okinawa, the USN had also been the focus of intense kamikaze air attacks. (Should be worth noting that the USSR was also spared the Kamikaze attacks.) Therefore Ike could be said to have lacked a full perspective of what was in store should the USA have to follow through with Operation Olympic and actually invade Japan Home Islands.

Note that to date it had taken actually invasion and conquer within Italy to get that nation to surrender and Germany had required an even more extensive invasion and total conquest, from both East and West, to finally surrender. Two out of three had shown to be fanatical enough to require extreme measures and there was no firm indication that the third ~ Japan would be any less so.

Hindsight is often close to 100% accurate; but foresight of the time and circumstances "back then" is rarely as much as a fifty~fifty coin toss.

The challenge to historians is to detach from the hindsight of "looking back" and knowing more than was available "back then" when the intel and knowledge of enemy resources and intent are less clear and knowable, such that one can objectively place themselves within proper context and perspective of what would have been know and could have been conceivable.

By the end of July and start of August 1945, to the USA, and West~UK, physical invasion of Japan was looking inevitable and due within the next month or so. The availability of a new and unique weapon with "game changing" potential was seen by most as an option worth deploying on a "Let's see what happens, what it can do." perspective.

Most whom are capable of the needed mental detachment to "Conflict Simulate~War Game" the situation of mid-Summer 1945 and upcoming invasion of Japan Home Islands, with it's huge costs in life, both military and civilian (both sides) would be inclined to try the option that might produce desired Victory Results at much lower costs, and sooner. Especially when all are likely "war-weary" and anxious to be "done with it".

...
Perhaps.

Let's start with an excerpt from your link showing USSR Pacific Fleet strengths;
...
... By August 1945, the Pacific Fleet consisted of two cruisers, one destroyer leader, ten destroyers, two torpedo boats, 19 patrol boats, 78 submarines, ten minelayers, 52 minesweepers, 49 "MO" anti-submarine boats (MO stands for Малый Охотник, or "little hunter"), 204 motor torpedo boats and 1459 war planes. ...
...

Pacific Fleet (Russia) - Wikipedia



First place to start would be the effectiveness of the gunnery and torpedo capabilities of these ships, especially compared to contemporaries of the USN in August 1945. I'd suspect such(USSR) were rather deficient.

"Two cruisers and less than a dozen destroyers" is a Task Force a bit short of anything the USN threw against the IJN during the numerous surface ship engagements against the IJN in the many battles of "The Slot" during the Solomon's (Guadalcanal ~ +) Campaign(s), and this Russian/USSR TF, if placed in such would likely have wound up wrecks on Iron Bottom Sound had they been there (and engaged).

POINT here is that if the USA/UK~USN hadn't spent four years reducing IJN/IJA resources, and had any handful of typical IJN crusiers (CL/CA) and destroyers (DD) along with air cover, been able to contest the USSR over water amphib operations, likely most of the USSR naval forces and transports/landing craft would have been sunk! BTW, likely any real amphib vessels in the USSR inventory for these operations would have come from USA Lend-Lease stocks.
...
I think, they suddenly changed their mind and accepted the allies' ultimatum, threatening utter destruction after the two bombs dropped during those three days, killing between 129,000 and 226,000 on the Japanese homeland. Unlikely, they knew how many we had. That kind of destruction in your homeland, without you being able to do a damn thing to prevent it, will get your attention and make you willing to accept the unacceptable and suffer the insufferable.
 
Stalin made peace with the Japanese and refused to attack them until after they were already defeated. It was the Soviet troops freed up by that peace agreement with Japan that reinforced Moscow during Barbarossa. The Japanese for their part were busy going south, where all the goodies were in China and SE Asia where there was more to gain than fighting over Mongolia and Siberia.

Dropping the bombs was as much a warning to Stalin as it was to force Japan to surrender. Our willingness to use it also got him to abandon his support for Korea. He didn't want to take on the U.S. in a war. That came later in Viet Nam, further away from Soviet borders and wouldn't require Soviet Troops having to get directly involved; Stalin suckered Mao into Korea then ran off leaving Mao holding the bag there, then made out like a bandit selling Mao war supplies for gold up front.
 
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So Truman ordered the first nuke dropped on Hiroshima. And it was a success.

Then he orders the second nuke dropped on Nagasaki. It wasn't perfect but it killed a bunch of people too.

The Japanese regime was silent.

A couple of weeks earlier, the allies, Stalin, Truman and Churchill's replacement, held a conference at Potsdam where they made a declaration. The declaration said that Japan must surrender immediately or face complete and utter destruction. This was a reference to the atomic bomb.

The Japanese met the Potsdam declaration with silence too.

So the American's couldn't figure out why there was no response from the Japanese after the two nukes were dropped.

The Secretary of State sent a letter to the Japanese via the Swiss embassy, since there were no communications between Japan and America at the time. The letter hinted that the Japanese Emperor could keep his position and he wouldn't face trial.

In fact, the first draft of the Potsdam Declaration said the Japanese Emperor could remain in office. That language was removed in the later drafts. Why? Because 85% of Americans wanted the Japanese Emperor to be executed for his crimes.

Executing the Emperor wasn't possible. Many in Japan saw the emperor as a Christ like figure.

So the Truman administration treaded carefully.

But a week after the bombs were dropped, and after reading the letter, the Japanese Emperor was convinced that the Americans meant him no harm so he threw his one vote in with the Japanese moderates and the vote to surrender passed.
 
Evidence indicates that Japan was trying to broker surrender terms with Stalin when Harry Truman refused to negotiate. At issue was the pardon of the Emperor which was accomplished anyway after two Bombs were dropped.
That is incorrect all the Japanese offered was a cessation of hostilities, return to 41 start lines EXCEPT in China, no occupation no adverse conditions to Japan at all.
 
That is incorrect all the Japanese offered was a cessation of hostilities, return to 41 start lines EXCEPT in China, no occupation no adverse conditions to Japan at all.
That's what negotiations are about. Doesn't it beat reducing the civilian populations of two cities to black shadows on the wall?
 
It was the Nukes. The Russians were no direct threat to the Japanese Islands and the Japanese knew it. After all, they had made amphibious landings early in the war and knew how complex the game was. The absolute worst the Soviets could do is grab the other half of Sakhalin Island and maybe with a whole lot of luck grab Hokkaido. But I really doubt that could happen. The Soviet lacked sealift capacity and barely had enough landing craft to land one division of light infantry. They had no trained crews for the landing craft so operational losses alone would have been bad. The invasion would have ended up with a division or two of light infantry without artillery. armor or supplies against three and a half million Japanese civilians and several IJA Infantry Divisions.
 
That's what negotiations are about. Doesn't it beat reducing the civilian populations of two cities to black shadows on the wall?
No. Japan had launched an unprovoked war of aggression against China in 1936, killed millions of Chinese civilians, over a million Chinese soldiers. millions of Indo-Chinese and Malaysian civilians, then it launched another war of aggression against the British Commonwealth, France, Dutch East Indies and the USA in December 1941. Do you really think Japan should have got off scot free?
 

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