We Should NOT Have Let Sadr Live

[Annie]

It seemed like a good idea at the time. :coffee3:

http://www.meforum.org/article/655

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A Hidden Hand?

While Muqtada has successfully taken the cards that he was dealt and catapulted himself into a position of power to challenge both the Hawza on one hand, and the full force of the U.S. army on the other, his rise did not occur in a vacuum. Today, he commands not a ragtag militia of dispossessed Shi‘ite but, increasingly, a well-armed, well-trained force of insurgents. The transformation of the Jaysh al-Mahdi lies not in Iraq, but across the border in Iran.

According to Asharq al-Awsat, a London-based pan-Arab newspaper, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps' Quds Force established three military training camps in Qasr-i Shirin, ‘Ilam, and Hamid, on the Iranian side of the Iran-Iraq border to train Jaysh al-Mahdi elements. A former Quds Force official cited in Asharq al-Awsat claims the Iranians have trained between 800 and 1,200 Iraqi supporters of Muqtada in espionage and reconnoitering in addition to standard military arts. There are also reports that the Iranian embassy in Baghdad has distributed 400 international cell phones to supporters of Muqtada as well as to clerics in Sadr City and Najaf. In addition to communications and logistical support, Iran provides $80 million a month in direct aid to Muqtada's movement.[33] The Iranian support is controversial. According to one critic, "Behind al-Sadr's phenomenon and money are the most extremist and anti-democratic governing bodies in Iran which seek to settle its account with the international community with the blood of the Iraqis."[34]

Muqtada has denied any political coordination between himself and Iran and has accused those making the allegations of wanting to label his movement as a terrorist organization similar to Hezbollah in Lebanon in order to provide an excuse to target his supporters. In fact, Muqtada has played an interesting game. While accepting Iranian money and perhaps even volunteers for his militia, he has sought to divorce himself from his Iranian mentor Ayatollah Kadhem Hussein al-Ha'iri who rebuked Muqtada for not coordinating his activities with Ha'iri's office in Najaf.[35] In the broader scale of things, however, the Iranian leadership is concerned about the rise of Najaf to its pre-Saddam glory as the leading center of Shi‘ite seminaries and scholarship that would diminish the role of the Shi‘ite center in Qum whose leaders provide the religious underpinnings for the Iranian regime. By empowering Muqtada al-Sadr, the Iranian leadership can keep Iraqi politicians and religious figures occupied with sorting out their own house. The threat to the Islamic Republic's religious legitimacy is delayed.
Looking Ahead

Consistent with his stated opposition to any form of government "not elected by the people," Muqtada has denounced the transitional government of Prime Minister Iyad Allawi and vowed to have nothing to do with it "until Judgment Day." However, reading Muqtada's Friday sermon in Kufa in June, Sheikh Jabber al-Khaffaji quoted Muqtada as saying that he would support the government if it were more responsive to Iraqi public opinion than to the concerns of the occupiers led by the United States.[36] That sermon continued to criticize interim president Ghazi al-Yawar for shaking hands with President Bush.[37]

Muqtada has missed no opportunity to be contrary and provocative. He seems to relish the role of the outlaw, which with all its negative connotations has brought him fame and power. At present, Muqtada alone can mobilize the disenfranchised and marginalized Shi‘ite masses that suffered under Saddam and whose situation has not improved in scale to their expectations. The ability to mobilize supporters, including those residing in Sadr City, will constitute a formidable political force in any future free election, especially if the United States and U.N. continue their plans to impose a Weimar Republic-style proportional representation system in Iraq. The murder charges against him are not insurmountable. The interim government may find it in the national interest to let the matter slide, especially if Muqtada agrees to pay ad-diya, blood money. [38]

The case of Muqtada is emblematic of the inability of the coalition forces to understand the texture of the Iraqi political culture in timely fashion or to construct and successfully execute plans to deal with those who would subvert the forces' goals. Believing in the authority of Grand Ayatollah Sistani, the coalition forces underestimated the potential harm a young and rebellious cleric with a distinguished name could inflict upon them. Further, the coalition's failure to carry out threats "to capture or kill" Muqtada when the dangers he posed began to become clear has left the transitional government with a growing crisis that it cannot easily resolve.

While Muqtada's influence is growing among many poor and marginalized Shi‘ite, it is doubtful that he can continue his rebellion indefinitely. Muqtada's isolation among the religious establishment, his inconsistency and inexperience, the resentment he engenders among the people of Najaf because of the hardships his rebellion has brought, as well as the balance of military force in favor of the interim government all disadvantage him. Both the interim government and multinational forces realize that they cannot allow Muqtada to operate in defiance of the order they seek to impose. It is imperative that Muqtada be neutralized either through military force or through co-optation into the political process. Failing to do so will only cause chaos.

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[onedomino]

Two can play Iran's game. We should fund and arm the Kurds that live in Northwestern Iran.

 

[Annie]

Two can play Iran's game. We should fund and arm the Kurds that live in Northwestern Iran.

At this point I'm not so sure. It would be another front, upsetting both Iran and Turkey.

 

[onedomino]

At this point I'm not so sure. It would be another front, upsetting both Iran and Turkey.

Iran must be made to realize that there is too big a price to pay when it funds terrorism against America and its allies (whoever they might be at this juncture). Where is the USS Vincennes when we need it? It was the ship that blew away the Iranian airbus. Supporting the Kurds would deliver our message loud and clear. Right now, the Iranians think that they can do whatever they want (especially through their (Hez)Ebola proxy. Regarding Turkey, the population of that country is virulently anti-American. The Turkish press routinely lies about American activities, making up atrocities that we have supposedly performed and printing the lies in their newspapers. I would tell the Turks that unless they change their foreign policy we will fund the Kurds and oppose their membership in the EU (right now, we support their membership; probably because it upsets France so much). The Kurds were screwed by early 20th century English cartographers, who drew Middle East boundaries without regard to the cultures living in the region. Much of the Middle East mess is a function of having to clean up after English and French colonial crashes.

 

[Annie]

Iran must be made to realize that there is too big a price to pay when it funds terrorism against America and its allies (whoever they might be at this juncture). Where is the USS Vincennes when we need it? It was the ship that blew away the Iranian airbus. Supporting the Kurds would deliver our message loud and clear. Right now, the Iranians think that they can do whatever they want (especially through their (Hez)Ebola proxy. Regarding Turkey, the population of that country is virulently anti-American. The Turkish press routinely lies about American activities, making up atrocities that we have supposedly performed and printing the lies in their newspapers. I would tell the Turks that unless they change their foreign policy we will fund the Kurds and oppose their membership in the EU (right now, we support their membership; probably because it upsets France so much). The Kurds were screwed by early 20th century English cartographers, who drew Middle East boundaries without regard to the cultures living in the region. Much of the Middle East mess is a function of having to clean up after English and French colonial crashes.

I agree with all you say. We have a large army, able to become much larger if necessity warrants. However, most do not want that. I don't see that we will be opening fronts as much as answering them. Iran may soon be the exception, though how it will become so, remains unclear to me. No doubt they need to be dealt with, but we are not willing to do so, yet.

 

[William Joyce]

Let's see...

First Sadddam had to go because he had nuclear weapons or something. Or, wait - no, it was because he wasn't democratic. Right. Or something - what did Bush say? Now he's gone. But now what rises after the secular leader goes - a popular figure supported by the masses - also must go. But not, obviously, because he has "weapons of mass destruction". Nor could it be because he's not "democratic," because, in the strict sense of the word, he is, because a majority support him.

What's the goddamn goal here, again?

 

[dilloduck]

Let's see...

First Sadddam had to go because he had nuclear weapons or something. Or, wait - no, it was because he wasn't democratic. Right. Or something - what did Bush say? Now he's gone. But now what rises after the secular leader goes - a popular figure supported by the masses - also must go. But not, obviously, because he has "weapons of mass destruction". Nor could it be because he's not "democratic," because, in the strict sense of the word, he is, because a majority support him.

What's the goddamn goal here, again?

I think it was to start wiping out Islamo-terrorists and countries that train and finance them.