odanny
Diamond Member
There newest main battle tank remains quite vulnerable, and if you think that technological advancements in this tank will actually work, then you are probably expecting a lot. Reliability? Very unlikely. It remains a soft target.
As of 2018, more than 2,700 T-90 tanks or vehicles built on its chassis have been produced for the Russian army, as well as several former Soviet republics, India and Algeria, among others. Some 100 are believed to have been deployed to the eastern offensive in Ukraine, but for all its touted innovations, the T-90 has been doing little better than the T-72s and T-80s that it has joined there.
First contact was reported on April 25, when Ukrainian infantry encountered a T-90 outside of Kharkiv and destroyed it with a Javelin antitank guided missile, along with an MT-LB prime mover and an infantry fighting vehicle that accompanied the tank.
While a single encounter is nothing from which to draw general conclusions, the outcome has parallels with the fates of scores of the T-90’s predecessors. For one thing, the electronic counter weapons have not worked consistently. For another, the American FGM-148 Javelin, German Panzerfaust 3 and other antitank missiles have tandem warheads, one to pre-detonate the active armor and the second to penetrate the tank’s hull. A third factor is an option in the Javelin’s repertoire to turn upwards as it approaches its target and then dive almost vertically on it from above, where the armor is thinner.
A final weakness is tactical: a penchant of the Russian tankers to advance independently, rather than in concert with accompanying infantry. Given the way Soviet combined-arms tactics had been perfected by the end of World War II, this retrograde tendency seems inexplicable, but it has denied the Russian tanks, regardless of model, critical infantry support and left them vulnerable to Ukrainian tank-killing teams.
www.historynet.com
As of 2018, more than 2,700 T-90 tanks or vehicles built on its chassis have been produced for the Russian army, as well as several former Soviet republics, India and Algeria, among others. Some 100 are believed to have been deployed to the eastern offensive in Ukraine, but for all its touted innovations, the T-90 has been doing little better than the T-72s and T-80s that it has joined there.
First contact was reported on April 25, when Ukrainian infantry encountered a T-90 outside of Kharkiv and destroyed it with a Javelin antitank guided missile, along with an MT-LB prime mover and an infantry fighting vehicle that accompanied the tank.
While a single encounter is nothing from which to draw general conclusions, the outcome has parallels with the fates of scores of the T-90’s predecessors. For one thing, the electronic counter weapons have not worked consistently. For another, the American FGM-148 Javelin, German Panzerfaust 3 and other antitank missiles have tandem warheads, one to pre-detonate the active armor and the second to penetrate the tank’s hull. A third factor is an option in the Javelin’s repertoire to turn upwards as it approaches its target and then dive almost vertically on it from above, where the armor is thinner.
A final weakness is tactical: a penchant of the Russian tankers to advance independently, rather than in concert with accompanying infantry. Given the way Soviet combined-arms tactics had been perfected by the end of World War II, this retrograde tendency seems inexplicable, but it has denied the Russian tanks, regardless of model, critical infantry support and left them vulnerable to Ukrainian tank-killing teams.
It was supposed to be Russia's secret weapon. But is this the most disappointing weapon in the history of modern warfare?
The T-90 was supposed to be the pride of post-Soviet armored units. So far, it's been a disappointment.
www.historynet.com
