The Cruise of the Great White Fleet

[Hawk1981]

For fourteen months, from December 1907 through February 1909, a fleet of the latest battleships and support vessels from the United States sailed around the world. Painted a stark white with gilded scrollwork and red, white and blue banners on the ships' bows, the vessels carrying 14,000 sailors and marines sailed 43,000 miles making 20 port calls.

The ostensible mission of the fleet's voyage was to showcase American goodwill. The United States had participated in navy courtesy calls since 1902 and the port calls by the world's leading navies through the 19th century had developed into significant pageants for displaying pomp, ceremony and naval muscle. President Theodore Roosevelt was anxious to confirm his conviction that only through a strong navy could the US project its power and prestige abroad.

With eleven new battleships constructed in four years, the voyage of the Great White Fleet would demonstrate both domestically and internationally that the United States had become a major sea power. Particularly in view of recent tensions with Japan, the voyage from the US navy's Atlantic ports to the Pacific would show America's willingness to commit assets that could be used to defend the possessions acquired by the US from Spain in the recent war and protect American interests in China.

Roosevelt did not want a break with Japan, knowing that the US was not prepared for a Pacific conflict, but the trip demonstrated some components of his "Big Stick Diplomacy." Portrayed as a friendly visit and welcomed by Japan, the fleet's visit served to confirm the stability of the new balance of power as well as the relevant spheres of influence between the US and Japan.

The voyage also provided an opportunity to test the long range capabilities of the new ships. The new battleships incorporated many lessons learned from the recent Spanish-American War as well as those lessons taken from the difficulties experienced by the Russian fleet when it was deployed from Europe and then destroyed by the Japanese fleet in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904.

Considerable effort was required to secure supplies of provisions and coal for the trip. New investments were committed to port facilities on the US west coast, Hawaii and in the Philippines. The cruise provided practical experience for the US Navy in sea duty, ship handling and long-range logistics. The voyage was completed with no major mechanical issues.

Significant design issues were revealed that would be resolved in the next generations of American battleships. Problems in seaworthiness, taking too much spray, impracticality of secondary armament and design of armor were noted for correction. The success of the peacetime voyage and no battle experience obscured some issues that would not be revealed until wartime conditions in the First World War.

From a fleet standpoint the voyage led to improvements in formation steaming, gunnery accuracy and fuel economy while demonstrating issues with non-standard and conservative ship design, and too much dependence on foreign coal resources. The voyage stressed the need for overseas bases that could provide better coaling and supply services along with more auxiliary ships. Foreign coaling ships or ports were used 90 percent of the time for coaling and resupply.

The end of the voyage and return of the fleet to the US came at the end of the Roosevelt Presidency, but his impact on US naval modernization and expansion would continue for many years, along with the projection of power through Gunboat Diplomacy.

 

[Tom Paine 1949]

Great retelling of this famous “coming out” story of American naval power onto the world stage.

That the sailing of the “Great White Fleet” was a brainstorm of the famous American “progressive trustbuster” Teddy Roosevelt says a lot about the complexities of American society in that Jim Crow era of industrial advance. The U.S. no longer had an empty continent before it waiting to be consolidated. There was only a wider world of old empires, nations and colonies themselves struggling to modernize. U.S. moves in the direction of international engagement, even though thought or meant to be “enlightened,” as also our later entry into WWI, were steps into a competitive world of clashing imperialisms.

 

[whitehall]

When it became obvious that the legacy of the great battleships was over and aircraft carriers became the new technology, the other Roosevelt set the old battle wagons up as a target for the Japanese attack while the carriers were conveniently at sea.