Hawk1981
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- Apr 1, 2020
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When the Confederate States declared their independence in 1861, and faced war with the Union, they hoped to coerce Great Britain and France into recognizing the new nation and supporting the Confederate war effort. Since the economies of Britain and France were heavily dependent on southern cotton for textile manufacturing, the South hoped to force an intervention by the European powers by restricting the flow of cotton through an embargo.
Prior to the Civil War cotton produced by the southern states held a predominant position in the economies of the US and in the world. In the 1850s cotton exports were over 55% of all US exports, and the South provided 75% of the world's supply of cotton. Nearly 80% of the cotton consumed by British factories, and 90% of the cotton produced by France was produced by the American South. In 1853, it was estimated that 20% of Britain's workforce was tied directly or indirectly to the textile industry.
Political leaders in the South advanced a theory that control over cotton exports could make a proposed independent southern Confederacy economically prosperous. The Union would be forced to grant the southern states independence due to the threat of economic ruin for the New England textile industry and the European countries would recognize the Confederacy because of the dependence of their economies on cotton. The "King Cotton" argument was a powerful factor in mobilizing support for secession in the cotton producing states.
These bellicose lines from a speech given by Senator James Hammond of South Carolina in 1858 summarized the "King Cotton" theory. "Without firing a gun, without drawing a sword, should they make war on us, we could bring the whole world to our feet. What would happen if no cotton was furnished for three years? England would topple headlong and carry the whole civilized world with her save the South. No, you dare not make war on cotton. No power on the earth dares to make war on it. Cotton is king."
When Confederate President Jefferson Davis took office he immediately leveraged the "King Cotton" strategy by cautioning the North that obstructing cotton's "transmission to foreign markets would be detrimental to manufacturing and commercial markets abroad." When the Union government responded with force, individual southern state governments and private citizens voluntarily refused to allow the export of cotton. Honoring state's rights, the Confederate government never formally approved an embargo. New Orleans forbade any cotton from the 1861 harvest to be brought in and burned the stocks that were on hand rather than ship it out. Prominent South Carolinian Edmund Rhett told the London Times that "you British must recognize us by the end of October [1861] because of cotton requirements."
With the imposition of a Union blockade on southern ports reinforcing the self-embargo on cotton, exports of cotton were reduced by 95%. Prices soared from ten cents to nearly two dollars a pound. The Confederate's strategy showed promise in the short run when manufacturers and merchants in both Britain and France urged their governments to recognize the Confederacy and restore the pipeline for cotton.
Ironically, the cotton embargo failed to bring recognition from Britain and France, in part, because of the enormous harvests from the prior two years that had been shipped and stockpiled by textile manufacturers taking advantage of the lower prices from the cotton glut prior to the outbreak of the war. The sudden increase in value of the stockpiled cotton preserved and even increased the profits of the European cotton interests. Producers, able to draw from their reserves, did not feel the effects of the cotton blockade/embargo until late in 1862.
Prior to the Civil War cotton produced by the southern states held a predominant position in the economies of the US and in the world. In the 1850s cotton exports were over 55% of all US exports, and the South provided 75% of the world's supply of cotton. Nearly 80% of the cotton consumed by British factories, and 90% of the cotton produced by France was produced by the American South. In 1853, it was estimated that 20% of Britain's workforce was tied directly or indirectly to the textile industry.
Political leaders in the South advanced a theory that control over cotton exports could make a proposed independent southern Confederacy economically prosperous. The Union would be forced to grant the southern states independence due to the threat of economic ruin for the New England textile industry and the European countries would recognize the Confederacy because of the dependence of their economies on cotton. The "King Cotton" argument was a powerful factor in mobilizing support for secession in the cotton producing states.
These bellicose lines from a speech given by Senator James Hammond of South Carolina in 1858 summarized the "King Cotton" theory. "Without firing a gun, without drawing a sword, should they make war on us, we could bring the whole world to our feet. What would happen if no cotton was furnished for three years? England would topple headlong and carry the whole civilized world with her save the South. No, you dare not make war on cotton. No power on the earth dares to make war on it. Cotton is king."
When Confederate President Jefferson Davis took office he immediately leveraged the "King Cotton" strategy by cautioning the North that obstructing cotton's "transmission to foreign markets would be detrimental to manufacturing and commercial markets abroad." When the Union government responded with force, individual southern state governments and private citizens voluntarily refused to allow the export of cotton. Honoring state's rights, the Confederate government never formally approved an embargo. New Orleans forbade any cotton from the 1861 harvest to be brought in and burned the stocks that were on hand rather than ship it out. Prominent South Carolinian Edmund Rhett told the London Times that "you British must recognize us by the end of October [1861] because of cotton requirements."
With the imposition of a Union blockade on southern ports reinforcing the self-embargo on cotton, exports of cotton were reduced by 95%. Prices soared from ten cents to nearly two dollars a pound. The Confederate's strategy showed promise in the short run when manufacturers and merchants in both Britain and France urged their governments to recognize the Confederacy and restore the pipeline for cotton.
Ironically, the cotton embargo failed to bring recognition from Britain and France, in part, because of the enormous harvests from the prior two years that had been shipped and stockpiled by textile manufacturers taking advantage of the lower prices from the cotton glut prior to the outbreak of the war. The sudden increase in value of the stockpiled cotton preserved and even increased the profits of the European cotton interests. Producers, able to draw from their reserves, did not feel the effects of the cotton blockade/embargo until late in 1862.