Disir
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In the case of Hezbollah the āeternal recurrenceā started at the moment of its birth in 1982 when then Iranian Ambassador to Damascus Ayatollah Ali-Akbar Mohtashami informed his masters in Tehran that he had created āa structureā to dislodge the network of Palestinian gunmen loyal to Yasser Arafat, who, until the Israeli military intervention, had turned parts of southern Lebanon into āFatahlandā.
At the time, Iran and Israel were both happy to see the back of Arafatās fighters. Israel regarded their presence close to itself as a threat while Tehran sought the destruction of the PLO because of Arafatās support for Saddam Hussein in his war against Iran.
Soon, however, it became clear that Tehran meant to use its new branch of Hezbollah as a Trojan horse to turn Lebanon into a satrapy in all but name. The scheme scandalized and frightened many in Lebanon, including the then one-star General Michel Aoun who emerged as a champion of the campaign against the creation of a parallel army in Lebanon.
A promise to disband the armed section of Hezbollah became a major item in the secret negotiations that the late Ayatollah Ruhallah Khomeiniās government held with the Reagan administration in Washington in 1985-86.
However, eight years later Tehran was trying to sell the same bill of goods to a new US administration under President Bill Clinton.
In an 180-minute meeting in Damascus in 1993, Clintonās Secretary of State Warren Christopher made a deal with then Syrian President Hafez Assad who assured him that Tehran was also on board.
The supposed ādealā, sold by Christopher to the Israelis as a major achievement, persuaded Israeli leaders not to take military action against Hezbollah.
However, the belauded ādealā soon proved meaningless as Hezbollah continued pinprick attacks against Israelās Lebanese allies while also seizing more Western hostages on command from Tehran.
Three years later, Christopher was back in Damascus demanding that Assad put the previous ādealā in writing in exchange for Israel ending its āOperation Grapes of Wrathā without destroying Hezbollahās armed structures.
This time, other actors became involved in the charade.
A charade
Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov, an old expert on the region, embarked on a shuttle diplomacy to save Hezbollah from destruction in exchange for a promise to dissolve its armed units.
France went further by inviting then Iranās Foreign Minister Ali-Akbar Velayati to Paris where he signed an accord with his French counterpart Herve de Charrette to guarantee the continued existence of Hezbollah in exchange for giving up its arms.
The tactic that Tehran used is known in diplomacy as ācheat-and-retreatā: When your back is to the wall you sign whatever your adversaries want. And, because your adversaries do not have the same attention span, they will soon forget what you had signed. Then you can resume your shenanigans until the next crisis.
Lebanon: Is cheat-and-retreat back on the menu?
The above is an op-ed but it is interesting
At the time, Iran and Israel were both happy to see the back of Arafatās fighters. Israel regarded their presence close to itself as a threat while Tehran sought the destruction of the PLO because of Arafatās support for Saddam Hussein in his war against Iran.
Soon, however, it became clear that Tehran meant to use its new branch of Hezbollah as a Trojan horse to turn Lebanon into a satrapy in all but name. The scheme scandalized and frightened many in Lebanon, including the then one-star General Michel Aoun who emerged as a champion of the campaign against the creation of a parallel army in Lebanon.
A promise to disband the armed section of Hezbollah became a major item in the secret negotiations that the late Ayatollah Ruhallah Khomeiniās government held with the Reagan administration in Washington in 1985-86.
However, eight years later Tehran was trying to sell the same bill of goods to a new US administration under President Bill Clinton.
In an 180-minute meeting in Damascus in 1993, Clintonās Secretary of State Warren Christopher made a deal with then Syrian President Hafez Assad who assured him that Tehran was also on board.
The supposed ādealā, sold by Christopher to the Israelis as a major achievement, persuaded Israeli leaders not to take military action against Hezbollah.
However, the belauded ādealā soon proved meaningless as Hezbollah continued pinprick attacks against Israelās Lebanese allies while also seizing more Western hostages on command from Tehran.
Three years later, Christopher was back in Damascus demanding that Assad put the previous ādealā in writing in exchange for Israel ending its āOperation Grapes of Wrathā without destroying Hezbollahās armed structures.
This time, other actors became involved in the charade.
A charade
Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov, an old expert on the region, embarked on a shuttle diplomacy to save Hezbollah from destruction in exchange for a promise to dissolve its armed units.
France went further by inviting then Iranās Foreign Minister Ali-Akbar Velayati to Paris where he signed an accord with his French counterpart Herve de Charrette to guarantee the continued existence of Hezbollah in exchange for giving up its arms.
The tactic that Tehran used is known in diplomacy as ācheat-and-retreatā: When your back is to the wall you sign whatever your adversaries want. And, because your adversaries do not have the same attention span, they will soon forget what you had signed. Then you can resume your shenanigans until the next crisis.
Lebanon: Is cheat-and-retreat back on the menu?
The above is an op-ed but it is interesting
