End result of Iran and Israel

Do you remember what it was like before the 6 day war?

Constantly under threat from Arab forces, yes.

The Six-Day War removed much of that threat. There hasn't been a serious attempt to invade Israel since 1973.
 
Constantly under threat from Arab forces, yes.

The Six-Day War removed much of that threat. There hasn't been a serious attempt to invade Israel since 1973.


There was no threat in 1967.. Read Moshe Dayan.
 
The regional conflict can’t go on forever
It must end and it don’t look very peaceful

Israel has the superior Air power
Iran through has tens of thousands of missiles they can launch into central Israel

I hope there is no war
Iran eventually gets nuked.
 
Throughout 1966, Syrian and Israeli tensions increased along the border over water rights and disputed land that had been demilitarized since the 1949 cease-fire agreement. Syrian and Israeli farmers working this land provided a pretext for low-intensity conflicts for years. About 80 percent of incidents, Moshe Dayan would later say, were the result of Israeli provocations:

It would go like this. We would send a tractor to plow the earth in some plot you couldn’t do anything with, in a demilitarized zone, knowing in advance that the Syrians would start shooting. If they didn’t shoot, we would tell the tractor to go farther, until finally the Syrians would lose their temper and shoot. And then we’d fire back, and later send in the air force.
 

The Soviets lied to Nasser.

In an interview granted by Moshe Dayan to an Israeli journalist, with the proviso that it would be kept secret during Dayan’s lifetime, he said:

Of course, they [the kibbutzniks] wanted to get the Syrians out of their sight. They had suffered a lot because of the Syrians ... But I can tell you with absolute certainty: the delegation that came to persuade Eshkol to go up to the Heights did not think about these matters. It thought about the Heights’ land. Listen, I myself am a farmer, I come from [the village of] Nahalal, don’t I? Not from Tel Aviv. And I recognise this thing. I saw them and spoke with them. They didn’t even try to hide their lust for that soil. This is what guided them.12
 
The Soviets lied to Nasser.

In an interview granted by Moshe Dayan to an Israeli journalist, with the proviso that it would be kept secret during Dayan’s lifetime, he said:

Of course, they [the kibbutzniks] wanted to get the Syrians out of their sight. They had suffered a lot because of the Syrians ... But I can tell you with absolute certainty: the delegation that came to persuade Eshkol to go up to the Heights did not think about these matters. It thought about the Heights’ land. Listen, I myself am a farmer, I come from [the village of] Nahalal, don’t I? Not from Tel Aviv. And I recognise this thing. I saw them and spoke with them. They didn’t even try to hide their lust for that soil. This is what guided them.12

As usual, your narrative is flat earth lunacy,
and "secret interviews" of an unnamed source.

The energy Arab supremacist invest in denial to compensate for their historic defeat,
could be better used to actually educate the largest illiterate group on earth...don't you think?


 
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As usual, your entire narrative
depends on a "secret interview" by an unnamed source.

The energy Arab supremacist invest in denial compensating for that defeat,
could be better used to actually educate the largest illiterate group on earth...don't you think?





Excerpt:

This is what Dayan said nine years later:

"The Syrians opposite them were soldiers who shot at them, and they certainly didn't like that. But I can say with absolute certainty that the delegation that came to convince Eshkol to ascend the Golan did not think about these things. They thought about the land of the Golan.

"I know what went on. I saw them and I spoke with them. They didn't even try to hide their lust for that soil. That's what guided them."

Those and other of Dayan's thoughts were set down on paper in 1976 by Rami Tal as they sat in Dayan's Tel Aviv garden. Tal, now a senior editor at the publishing house for the newspaper Yediot Aharonot, asked permission to record Dayan's words.

Dayan agreed on condition that they not be published without his permission. Tal, who printed them in Yediot Aharonot's Passover supplement last week, said that after Dayan died in 1981, the transcripts sat in a drawer for 15 years.

Last year, he showed them to Yossi Ginossar, a former high official in the Shin Bet security service and a confidant of Dayan's who urged that they be published. Tal sought permission from Dayan's daughter, Yael, who also agreed they were of great historical importance and should be published.

Apart from his assertion about the cause of the Golan battle, Dayan also spoke of the Syrian attacks on the Israeli kibbutzim and asserted that they were the result of Israeli aggression.

He said: "Eighty percent of the incidents worked like this: we would send tractors to plow in an area of little use, in a demilitarized zone, knowing ahead of time that the Syrians would shoot. If they didn't start shooting, we would tell the tractors to advance until the Syrians would get aggravated and start shooting. We used artillery and later the air force became involved."

Dayan said this was the policy for years and that former northern military commanders, later including Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, consistently used such tactics.

He said that after the 1948 war of independence, Israel was unhappy with the cease-fire lines and wanted to change them "through military actions that were not quite at the level of war. The idea was to seize an area and hold on to it until the enemy despairs and gives it to us."

Syria has long maintained that it was not the aggressor in the 1967 war, in which Israel fought on three fronts against Egypt, Jordan and Syria. Israel has insisted that the capture of the heights was a defensive action. While Syria insists today that the Golan Heights must be returned for the two countries to live in peace, Israel has said the amount of land to be returned should be a matter of negotiation.
 

Excerpt:

This is what Dayan said nine years later:

"The Syrians opposite them were soldiers who shot at them, and they certainly didn't like that. But I can say with absolute certainty that the delegation that came to convince Eshkol to ascend the Golan did not think about these things. They thought about the land of the Golan.

"I know what went on. I saw them and I spoke with them. They didn't even try to hide their lust for that soil. That's what guided them."

Those and other of Dayan's thoughts were set down on paper in 1976 by Rami Tal as they sat in Dayan's Tel Aviv garden. Tal, now a senior editor at the publishing house for the newspaper Yediot Aharonot, asked permission to record Dayan's words.

Dayan agreed on condition that they not be published without his permission. Tal, who printed them in Yediot Aharonot's Passover supplement last week, said that after Dayan died in 1981, the transcripts sat in a drawer for 15 years.

Last year, he showed them to Yossi Ginossar, a former high official in the Shin Bet security service and a confidant of Dayan's who urged that they be published. Tal sought permission from Dayan's daughter, Yael, who also agreed they were of great historical importance and should be published.

Apart from his assertion about the cause of the Golan battle, Dayan also spoke of the Syrian attacks on the Israeli kibbutzim and asserted that they were the result of Israeli aggression.

He said: "Eighty percent of the incidents worked like this: we would send tractors to plow in an area of little use, in a demilitarized zone, knowing ahead of time that the Syrians would shoot. If they didn't start shooting, we would tell the tractors to advance until the Syrians would get aggravated and start shooting. We used artillery and later the air force became involved."

Dayan said this was the policy for years and that former northern military commanders, later including Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, consistently used such tactics.

He said that after the 1948 war of independence, Israel was unhappy with the cease-fire lines and wanted to change them "through military actions that were not quite at the level of war. The idea was to seize an area and hold on to it until the enemy despairs and gives it to us."

Syria has long maintained that it was not the aggressor in the 1967 war, in which Israel fought on three fronts against Egypt, Jordan and Syria. Israel has insisted that the capture of the heights was a defensive action. While Syria insists today that the Golan Heights must be returned for the two countries to live in peace, Israel has said the amount of land to be returned should be a matter of negotiation.

But do you see any source
besides the Arab supremacist's hurt ego?
Can't be your only excuse for being such sore losers.
 
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You don't believe Moshe Dayan?

Should I believe unnamed "secret interviews"
or the conspiracy theories that Arab supremacists
shovel to compensate for their degradation and hurt ego?

Maybe next time think twice before bragging about getting willingly brainwashed.
 
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The Soviets lied to Nasser.

In an interview granted by Moshe Dayan to an Israeli journalist, with the proviso that it would be kept secret during Dayan’s lifetime, he said:

Of course, they [the kibbutzniks] wanted to get the Syrians out of their sight. They had suffered a lot because of the Syrians ... But I can tell you with absolute certainty: the delegation that came to persuade Eshkol to go up to the Heights did not think about these matters. It thought about the Heights’ land. Listen, I myself am a farmer, I come from [the village of] Nahalal, don’t I? Not from Tel Aviv. And I recognise this thing. I saw them and spoke with them. They didn’t even try to hide their lust for that soil. This is what guided them.12

No single part of that refutes that Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia posed a real and existential threat to Israel (before 1967 and since) and the lives of the millions of Jews living there. It doesn't matter if Soviets, or British, or the Tooth Fairy lied (or in this case, operated off bad intel) about Israeli intentions. The fact is, he had the entire combined Armies of the Arab World poised on the border with Israel and very, very, very publicly broadcasted his intention to kill every Jewish man, woman, and child in Israel.

Jews sat still and didn't act the last time a similar madman made the same threat and six million of them died because of it. We won't do so again.

There are Israelis today who argue that Judea and Samaria are rightfully Israeli territory. That doesn't remove or negate or even mitigate the fact that there are millions of Arabs (and Persians) who believe every square inch of Israel is rightfully Arab and are not beyond making that come true by killing every Jewish man, woman, and child in Israel.
 
That region has had continual conflict for 7,000 years.
Cro-Magnon V Neanderthal. Homo Sapiens V Homo Erectus

The bloodbath has been going on since the Jews left Sumeria, long before Mohammed and his handbook for thrill-killers. It's not about words; it's about swords. This final chapter, Israel has the swords to finish off the Nazislamis for good.
 
You can be modern and technological but one nuclear bomb can ruin your entire day.

Why would Iran nuke Israel?


***snip***

The Twelver beliefs have raised concern in conjunction with Iran's steeped interest in furiously pressing forward with its nuclear program, combined with threats against Israel and the West. Critics of the Islamic Republic allege that Ahmadinejad and the Supreme Leader would even go so far as to hasten a nuclear showdown and cataclysmic strike—perhaps an attack on Israel and inevitable retaliation—to hasten the arrival of the 12th Imam. Ahmadinejad has even called for the reappearance of the 12th Imam from the podium of the United Nations General Assembly. During his speeches within Iran, Ahmadinejad has said that the main mission of the Islamic Revolution is to pave the way for the reappearance of the 12th Imam.
When the Marine Corps Hymn Became "Tie a Yellow Ribbon"

Jew-hating Jimmy and the sissy Marines let that punk take over our Embassy. What kind of POGs surrender to a teenage mob?
 
Ottoman Turks were continually at war with Byzantines in the Levant from the 13th Century until the middle of the 15th. With The Mamluks and Persians in the 16th and 17th Centuries. From then on, they were continuously in conflict with Europeans and their neighbors in Egypt, Lebanon, and present day Iran until the Ottoman Empire dissolved in 1918.
Our Diploma Dumbo Media Knows Nothing Worth Knowing About Islamic History

The peak of the Ottoman jihad was SEPTEMBER ELEVENTH, 1683. If a dedicated religious fanatic had been in charge of the jihad that day, it would have already spread to Paris and Islam would have conquered the world.

It was all downhill after the Battle of Vienna the next day, especially at the literally Turkey shoot at the Battle of Zenta in 1697. The Whites could have finished off Islam at any time after that, but wasted time in bitchy quarrels among themselves. Worse of all was joining Turkey against Russia in the Crimean War (1853).
 
Constantly under threat from Arab forces, yes.

The Six-Day War removed much of that threat. There hasn't been a serious attempt to invade Israel since 1973.
Golda Locks


Israel's appeasing weakness back then was caused by a preview of 9/11, where they had good reason they were under the threat of a mass-murder hijacking that turned out to be an off-course Libyan airliner. Shamed and pressured by the self-hating wimpy-nerd Jews at the New York Times, they promised never to act like "trigger-happy tough guys" again.
 
Ottoman Turks were continually at war with Byzantines in the Levant from the 13th Century until the middle of the 15th. With The Mamluks and Persians in the 16th and 17th Centuries. From then on, they were continuously in conflict with Europeans and their neighbors in Egypt, Lebanon, and present day Iran until the Ottoman Empire dissolved in 1918.
And an on and off civil war with Egypt in the 1800's that didn't get resolved until the 1840's or so. You probably know this already, just posting it to annoy assorted Islamo-shills.


The process of Muhammad Ali's seizure of power was a long three way civil war between the Ottoman Turks, Egyptian Mamluks, and Albanian mercenaries. It lasted from 1803 to 1807 with the Albanian Muhammad Ali Pasha taking control of Egypt in 1805, when the Ottoman Sultan acknowledged his position. Thereafter, Muhammad Ali was the undisputed master of Egypt, and his efforts henceforth were directed primarily to the maintenance of his practical independence.

Egypt under Muhammad Ali​

Campaign against the Saudis​

Main article: Ottoman–Saudi War

Ottoman-Saudi war in 1811–18 was fought between Egypt under the reign of Muhammad Ali (nominally under Ottoman rule) and the Wahabbis of Najd who had conquered Hejaz from the Ottomans.

When Wahabis captured Mecca in 1802, the Ottoman sultan ordered Muhammad Ali of Egypt to start moving against Wahabbis to re-conquer Mecca and return the honour of the Ottoman Empire.


First Arabian campaign​



Muhammad Ali Pasha

Acknowledging the sovereignty of the Ottoman Sultan, and at the commands of the Ottoman Porte, in 1811 Muhammad Ali dispatched an army of 20,000 men (and 2,000 horses) under the command of his son Tusun, a youth of sixteen, against the Saudis in the Ottoman–Saudi War. After a successful advance this force met with a serious repulse at the Battle of Al-Safra, and retreated to Yanbu. In the end of the year Tusun, having received reinforcements, again assumed the offensive and captured Medina after a prolonged siege. He next took Jeddah and Mecca, defeating the Saudi beyond the latter and capturing their general.

But some mishaps followed, and Muhammad Ali, who had determined to conduct the war in person, left Egypt in the summer of 1813—leaving his other son Ibrahim in charge of the country. He encountered serious obstacles in Arabia, predominantly stemming from the nature of the country and the harassing mode of warfare adopted by his adversaries, but on the whole his forces proved superior to those of the enemy. He deposed and exiled the Sharif of Mecca and after the death of the Saudi leader Saud he concluded a treaty with Saud's son and successor, Abdullah I in 1815.

Following reports that the Turks, whose cause he was upholding in Arabia, were treacherously planning an invasion of Egypt, and hearing of the escape of Napoleon from Elba and fearing danger to Egypt from France or Britain, Muhammad Ali returned to Cairo by way of Kosseir and Kena, reaching the capital on the day of the Battle of Waterloo.


Second Arabian campaign​

Tusun returned to Egypt on hearing of the military revolt at Cairo, but died in 1816 at the early age of twenty. Muhammad Ali, dissatisfied with the treaty concluded with the Saudis, and with the non-fulfillment of certain of its clauses, determined to send another army to Arabia, and to include in it the soldiers who had recently proved unruly.

This expedition, under his eldest son Ibrahim Pasha, left in the autumn of 1816. The war was long and arduous but in 1818 Ibrahim captured the Saudi capital of Diriyah. Abdullah I, their chief, was made prisoner and with his treasurer and secretary was sent to Istanbul (in some references he was sent to Cairo), where, in spite of Ibrahim's promise of safety and of Muhammad Ali's intercession in their favor,[citation needed] they were put to death. At the close of the year 1819 Ibrahim returned having subdued all opposition in Arabia.

...

Invasion of Libya and Sudan​

Main article: Egyptian invasion of Sudan 1820-24

In 1820 Muhammad Ali gave orders to commence the conquest of eastern Libya. He first sent an expedition westward (Feb. 1820) which conquered and annexed the Siwa oasis. Ali's intentions for Sudan was to extend his rule southward, to capture the valuable caravan trade bound for the Red Sea, and to secure the rich gold mines which he believed to exist in Sennar. He also saw in the campaign a means of getting rid of his disaffected troops, and of obtaining a sufficient number of captives to form the nucleus of the new army.

The forces destined for this service were led by Ismail, his youngest son. They consisted of between 4000 and 5000 men, being Turks and Arabs. They left Cairo in July 1820. Nubia at once submitted, the Shaigiya tribe immediately beyond the province of Dongola were defeated, the remnant of the Mamluks dispersed, and Sennar was reduced without a battle.

Mahommed Bey, the defterdar, with another force of about the same strength, was then sent by Muhammad Ali against Kordofan with like result, but not without a hard-fought engagement. In October 1822, Ismail, with his retinue, was burnt to death by Nimr, the mek (king) of Shendi; following this incident the defterdar, a man infamous for his cruelty, assumed the command of those provinces, and exacted terrible retribution from the inhabitants. Khartoum was founded at this time, and in the following years the rule of the Egyptians was greatly extended and control of the Red Sea ports of Suakin and Massawa obtained.


Ahmad Revolt​

In 1824 a native rebellion broke out in Upper Egypt headed by one Ahmad, an inhabitant of al-Salimiyyah, a village situated a few miles above Thebes. He proclaimed himself a prophet, and was soon followed by between 20,000 and 30,000 insurgents, mostly peasants, but some of them deserters from the Nizam Gedid, for that force was yet in a half-organized state.

The peasants were angered by many of Ali's reforms, especially the introduction of conscription and the increase in taxes and forced labour.

The insurrection was crushed by Muhammad Ali, and about one fourth of Ahmad's followers perished, but he himself escaped and was never heard of again. Few of these unfortunates possessed any other weapon than the long staff (nabbut) of the Egyptian peasant; still they offered an obstinate resistance, and the combat in which they were defeated resembled a massacre. This movement was the last internal attempt to destroy the pasha's authority.

The subsequent years saw an imposition of order across Egypt and Ali's new highly trained and disciplined forces spread across the nation. Public order was rendered perfect; the Nile and the highways were secure to all travelers, Christian or Muslim; the Bedouin tribes were won over to peaceful pursuits.


Greek campaign​

Main article: Greek War of Independence

Muhammad Ali was fully conscious that the empire which he had so laboriously built up might at any time have to be defended by force of arms against his master Sultan Mahmud II, whose whole policy had been directed to curbing the power of his too ambitious vassals, and who was under the influence of the personal enemies of the pasha of Egypt, notably of Hüsrev Pasha, the Grand Vizier, who had never forgiven his humiliation in Egypt in 1803.

Mahmud also was already planning reforms borrowed from the West, and Muhammad Ali, who had plenty of opportunity of observing the superiority of European methods of warfare, was determined to anticipate the sultan in the creation of a fleet and an army on European lines, partly as a measure of precaution, partly as an instrument for the realization of yet wider schemes of ambition. Before the outbreak of the War of Greek Independence in 1821, he had already expended much time and energy in organizing a fleet and in training, under the supervision of French instructors, native officers and artificers; though it was not till 1829 that the opening of a dockyard and arsenal at Alexandria enabled him to build and equip his own vessels. By 1823, moreover, he had succeeded in carrying out the reorganization of his army on European lines, the turbulent Turkish and Albanian elements being replaced by Sudanese and fellahin. The effectiveness of the new force was demonstrated in the suppression of an 1823 revolt of the Albanians in Cairo by six disciplined Sudanese regiments; after which Mehemet Ali was no more troubled with military mutinies.

His foresight was rewarded by the invitation of the sultan to help him in the task of subduing the Greek insurgents, offering as reward the pashaliks of the Morea and of Syria. Mehemet Ali had already, in 1821, been appointed by him governor of Crete, which he had occupied with a small Egyptian force. In the autumn of 1824 a fleet of 60 Egyptian warships carrying a large force of 17,000 disciplined troops concentrated in Suda Bay, and, in the following March, with Ibrahin as commander-in-chief landed in the Morea.

His naval superiority wrested from the Greeks the command of a great deal of the sea, on which the fate of the insurrection ultimately depended, while on land the Greek irregular bands, having largely soundly beaten the Porte's troops, had finally met a worthy foe in Ibrahim's disciplined troops. The history of the events that led up to the battle of Navarino and the liberation of Greece is told elsewhere; the withdrawal of the Egyptians from the Morea was ultimately due to the action of Admiral Sir Edward Codrington, who early in August 1828 appeared before Alexandria and induced the pasha, by no means sorry to have a reasonable excuse, by a threat of bombardment, to sign a convention undertaking to recall Ibrahim and his army. But for the action of European powers, it is suspected by many that the Ottoman Empire might have defeated the Greeks.


War with the Sultan​

Main article: Egyptian–Ottoman War (1831–33)

Ali went to war against the sultan on in order to obtain raw materials lacking in Egypt (especially timber for his navy) and a captive market for Egypt's new industrial output. From fall 1831 to December 1832 Ibrahim led the Egyptian army through Lebanon and Syria and across the Taurus Mountains into Anatolia where he defeated the Ottoman forces and pushed on to Kutahya, only 150 miles from Istanbul.[4]

For the next ten years relations between the Sultan and the Pasha remained in the forefront of the questions which agitated the diplomatic world. It was not only the very existence of the Ottoman empire that seemed to be at stake, but Egypt itself had become more than ever the object of international attention, to British statesmen especially, and in the issue of the struggle were involved the interests of Britain in the two routes to India by the Isthmus of Suez and the valley of the Euphrates. Ibrahim, who once more commanded in his father's name, launched another brilliant campaign beginning with the storming of Acre on May 27, 1832, and culminating in the rout and capture of Reshid Pasha at Konya on December 21.

Soon after he was blocked by the intervention of Russia, however. As the result of endless discussions between the representatives of the powers, the Porte and the pasha, the Convention of Kütahya was signed on May 14, 1833, by which the sultan agreed to bestow on Muhammad Ali the pashaliks of Syria, Damascus, Aleppo and Itcheli, together with the district of Adana.[5] The announcement of the pasha's appointment had already been made in the usual way in the annual firman issued on May 3. Adana was bestowed on Ibrahim under the style of muhassil, or collector of the crown revenues, a few days later.

Muhammad Ali now ruled over a virtually independent empire, stretching from the Sudan to the Taurus Mountains, subject only to a moderate annual tribute. However the unsound foundations of his authority were not long in revealing themselves. Scarcely a year from the signing of the Convention of Kutaya the application by Ibrahim of Egyptian methods of government, notably of the monopolies and conscription, had driven Syrians, Druze and Arabs, into revolt, after first welcoming him as a deliverer. The unrest was suppressed by Muhammad Ali in person, and the Syrians were terrorized, but their discontent encouraged the Sultan Mahmud to hope for revenge, and a renewal of the conflict was only staved off by the anxious efforts of the European powers.

In the spring of 1839 the sultan ordered his army, concentrated under Reshid in the border district of Bir on the Euphrates, to advance over the Syrian frontier. Ibrahim, seeing his flank menaced, attacked it at Nezib on the 24th of June. Once more the Ottomans were utterly routed. Six days later, before the news reached Constantinople, Mahmud died.

Now, with the defeat of the Ottomans and the conquest of Syria, Muhammad Ali had reached the height of his power. For one brief moment in time, he had become the envy of the Egyptian kings of antiquity, controlling Egypt, the Sudan, and Syria (which alone would have made him their better in power) he saw the Ottoman armies collapse or fall into disorganization after their defeat in Syria, and it looked like the Middle East and Anatolia were his for the taking. It looked like he could march all the way to Istanbul, in the minds of some, and place himself on the Sultan's throne.

With the Ottoman Empire at the feet of Muhammad Ali, the European powers were greatly alarmed and issued the Convention of London of 1840, designed to end the war and deal with the likely contingency of Muhammad Ali's refusal. Their intervention during the Oriental Crisis of 1840 was prompt, launching an invasion by a primarily British force (with some French and Greek elements), they made short work of Muhammad Ali's pride and joy: Egypt's modern Armed forces. However, while his army was being defeated, Muhammad saw the possibility of victory in France's unwillingness to participate (it having some warm feelings to the Khedive, and mainly participating with what was considered a token force to try to block a British expansion in North Africa.) However, in spite of France's dislike of an Egypt dominated by the British, it was equally unwilling to allow the ambitious Governor to upset the balance of power, and thus, by waiting for the hope of a better chance at victory, Muhammad Ali had to suffer a harder defeat.

However, though he had lost Syria and his position of great power, the war with the West had not been a complete disaster by any means. For though humiliated and defeated by the Western Powers, the West had no intention of removing him and the block he placed on Ottoman Power. Thus, though the peace treaty was harsh, it achieved one of Muhammad Ali's greatest dreams: to place his family firmly in the reigns of Egyptian power. It was far from all that the crafty Pasha had wanted, but it was what he had to live with, for even in the ending days of the Syrian War, Muhammad was starting to show his age, and would find that he did not have much time left in the world.


End of Muhammad Ali's rule​

The end was reached early in 1841. New 'firmans' were issued which confined the pasha's authority to Egypt, including the Sinai peninsula and certain places on the Arabian side of the Red Sea, and to the Sudan. The most important of these documents is dated February 13, 1841.

The government of the pashalik of Egypt was made hereditary within the family of Muhammad Ali. A map showing the boundaries of Egypt accompanied the firman granting Muhammad Ali the pashalik, a duplicate copy being retained by the Porte. The Egyptian copy is supposed to have been lost in a fire which destroyed a great part of the Egyptian archives. The Turkish copy has never been produced and its existence now appears doubtful. The point was of importance, as in 1892 and again in 1906 boundary disputes arose between Ottoman Empire and the Egyptian Khiedevate.

Various restrictions were laid upon Muhammad Ali, emphasizing his position as vassal. He was forbidden to maintain a fleet and his army was not to exceed 18,000 men. The pasha no longer a disrupting figure in European politics, but he continued to occupy himself with his improvements in Egypt. But times were not all good; the long wars combined with murrain of cattle in 1842 and a destructive Nile flood made matters worse. In 1843 there was a plague of locusts where whole villages were depopulated. Even the sequestered army was a strain enough for a population unaccustomed to the rigidities of the conscription service. Florence Nightingale, the famous British nurse, recounts in her letters from Egypt written in 1849–50, that many an Egyptian family thought it be enough to "protect" their children from the inhumanities of the military service by blinding them in one eye or rendering them unfit by cutting off their limb. But Muhammad Ali was not to be confounded by such tricks of bodily non-compliance, and with that view he set up a special corps of disabled musketeers declaring that one can shoot well enough even with one eye.

Meantime the uttermost farthing was wrung from the wretched fellahin, while they were forced to the building of magnificent public works by unpaid labor. In 1844–45 there was some improvement in the condition of the country as a result of financial reforms the pasha executed. Muhammad Ali, who had been granted the honorary rank of grand vizier in 1842, paid a visit to Istanbul in 1846, where he became reconciled to his old enemy Khosrev Pasha, whom he had not seen since he spared his life at Cairo in 1803.

In 1847 Muhammad Ali laid the foundation stone of the great bridge across the Nile at the beginning of the Delta. Towards the end of 1847, the aged pasha's previously sharp mind began to give way, and by the following June he was no longer capable of administering the government. In September 1848 Ibrahim was acknowledged by the Porte as ruler of the pashalik, but he died in the following November.

Muhammad Ali survived another eight months, dying on August 2, 1849. He had done a great work in Egypt, the most permanent being the weakening of the tie binding the country to Turkey, the starting of the great cotton industry, the recognition of the advantages of European science, and the conquest of the Sudan.



But this probably is 'peaceful' by Muslim standards. Also see ...



THE 1874 to 1876 Egyptian-Ethiopian War is one of the 19th century’s more obscure conflicts.


Among the most surprising aspects of the conflict is that it involved a group of ex-Confederate officers who had been hired by an Ottoman viceroy to conquer an empire in central Africa.


These Confederate veterans had fought in the U.S. Civil War, in part to preserve a social system based on the enslavement of Africans and their descendants. However, along with some Union officers, less than 10 years after the fall of the Confederacy they found themselves posted more than 6,000 miles from home, in new uniforms and leading columns of African troops into the Ethiopian highlands.
 

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