preemptingyou03
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Blowback Schmoback
Alienating Enemies, Creating Allies
By Nicholas M. Guariglia
March 14, 2006
For some in our government, the sole obstacle to peace in our world is stopping the unintended consequences of our policies. Weve heard the chorus before: the war against Islamic fascism is not really a war at all, but a battle for hearts and minds, where any provocative American action is sure to prompt global outrage and, of course, Muslim madness on the Arab street. The cowboy mannerisms of a unilateral Bush the Texas twang supposedly not helping a glaring Rumsfeld, and an unsmiling Cheney certainly alienate our allies and create more enemies or so the thinking goes.
The term is called blowback; the belief that no bad deed goes unpunished. According to this prognosis, the hearts and minds battle that began in lower Manhattan can be over in a New York minute if only the U.S. understood or listened to the grievances of its adversaries. Our opponents, we are to believe, are quasi-freedom fighters who simply oppose what we do support Israel, topple fascists, occupy holy lands, etc. and are not seventh-century head-loppers and limb-slicers that cringe at the very thought of how we live.
It is our policies that the jihadists and their rogue conglomerates loathe not our freedoms, we are told. Chalmers Johnson, author of Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire, contends Mr. bin Laden only turned against the United States in 1991 because he regarded the stationing of American troops in his native Saudi Arabia during and after the Persian Gulf War as a violation of his religious beliefs. Fair enough. The solution, Johnson ensures us, must then be to withdraw U.S. forces from Arabian lands.
Yet is that not precisely what happened? For a moment, ignore the fact that we were asked to station forces in Saudi Arabia for protection from Hussein the Butcher paying, not demanding to be paid à la Rome, for a base presence. American soldiers respected and conducted themselves in accordance with Saudi religious law: female soldiers covered their faces when frequenting Saudi towns and Christian infantrymen kept their Bible out of the land of Muhammad. All this and more, without ever openly pondering why we behaved in such a multicultural fashion or why we allowed 7,000 nutty princes and royal cousins to tell us what to do.
Why then are there continued bloodcurdling threats? Oddly enough, the al Qaidist campaign has never been at a higher level inside the Kingdom than since the U.S. announced it would begin to withdraw from Saudi Arabia (deploying most of those units northward into Iraq). The violence has been steady and atrocious, exemplified by Abdel Aziz al Muqrin sawing off the head of American contractor Paul Johnson, stuffing it into a freezer, and wondering out loud what his infidel blood tastes like. Certainly authors like Mr. Johnson wonder late at night why there hasnt been a conciliatory thank you and subsequent halt of violence from al Qaida, correct?
Copout Award of our time goes wholly to this claim that our predators will cease the bloodshed if we just stopped doing what we do. For starters, let us ponder one overriding question: Are we now to conduct international affairs under the constraints of first ensuring all potential adversaries cheerfully accept our policies? Are we to assume that Darius III was pleased when Alexanders hoplites vanquished his dynasty or that an outwitted Rommel was optimistic and encouraged by Pattons superior maneuverability? There never has been, nor will there ever be in all of human history two enemies that agree with each others policies against the other. This is an undeniable category of conflict and it is nothing to be ashamed of.
Indeed, the fact that those who practice totalitarian governance, gender apartheid, and ethnic cleansing also oppose our policies would be, one would think, something to hang our hat on such fascists approving of our policies being the true cause for concern and introspection. Our enemies neck-cutters of unsuspecting stewardesses, throwers of children into wood chippers are not, in the words of philosopher Lee Harris, friends we havent done enough for yet. There is no oversight on our part, and nothing we, and not they, must correct.
Perhaps just perhaps stooges like bin Laden, al Muqrin, and the clan, are not simply misunderstood, misguided, and misdirected individuals with a legitimate grievance? Perhaps the problem is a bit more serious than their lacking in diplomatic niceties?
While there is good reason to prevent the creation of more terroristic mindsets even Donald Rumsfeld speaks of this in his interoffice memos this fear ought not to come from a belief that only U.S. action incites this result, or that U.S. initiation cannot flip the equation. Has anyone ever considered the status of Iraqi state-induced belligerence, post-Hussein? Without downplaying the uncertainties and violence within Iraq, is it more or less likely that missiles will now be launched by the government in Baghdad down upon Israeli cities or Saudi citizens? Is it more or less likely that the Iraqi government now with Kurdish parliamentarians will ethnically cleanse Iraqi Kurds or use gas against Iraqi villages? Spending time and energy securing their own towns, can or will the Iraqis ever again invade Kuwait or Iran, for that matter? Is it more or less likely that an elected Jalal Talabani will try to, Saddam-style, assassinate George Bush or any other former U.S. leader?
And what are we to make of so-called red-on-red action, where insurgents in Iraq begin to turn on each other? For the better part of 2005, both U.S. and Iraqi forces conducted the bulk of their counterinsurgency efforts in the Al Anbar province of western Iraq. Al Anbar Iraqs largest province was the hotbed of foreign jihadists whod cross over from bordering Jordan, Syria, and Saudi Arabia and link up with indigenous Iraqi insurrectionists. In the aftermath of brilliant battlefield successes unsurprisingly ignored by the mainstream media, or spun as continued violence U.S. efforts (that included but were not limited to Operation Matador and Operation New Market) halted most of the violence in western Iraq. Entire cities once al Qaida-dominated, isolated from Iraqi society, such as Qaim, Haditha, and Tal Afar, were taken back in both devastating and appropriate fashion.
Following the theory of blowback, however, arent these U.S. incursions supposed to generate far greater anti-U.S. hostility? Arent these methods of sweep and clear, search and destroy, takedown and buildup, supposed to bite us in the end? Arent noncombatants, such as law abiding Iraqi civilians, supposed to take up arms against U.S. forces out of sheer rage? Why, then, are Sunni insurgents now promising to annihilate the al Qaida fringe of the insurrection? Shouldnt these operations prompt Iraqi insurgent leaders like Osama al Jadaan to up the ante in their pursuit of killing Americans?
Yet with Sunni involvement in the Iraqi parliament, al Jadaan who has now promised to destroy al Qaida and bring Abu al Zarqawi to justice and other likeminded rejectionists are suddenly forming an anti-al Qaida alliance with Iraqi security forces, all but acknowledging that the future of Iraq rests with democratization, not theocratization, and the quickest way to get Americans to leave their country is to at once turn their backs on the hardcore foreign elements of the insurrection. Iraqis who once supported anti-U.S. violence now realize the Wahhabis are less the fighters worthy of glorification and more the brutal deviants worthy of scorn, with their own plans for Iraq that hinge on killing as many Iraqis as possible. Even the pussball warlord Muqtada al Sadr, whom I otherwise wouldnt mind dead, has blamed most of the Sunni-on-Shia violence on al Qaida, where he once took up arms against U.S. forces.
This fear of blowback fear of killing enemies for fear of creating enemies for fearing of having enemies was unwarranted in Japan, after all. Much like today, we were then assured there was some kind of racial component a warrior code and all that garbage that would never allow the Japanese to surrender; or upon surrender, create an atmosphere of lost honor that would ensure future generations to seek vengeance. And yet, two well-placed bombs were dropped, surrender swiftly followed, MacArthur came in, disbanded the Imperial military, single-handedly wrote Japans constitution, and forced the Emperor to admit that he was in fact not divine. And today, Japan has one of the most pacifistic societies (and successful economies) on the planet: no standing offensive army, no right to own firearms, and a population overwhelmingly opposed to foreign entanglements. Americans are now more inclined to expect Hondas than kamikazes originating from Tokyo.
And so the debate goes. Blowback is a possibility only in the sense that retaliatory measures of an undefeated adversary are always a possibility. But with a continued postbellum effort to democratize and liberalize, enemies in fact are vanquished, and once-unseen allies in fact are created and empowered. For all the squabbling over Iraq, rarely is the debate framed like so: name another Arab state with hundreds of thousands of enlisted citizens fighting side by side with Americans against Islamic jihadists. The answer is blunt: Iraq and Iraq alone.