August 14, 1945: Despite Being Nuked Twice, Japanese Attempt a Coup to Keep War Going

[Weatherman2020]

August 14, 1945. We attempt contact with Japan to see if they are willing to discuss surrender. A lot was happening in Japan at this time. Even after two nuclear bombs being used, the Japanese military was attempting a coup to keep the Emperor from surrendering.

"To Bear the Unbearable": Japan's Surrender, Part II | The National WWII Museum | New Orleans

Although a decision to continue the war would mean national suicide, members of the Japanese military came close to refusing Emperor Hirohito’s surrender order.

www.nationalww2museum.org

 

[theHawk]

August 14, 1945. We attempt contact with Japan to see if they are willing to discuss surrender. A lot was happening in Japan at this time. Even after two nuclear bombs being used, the Japanese military was attempting a coup to keep the Emperor from surrendering.

View attachment 681970

"To Bear the Unbearable": Japan's Surrender, Part II | The National WWII Museum | New Orleans

Although a decision to continue the war would mean national suicide, members of the Japanese military came close to refusing Emperor Hirohito’s surrender order.

www.nationalww2museum.org

Yup, I remember writing a paper on it when in college. One of the government officials said there was no difference between the nuclear bombs and regular bombs, and said “let them drop a dozen more” or something to that effect. They were really willing to fight to the last man.

 

[1srelluc]

They were nothing if not persistent.

 

[whitehall]

The Bushido holdouts knew the war was lost and they tried to negotiate surrender terms but the Truman administration wouldn't talk to them. In desperation they went to Stalin. One of the main issues was not executing the emperor and ironically MacArthur saw to it that the U.S. would execute relatively few Japanese war criminals and the emperor was spared.

 

[AZrailwhale]

The Bushido holdouts knew the war was lost and they tried to negotiate surrender terms but the Truman administration wouldn't talk to them. In desperation they went to Stalin. One of the main issues was not executing the emperor and ironically MacArthur saw to it that the U.S. would execute relatively few Japanese war criminals and the emperor was spared.

Their "terms" (and since when does the losing side set peace terms?) were a return to status quo ante December 6th, 1941 with Japan retaining Manchuria and Korea. No allied controlled war crimes trials (meaning no trials at all since according to their beliefs no war crimes were committed). Any disarmament to be done by the Japanese with no allied supervision. No occupation of Japan by allied troops and the retention of the emperor as head of state with his divine status retained. They were so ridiculous the Japanese ambassador refused to present them to the Soviets.

 

[whitehall]

Their "terms" (and since when does the losing side set peace terms?) were a return to status quo ante December 6th, 1941 with Japan retaining Manchuria and Korea. No allied controlled war crimes trials (meaning no trials at all since according to their beliefs no war crimes were committed). Any disarmament to be done by the Japanese with no allied supervision. No occupation of Japan by allied troops and the retention of the emperor as head of state with his divine status retained. They were so ridiculous the Japanese ambassador refused to present them to the Soviets.

The U.S. negotiated surrender terms with Germany in WW1. It's a legitimate issue. Imagine if the safety of the Japanese Emperor was all that stood in the way of the incineration of Japanese civilians in two cities by the Atomic Bomb.

 

[Mushroom]

August 14, 1945. We attempt contact with Japan to see if they are willing to discuss surrender. A lot was happening in Japan at this time. Even after two nuclear bombs being used, the Japanese military was attempting a coup to keep the Emperor from surrendering.

View attachment 681970

"To Bear the Unbearable": Japan's Surrender, Part II | The National WWII Museum | New Orleans

Although a decision to continue the war would mean national suicide, members of the Japanese military came close to refusing Emperor Hirohito’s surrender order.

www.nationalww2museum.org

It actually was not "The Military" involved in the Kyujo inciident, but a small group inside. It was led by only 5 officers,

It did not last long, because the military itself was still behind the Emperor. The coup only lasted about 6 hours before it collapsed, as more senior officers managed to get most of those involved to return to their barracks. The leaders then killed themselves.

There was another one in Matsue on 15 August. But that was more civilian based, with the same goal of replacing the government with one they hoped would continue the war.

 

[Mushroom]

The Bushido holdouts knew the war was lost and they tried to negotiate surrender terms but the Truman administration wouldn't talk to them.

Actually, they never did. Until days before the dropping of the bombs the marching orders of the Ambassador to the Soviet Union was to get them involved in a cease fire, and a pro quo ante bdellium ceasefire where both sides returned to where they were prior to December 1941.

The Japanese Government never once considered or offered a surrender. But they did believe that they had the right to demand a cease fire and that it would be accepted.

 

[Mushroom]

with Japan retaining Manchuria and Korea

And even more than that.

Any Allied territory that Japan occupied during the war (specifically the Philippines) would remain demilitarized, and with Japanese "monitors" to ensure that remained that way.

Which is why Ambassador Sato sent to his own leadership when they insisted that he push through their ideas of peace the following message:

"pretty little phrases devoid of all connection with reality"

He told them over and over again that what they were demanding was impossible, and that they had to get serious about trying to end the war before it was too late.

And it is not like this is not known, the US was reading these messages from two sources. First because of MAGIC we had already broken most of the Japanese codes, so were reading what was sent between Tokyo and the Ambassador. And secondly, because of Venona we were reading some of the messages within the Soviet Union about how they were just stalling the Japanese and would never present their stupid offers even if they were not completely impossible.

Technically, Manchukuo was an independent nation, which was a Constitutional Monarchy led by Puyi, the "Last Emperor of China". Yes it was largely a puppet state, but it was an independent nation.

And Chosen (Korea) was part of Japan, as agreed in the Japan-Korea Annexation Treaty of 1910.

Korea had by 1945 been under control of Japan for decades, going back to the 1876 Japan-Korea Treaty in fact.

 

[Mushroom]

The U.S. negotiated surrender terms with Germany in WW1. It's a legitimate issue. Imagine if the safety of the Japanese Emperor was all that stood in the way of the incineration of Japanese civilians in two cities by the Atomic Bomb.

It was more that Japan refused any communication with the Allied Powers.

When Potsdam was issued, the official response from Japan was that it was to be ignored, and not even discussed.

On 12 July, Tojo informed Ambassador Sato to inform the Soviets that Japan had no choice but to continue fighting to the end, no matter what the consequences.

The Potsdam Declaration was issued on 26 July.

On 28 July, Prime Minister Suzuki released the famous "Mokusatsu Statement", where he unconditionally rejected Potsdam. Mokusatsu is Japanese, and means "Kill with silence".

We might have negotiated something sooner with Japan, if they had ever been willing to negotiate anything, ever. Yes, there are random claims that the Japanese met with General MacArthur and others, but I don't believe them. That is a complete contradiction to what their government was doing, and sending to their own ambassadors. And nobody has ever been able to explain who MacArthur or anybody else met with, where, or what authority they had to convey an offer of surrender.

Some random individual could go up today in Ukraine and tell the Russian General in charge of the invasion that the country wants to surrender. But without authority, that is absolutely meaningless. And not a single person has ever said who was making those silly offers, let alone what authority they had.

 

[Rigby5]

Yup, I remember writing a paper on it when in college. One of the government officials said there was no difference between the nuclear bombs and regular bombs, and said “let them drop a dozen more” or something to that effect. They were really willing to fight to the last man.

Then you wrote a paper on false propaganda, and not the facts.
The fact are that "regular" bombs used for firestorms killed far more than either nuclear bomb did.
Second is that the Japanese high command never got back any results from the teams sent to find out what happened to Hiroshima or Nagasaki, so they had NOTHING at all to do with the surrender, which Japan had been trying to negotiate for over half a year.
More people died in Japan from the starvation caused by the illegal US blockade on food, then from any use of atomic weapons.

 

[Rigby5]

Their "terms" (and since when does the losing side set peace terms?) were a return to status quo ante December 6th, 1941 with Japan retaining Manchuria and Korea. No allied controlled war crimes trials (meaning no trials at all since according to their beliefs no war crimes were committed). Any disarmament to be done by the Japanese with no allied supervision. No occupation of Japan by allied troops and the retention of the emperor as head of state with his divine status retained. They were so ridiculous the Japanese ambassador refused to present them to the Soviets.

Wrong.
The ONLY term the Japanese wanted was to retain the Emperor as a religious symbol.

 

[Rigby5]

Actually, they never did. Until days before the dropping of the bombs the marching orders of the Ambassador to the Soviet Union was to get them involved in a cease fire, and a pro quo ante bdellium ceasefire where both sides returned to where they were prior to December 1941.

The Japanese Government never once considered or offered a surrender. But they did believe that they had the right to demand a cease fire and that it would be accepted.

False.
We know from the "Postdam Diaries" by Truman, that the Japanese were desperate to surrender due to the massive starvation death rate, as early as 6 months before we even finished making the atomic bombs.
They had not political communications means with the US, so went through the Russians, who still had an embassy in Tokyo. Truman told Stalin to stall them.

 

[Rigby5]

Anyone claiming the Japanese refused to surrender after the Postdam Declaration, is a liar.
{...
The Potsdam Declaration and consideration of adopting it occurred before nuclear weapons were used. The terms of the declaration were hotly debated within the Japanese government. Upon receiving the declaration, Foreign Minister Shigenori Tōgō hurriedly met with Prime Minister Kantarō Suzuki and Cabinet Secretary Hisatsune Sakomizu. Sakomizu recalled that all felt the declaration must be accepted.
...
Tōgō met with Emperor Hirohito and advised him to treat the declaration with the utmost circumspection, but that a reply should be postponed until the Japanese received a response from the Soviets to mediate peace. Hirohito stated that the declaration was "acceptable in principle."
...}

Potsdam Declaration - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

 

[theHawk]

Then you wrote a paper on false propaganda, and not the facts.
The fact are that "regular" bombs used for firestorms killed far more than either nuclear bomb did.
Second is that the Japanese high command never got back any results from the teams sent to find out what happened to Hiroshima or Nagasaki, so they had NOTHING at all to do with the surrender, which Japan had been trying to negotiate for over half a year.
More people died in Japan from the starvation caused by the illegal US blockade on food, then from any use of atomic weapons.

No, it wasn’t propaganda.

As you pointed out, the regular ”fire bombing” of cities across Japan killed far more people. Which is why they didn’t care if it was a nuclear bomb. They did know it was a nuclear bomb.

US blockade on Japan wasn’t “illegal”, it’s called war.

 

[toobfreak]

Despite Being Nuked Twice, Japanese Attempt a Coup to Keep War Going​

Them Japs be crazy!

 

[Mushroom]

Tōgō met with Emperor Hirohito and advised him to treat the declaration with the utmost circumspection, but that a reply should be postponed until the Japanese received a response from the Soviets to mediate peace. Hirohito stated that the declaration was "acceptable in principle."

And their Prime Minister openly said that Potsdam should be completely ignored.

And as the Japanese were trying to gain a cease fire and a pro quo ante bdellium (reset to borders prior to December 1941), that was simply never going to happen.

They had tried to pass that proposal through both Switzerland and Sweden before the Soviets, and they both refused to even pass it along to the Allies as they knew it would be rejected. The Soviets also knew it would be rejected, so never passed it along. And even the Japanese Ambassador to the Soviet Union knew it would never be passed along, and even if it was the Allies would reject it.

Only the Big Six were delusional enough to believe that the Allies would have agreed to simply pretend that the war had never happened.

 

[Weatherman2020]

The Bushido holdouts knew the war was lost and they tried to negotiate surrender terms but the Truman administration wouldn't talk to them. In desperation they went to Stalin. One of the main issues was not executing the emperor and ironically MacArthur saw to it that the U.S. would execute relatively few Japanese war criminals and the emperor was spared.

We listened to the Japanese government, not anyone else for good reason.

 

[whitehall]

Actually, they never did. Until days before the dropping of the bombs the marching orders of the Ambassador to the Soviet Union was to get them involved in a cease fire, and a pro quo ante bdellium ceasefire where both sides returned to where they were prior to December 1941.

The Japanese Government never once considered or offered a surrender. But they did believe that they had the right to demand a cease fire and that it would be accepted.

It's not true that Japan thought they had a "right" to demand anything. Negotiating terms of surrender goes back to the American Revolution. Grant offered Lee terms of surrender when the North defeated the South. The Japanese holdouts were trying to save face and protect the emperor. Unfortunately Stalin was a poor choice when Truman refused to even listen to them. The eggheads were dying to use their device on humans and Germans were not an option. They got what they wanted in a horrific display and then they pretended that they weren't involved.

 

[Mushroom]

It's not true that Japan thought they had a "right" to demand anything. Negotiating terms of surrender goes back to the American Revolution

There is a difference between "negotiating a surrender" and "dictating a cease fire".

And it can be seen quite clearly in that they outright rejected Potsdam, and refuse to consider or discuss it.

If they had honestly been willing to surrender, then at that time they would have opened a dialogue with the Allies. Either directly, or indirectly through a third party. But they did none of that, they openly and publicly dismissed it, even using the word "Mokusatsu", which normally translates to "kill with silence" (but also "treat with silent contempt").

That is because they felt they still had the upper hand in the war. That they were the stronger nation, and had the right and power to dictate terms. And not for a surrender, but an armistice to stop the fighting.

And remember, even Ambassador Soto was urging them constantly to "get serious" about ending the war, before it was too late. We actually have three records of all of their dispatches back and forth. Both those translated via Magic, those from Venona, then again from the Japanese archives themselves.

Nuclear Files: Library: Correspondence: Telegrams: Togo-Sato

Japanese Peace feelers in the Soviet Union

www.nuclearfiles.org

I suggest anybody that wants to know how the final two months of the war were from the Japanese perspective read those dispatches.

As you already know, the thinking of the Soviet authorities is realistic. It is difficult to move them with abstractions, to say nothing about the futility of trying to get them to consent to persuasion with phrases beautiful but somewhat remote from the facts and empty in content. In fact, with reference to your proposal in telegram No. 853, Molotov does not show the least interest. And again, in his refusal he gave a very similar answer. If indeed our country is pressed by the necessity of terminating the war, we ourselves must first of all firmly to terminate the war. Without this resolution, an attempt to sound out the intentions of the Soviet Union will result in no benefit. In these days, with the enemy air raids accelerated and intensified, is there any meaning in showing that our country has reserve strength for a war of resistance, or in sacrificing the lives of hundreds of thousands of conscripts and millions of other innocent residents of cities and metropolitan areas?

Dispatch from Ambassador Soto to Foreign Minister Togo, 12 July 1945

No, the Big Six still had it in their minds that they could and would win the war, and had no intention of ending the war unless it was in their favor. And the Allied Powers would never have accepted that.

I find it fascinating that even today, people constantly try to "Monday morning quarterback" the negotiations, and say that Japan thought the Soviets were going to help them negotiate a peace. Here we have their own Ambassador telling them that would not happen, way back on 12 July. He knew the reality of it, and over and over tried to tell Tokyo that it would never happen unless Japan was ready to give major concessions. That only a surrender and not an armistice would end the war.

There is a reason why I constantly encourage people to go to the source documents, and not simply rely upon what others say. Those original documents give a direct peek into exactly was going on, unshaded and without spin. Japan had absolutely no idea we were "reading their mail", and what we see in the Soto-Togo messages was a lot of frustration, and demands to make the Soviets see things the way Japan wanted them to, and to do what they asked.