Are New Battle Rules Tying Soldiers Hands?

[Vel]

It seems to me that this order, while I understand the premise behind it, will result in the Taliban stepping up using civilians to defeat the U.S. military. It reminds me of the legislation they had in Florida that denied you the right to defend yourself if you could run away.


June 22, 2009
New US battle rule: No fighting near Afghan homes

By JASON STRAZIUSO
Associated Press Writer
The top U.S. general in Afghanistan will soon formally order U.S. and NATO forces to break away from fights with militants hiding in Afghan houses so the battles do not kill civilians, a U.S. official said Monday.
The order would be one of the strongest measures taken by a U.S. commander to protect Afghan civilians in battle. American commanders say such deaths hurt their mission because they turn average Afghans against the government and U.S. and NATO forces.
Civilian casualties are a major source of friction between Afghan President Hamid Karzai and the U.S. The U.N. says U.S., NATO and Afghan forces killed 829 civilians in the Afghan war last year.
Gen. Stanley McChrystal, who took command of international forces in Afghanistan this month, has said his measure of effectiveness will be the "number of Afghans shielded from violence," and not the number of militants killed.
McChrystal will issue orders within days saying troops may attack insurgents hiding in Afghan houses if the U.S. or NATO forces are in imminent danger and must return fire, said U.S. military spokesman Rear Adm. Greg Smith.
"But if there is a compound they're taking fire from and they can remove themselves from the area safely, without any undue danger to the forces, then that's the option they should take," Smith said. "Because in these compounds we know there are often civilians kept captive by the Taliban."
McChrystal's predecessor, Gen. David McKiernan, issued rules last fall that told commanders to set conditions "to minimize the need to resort to deadly force."


www.mysanantonio.com

 

[strollingbones]

read "lone survivor" you will understand roe's and there impact on us troops

 

[Vel]

read "lone survivor" you will understand roe's and there impact on us troops

I haven't read the book, but I'm somewhat familiar with the story. The story also doesn't change my opinion about this new policy. I think that our troops need to be as chary of Afghan civilians physical well being and their cultural sensitivities as possible, but, I also believe that announcing this policy is tantamount to instructing the Taliban as to how they can defeat the U.S. military.

 

[Metternich]

To consider the nature of what the Taliban is, is to accept that there are few honestly 'innocent' Afghans in the areas which have the largest Taliban concentrations. The Taliban does not have a military because it it is an idea - at best - an idea that anyone can pick up after work, shoot a few rounds at American and NATO soldiers, then go home to screw the wife. To believe that not targeting that persons house because we're fearful he'll become a true full-timer like a few thousand is a poor policy.

We know from Iraq a few ground rules, A: we need the people on our side, B: it's more then a kill-count and C: we must rely on troops on the ground.

Yet this is a facsimile fix, a fixing of the fundamentals is what we need - not some hollow gesture that will only kill American troops. We get people on our side by giving them protection, by blowing apart any Taliban (be the individual in question a part or full-timer) that poke their head out. We need more then a kill-count but we need to consider that to have a lower kill-count we'll need more troops (C) and by refusing to act in a marginalizing fashion with regards to that weakness (we have our troops accepting more responsibilities in warfare without more supports) only more casualties can result.

In short, we need more troops not more rules.

 

[rayboyusmc]

What is really the craps is that the Taliban offered to turn over Ossama the Mama if we would try him in another country other than the USA.

Wonder what would have happened then if they had accepted that offer. Hell, if they didn't find him guilty we could have killed him before he was safely away.

Some politicians just need a war to make them a war time president. As General Smedley Butler, USMC, said: War Is A Racket. You don't make money by not sending the troops off to fight and die for your profit.

 

[AllieBaba]

The ridiculous rules of engagement we are making our soldiers adhere to in Afghanistan and Iraq are undoubtedly leading to the unnecessary deaths of those same soldiers.

And this goes for the idiotic insistence that we MIRANDIZE fucking hostiles. What a load of crap. Why don't we just line our guys up and let the assholes take pot shots at them?

 

[manifold]

Me no likey. Bad idea.

 

[Bootneck]

It seems to me that this order, while I understand the premise behind it, will result in the Taliban stepping up using civilians to defeat the U.S. military. It reminds me of the legislation they had in Florida that denied you the right to defend yourself if you could run away.

The Taliban always have, and always will, use cover of civilian areas to attack from. With such ROEs, clearing a village or urban area of insurgents will become a no-no. Tours in Afghanistan are hard enough as it is, without asking troops to enter a fight with one hand tied behind their backs. We might as well use fucking paint ball guns!

Better to confine NATO and US ops in Afghanistan to training their security forces and leaving them to take the fight to the Taliban.

 

[Vel]

It seems to me that this order, while I understand the premise behind it, will result in the Taliban stepping up using civilians to defeat the U.S. military. It reminds me of the legislation they had in Florida that denied you the right to defend yourself if you could run away.

The Taliban always have, and always will, use cover of civilian areas to attack from. With such ROEs, clearing a village or urban area of insurgents will become a no-no. Tours in Afghanistan are hard enough as it is, without asking troops to enter a fight with one hand tied behind their backs. We might as well use fucking paint ball guns!

Better to confine NATO and US ops in Afghanistan to training their security forces and leaving them to take the fight to the Taliban.

I wonder what these kinds of policies are going to do to the re-enlistment rate of our armed forces?

 

[Gunny]

It seems to me that this order, while I understand the premise behind it, will result in the Taliban stepping up using civilians to defeat the U.S. military. It reminds me of the legislation they had in Florida that denied you the right to defend yourself if you could run away.


June 22, 2009
New US battle rule: No fighting near Afghan homes

By JASON STRAZIUSO
Associated Press Writer
The top U.S. general in Afghanistan will soon formally order U.S. and NATO forces to break away from fights with militants hiding in Afghan houses so the battles do not kill civilians, a U.S. official said Monday.
The order would be one of the strongest measures taken by a U.S. commander to protect Afghan civilians in battle. American commanders say such deaths hurt their mission because they turn average Afghans against the government and U.S. and NATO forces.
Civilian casualties are a major source of friction between Afghan President Hamid Karzai and the U.S. The U.N. says U.S., NATO and Afghan forces killed 829 civilians in the Afghan war last year.
Gen. Stanley McChrystal, who took command of international forces in Afghanistan this month, has said his measure of effectiveness will be the "number of Afghans shielded from violence," and not the number of militants killed.
McChrystal will issue orders within days saying troops may attack insurgents hiding in Afghan houses if the U.S. or NATO forces are in imminent danger and must return fire, said U.S. military spokesman Rear Adm. Greg Smith.
"But if there is a compound they're taking fire from and they can remove themselves from the area safely, without any undue danger to the forces, then that's the option they should take," Smith said. "Because in these compounds we know there are often civilians kept captive by the Taliban."
McChrystal's predecessor, Gen. David McKiernan, issued rules last fall that told commanders to set conditions "to minimize the need to resort to deadly force."


www.mysanantonio.com

We might as well pack it in now and leave.

 

[Vel]

It seems to me that this order, while I understand the premise behind it, will result in the Taliban stepping up using civilians to defeat the U.S. military. It reminds me of the legislation they had in Florida that denied you the right to defend yourself if you could run away.


June 22, 2009
New US battle rule: No fighting near Afghan homes

By JASON STRAZIUSO
Associated Press Writer
The top U.S. general in Afghanistan will soon formally order U.S. and NATO forces to break away from fights with militants hiding in Afghan houses so the battles do not kill civilians, a U.S. official said Monday.
The order would be one of the strongest measures taken by a U.S. commander to protect Afghan civilians in battle. American commanders say such deaths hurt their mission because they turn average Afghans against the government and U.S. and NATO forces.
Civilian casualties are a major source of friction between Afghan President Hamid Karzai and the U.S. The U.N. says U.S., NATO and Afghan forces killed 829 civilians in the Afghan war last year.
Gen. Stanley McChrystal, who took command of international forces in Afghanistan this month, has said his measure of effectiveness will be the "number of Afghans shielded from violence," and not the number of militants killed.
McChrystal will issue orders within days saying troops may attack insurgents hiding in Afghan houses if the U.S. or NATO forces are in imminent danger and must return fire, said U.S. military spokesman Rear Adm. Greg Smith.
"But if there is a compound they're taking fire from and they can remove themselves from the area safely, without any undue danger to the forces, then that's the option they should take," Smith said. "Because in these compounds we know there are often civilians kept captive by the Taliban."
McChrystal's predecessor, Gen. David McKiernan, issued rules last fall that told commanders to set conditions "to minimize the need to resort to deadly force."


www.mysanantonio.com

We might as well pack it in now and leave.

This has probably been one of the oddest wars our nation ( or any other for that matter ) has engaged in. At it's inception we were dropping bombs with some planes and MRE's with others. I recall the consternation over the fact that the MRE's weren't halal and that in addition to changing the ingredients in the packages, we also had to change the colors on the outside to make sure they weren't confused with bombs. This is the first war that I can think of where the focus has always been on cultural sensitivites rather than killing the enemy. How can anyone expect our guys to win this way?

 

[garyd]

Of course they are.

Ray boy it's little late for second guessing and what if.

 

[Gunny]

It seems to me that this order, while I understand the premise behind it, will result in the Taliban stepping up using civilians to defeat the U.S. military. It reminds me of the legislation they had in Florida that denied you the right to defend yourself if you could run away.


June 22, 2009
New US battle rule: No fighting near Afghan homes

By JASON STRAZIUSO
Associated Press Writer
The top U.S. general in Afghanistan will soon formally order U.S. and NATO forces to break away from fights with militants hiding in Afghan houses so the battles do not kill civilians, a U.S. official said Monday.
The order would be one of the strongest measures taken by a U.S. commander to protect Afghan civilians in battle. American commanders say such deaths hurt their mission because they turn average Afghans against the government and U.S. and NATO forces.
Civilian casualties are a major source of friction between Afghan President Hamid Karzai and the U.S. The U.N. says U.S., NATO and Afghan forces killed 829 civilians in the Afghan war last year.
Gen. Stanley McChrystal, who took command of international forces in Afghanistan this month, has said his measure of effectiveness will be the "number of Afghans shielded from violence," and not the number of militants killed.
McChrystal will issue orders within days saying troops may attack insurgents hiding in Afghan houses if the U.S. or NATO forces are in imminent danger and must return fire, said U.S. military spokesman Rear Adm. Greg Smith.
"But if there is a compound they're taking fire from and they can remove themselves from the area safely, without any undue danger to the forces, then that's the option they should take," Smith said. "Because in these compounds we know there are often civilians kept captive by the Taliban."
McChrystal's predecessor, Gen. David McKiernan, issued rules last fall that told commanders to set conditions "to minimize the need to resort to deadly force."


www.mysanantonio.com

We might as well pack it in now and leave.

This has probably been one of the oddest wars our nation ( or any other for that matter ) has engaged in. At it's inception we were dropping bombs with some planes and MRE's with others. I recall the consternation over the fact that the MRE's weren't halal and that in addition to changing the ingredients in the packages, we also had to change the colors on the outside to make sure they weren't confused with bombs. This is the first war that I can think of where the focus has always been on cultural sensitivites rather than killing the enemy. How can anyone expect our guys to win this way?

You can't, thus my statement. We might as well pack it in. I would be pissed if I was sent to a war where the objective wasn't to win the war. Destroy the enemy and his ability to wage war, THEN worry about the humanitarian crap.

Otherwise, don't deploy me. Putting military personnel in that position is bullshit. The idiots that think up this backwards-assed crap should have to get out on the line.

 

[strollingbones]

i love when we are more concerned with the enemies than our own troops....at a time the simple roe was let the other man die for his country...now its ....go in there and dont do shit..do you think the troops are on to who is what over there....

if i leave my home and go committ an act of violence...in the us...they will come into my home....look at waco and ruby ridge....but not the afghans

 

[Lycurgus]

We might as well pack it in now and leave.

This has probably been one of the oddest wars our nation ( or any other for that matter ) has engaged in. At it's inception we were dropping bombs with some planes and MRE's with others. I recall the consternation over the fact that the MRE's weren't halal and that in addition to changing the ingredients in the packages, we also had to change the colors on the outside to make sure they weren't confused with bombs. This is the first war that I can think of where the focus has always been on cultural sensitivites rather than killing the enemy. How can anyone expect our guys to win this way?

You can't, thus my statement. We might as well pack it in. I would be pissed if I was sent to a war where the objective wasn't to win the war. Destroy the enemy and his ability to wage war, THEN worry about the humanitarian crap.

Otherwise, don't deploy me. Putting military personnel in that position is bullshit. The idiots that think up this backwards-assed crap should have to get out on the line.

Exactly. Been there, done that, The bull shit doesn't work.

 

[Citizen]

This has probably been one of the oddest wars our nation ( or any other for that matter ) has engaged in. At it's inception we were dropping bombs with some planes and MRE's with others. I recall the consternation over the fact that the MRE's weren't halal and that in addition to changing the ingredients in the packages, we also had to change the colors on the outside to make sure they weren't confused with bombs. This is the first war that I can think of where the focus has always been on cultural sensitivites rather than killing the enemy. How can anyone expect our guys to win this way?

You can't, thus my statement. We might as well pack it in. I would be pissed if I was sent to a war where the objective wasn't to win the war. Destroy the enemy and his ability to wage war, THEN worry about the humanitarian crap.

Otherwise, don't deploy me. Putting military personnel in that position is bullshit. The idiots that think up this backwards-assed crap should have to get out on the line.

Exactly. Been there, done that, The bull shit doesn't work.

You are not alone, there were thousands of others that have been there and done that back in the sixties and seventies, and it didn't work for them either.

 

[Toome]

We did this before in a place called Vietnam.

Those who don't learn from history are doomed to repeat it.

 

[Tech_Esq]

It seems to me that this order, while I understand the premise behind it, will result in the Taliban stepping up using civilians to defeat the U.S. military. It reminds me of the legislation they had in Florida that denied you the right to defend yourself if you could run away.


June 22, 2009
New US battle rule: No fighting near Afghan homes

By JASON STRAZIUSO
Associated Press Writer
The top U.S. general in Afghanistan will soon formally order U.S. and NATO forces to break away from fights with militants hiding in Afghan houses so the battles do not kill civilians, a U.S. official said Monday.
The order would be one of the strongest measures taken by a U.S. commander to protect Afghan civilians in battle. American commanders say such deaths hurt their mission because they turn average Afghans against the government and U.S. and NATO forces.
Civilian casualties are a major source of friction between Afghan President Hamid Karzai and the U.S. The U.N. says U.S., NATO and Afghan forces killed 829 civilians in the Afghan war last year.
Gen. Stanley McChrystal, who took command of international forces in Afghanistan this month, has said his measure of effectiveness will be the "number of Afghans shielded from violence," and not the number of militants killed.
McChrystal will issue orders within days saying troops may attack insurgents hiding in Afghan houses if the U.S. or NATO forces are in imminent danger and must return fire, said U.S. military spokesman Rear Adm. Greg Smith.
"But if there is a compound they're taking fire from and they can remove themselves from the area safely, without any undue danger to the forces, then that's the option they should take," Smith said. "Because in these compounds we know there are often civilians kept captive by the Taliban."
McChrystal's predecessor, Gen. David McKiernan, issued rules last fall that told commanders to set conditions "to minimize the need to resort to deadly force."


www.mysanantonio.com

Fuck this noise! It's time to pull out and pull out now. Anytime you start coming up with this many rules to fight a war, you aren't fighting it to win. I understand the sentiment, but it is unworkable in battle.

Time to withdraw. Let the fuckers rebuild the snake pit.

 

[Epsilon Delta]

These ROEs are in line with the new counter-insurgency priorities, detailed in the 2006 US Army & Marine's Counterinsurgency Field Manual, which I would recommend anybody with an interest in this to read (and lucky for you, it's free! on the internet!). The focus of counter-insurgency operations has changed, for the better, to the overall simple premise that COLLATERAL DAMAGE FUELS INSURGENCY and that CONVENTIONAL TACTICS DON'T WORK. I'm going to quote some parts of the new Manual:

The United States possesses overwhelming conventional military superiority. This capability has pushed its enemies to fight U.S. forces unconventionally, mixing modern technology with ancient techniques of insurgency and terrorism. Most enemies either do not try to defeat the United States with conventional operations or do not limit themselves to purely military means. They know that they cannot compete with U.S. forces on those terms. Instead, they try to exhaust U.S. national will, aiming to win by undermining and outlasting public support. Defeating such enemies presents a huge challenge to the Army and Marine Corps. Meeting it requires creative efforts by every Soldier and Marine. [...]

Western militaries too often neglect the study of insurgency. They falsely believe that armies trained to win large conventional wars are automatically prepared to win small, unconventional ones. In fact, some capabilities required for conventional success—for example, the ability to execute operational maneuver and employ massive firepower—may be of limited utility or even counterproductive in COIN operations. Nonetheless, conventional forces beginning COIN operations often try to use these capabilities to defeat insurgents; they almost always fail. The military forces that successfully defeat insurgencies are usually those able to overcome their institutional inclination to wage conventional war against insurgents. They learn how to practice COIN and apply that knowledge. This publication can help to compress the learning curve. It is a tool for planners, trainers, and field commanders. [...]

Political power is the central issue in insurgencies and counterinsurgencies; each side aims to get the people to accept its governance or authority as legitimate. [...] Long-term success in COIN depends on the people taking charge of their own affairs and consenting to the government’s rule. Achieving this condition requires the government to eliminate as many causes of the insurgency as feasible. In almost every case, counterinsurgents face a populace containing an active minority supporting the government and an equally small militant faction opposing it. Success requires the government to be accepted as legitimate by most of that uncommitted middle, which also includes passive supporters of both sides. Because of the ease of sowing disorder, it is usually not enough for counterinsurgents to get 51 percent of popular support; a solid majority is often essential. However, a passive populace may be all that is necessary for a well-supported insurgency to seize political power.

[F]or some societies, providing security and some basic services may be enough for citizens to grant a government legitimacy; indeed, the importance of security in situations where violence has escalated cannot be overemphasized. In such cases, establishing security can win the people’s confidence and enable a government to develop legitimacy in other areas.

This is the really important part:

Insurgents Must be Isolated from Their Cause and Support

1-128. It is easier to separate an insurgency from its resources and let it die than to kill every insurgent.
Clearly, killing or capturing insurgents will be necessary, especially when an insurgency is based in religious or ideological extremism. However, killing every insurgent is normally impossible. Attempting to do so can also be counterproductive in some cases; it risks generating popular resentment, creating martyrs that motivate new recruits, and producing cycles of revenge.

1-129. Dynamic insurgencies can replace losses quickly. Skillful counterinsurgents must thus cut off the
sources of that recuperative power. Some sources can be reduced by redressing the social, political, and economic grievances that fuel the insurgency. Physical support can be cut off by population control or border security. International or local legal action might be required to limit financial support. Urban insurgents, however, are especially difficult to isolate from their cause and sources of support. They may operate in small, compartmentalized cells that are usually independent or semi-independent. These cells often have their own support mechanisms and few, if any, ties to the population that counterinsurgents can track.

1-130. As the HN government increases its legitimacy, the populace begins to assist it more actively.
Eventually, the people marginalize and stigmatize insurgents to the point that the insurgency’s claim to
legitimacy is destroyed. However, victory is gained not when this isolation is achieved, but when the victory is permanently maintained by and with the people’s active support and when insurgent forces have been defeated.

http://usacac.army.mil/cac/repository/materials/coin-fm3-24.pdf

U.S. Military Counterinsurgency Manual, December 2006 - Council on Foreign Relations

 

[Gunny]

These ROEs are in line with the new counter-insurgency priorities, detailed in the 2006 US Army & Marine's Counterinsurgency Field Manual, which I would recommend anybody with an interest in this to read (and lucky for you, it's free! on the internet!). The focus of counter-insurgency operations has changed, for the better, to the overall simple premise that COLLATERAL DAMAGE FUELS INSURGENCY and that CONVENTIONAL TACTICS DON'T WORK. I'm going to quote some parts of the new Manual:

The United States possesses overwhelming conventional military superiority. This capability has pushed its enemies to fight U.S. forces unconventionally, mixing modern technology with ancient techniques of insurgency and terrorism. Most enemies either do not try to defeat the United States with conventional operations or do not limit themselves to purely military means. They know that they cannot compete with U.S. forces on those terms. Instead, they try to exhaust U.S. national will, aiming to win by undermining and outlasting public support. Defeating such enemies presents a huge challenge to the Army and Marine Corps. Meeting it requires creative efforts by every Soldier and Marine. [...]

Western militaries too often neglect the study of insurgency. They falsely believe that armies trained to win large conventional wars are automatically prepared to win small, unconventional ones. In fact, some capabilities required for conventional success—for example, the ability to execute operational maneuver and employ massive firepower—may be of limited utility or even counterproductive in COIN operations. Nonetheless, conventional forces beginning COIN operations often try to use these capabilities to defeat insurgents; they almost always fail. The military forces that successfully defeat insurgencies are usually those able to overcome their institutional inclination to wage conventional war against insurgents. They learn how to practice COIN and apply that knowledge. This publication can help to compress the learning curve. It is a tool for planners, trainers, and field commanders. [...]

Political power is the central issue in insurgencies and counterinsurgencies; each side aims to get the people to accept its governance or authority as legitimate. [...] Long-term success in COIN depends on the people taking charge of their own affairs and consenting to the government’s rule. Achieving this condition requires the government to eliminate as many causes of the insurgency as feasible. In almost every case, counterinsurgents face a populace containing an active minority supporting the government and an equally small militant faction opposing it. Success requires the government to be accepted as legitimate by most of that uncommitted middle, which also includes passive supporters of both sides. Because of the ease of sowing disorder, it is usually not enough for counterinsurgents to get 51 percent of popular support; a solid majority is often essential. However, a passive populace may be all that is necessary for a well-supported insurgency to seize political power.

[F]or some societies, providing security and some basic services may be enough for citizens to grant a government legitimacy; indeed, the importance of security in situations where violence has escalated cannot be overemphasized. In such cases, establishing security can win the people’s confidence and enable a government to develop legitimacy in other areas.

This is the really important part:

Insurgents Must be Isolated from Their Cause and Support

1-128. It is easier to separate an insurgency from its resources and let it die than to kill every insurgent.
Clearly, killing or capturing insurgents will be necessary, especially when an insurgency is based in religious or ideological extremism. However, killing every insurgent is normally impossible. Attempting to do so can also be counterproductive in some cases; it risks generating popular resentment, creating martyrs that motivate new recruits, and producing cycles of revenge.

1-129. Dynamic insurgencies can replace losses quickly. Skillful counterinsurgents must thus cut off the
sources of that recuperative power. Some sources can be reduced by redressing the social, political, and economic grievances that fuel the insurgency. Physical support can be cut off by population control or border security. International or local legal action might be required to limit financial support. Urban insurgents, however, are especially difficult to isolate from their cause and sources of support. They may operate in small, compartmentalized cells that are usually independent or semi-independent. These cells often have their own support mechanisms and few, if any, ties to the population that counterinsurgents can track.

1-130. As the HN government increases its legitimacy, the populace begins to assist it more actively.
Eventually, the people marginalize and stigmatize insurgents to the point that the insurgency’s claim to
legitimacy is destroyed. However, victory is gained not when this isolation is achieved, but when the victory is permanently maintained by and with the people’s active support and when insurgent forces have been defeated.

http://usacac.army.mil/cac/repository/materials/coin-fm3-24.pdf

U.S. Military Counterinsurgency Manual, December 2006 - Council on Foreign Relations

Ah yes, another FM the government has foisted onto it's own private laboratory for testing new PC ideas. If collateral damage causes others to become terrorists, you kill them too. As long as you are relentless and don't have some chair-polisher trying to overthink the psychology calling the policy, they'll get the message.

Instead, they get to read the "anti's" trying to hold out military to a set of standards Christ himself would be hard-pressed to emulate.