Would It Kill Us to Apologize to Iran for the Coup?

The article presents one way to spin the story. Another would suggest Iran should thank the US and UK for preventing Mossadeq from delivering Iran over to the USSR intentionally or not. During WWII, Iran had been occupied by the Soviet Union, the US and the UK so that aid, mostly from the US, could be delivered to the Soviets. After the war, Stalin refused to withdraw his troops until the UK with the support of the US demanded it. The USSR then for years sought to persuade some outlying provinces to secede, and this agitation continued during the the events of 1953.

There can be little doubt but that the USSR would have turned Iran into a Soviet satellite state if Mossadeq had managed to break relations with the UK and US, and then Iran would have had no control over its oil production or oil revenues.

There is enormous doubt about that, actually.

In fact, had the Soviets not gotten bogged down in Afghanistan, they would almost certainly have tried again to take over Iran after the Islamic Revolution.

Conjecture

Instead asking for an apology from the US, Amadinejad should apologize to the US for its decades of ingratitude.

Don't hold your breath.

Yes, what ingrates. We give them a perfectly good military dictator to rule over them and they dare question us?

And a swell American trained secret police, too. They never thanked us for that, either.

Maybe the Soviets would have taken over Iran, key word being maybe. The choice, however, was for the Iranian people to make, and they clearly chose Mossadeq.

The documents indicate that the CIA paid for thugs to stage the coup. That is not a point of argument it is a fact.

There is no question but that the Soviets would have tried to take over Iran, and with the UK and US not supporting the government, there would have been nothing to stop them. The real choice the Iranians had was between the Shah and a Soviet dictatorship.

There isn't? I say there is.

In fact, the Shah was a constitutional monarch who succeeded his father to the throne in 1941, and after the war instituted extensive social, economic and political reforms, some of which alienated the clergy which joined in a loose political alliance with the communists to oppose the Shah. Mossadeq, who was a member of the Qajar royal family the Shah's father had overthrown in 1921 had not been allowed to participate in politics until after the new Shah had instituted those reforms.

After Mossadeq nationalized the oil industry, the British blockaded Iran, preventing the country from selling any oil, and as the economy crumbled, the people demonstrated daily in the streets for and against everything.

So, a nation elects to take control of its own resources.

Britian blockades that nation (an act of war) and that is the justification for the USA staging a coup by a criminal class?!


Mossadeq became increasingly worried that the crowds would turn against him or that the Shah or his supporters would try to depose him, so he demanded that the Shah sign over to him control of the military which the constitution vested in the Shah.

You mean the crowds that the CIA was paying to riot?
The Shah, never a strong or courageous man, signed papers to that effect, but then had a change of heart and exercised his constitutional authority to remove Mossadeq as PM and appoint some one else, but Mossadeq refused to step down and fired up his followers against the Shah, who then fled the country out of fear. It was at this point the US and UK agents persuaded the Shah to return to Iran, assert his constitutional authority and to rally his supporters and the military to support this move. Mossadeq had in the meantime, facing some opposition in the parliament, declared a state of emergency and began to rule by decree. With the assistance of US and UK advice and money, the Shah's supporters began a propaganda campaign to rally support for the Shah among the people and the military, and then the Shah had Mossadeq arrested for treason for refusing to abide by the Shah's order to step down from the office of PM and other offenses.

What a tangled web we weaved, when at first we practiced to decieve.

So did the US and UK help the Shah depose Mossadeq in a coup or did they prevent Mossadeq from deposing the Shah in a coup? When Mossadeq demanded the Shah give him control over the military was he acting within his legal powers, or had he exceeded his legal authority? When he closed the parliament and began to rule by decree, had he effectively ended democracy in Iran? There are accounts of these events that support all of these points of view, but when we consider that the main opposition to the Shah were the Soviet inspired communists and the hardline Islamists, it is clear that without the Shah, there was no likelihood Iran would remained a democracy.

Per usual, post WWII the European Western powers were seising control of third world natuion's resources.

When those nations objected for purely nationalistic reasons, they were accused of being communists.

Typical of that time.
 
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tHE EVENT WAS OVER 50 YEARS AGO, WHO THE HELL CARES. And as been pointed out Iranians and Arabs , muslims in general, think if you say your sorry it is cause you are afraid and weak. Since no one is still alive that was in power when the coup happened we have nothing to apologize FOR.

Iranians are not Arabs, in case that was your implication. If it was, a skewed understanding of Middle Eastern affairs leads to a skewed perspective on how best to handle them.

That, retard, would be why they both, Iranian and arab are listed, cause they are NOT the same. They both however are Muslim AND they both think like Muslims, which is that apologizing is a sign of weakness.

hey loony tunes do you have a link to this Muslims view apologies as weakness thing...
 
When President Obama told al-Arabiya, "if countries like Iran are willing to unclench their fist, they will find an extended hand from us," the most widely reported Iranian response was President Ahmedinijad's suggestion that if the U.S. truly wants good relations with Iran, it should begin by apologizing for U.S. "crimes" against Iran, including U.S. support for the coup that overthrew Iranian democracy in 1953.

Robert Naiman: Would It Kill Us to Apologize to Iran for the Coup?

I had a lot of Iranian friends in College and still do. They're great people. The ball is in Obama's court.
 
That, retard, would be why they both, Iranian and arab are listed, cause they are NOT the same. They both however are Muslim AND they both think like Muslims, which is that apologizing is a sign of weakness.

These crude comparisons and conflations are a chief basis for your ignorance of commendable Middle East and Islamic policy. Much like GWB, who was unaware that there were sect differences in Islam while he was planning the invasion of Iraq, you simply don't have the sufficient knowledge of the region to understand that a Persian, Shi'a government is not likely to develop nuclear weapons (on which Supreme Leader Khameini has declared a fatwa, incidentally) only to surrender control of them to an unaccountable Arab, Sunni, and jihadist organization, just to take a common example.

I am not worried about them giving them to some other faction, they will USE them themselves or give them to their terrorist puppets. And by the way, when they do, they will pay in LOTS of blood as Israel and the US NUKE the hell out of Iran.


The US is not going to nuke iran. Israel sure the hell is not going to nuke iran. We won't start another cold war with Russia just to suck some jewish dick. Sorry. I guess you'll have to figure out a way to instigate the Tribulation some other way.
 

The article presents one way to spin the story. Another would suggest Iran should thank the US and UK for preventing Mossadeq from delivering Iran over to the USSR intentionally or not. During WWII, Iran had been occupied by the Soviet Union, the US and the UK so that aid, mostly from the US, could be delivered to the Soviets. After the war, Stalin refused to withdraw his troops until the UK with the support of the US demanded it. The USSR then for years sought to persuade some outlying provinces to secede, and this agitation continued during the the events of 1953.

There can be little doubt but that the USSR would have turned Iran into a Soviet satellite state if Mossadeq had managed to break relations with the UK and US, and then Iran would have had no control over its oil production or oil revenues. In fact, had the Soviets not gotten bogged down in Afghanistan, they would almost certainly have tried again to take over Iran after the Islamic Revolution.

Instead asking for an apology from the US, Amadinejad should apologize to the US for its decades of ingratitude.

That argument really depends entirely in the premise that Mopssadeq would have willingly turned Iran into a Societ client state.

Frankly, I doubt that.

Obviously you believe it.

If you are right, then the coup was a good thing.

If I am right, then the coup was a bad idea.

What evidence do you bring to the table to support your contention?

What Mossadeq would have willingly done is irrelevant. The USSR had been trying to gain control of Iran since the end of WWII, not only because of its oil but also to gain Iran's ports on the Persian Gulf. The principal opposition to the Shah came from a loose coalition of communists and hardline Islamists who were united only in their opposition to the Shah's social, political and economic reforms aimed at turning Iran into western style secular democracy. It was this coalition of communists and Islamists that Mossadeq depended on in his efforts to unseat the Shah, and had the Shah left and the UK and US withdrawn their support for the Iranian government, a civil war between the communists and the Islamists would certainly have followed with the communists backed by the Soviets next door in Afghanistan.

The communists would have declared they were the legitimate government of Iran and asked the USSR to help them put down the Islamist insurrection, much as the communist government in Afghanistan did some years later, and the USSR would have recognized the communist government as legitimate and sent troops from Afghanistan to crush the Islamist rebellion. Soon after that a Soviet fleet would have had a home base in the Persian Gulf.
 
And you believe the Soviets would have asked Mossadeq his opinion? What we know for a fact is that the USSR wanted Iran and that without the support of the US and UK there was little Iran could have done to resist them. If Mossadeq didn't intend to make Iran into a Soviet satellite state, then he was a fool to think he could have prevented it.

Then the preferable solution would have been to support a democratically elected leader against Soviet intrusion, not undermine him so as to effectively replace him with a brutal dictator and his murderous SAVAK police. Clearly, the motive was British opposition to Mossadeq's oil nationalization plans.

Britain's concern was over the nationalization of Iran's oil, but the US concern was the fear of a Soviet takeover of Iran. As for democracy in Iran, by the time the US took an active role, Mossadeq had already declared a state of emergency and begun ruling by decree, citing the authority of an old Iranian law, and had demanded the Shah cede to him, without legal authority to do so, control over the military, in effect, Mossadeq was acting in defiance of the very constitution under the authority of which he held office. Although he had once been democratically elected, one could make a strong argument that his actions had the effect of dismantling democracy in Iran.

While the Shah's government did evolve into a brutal dictatorship, although no more brutal than many other ME and central Asian dictatorships, one should remember than it was this Shah that had brought democracy to Iran by instituting political reforms overturning his father's harsher government and that it was this Shah that had allowed Mossadeq to participate in the government again after thirty years. One should also remember that it was Mossadeq who incited and exacerbated the resentments of the communists and Islamists over the Shah's westernizing reforms, which included the only real democracy in the area other than Israel's, and in that way created the chaos that later led him to declare a state of emergency and rule by decree and unlawfully demand the Shah surrender control of the military to him.

One could argue that given the chaos in the streets and the deterioration of the government under Mossadeq, it would have been irresponsible of the Shah not to have exercised his constitutional authority to replace him as PM, and in fact, this was the argument the US made to him to persuade the Shah to return from Baghdad. Mossadeq's extraordinary actions to keep control of the government show he was aware that his government was on the verge of collapse, and the US believed once that happened civil strife would lead inevitably to a Soviet takeover and a Soviet fleet based in the Persian Gulf.

CIA secret documents released in 2000 show the US was not opposed to Mossadeq's government or interested in Britain's oil dispute with Iran, but did not believe the Mossadeq government could withstand Soviet efforts to takeover Iran and so concluded that the Shah, not as brave or strong a leader as they would have liked, was the best option for preserving Iran's independence from Soviet domination.
 
HA!

tell us more about "killing people all over the world" mr. exterminate arabs.
 
And you believe the Soviets would have asked Mossadeq his opinion? What we know for a fact is that the USSR wanted Iran and that without the support of the US and UK there was little Iran could have done to resist them. If Mossadeq didn't intend to make Iran into a Soviet satellite state, then he was a fool to think he could have prevented it.

Then the preferable solution would have been to support a democratically elected leader against Soviet intrusion, not undermine him so as to effectively replace him with a brutal dictator and his murderous SAVAK police. Clearly, the motive was British opposition to Mossadeq's oil nationalization plans.

Britain's concern was over the nationalization of Iran's oil, but the US concern was the fear of a Soviet takeover of Iran. As for democracy in Iran, by the time the US took an active role, Mossadeq had already declared a state of emergency and begun ruling by decree, citing the authority of an old Iranian law, and had demanded the Shah cede to him, without legal authority to do so, control over the military, in effect, Mossadeq was acting in defiance of the very constitution under the authority of which he held office. Although he had once been democratically elected, one could make a strong argument that his actions had the effect of dismantling democracy in Iran.

While the Shah's government did evolve into a brutal dictatorship, although no more brutal than many other ME and central Asian dictatorships, one should remember than it was this Shah that had brought democracy to Iran by instituting political reforms overturning his father's harsher government and that it was this Shah that had allowed Mossadeq to participate in the government again after thirty years. One should also remember that it was Mossadeq who incited and exacerbated the resentments of the communists and Islamists over the Shah's westernizing reforms, which included the only real democracy in the area other than Israel's, and in that way created the chaos that later led him to declare a state of emergency and rule by decree and unlawfully demand the Shah surrender control of the military to him.

One could argue that given the chaos in the streets and the deterioration of the government under Mossadeq, it would have been irresponsible of the Shah not to have exercised his constitutional authority to replace him as PM, and in fact, this was the argument the US made to him to persuade the Shah to return from Baghdad. Mossadeq's extraordinary actions to keep control of the government show he was aware that his government was on the verge of collapse, and the US believed once that happened civil strife would lead inevitably to a Soviet takeover and a Soviet fleet based in the Persian Gulf.

CIA secret documents released in 2000 show the US was not opposed to Mossadeq's government or interested in Britain's oil dispute with Iran, but did not believe the Mossadeq government could withstand Soviet efforts to takeover Iran and so concluded that the Shah, not as brave or strong a leader as they would have liked, was the best option for preserving Iran's independence from Soviet domination.
great post
 
These crude comparisons and conflations are a chief basis for your ignorance of commendable Middle East and Islamic policy. Much like GWB, who was unaware that there were sect differences in Islam while he was planning the invasion of Iraq, you simply don't have the sufficient knowledge of the region to understand that a Persian, Shi'a government is not likely to develop nuclear weapons (on which Supreme Leader Khameini has declared a fatwa, incidentally) only to surrender control of them to an unaccountable Arab, Sunni, and jihadist organization, just to take a common example.

I am not worried about them giving them to some other faction, they will USE them themselves or give them to their terrorist puppets. And by the way, when they do, they will pay in LOTS of blood as Israel and the US NUKE the hell out of Iran.


The US is not going to nuke iran. Israel sure the hell is not going to nuke iran. We won't start another cold war with Russia just to suck some jewish dick. Sorry. I guess you'll have to figure out a way to instigate the Tribulation some other way.

Hey retard, after Iran uses a nuke we sure as hell will, well unless a cowardly Leftist is in the White House. Iran will either use it themselves or give one to their terrorist clients and hope somehow no one knows they did it. Obama is already sucking up to the Iranians as we speak.
 
Hey retard, after Iran uses a nuke we sure as hell will, well unless a cowardly Leftist is in the White House. Iran will either use it themselves or give one to their terrorist clients and hope somehow no one knows they did it. Obama is already sucking up to the Iranians as we speak.

Don't be an idiot. Iranian leaders aren't so irrational so as not to fear mutually assured destruction. Moreover, Israel could not launch an Osirak-style strike on Iran due to the far different technical structure of its nuclear program than Iraq, which involves spread out underground facilities. You'll have to specify which "terrorist client" you're referring to this time...as though it's likely for a Shi'a, Persian government to develop nuclear weapons (against Supreme Leader Khameini's fatwa, at that) for the purpose of surrendering control over them to an unaccountable Sunni, Arab jihadist organization, though you've ignored that point the first time and you'll likely ignore it again.
 
How much power does Ahmadinejad really have? The Mullahs or clerics call the shots. Are these Mullahs/clerics as crazy as Khoemeni was?
 
Britain's concern was over the nationalization of Iran's oil, but the US concern was the fear of a Soviet takeover of Iran. As for democracy in Iran, by the time the US took an active role, Mossadeq had already declared a state of emergency and begun ruling by decree, citing the authority of an old Iranian law, and had demanded the Shah cede to him, without legal authority to do so, control over the military, in effect, Mossadeq was acting in defiance of the very constitution under the authority of which he held office. Although he had once been democratically elected, one could make a strong argument that his actions had the effect of dismantling democracy in Iran.

That's not an entirely accurate summary of the political climate within Iran, or the sequence of events that occurred. Interest in halting Soviet intrusion did indeed exist, but so do declassified CIA documents that indicate that warnings of Soviet intrusions supported by Iran's pro-Soviet Tudah were largely inaccurate and functioned as a smokescreen, as later admitted by Dean Acheson.

1952 CIA coup in Iran, by ERVAND ABRAHAMIAN

Throughout the crisis, the “communist danger” was more of a rhetorical device than a real issue — i.e., it was part of the cold-war discourse. The British and American governments knew Mossadeq was as distrustful of the Soviet Union as of the West. In fact, they often complained to each other about his “neutralism.” They knew perfectly well that the so-called “fellow-travelers” were staunch nationalists (after the coup some of them obtained refuge in the United States). They also knew that the Tudeh, even though the largest political organization, was in no position to seize power (F0 371/Persia 1952/ 98597; FO 371/Persia 1953/104573; Declassified Documents/1981/CIA/ Doc 276). Despite 20,000 members and 110,000 sympathizers, the Tudeh was no match for the armed tribes and the 129,000-man military. What is more, the British and Americans had enough inside information to be confident that the party had no plans to initiate armed insurrection. At the beginning of the crisis when the Truman administration was under the impression a compromise was possible, Acheson had stressed the communist danger and warned if Mossadeq was not helped the Tudeh would take over (FO 371/Persia 1051/1530). The Foreign Office had retorted that the Tudeh was no real threat (FO 371/ Persia 1952/98608). But, in August 1953, when the Foreign Office echoed the Eisenhower administration’s claim that the Tudeh was about to take over, Acheson now retorted that there was no such communist danger (Roosevelt, 1979, 88). Acheson was honest enough to admit that the issue of the Tudeh was a smokescreen.

I would recommend adopting a somewhat more skeptical perspective of this matter, since merely assuming that the U.S. had some benevolent interest in preventing Soviet intrusion in the region is superficially and unduly optimistic, especially considering Mossadeq's hostility toward all varieties of foreign intervention.

As for democracy in Iran, by the time the US took an active role, Mossadeq had already declared a state of emergency and begun ruling by decree, citing the authority of an old Iranian law, and had demanded the Shah cede to him, without legal authority to do so, control over the military, in effect, Mossadeq was acting in defiance of the very constitution under the authority of which he held office. Although he had once been democratically elected, one could make a strong argument that his actions had the effect of dismantling democracy in Iran.

Mossadeq's emergency powers were granted by parliamentary decree, and were not seized or forcefully taken, as your summary succinctly insinuates. Moreover, his powers were often utilized to check monarchical power of dubious constitutionality, and their expansion was certainly far more democratic than the monarchical authorities. Moreover, the Shah did indeed "cede control" (not an entirely accurate term) over the military to Mossadeq in response to protests, so perhaps the "strength" of your arguments would be better applied to Pahlavi, if you believe that transferring power from a monarch to a democratically elected prime minister has the consequence of "dismantling democracy."

While the Shah's government did evolve into a brutal dictatorship, although no more brutal than many other ME and central Asian dictatorships, one should remember than it was this Shah that had brought democracy to Iran by instituting political reforms overturning his father's harsher government and that it was this Shah that had allowed Mossadeq to participate in the government again after thirty years. One should also remember that it was Mossadeq who incited and exacerbated the resentments of the communists and Islamists over the Shah's westernizing reforms, which included the only real democracy in the area other than Israel's, and in that way created the chaos that later led him to declare a state of emergency and rule by decree and unlawfully demand the Shah surrender control of the military to him.

Such claims are similarly inaccurate, not least of which being the reference to Israeli democracy, which did not exist in a sufficient manner then and continues to be insufficient today. Mossadeq was a secularist himself who is today ignored by Islamic clerics in favor of Ayatollah Kashani when it comes to the celebration of oil nationalization, so your claim that he was hostile to Western reforms is dubious in more way than one.

One could argue that given the chaos in the streets and the deterioration of the government under Mossadeq, it would have been irresponsible of the Shah not to have exercised his constitutional authority to replace him as PM, and in fact, this was the argument the US made to him to persuade the Shah to return from Baghdad. Mossadeq's extraordinary actions to keep control of the government show he was aware that his government was on the verge of collapse, and the US believed once that happened civil strife would lead inevitably to a Soviet takeover and a Soviet fleet based in the Persian Gulf.

Your reference to "constitutional" authority would be better applied to monarchical authority. Greater protests and unrest came after the initial resignation of Mossadeq and Qavam's attempt to re-open negotiations with foreign powers with oil interests in the region, considering that nationalization efforts were strongly supported by large portions of the electorate. Indeed, it is more arguable that foreign interference in the region not only increased the "civil strife" and unrest caused by Qavam's unacceptable policies, but increased Mossadeq's increasing wariness of foreign intervention and increased use of authoritarian policies, which occurred after he became aware of plots against him.

CIA secret documents released in 2000 show the US was not opposed to Mossadeq's government or interested in Britain's oil dispute with Iran, but did not believe the Mossadeq government could withstand Soviet efforts to takeover Iran and so concluded that the Shah, not as brave or strong a leader as they would have liked, was the best option for preserving Iran's independence from Soviet domination.

I've seen indication of alternate motivations.

On 19 June 1953, the final operational plan, agreed upon by Mr. Roosevelt for CIA and by British Intelligence in London, was submitted in Washington to the Department of State; to Mr. Allen W. Dulles, Director of CIA; and to Ambassador Henderson for approval. Simultaneously, it was submitted to the British Foreign Office by SIS for approval. The Department of State wanted to be assured of two things before it would grant approval of the plan:

1. that the United States Government could provide adequate grant aid to a successor Iranian Government so that such a government could be sustained until an oil settlement was reached;

2. that the British Government would signify in writing, to the satisfaction of the Department of State, its intention to reach an early oil settlement with a successor Iranian Government in a, spirit of good will and equity.

The Department of State satisfied itself on both of these scores.

My contention would be that merely taking a rosy view of U.S. planners benevolently and generously wishing to protect the Iranian and American peoples from Soviet intrusion in the Middle East is hopelessly optimistic, even naive, and that a more skeptical, rational view of the matter ought to be considered.
 

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