What really matters on health care: Making it work

strollingbones

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Sep 19, 2008
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You’ve got to give it up for the political media: Somehow, through sheer force of will, we’ve actually managed to turn the most complex and consequential piece of legislation in decades into Washington’s version of March Madness — just another step for American politics down the ruinous Road to Sports Center. No longer is the health care law about the uninsured or “bending the cost curve,” or any of that boring stuff. Now it’s all about beating the spread.

Can the Obama administration get to 6 million by the original enrollment deadline next week, or even after the extension into next month? Is it a victory if the president comes within 500,000 of the goal, or a crushing defeat? Maybe we can break it down in a chart.

The truth is that whether it takes six weeks or six months to meet the next arbitrary benchmark, the health care law is now embedded in the society, and it’s not going anywhere. So the only important, longer-term question, and the one that almost no one is talking about, is whether our ailing political system can actually function well enough to make it work.

I recently thought about a conversation I had with Max Baucus, then the chairman of the Senate Finance Committee and now ambassador to China, at around this time in 2009. Barack Obama and Democratic leaders on the Hill were just starting to open talks about a health care bill, and Baucus told me he was adamant about getting some Republicans behind it. He rejected the idea that Democrats could unilaterally push a contentious bill through the Senate with a simple majority, through a budget maneuver known as “reconciliation” — which is exactly what ended up happening.

I asked Baucus why it mattered. Whether a bill passed with bipartisan acclaim or through the use of some arcane legislative gimmick, it would still be law, right?

Sure, Baucus told me, you could ram through a health care overhaul on a partisan vote. But you wouldn’t be able to sustain it.

As it happened, Democrats didn’t have a whole lot of choice. Republicans ultimately made a decision to oppose any reform, and it became clear that if Obama were going to achieve his party’s 70-year goal of universal coverage, he was going to have to do it in a way that left Congress and the country deeply divided. I’m not going to second-guess that strategy now.

But Baucus turned out to be prescient. He wasn’t only saying that a law passed by one party alone would be litigated or overturned. Baucus’s larger point was that this kind of sprawling social legislation, which Congress hadn’t really endeavored to pass since the 1960s, doesn’t end with a single vote. Inevitably, it needs to be tweaked and revised, as conditions change and unintended consequences reveal themselves. A massive undertaking like health care reform isn’t so much a single law as it is a yearslong process, and one that requires some buy-in from both sides.

Look at Social Security, which Franklin Roosevelt signed into law in 1935, over the objections of factions in both parties. Just four years later, Congress made sweeping changes to the new program, expanding its reach to widows and fatherless children while also tinkering with the financing mechanism so that workers could see benefits sooner. It wasn’t until the 1950s that agricultural and workers in service industries — many of them African-Americans who had been left out of the initial law — became beneficiaries, too. The Harvard sociologist Theda Skocpol, who has written extensively on the program, says it wasn’t until the Nixon administration that Social Security really became enshrined as the untouchable program we know today.

The imperfect health care law will need tinkering, too. We may need to raise or otherwise amend the threshold of 50 employees that triggers a mandate for an employer to provide coverage, so that employers aren’t tempted to fire their 51st and 52nd full-time workers to avoid the mandate, and so that more workers can take advantage of the exchanges. Sen. Mark Begich, an Alaska Democrat, has proposed adding a new “copper level” policy choice to the exchanges, which would offer less expensive plans with less elaborate coverage, and broadening tax credits to make more small businesses eligible.

Such changes would affect only the coverage side of things, though; the more pressing concern in years ahead may well have to do with reining in costs. Looking to make the law politically palatable, Democrats front-loaded most of the benefits that were sure to be popular (eventually, anyway), while pushing off a lot of the cost-saving measures. Some liberal defenders of the law will tell you this is all well and good, because health care costs have been growing at a much lower rate recently anyway, which they attribute chiefly to the effects of the new law.

But in fact, economists say there are probably several explanations for the slowing growth in expenses — chief among them that consumers simply seek less medical care during a steep recession. And this means that as the economy slowly rebounds, and as the retirement of the boomers accelerates, cost containment may once again become a pressing problem.

http://news.yahoo.com/what-really-matters-on-health-care--making-it-work-234038897.html


face it obama care is here to stay
 
The best way I see to make it work
is to keep this system for the people who WANT to make it work.
Who BELIEVE in a govt system for health care.

And free up the others opposed to it, to develop and be under their own system to make THAT work. You won't have any resistance and obstructions that way.

If you don't want people hyping it down to make it fail,
then don't force them to participate in it. DUH!

Look at how religious organizations work, or successful nonprofits. All the people participating CHOOSE and WANT to be there, and WANT the program to be successful. If people disagree, they leave. So you are only left with the people who WANT to make things work.

I think the Democrat and Green Party could satisfy their current members and agenda, and attract more members, by orchestrating their own network of sustainable health care, where members would WANT to participate and WANT to invest their money, efforts, attention and resources. The Parties already run this way, by voluntary participation. Why not use that structure, which is democratically elected and run, to manage the actual health care system?

All Parties could work with their own members, beliefs, and principles to serve their base in ways they deem most effective and WANT TO MAKE WORK. there would be no opposition.

That means all resources and efforts would go DIRECTLY into health care solutions,
and ZERO would be wasted fighting each other politically after eliminating those conflicts.

You’ve got to give it up for the political media: Somehow, through sheer force of will, we’ve actually managed to turn the most complex and consequential piece of legislation in decades into Washington’s version of March Madness — just another step for American politics down the ruinous Road to Sports Center. No longer is the health care law about the uninsured or “bending the cost curve,” or any of that boring stuff. Now it’s all about beating the spread.

Can the Obama administration get to 6 million by the original enrollment deadline next week, or even after the extension into next month? Is it a victory if the president comes within 500,000 of the goal, or a crushing defeat? Maybe we can break it down in a chart.

The truth is that whether it takes six weeks or six months to meet the next arbitrary benchmark, the health care law is now embedded in the society, and it’s not going anywhere. So the only important, longer-term question, and the one that almost no one is talking about, is whether our ailing political system can actually function well enough to make it work.

I recently thought about a conversation I had with Max Baucus, then the chairman of the Senate Finance Committee and now ambassador to China, at around this time in 2009. Barack Obama and Democratic leaders on the Hill were just starting to open talks about a health care bill, and Baucus told me he was adamant about getting some Republicans behind it. He rejected the idea that Democrats could unilaterally push a contentious bill through the Senate with a simple majority, through a budget maneuver known as “reconciliation” — which is exactly what ended up happening.

I asked Baucus why it mattered. Whether a bill passed with bipartisan acclaim or through the use of some arcane legislative gimmick, it would still be law, right?

Sure, Baucus told me, you could ram through a health care overhaul on a partisan vote. But you wouldn’t be able to sustain it.

As it happened, Democrats didn’t have a whole lot of choice. Republicans ultimately made a decision to oppose any reform, and it became clear that if Obama were going to achieve his party’s 70-year goal of universal coverage, he was going to have to do it in a way that left Congress and the country deeply divided. I’m not going to second-guess that strategy now.

But Baucus turned out to be prescient. He wasn’t only saying that a law passed by one party alone would be litigated or overturned. Baucus’s larger point was that this kind of sprawling social legislation, which Congress hadn’t really endeavored to pass since the 1960s, doesn’t end with a single vote. Inevitably, it needs to be tweaked and revised, as conditions change and unintended consequences reveal themselves. A massive undertaking like health care reform isn’t so much a single law as it is a yearslong process, and one that requires some buy-in from both sides.

Look at Social Security, which Franklin Roosevelt signed into law in 1935, over the objections of factions in both parties. Just four years later, Congress made sweeping changes to the new program, expanding its reach to widows and fatherless children while also tinkering with the financing mechanism so that workers could see benefits sooner. It wasn’t until the 1950s that agricultural and workers in service industries — many of them African-Americans who had been left out of the initial law — became beneficiaries, too. The Harvard sociologist Theda Skocpol, who has written extensively on the program, says it wasn’t until the Nixon administration that Social Security really became enshrined as the untouchable program we know today.

The imperfect health care law will need tinkering, too. We may need to raise or otherwise amend the threshold of 50 employees that triggers a mandate for an employer to provide coverage, so that employers aren’t tempted to fire their 51st and 52nd full-time workers to avoid the mandate, and so that more workers can take advantage of the exchanges. Sen. Mark Begich, an Alaska Democrat, has proposed adding a new “copper level” policy choice to the exchanges, which would offer less expensive plans with less elaborate coverage, and broadening tax credits to make more small businesses eligible.

Such changes would affect only the coverage side of things, though; the more pressing concern in years ahead may well have to do with reining in costs. Looking to make the law politically palatable, Democrats front-loaded most of the benefits that were sure to be popular (eventually, anyway), while pushing off a lot of the cost-saving measures. Some liberal defenders of the law will tell you this is all well and good, because health care costs have been growing at a much lower rate recently anyway, which they attribute chiefly to the effects of the new law.

But in fact, economists say there are probably several explanations for the slowing growth in expenses — chief among them that consumers simply seek less medical care during a steep recession. And this means that as the economy slowly rebounds, and as the retirement of the boomers accelerates, cost containment may once again become a pressing problem.

http://news.yahoo.com/what-really-matters-on-health-care--making-it-work-234038897.html


face it obama care is here to stay
 
Last edited:
Obama took a healthcare system that was working for over 90% of Americans and broke it attempting to make it work the 10% that don't want to pay for it.
 
I recently thought about a conversation I had with Max Baucus, then the chairman of the Senate Finance Committee and now ambassador to China, at around this time in 2009. Barack Obama and Democratic leaders on the Hill were just starting to open talks about a health care bill, and Baucus told me he was adamant about getting some Republicans behind it. He rejected the idea that Democrats could unilaterally push a contentious bill through the Senate with a simple majority, through a budget maneuver known as “reconciliation” — which is exactly what ended up happening.

I asked Baucus why it mattered. Whether a bill passed with bipartisan acclaim or through the use of some arcane legislative gimmick, it would still be law, right?

Sure, Baucus told me, you could ram through a health care overhaul on a partisan vote. But you wouldn’t be able to sustain it.

As it happened, Democrats didn’t have a whole lot of choice. Republicans ultimately made a decision to oppose any reform, and it became clear that if Obama were going to achieve his party’s 70-year goal of universal coverage, he was going to have to do it in a way that left Congress and the country deeply divided. I’m not going to second-guess that strategy now.

Bullshit. They had a choice and they chose poorly.
 
Sure, Baucus told me, you could ram through a health care overhaul on a partisan vote. But you wouldn’t be able to sustain it.

As it happened, Democrats didn’t have a whole lot of choice. Republicans ultimately made a decision to oppose any reform, and it became clear that if Obama were going to achieve his party’s 70-year goal of universal coverage, he was going to have to do it in a way that left Congress and the country deeply divided. I’m not going to second-guess that strategy now.

Bullshit. They had a choice and they chose poorly.

What about when the Republicans DID orchestrate a compromise agreement to just change TWO sticking points that were holding up the process (so the budget could pass):
a. delay the individual mandate for one year since the employer mandate had been
b. remove the tax on medical devices that people on all sides agreed would hurt companies seeking to provide medical services and equipment

Obama and the Democrats refused to pass anything that had any such revisions.

So whose fault was that?

The Republicans (even the extreme opposition that did NOT really agree to these concessions any more than Obama and Democrats accepted any changes either)
AGREED to compromise the other issues and just stick to these that other people
also agreed upon. You tell me who was obstructing the process unnecessarily.
 

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