what did pvt manning really do or reveal?

[strollingbones]

is pvt manning a whistle blower or spy? the information he revealed was somewhat outdated as most of it was from 2004 to 2009.
much of it...is information the american public should have. ie. the reality of the war for the ground troops, the reality of the nature of the paki government and how they are helping terrorist ...

how was he able to convey this many documents without anyone noticing...are the controls of said documents that lax?

are these documents really a blow to nation security? do they place anyone in harms way?

step up to the soapbox and say your piece about what you think of these leaked documents and the man or men who did it? not personal attacks on them..but their motives etc.

 

[strollingbones]

dont derail the thread...i am serious i want to hear what people think and the reasons they think that

 

[California Girl]

Manning was placed in a position of trust, and swore to defend the Constitution of the United States. He broke that trust, stole our secrets and passed them to a third party who made that information public. He is a traitor in all but official definition. And, he didn't do it because he had some passionate belief in a cause... he did it because his boyfriend dumped him and he was emotionally unstable. Fuck him. Once the formalities are over, he can rot in jail... and then in hell.

 

[strollingbones]

By stark contrast, WikiLeaks isn't interested in helping governments, militaries and corporations keep secrets. They're interested in the opposite: forcing transparency on institutions which conduct the vast, vast bulk of their substantive conduct in the dark. They're not susceptible to pressure from political and corporate officials; rather, they want to hold them accountable. That's what makes WikiLeaks so uniquely threatening to elite institutions, and anyone who doubts that should simply read the 2008 Pentagon Report discussing ways to destroy it, or review the Obama administration's unprecedented and rapidly escalating war on whistle-blowers generally.

The strange and consequential case of Bradley Manning, Adrian Lamo and WikiLeaks - Glenn Greenwald - Salon.com


very interesting read

 

[California Girl]

By stark contrast, WikiLeaks isn't interested in helping governments, militaries and corporations keep secrets. They're interested in the opposite: forcing transparency on institutions which conduct the vast, vast bulk of their substantive conduct in the dark. They're not susceptible to pressure from political and corporate officials; rather, they want to hold them accountable. That's what makes WikiLeaks so uniquely threatening to elite institutions, and anyone who doubts that should simply read the 2008 Pentagon Report discussing ways to destroy it, or review the Obama administration's unprecedented and rapidly escalating war on whistle-blowers generally.

The strange and consequential case of Bradley Manning, Adrian Lamo and WikiLeaks - Glenn Greenwald - Salon.com


very interesting read

I tend to form my own opinions, I don't need other people to form them for me so your 'very interesting read' is of no real interest to me.

WikiLeaks is just a bunch of hacks whose only interest is self promotion. Assange is a proven liar (see his claim to have broken the 'climate gate emails'... that's total bullshit), he's not a journalist, he's not doing this for the greater good, he's just an ego-maniac. I hope the DoJ is serious in its pursuit of Assange... and I hope he stands trial for his crime. Because stealing government information is a crime. Whether you like it or not is of no consequence.

 

[Valerie]

I keep seeing people say there was nothing too revealing in these cables and the info is stuff we have a right to know....Sure, that's fine if WeepyLeaks wants to go around the world and gather their own intelligence, but there is no "right" STEAL our national intelligence or to publish intelligence that has been STOLEN from us. So far we are lucky nothing more dangerous has been leaked, but I agree that these leaks have harmed our national diplomacy which can appear less dangerous on the immediate surface, but none of us knows just how it will effect things going forward either...

Private First Class (PFC) Bradley E. Manning (born 17 December 1987) is a United States Army soldier who was arrested and charged with the unauthorized use and disclosure of U.S. classified information. He has been held in solitary confinement at the Marine Corps Brig, Quantico since sometime in May 2010.

Manning was an intelligence analyst assigned to a support battalion with the 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division at Contingency Operating Station Hammer, Iraq. Agents of the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command arrested Manning based on information received from federal authorities provided by an American informant, Adrian Lamo, in whom Manning had previously confided.[1][2][3] Lamo said that Manning claimed, via instant messaging, to be the person who had leaked the "Collateral Murder" video of a helicopter airstrike on July 12, 2007, in Baghdad. Additionally, a video of the Granai airstrike and around 260,000 diplomatic cables were released to Wikileaks.[4][5][6]

Manning was charged under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) with violations of UCMJ Articles 92 and 134 for "transferring classified data onto his personal computer and adding unauthorized software to a classified computer system," and "communicating, transmitting and delivering national defense information to an unauthorized source".[2][7][8]

Bradley Manning - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

How Manning Stole The Cables


[/B]
Many outside the military and diplomatic communities have wondered just how such a large amount of sensitive missives could have been taken. As a public service, Conflict Health is very pleased to publish a guest article from Captain Nick Dubaz, an Active Duty Army Civil Affairs Officer, explaining in full technical detail how it happened.

A number of commenters on the latest Wikileaks release have questioned how one junior enlisted Army intelligence analyst could possibly have collected and stolen such a massive number of documents unaided and undiscovered. Indeed, the very mention of “intelligence” evokes notions of secure, guarded, windowless facilities under constant surveillance employing the latest biometric technology to secure America’s secrets. This image may have once been partially true in the case of Top Secret and Compartmented information, but the distributed nature of our modern intelligence community and the proliferation of secret network access necessitated by our wars in Iraq and Afghanistan has fundamentally changed both protection of and access to classified information. The technical methods Private First Class Bradley Manning, the accused leaker, may have used to obtain and steal the material and transmit it to Wikileaks are simple and demonstrate the intelligence community’s vulnerability to an insider threat.

All mission traffic in Iraq and Afghanistan occurs on computer systems classified at the Secret-Releasable to NATO/ISAF level or above. Historically, mission traffic occurred at the Secret-NOFORN (Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals) level on the SIPR network (Secret Internet Protocol Router) and non-US elements operated on separate networks known as CENTRIX segregated by organizational membership (NATO, ISAF, etc). This caused significant information sharing problems and now lower level U.S. forces are transitioning many functions to CENTRIX to create a common mission network. Regardless, these information systems are now present at every Company-level headquarters and above, providing wide access to Secret-level intelligence and diplomatic information processed and disseminated on the network. Access to Top Secret (TS) and Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) information systems remains much more limited, but is still partially vulnerable to Bradley Manning-like insider threats.

The Wikileaks reports on Iraq and Afghanistan are from a system known as CIDNE (Combined Information/Data Network Exchange) which is the latest iteration of the database of record for all tactical reporting across the OIF and OEF theaters. The release is only a tiny percentage of the actual data contained in the database. Each record in the Wikileaks release is only the initial text report often transcribed from the radio or secret chat rooms. After the incident/action is completed, each record is typically updated with new information, pictures, videos, PowerPoints and other relevant documentation. To allow for transfer into incompatible systems and other software packages, CIDNE includes an “Export to Excel” feature that allows for the rapid filtering and transfer of records to other systems. Bradley Manning likely utilized this feature to export the comprehensive CIDNE database that he would later transmit to Wikileaks. Such an action could be completed in less than an hour depending on the bandwidth available and leaves no signature that would be readily noticed as unusual or alarming.


(cont...)
How Manning Stole The Cables ? Conflict Health

[/QUOTE]

 

[strollingbones]

cg if you dont want to read something that is fine...has nothing to do with forming an opinion simply asking others for their opinions on this issue...after all isnt that what a message board is made up of...others expressing their opinions?

 

[strollingbones]

does wikileaks exist due to the governments own lies? jessica lynch and pat tillman come to mind...does anyone really trust the government's information anymore?

 

[Ringel05]

does wikileaks exist due to the governments own lies? jessica lynch and pat tillman come to mind...does anyone really trust the government's information anymore?

Just the governments information?

 

[strollingbones]

good point ring....information if just hard to come by that one can trust

 

[Ringel05]

I keep seeing people say there was nothing too revealing in these cables and the info is stuff we have a right to know....Sure, that's fine if WeepyLeaks wants to go around the world and gather their own intelligence, but there is no "right" STEAL our national intelligence or to publish intelligence that has been STOLEN from us. So far we are lucky nothing more dangerous has been leaked, but I agree that these leaks have harmed our national diplomacy which can appear less dangerous on the immediate surface, but none of us knows just how it will effect things going forward either...

Private First Class (PFC) Bradley E. Manning (born 17 December 1987) is a United States Army soldier who was arrested and charged with the unauthorized use and disclosure of U.S. classified information. He has been held in solitary confinement at the Marine Corps Brig, Quantico since sometime in May 2010.

Manning was an intelligence analyst assigned to a support battalion with the 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division at Contingency Operating Station Hammer, Iraq. Agents of the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command arrested Manning based on information received from federal authorities provided by an American informant, Adrian Lamo, in whom Manning had previously confided.[1][2][3] Lamo said that Manning claimed, via instant messaging, to be the person who had leaked the "Collateral Murder" video of a helicopter airstrike on July 12, 2007, in Baghdad. Additionally, a video of the Granai airstrike and around 260,000 diplomatic cables were released to Wikileaks.[4][5][6]

Manning was charged under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) with violations of UCMJ Articles 92 and 134 for "transferring classified data onto his personal computer and adding unauthorized software to a classified computer system," and "communicating, transmitting and delivering national defense information to an unauthorized source".[2][7][8]

Bradley Manning - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

How Manning Stole The Cables


[/B]
Many outside the military and diplomatic communities have wondered just how such a large amount of sensitive missives could have been taken. As a public service, Conflict Health is very pleased to publish a guest article from Captain Nick Dubaz, an Active Duty Army Civil Affairs Officer, explaining in full technical detail how it happened.

A number of commenters on the latest Wikileaks release have questioned how one junior enlisted Army intelligence analyst could possibly have collected and stolen such a massive number of documents unaided and undiscovered. Indeed, the very mention of “intelligence” evokes notions of secure, guarded, windowless facilities under constant surveillance employing the latest biometric technology to secure America’s secrets. This image may have once been partially true in the case of Top Secret and Compartmented information, but the distributed nature of our modern intelligence community and the proliferation of secret network access necessitated by our wars in Iraq and Afghanistan has fundamentally changed both protection of and access to classified information. The technical methods Private First Class Bradley Manning, the accused leaker, may have used to obtain and steal the material and transmit it to Wikileaks are simple and demonstrate the intelligence community’s vulnerability to an insider threat.

All mission traffic in Iraq and Afghanistan occurs on computer systems classified at the Secret-Releasable to NATO/ISAF level or above. Historically, mission traffic occurred at the Secret-NOFORN (Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals) level on the SIPR network (Secret Internet Protocol Router) and non-US elements operated on separate networks known as CENTRIX segregated by organizational membership (NATO, ISAF, etc). This caused significant information sharing problems and now lower level U.S. forces are transitioning many functions to CENTRIX to create a common mission network. Regardless, these information systems are now present at every Company-level headquarters and above, providing wide access to Secret-level intelligence and diplomatic information processed and disseminated on the network. Access to Top Secret (TS) and Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) information systems remains much more limited, but is still partially vulnerable to Bradley Manning-like insider threats.

The Wikileaks reports on Iraq and Afghanistan are from a system known as CIDNE (Combined Information/Data Network Exchange) which is the latest iteration of the database of record for all tactical reporting across the OIF and OEF theaters. The release is only a tiny percentage of the actual data contained in the database. Each record in the Wikileaks release is only the initial text report often transcribed from the radio or secret chat rooms. After the incident/action is completed, each record is typically updated with new information, pictures, videos, PowerPoints and other relevant documentation. To allow for transfer into incompatible systems and other software packages, CIDNE includes an “Export to Excel” feature that allows for the rapid filtering and transfer of records to other systems. Bradley Manning likely utilized this feature to export the comprehensive CIDNE database that he would later transmit to Wikileaks. Such an action could be completed in less than an hour depending on the bandwidth available and leaves no signature that would be readily noticed as unusual or alarming.


(cont...)
How Manning Stole The Cables ? Conflict Health

Anyone who is familiar with compartmentalization of sensitive information knows all that is complete bull shit.

 

[Truthmatters]

By stark contrast, WikiLeaks isn't interested in helping governments, militaries and corporations keep secrets. They're interested in the opposite: forcing transparency on institutions which conduct the vast, vast bulk of their substantive conduct in the dark. They're not susceptible to pressure from political and corporate officials; rather, they want to hold them accountable. That's what makes WikiLeaks so uniquely threatening to elite institutions, and anyone who doubts that should simply read the 2008 Pentagon Report discussing ways to destroy it, or review the Obama administration's unprecedented and rapidly escalating war on whistle-blowers generally.

The strange and consequential case of Bradley Manning, Adrian Lamo and WikiLeaks - Glenn Greenwald - Salon.com


very interesting read

I tend to form my own opinions, I don't need other people to form them for me so your 'very interesting read' is of no real interest to me.

WikiLeaks is just a bunch of hacks whose only interest is self promotion. Assange is a proven liar (see his claim to have broken the 'climate gate emails'... that's total bullshit), he's not a journalist, he's not doing this for the greater good, he's just an ego-maniac. I hope the DoJ is serious in its pursuit of Assange... and I hope he stands trial for his crime. Because stealing government information is a crime. Whether you like it or not is of no consequence.

I note this one keeps talking about forming her own opinion lately.


The odd part is she thinks refusing to hear the thoughts of others makes her OWN ideas somehow more PURE.

This is the tell tale signs of a partisan hack.

Dont talk to other humans about it because it might Taint your view with thoughts.

Dont accept facts you dont like because they will taint your OWN ideas.


I wish to hell these people could hear just how stupid this sounds to people who are willing to listen to the ideas of others and are guided by facts.

No refuge for the terminally silly from ideas and thoughts.

Never make it easy for fools to avoid facts and ideas.

 

[Valerie]

I keep seeing people say there was nothing too revealing in these cables and the info is stuff we have a right to know....Sure, that's fine if WeepyLeaks wants to go around the world and gather their own intelligence, but there is no "right" STEAL our national intelligence or to publish intelligence that has been STOLEN from us. So far we are lucky nothing more dangerous has been leaked, but I agree that these leaks have harmed our national diplomacy which can appear less dangerous on the immediate surface, but none of us knows just how it will effect things going forward either...

Private First Class (PFC) Bradley E. Manning (born 17 December 1987) is a United States Army soldier who was arrested and charged with the unauthorized use and disclosure of U.S. classified information. He has been held in solitary confinement at the Marine Corps Brig, Quantico since sometime in May 2010.

Manning was an intelligence analyst assigned to a support battalion with the 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division at Contingency Operating Station Hammer, Iraq. Agents of the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command arrested Manning based on information received from federal authorities provided by an American informant, Adrian Lamo, in whom Manning had previously confided.[1][2][3] Lamo said that Manning claimed, via instant messaging, to be the person who had leaked the "Collateral Murder" video of a helicopter airstrike on July 12, 2007, in Baghdad. Additionally, a video of the Granai airstrike and around 260,000 diplomatic cables were released to Wikileaks.[4][5][6]

Manning was charged under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) with violations of UCMJ Articles 92 and 134 for "transferring classified data onto his personal computer and adding unauthorized software to a classified computer system," and "communicating, transmitting and delivering national defense information to an unauthorized source".[2][7][8]

Bradley Manning - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

How Manning Stole The Cables


[/B]
Many outside the military and diplomatic communities have wondered just how such a large amount of sensitive missives could have been taken. As a public service, Conflict Health is very pleased to publish a guest article from Captain Nick Dubaz, an Active Duty Army Civil Affairs Officer, explaining in full technical detail how it happened.

A number of commenters on the latest Wikileaks release have questioned how one junior enlisted Army intelligence analyst could possibly have collected and stolen such a massive number of documents unaided and undiscovered. Indeed, the very mention of “intelligence” evokes notions of secure, guarded, windowless facilities under constant surveillance employing the latest biometric technology to secure America’s secrets. This image may have once been partially true in the case of Top Secret and Compartmented information, but the distributed nature of our modern intelligence community and the proliferation of secret network access necessitated by our wars in Iraq and Afghanistan has fundamentally changed both protection of and access to classified information. The technical methods Private First Class Bradley Manning, the accused leaker, may have used to obtain and steal the material and transmit it to Wikileaks are simple and demonstrate the intelligence community’s vulnerability to an insider threat.

All mission traffic in Iraq and Afghanistan occurs on computer systems classified at the Secret-Releasable to NATO/ISAF level or above. Historically, mission traffic occurred at the Secret-NOFORN (Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals) level on the SIPR network (Secret Internet Protocol Router) and non-US elements operated on separate networks known as CENTRIX segregated by organizational membership (NATO, ISAF, etc). This caused significant information sharing problems and now lower level U.S. forces are transitioning many functions to CENTRIX to create a common mission network. Regardless, these information systems are now present at every Company-level headquarters and above, providing wide access to Secret-level intelligence and diplomatic information processed and disseminated on the network. Access to Top Secret (TS) and Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) information systems remains much more limited, but is still partially vulnerable to Bradley Manning-like insider threats.

The Wikileaks reports on Iraq and Afghanistan are from a system known as CIDNE (Combined Information/Data Network Exchange) which is the latest iteration of the database of record for all tactical reporting across the OIF and OEF theaters. The release is only a tiny percentage of the actual data contained in the database. Each record in the Wikileaks release is only the initial text report often transcribed from the radio or secret chat rooms. After the incident/action is completed, each record is typically updated with new information, pictures, videos, PowerPoints and other relevant documentation. To allow for transfer into incompatible systems and other software packages, CIDNE includes an “Export to Excel” feature that allows for the rapid filtering and transfer of records to other systems. Bradley Manning likely utilized this feature to export the comprehensive CIDNE database that he would later transmit to Wikileaks. Such an action could be completed in less than an hour depending on the bandwidth available and leaves no signature that would be readily noticed as unusual or alarming.


(cont...)
How Manning Stole The Cables ? Conflict Health

Anyone who is familiar with compartmentalization of sensitive information knows all that is complete bull shit.

What are you talking about???

 

[Valerie]

CIDNE (Combined Information Data Network Exchange) is the CENTCOM directed reporting tool within Iraq and Afghanistan. CIDNE serves the primary bridge between disparate communities who might not otherwise share data by providing a standardized reporting framework across intelligence and operations disciplines. This common framework allows structured operational and intelligence information to be shared vertically and horizontally as part of flexible, user-defined workflow processes that collect, correlate, aggregate and expose information as part of the end-user’s individual information lifecycle requirements.


In addition to being the designated Significant Activity (SIGACT) reporting tool of record in the CENTCOM AOR, CIDNE is also the designated HUMINT, EOD (Explosives Ordinance Disposal) and WIT (Weapons Intelligence Team) reporting tool as well. Although not officially designated by CENTCOM as the reporting tool of record for Target Development, Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations, Engagement, or Indirect Fires, CIDNE’s popularity has made it a primary tool for each of these communities as well.

CIDNE provides an end-to-end knowledge management solution in support of Counter-Improvised Explosive Device (C-IED) operations. Capabilities support both defeating the device and attacking the network--from initial threat reporting through device exploitation, target development and evidence tracking. The IED report implements the Weapons Technical Intelligence (WTI) lexicon standard.

ISS field support teams provide CIDNE training and support to deployed tactical users to improve reporting and analysis processes. Built on a SOA framework, CIDNE is interoperable with a number of Army Battle Command and Intelligence systems, including the Distributed Common Ground Station—Army (DCGS-A). The information in CIDNE is collected across the battle space at all echelons; ensuring that mission-critical information doesn’t slip through the seams.

CIDNE - CIDNE

 

[Truthmatters]

Valerie, heres an idea if you are willing to listen to ideas.

The young man reveled these documents to show to the world how easy it was for him to obtain them.

You see he was outing the country for its extrememly POOR security of what it labeled secret documents.

It was a whistler blower act.

He knew if he could optain them soooo easily that these docs were completely insecure and had already no doubt been veiwed by someone on the outside.


electronic comunications and storage are HORRIBLY unprotected by our country AND the corporations.

Computors are NOT secure enough to do the business that system (both gov and private) are increasingly forcing us to use for information that should be completely secure.


Its a whistle blower case, the young man thought he was helping the US protect itsself.

GET IT NOW??????

 

[Valerie]

Humor me for a moment: if your life was in danger, would you trust Julian Assange to keep your identity a secret? Assange, the founder of WikiLeaks, has dedicated himself to exposing secrets he feels should not be kept — but how he decides what’s worth staying secret and what isn’t is anyone’s guess. The latest leak from WikiLeaks, which posts 92,000 classified documents to the Internet and dares readers to find something noteworthy inside, puts a huge number of people at risk. And Assange doesn’t seem to care.

This is a much more serious issue than most people realize. Abaceen Nasimi, an Afghan who’s traveling around the country and tweeting about it, worries this morning, “The Wiki leaks is going to get lots of people into the hit list of Taleban, even if the names are not real.”

“What a mess,” he adds.

Adam Serwer, a staff writer for the American Prospect, tweeted this morning, “Former Military Intelligence Officer sez of wikileaks, ‘Its an AQ/Taliban execution team’s treasure trove.’”

This is a very real worry — despite Assange’s assurances that his organization is withholding 15,000 documents to “redact” or change any names, what assurances can we have that WikiLeaks will do a good job?

Can an organization whose sole purpose is exposing secret information really do a good job safeguarding the lives it endangers through exposure? They really cannot. The New York Times admitted as much, saying they took much greater pains not to provide readers the means to uncover the identities of anyone in the reports they mention (some of these efforts, like not linking to WikiLeaks, are almost cutesy on the Internet, but are nevertheless honest). “At the request of the White House,” the Times editors say, “[we] urged WikiLeaks to withhold any harmful material from its Web site.”

Small comfort, since WikiLeaks is barely trying. The materials in question mostly consist of immediate incident reports — seemingly downloaded directly from CIDNE, a massive reporting database the military maintains in Afghanistan and Iraq. These reports are about as accurate as first reports from a crime scene: often accurate in atmosphere, but usually wrong on details.

The military is rightly accused of overclassifying material, but in this case we have some idea of why: even with the names removed from these reports, you know where they happened (many still have place names). You know when they happened. And you know an Afghan was speaking to a U.S. soldier or intelligence agent. If you have times, locations and half the participants, you don’t need names to identify who was involved in a conversation — with some very basic detective work, you can find out (and it’s much easier to do in Afghanistan, which loves gossip).

If I were a Taliban operative with access to a computer — and lots of them have access to computers — I’d start searching the WikiLeaks data for incident reports near my area of operation to see if I recognized anyone. And then I’d kill whomever I could identify. Those deaths would be directly attributable to WikiLeaks.

The Wiki leak is more and less important than you think | Need to Know

 

[Truthmatters]

BTW you do realize that Asssange asked the pentagon to help him redact the info right?

They refused and he redacted himself

 

[California Girl]

BTW you do realize that Asssange asked the pentagon to help him redact the info right?

They refused and he redacted himself

Would you hand over valuations to a thief because he'd stolen your jewelry?

Jeez, you are one dumb schmuck. But, weren't you one who was claiming that Assange is a journalist?

 

[Truthmatters]

what was he before he released these docs?

 

[Ringel05]

I keep seeing people say there was nothing too revealing in these cables and the info is stuff we have a right to know....Sure, that's fine if WeepyLeaks wants to go around the world and gather their own intelligence, but there is no "right" STEAL our national intelligence or to publish intelligence that has been STOLEN from us. So far we are lucky nothing more dangerous has been leaked, but I agree that these leaks have harmed our national diplomacy which can appear less dangerous on the immediate surface, but none of us knows just how it will effect things going forward either...






Bradley Manning - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Anyone who is familiar with compartmentalization of sensitive information knows all that is complete bull shit.

What are you talking about???

The "How Manning stole cables" smokescreen, I don't buy it. I also don't buy his being able to access the vast amount of state department data he supposedly did, it just doesn't add up.