CDZ Variation on "Thompson's Violinist" analogy with POLL

Would the person who connects themself to the child be obligated to remain connected to the child?


  • Total voters
    6
However, that which you just described is not the basis for nor the logic behind the "rape exception" either.

Okay, I'll bite. What is the basis/logic for the rape exception?


You weren't being baited but I would gladly give you the Constitutional arguments for the rape exception if you were already onboard with the personhood issue.

Because we are still so far apart on that and because you haven't been very receptive about the points made in this allegory. . . I don't feel like wasting my time with the rest.

I just want you to give or point me to a solid logical (not emotional) argument that presents the case for the rape exception. I know I can find one, but I want to read the one you think is most logically rigorous.

"Okay, I'll bite" was offered as a figure of speech, not to indicate I inferred that you were baiting me. Apologies if I misled you in that regard.

Like I said, it's not worth it when we can't even agree on the points I am trying to make with my allegory.

We agree on all of them except for when personhood commences.
 
However, that which you just described is not the basis for nor the logic behind the "rape exception" either.

Okay, I'll bite. What is the basis/logic for the rape exception?


You weren't being baited but I would gladly give you the Constitutional arguments for the rape exception if you were already onboard with the personhood issue.

Because we are still so far apart on that and because you haven't been very receptive about the points made in this allegory. . . I don't feel like wasting my time with the rest.

I just want you to give or point me to a solid logical (not emotional) argument that presents the case for the rape exception. I know I can find one, but I want to read the one you think is most logically rigorous.

"Okay, I'll bite" was offered as a figure of speech, not to indicate I inferred that you were baiting me. Apologies if I misled you in that regard.

Like I said, it's not worth it when we can't even agree on the points I am trying to make with my allegory.

We agree on all of them except for when personhood commences.

How can you say that. . . When you know that we just disagreed about whether or not the being connected to another by a 3rd party and against your will is analogous to a rape pregnancy?
 
Bumping this to ask. . . where are the Pro-Lifers thoughts on this analogy/ allegory?

Where are your votes?
 
Bumping this to ask. . . where are the Pro-Lifers thoughts on this analogy/ allegory?

Where are your votes?

Off Topic:
People on USMB seem not to like to vote in polls. Ironic given the political nature of the forum. I can't attest to why that is.
What gives you that idea?

I think that most of the time that polls here are ignored and/or get little traction is because the options are inadequate to cover the question.
 
Bumping this to ask. . . where are the Pro-Lifers thoughts on this analogy/ allegory?

Where are your votes?

Off Topic:
People on USMB seem not to like to vote in polls. Ironic given the political nature of the forum. I can't attest to why that is.
What gives you that idea?

I think that most of the time that polls here are ignored and/or get little traction is because the options are inadequate to cover the question.

Well, the handful of polls I've created don't generate many votes. Some of them are simple "yes/no" poll questions -- as compared with qualified "yes" or qualified "no" answers -- that merely ask one to assess whether the preponderance of one's view is "yes" or "no," for whatever reason(s), and still the responses are few.
I've even offered "none of the above" or "I don't know" options even.

It could be that many folks access USMB via phone or tablet and cannot respond to polls? I don't know; I only log in via a pc/laptop.

I asserted that folks "don't seem to like" polls around here. To be more accurate and neutral, I should have said "people don't much respond to polls."
 
Bumping this to ask. . . where are the Pro-Lifers thoughts on this analogy/ allegory?

Where are your votes?

Off Topic:
People on USMB seem not to like to vote in polls. Ironic given the political nature of the forum. I can't attest to why that is.
What gives you that idea?

I think that most of the time that polls here are ignored and/or get little traction is because the options are inadequate to cover the question.

Well, the handful of polls I've created don't generate many votes. Some of them are simple "yes/no" poll questions -- as compared with qualified "yes" or qualified "no" answers -- that merely ask one to assess whether the preponderance of one's view is "yes" or "no," for whatever reason(s), and still the responses are few.
I've even offered "none of the above" or "I don't know" options even.

It could be that many folks access USMB via phone or tablet and cannot respond to polls? I don't know; I only log in via a pc/laptop.

I asserted that folks "don't seem to like" polls around here. To be more accurate and neutral, I should have said "people don't much respond to polls."


None of your polls are one subjects that are clearly as polarized as the abortion topic is. Furthermore, they are really difficult (for me) to relate to.

I thought my allegory and poll would have been much easier for readers to relate to than your are.

Then again, maybe not.
 
Bumping this to ask. . . where are the Pro-Lifers thoughts on this analogy/ allegory?

Where are your votes?

Off Topic:
People on USMB seem not to like to vote in polls. Ironic given the political nature of the forum. I can't attest to why that is.
What gives you that idea?

I think that most of the time that polls here are ignored and/or get little traction is because the options are inadequate to cover the question.

Well, the handful of polls I've created don't generate many votes. Some of them are simple "yes/no" poll questions -- as compared with qualified "yes" or qualified "no" answers -- that merely ask one to assess whether the preponderance of one's view is "yes" or "no," for whatever reason(s), and still the responses are few.
I've even offered "none of the above" or "I don't know" options even.

It could be that many folks access USMB via phone or tablet and cannot respond to polls? I don't know; I only log in via a pc/laptop.

I asserted that folks "don't seem to like" polls around here. To be more accurate and neutral, I should have said "people don't much respond to polls."


None of your polls are one subjects that are clearly as polarized as the abortion topic is. Furthermore, they are really difficult (for me) to relate to.

I thought my allegory and poll would have been much easier for readers to relate to than your are.

Then again, maybe not.

Give your true life experience using anecdotes catches the audience' attention.
 
Bumping this to ask. . . where are the Pro-Lifers thoughts on this analogy/ allegory?

Where are your votes?

Off Topic:
People on USMB seem not to like to vote in polls. Ironic given the political nature of the forum. I can't attest to why that is.
Because the ‘polls’ are utterly meaningless, devoid of merit or value, in no way ‘representative’ of a ‘majority’ of anyone.

And it makes perfect sense given the political nature of the forum, where many members correctly understand that internet polls have no validity whatsoever – here or anywhere else.
 
Bumping this to ask. . . where are the Pro-Lifers thoughts on this analogy/ allegory?

Where are your votes?

Off Topic:
People on USMB seem not to like to vote in polls. Ironic given the political nature of the forum. I can't attest to why that is.
Because the ‘polls’ are utterly meaningless, devoid of merit or value, in no way ‘representative’ of a ‘majority’ of anyone.

And it makes perfect sense given the political nature of the forum, where many members correctly understand that internet polls have no validity whatsoever – here or anywhere else.


I think the polls have plenty of value as they can be a good tool for starting a conversation and also to see how confident the participants are of their views (and answers) at the same time.
 
None of your polls are one subjects that are clearly as polarized as the abortion topic is.

Okay...Truly, I thought the simplicity of the polls would make them far easier to answer, thereby producing high participation rates. I guess not. But, the participation rate in your poll doesn't seem to counter or support my expectation. That has a fair bit to do with why I said it "seems" USMB members don't like polls.

they are really difficult (for me) to relate to.

Well, that's a sentiment I didn't expect. I thought my poll questions were rather straightforward and thus easy to answer. (Obviously, I'm not really speaking of the "snow" one in that sense, although for folks who were hit by the blizzard, I'd have thought it pretty "relatable.")

the ‘polls’ are utterly meaningless, devoid of merit or value, in no way ‘representative’ of a ‘majority’ of anyone.

I think the polls have plenty of value as they can be a good tool for starting a conversation and also to see how confident the participants are of their views (and answers) at the same time.

Red:
Exactly my thoughts as well re: the value of polls.

Blue:
They certainly won't be representative of any majority other than the majority of folks who care enough to respond to the poll question(s). If a enough USMB members respond, a poll can representative of what USMB members think.
 
Bumping this to ask. . . where are the Pro-Lifers thoughts on this analogy/ allegory?

Where are your votes?

Off Topic:
People on USMB seem not to like to vote in polls. Ironic given the political nature of the forum. I can't attest to why that is.

I don't vote in flawed polls, especially those including undefined terms or lacking a complete set of responses.

In response to the rape exception, the only justification would rest on a self defense theory, i.e., protecting oneself from great bodily harm inflicted by another. Even so, this remedy should be restricted to the earliest period of pregnancy, when fetal viability becomes a separate issue.

Another question that goes begging is fetal homicide by a third party. As with other criminal statutes, state laws vary widely on whether the murder of a pregnant woman constitutes a double homicide. Why is it permissible for states to decide this issue, but not that of legal abortion?

Although SCOTUS clearly overstepped its Constitutional authority by entering into the abortion debate, the flawed logic (juxtaposing fetal viability and medical risk of pregnancy) of its Roe v. Wade decision might have been acceptable if it had been left applicable to the first trimester of pregnancy. However, the radical Feminist Movement insisted that its diktat be expanded to provide federal protection of the most barbaric procedures imaginable. As a result, both sides have been forced to advocate and defend the most extreme positions on this issue, thus precluding the type of political resolution that can only occur at the state level.

Despite all the predictions to the contrary, abortion will continue to fester as long as it remains a federal issue.
 
state laws vary widely on whether the murder of a pregnant woman constitutes a double homicide. Why is it permissible for states to decide this issue, but not that of legal abortion?

The answer is partly states rights and partly because federal laws and SCOTUS decisions supercede those made at at the state level and Roe v Wade was arguably unclear/imprecise on the matter of personhood. In Roe, the Supreme Court expressly rejected Texas’s claim that a “fetus is a ‘person’ within the language and meaning of” the Constitution, and in so doing, pointed out inconsistencies in Texas’s argument.

The Court pointed out, for example, that no state, including Texas banned all abortions. The Court further pointed out that the exceptions to abortion bans that routinely existed in state law at the time were out of line with Texas’s argument in Roe that “a fetus is a person who is not to be deprived of life without due process of law.” In other words, Texas couldn’t point to any state law that recognized fetuses as persons. Personhood activists, therefore, seek to avoid this inconsistency by enacting laws that specifically recognize the so-called unborn as persons.

Once states confer personhood rights upon eggs, personhood activists believe that they can successfully argue for abortion bans based on newly-created civil rights for prenatal life—rights they think will provide a counterweight to the federally-protected privacy rights established in Roe v. Wade. Personhood activists and legislators will then argue that under the Constitution, the civil rights of the unborn are paramount to the privacy rights of women.

Even if states successfully pass fetal personhood bills that doesn’t necessarily mean that a fetus will suddenly be granted the same rights as a pregnant woman. Why? Because personhood activists are confused about what a “person” is, what “personhood” means, and what rights personhood status will confer upon fetuses.

First, it is important to recognize that “person” is a term of art. Colloquially speaking, when we think of “person” we think of an existing human being, which is why discussions of “corporate personhood” can be so baffling. One associates “persons” with feelings, and emotions, and activity. But as a legal matter, “person” defines the sorts of activities and entities (whether human or not) that are entitled to constitutional protection, and the type of “person” determines what types of constitutional protections are afforded. For example, in the famous case Dred Scott v. Sanford, the Supreme Court denied personhood to slaves, even though today, few would argue that slaves are not “persons” in a colloquial sense.

So what is “personhood?” It depends on whether one is talking about natural personhood or juridical personhood.

“Natural personhood” refers to persons as the term is understood in common parlance. Sir William Blackstone characterized “natural persons” as those “uch as the God of nature formed us.” Natural persons don’t have to wait for a court or state to grant them rights; the rights available to “natural persons” attach at birth. While the constitutional rights afforded “natural persons” are subject to change, whatever constitutional liberties are available, “natural persons” are entitled to them. In short, “natural persons” are alive and breathing people with all of the rights that one normally associates with being an alive breathing person.

“Juridical personhood,” on the other hand, refers to “artificial persons.” Juridical persons are legal fictions, and are granted by states certain rights normally associated with live, breathing persons. These rights are do not attach at birth, and whether or not juridical persons are afforded constitutional rights is subject to the whims of the state. There is no framework for determining what rights shall be granted to a juridical person, and generally, such rights are granted in an effort to accomplish a particular social goal.

The most common (and befuddling) example is corporate personhood. From Citizens United to the ongoing birth control benefit lawsuits, whether or not corporations are persons under the Constitution and to what extent corporations may avail themselves of the various constitutional protections afforded persons is a complex issue.

It is indisputable that corporations are not alive and breathing persons, but rights traditionally viewed as reserved for natural persons or human beings have been granted to corporations, by and large to accomplish a particular goal, i.e., to protect the collective rights of the human beings (shareholders) that comprise the corporation. Consequently, granting corporations free-speech rights is not about granting a brick-and-mortar building the right to participate in the electoral process, but about allowing the shareholders that comprise the corporation a right to use their money collectively to influence elections, just as persons can use their money individually to influence elections.

Accordingly, to the extent states confer personhood status upon fetuses, fetuses will be juridical persons, not natural persons. And whatever rights are conferred, such rights will not—or at least should not—translate into a broad “right to life.”

At the outset, states cannot grant fetuses rights that infringe women’s constitutional privacy rights. That’s Supremacy Clause 101. Most importantly, however, states that legislate an interest in protecting life do so in their own interest.

Both Roe and Casey establish that states have a “important and legitimate interest in potential life.” As a constitutional matter, therefore, fetuses don’t have any rights—states do. And in the abortion context, it is the right of the state to protect potential life that is legally significant—not the right of the fetus to grow from juridical personhood to natural personhood.

Personhood activists seem to be confused on this point. They believe that when states grant personhood rights to fetuses, those rights immediately take on constitutional importance at the federal level, such that fetuses are automatically granted the same constitutional rights to which natural persons are entitled. Those rights can then act as a counterweight to the federal privacy rights afforded to women by Roe v. Wade and, ultimately, be deemed paramount to those rights—or, at least, that’s what personhood activists think. But they are incorrect.

For example, in a paper entitled “Personhood: A Path to Victory,” Gualberto Garcia Jones J.D. notes (the capital letters are hers, not mine):

STATES POSSESS THE RIGHTS TO ENACT CONSTITUTIONS WITH RIGHTS THAT ARE MORE EXPANSIVE THAN THOSE THAT ARE CONTAINED IN THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION.​

Jones goes on to argue,

Itʼs a well established principle of law that states possess the rights to enact constitutions with rights that are more expansive than those that are contained in the federal constitution.​

Well, yes, that’s true. But states cannot enact rights that are more expansive than federal rights if such rights conflict with existing federal rights. Again, that’s Supremacy Clause 101.

Jones continues:

By adopting an expansive definition of the word person, which would include protection of the preborn, the states would be issuing a direct challenge to Roe v. Wade, which interpreted the 14th amendment to say that the right to privacy included a right to abortion which the states could not infringe upon. In deciding [a case arising from a conflict between state personhood laws and Roe v. Wade], the Court might very well find that the right to an abortion is nowhere to be found in the 14th amendment and that the states may regulate it as they wish.​

Actually, no, the Court would likely do no such thing. The Supreme Court did not predicate abortion rights on an explicit right to abortion in the text of the Constitution, but rather on the penumbra of rights implicit in the 14th Amendment. It is highly unlikely that the Supreme Court would vitiate Roe v. Wade, hold that there is no federal right to privacy for women, thus leaving women’s reproductive rights to the whims of the state.

Similarly, in an article entitled “The Personhood Strategy: A State’s Prerogative to Take Back Abortion Law,” Rita M. Dunaway asserts,

By enacting a statute or constitutional amendment specifically recognizing unborn children as human beings and clarifying that all human beings within the state are possessed of fundamental rights under the state‟s laws, states can provide unborn children with a source of fundamental rights independent from the Supreme Court‟s interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment.​

Again, no. The rights conferred by states cannot trump the rights conferred by the U.S. Constitution. Remember? Supremacy Clause? And even if fetuses were elevated to the status of person, they would remain juridical persons, and juridical persons are not natural persons.

The bottom line is this: even if states were to enact fetal personhood laws, states would simply be clarifying their interest in protecting potential life, not creating a fetal right to life. Under Roe, the only right that could trump a woman’s right to privacy is a state’s compelling interest in potential life, not some right to actual life held by the fetus itself. And, as Justice Kennedy explained in Gonzales v. Carhart, (citing Planned Parenthood v. Casey, which held that states may not impose an undue burden on a woman’s right to abortion), a balance must be struck between a woman’s right to abortion and a state’s right to “express profound respect for the life of the unborn.” This suggests that personhood activists will have a difficult time convincing the Court that the rights of the unborn are paramount to a woman’s constitutional right to privacy.

Ultimately, Roe and Casey pit state’s rights against women’s rights, not women’s rights against fetal rights. And, under the current constitutional framework, as between a woman’s federally-granted right to privacy and a state’s right to protect potential life, women’s rights are — or at least should be — paramount.



Although SCOTUS clearly overstepped its Constitutional authority by entering into the abortion debate, the flawed logic (juxtaposing fetal viability and medical risk of pregnancy) of its Roe v. Wade decision might have been acceptable if it had been left applicable to the first trimester of pregnancy. However, the radical Feminist Movement insisted that its diktat be expanded to provide federal protection of the most barbaric procedures imaginable. As a result, both sides have been forced to advocate and defend the most extreme positions on this issue, thus precluding the type of political resolution that can only occur at the state level.


You must know by now that I'm not going to respond to the content of this section of your post because it contains too many unsubstantiated qualifications/assertions:

  • You do not show that the SCOTUS "clearly" did anything, much less that the thing it did was "overstep" its authority.
  • You do not show how the logic is flawed, not even by citing the nature of the rational fallacy you see as being used.
  • You do not show that juxtaposing those two things (1) constitutes anything other than a mere abutting, or (2) that in juxtaposing them one inherently is making an argument on its own and what be that argument/claim, or (3) that there is some reason to think "juxtapose" is synonymous with "equate to" as goes the "rape exception."
  • You do not show that "radical" feminists are the only ones insisting on the federal protections noted.
  • You do not show that one must necessarily be a "radical" feminist, or a feminist of any stripe, to insist on the noted federal protections.
 
Bumping this to ask. . . where are the Pro-Lifers thoughts on this analogy/ allegory?

Where are your votes?

Off Topic:
People on USMB seem not to like to vote in polls. Ironic given the political nature of the forum. I can't attest to why that is.

I don't vote in flawed polls, especially those including undefined terms or lacking a complete set of responses.

Do you answer questions?

If I connected your body to mine in such a way that you will die if that connection is broken before the passing of nine months time. . . you you or would you not have a right to maintain that connection?

And before you answer. . . imagine how that "right" can reasonably be objectively deliberated by others.

In as much as that is the case with the way this is comparable to the abortion issue? Your personal vote really isn't even needed.

The reason for that is that I believe even the SCOTUS would agree that once "personhood" is recognized for children in the womb. . . the argument that a child has a right to remain connected to the mother's body after she assumed the risks and essentially connected him or her to herself... is not that different from the point made in this allegory.

Let's think about all of this as we listen to this exchange between Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart and Pro-abort lawyer - Sara Weddington. . .



I don't see how else it can be interpreted - than to conclude that the Justice was talking about the child's right to remain connected to his/her mother's body - at least - for the duration of a typical pregnancy.
In response to the rape exception, the only justification would rest on a self defense theory, i.e., protecting oneself from great bodily harm inflicted by another. Even so, this remedy should be restricted to the earliest period of pregnancy, when fetal viability becomes a separate issue.

That's a great subject for another thread.

This thread is not about that.

Another question that goes begging is fetal homicide by a third party. As with other criminal statutes, state laws vary widely on whether the murder of a pregnant woman constitutes a double homicide. Why is it permissible for states to decide this issue, but not that of legal abortion?

The Unborn Victims of Violence act that is the basis for all those State's Laws. . . is a Federal Statute. US Code 1841 to be exact.

Although SCOTUS clearly overstepped its Constitutional authority by entering into the abortion debate, the flawed logic (juxtaposing fetal viability and medical risk of pregnancy) of its Roe v. Wade decision might have been acceptable if it had been left applicable to the first trimester of pregnancy. However, the radical Feminist Movement insisted that its diktat be expanded to provide federal protection of the most barbaric procedures imaginable. As a result, both sides have been forced to advocate and defend the most extreme positions on this issue, thus precluding the type of political resolution that can only occur at the state level.

Despite all the predictions to the contrary, abortion will continue to fester as long as it remains a federal issue.

Personal opinions noted.

Personhood is not determined State by State.

Is it?
 
state laws vary widely on whether the murder of a pregnant woman constitutes a double homicide. Why is it permissible for states to decide this issue, but not that of legal abortion?

The answer is partly states rights and partly because federal laws and SCOTUS decisions supercede those made at at the state level and Roe v Wade was arguably unclear/imprecise on the matter of personhood. In Roe, the Supreme Court expressly rejected Texas’s claim that a “fetus is a ‘person’ within the language and meaning of” the Constitution, and in so doing, pointed out inconsistencies in Texas’s argument.

The Court pointed out, for example, that no state, including Texas banned all abortions. The Court further pointed out that the exceptions to abortion bans that routinely existed in state law at the time were out of line with Texas’s argument in Roe that “a fetus is a person who is not to be deprived of life without due process of law.” In other words, Texas couldn’t point to any state law that recognized fetuses as persons. Personhood activists, therefore, seek to avoid this inconsistency by enacting laws that specifically recognize the so-called unborn as persons.

Once states confer personhood rights upon eggs, personhood activists believe that they can successfully argue for abortion bans based on newly-created civil rights for prenatal life—rights they think will provide a counterweight to the federally-protected privacy rights established in Roe v. Wade. Personhood activists and legislators will then argue that under the Constitution, the civil rights of the unborn are paramount to the privacy rights of women.

Even if states successfully pass fetal personhood bills that doesn’t necessarily mean that a fetus will suddenly be granted the same rights as a pregnant woman. Why? Because personhood activists are confused about what a “person” is, what “personhood” means, and what rights personhood status will confer upon fetuses.

First, it is important to recognize that “person” is a term of art. Colloquially speaking, when we think of “person” we think of an existing human being, which is why discussions of “corporate personhood” can be so baffling. One associates “persons” with feelings, and emotions, and activity. But as a legal matter, “person” defines the sorts of activities and entities (whether human or not) that are entitled to constitutional protection, and the type of “person” determines what types of constitutional protections are afforded. For example, in the famous case Dred Scott v. Sanford, the Supreme Court denied personhood to slaves, even though today, few would argue that slaves are not “persons” in a colloquial sense.

So what is “personhood?” It depends on whether one is talking about natural personhood or juridical personhood.

“Natural personhood” refers to persons as the term is understood in common parlance. Sir William Blackstone characterized “natural persons” as those “uch as the God of nature formed us.” Natural persons don’t have to wait for a court or state to grant them rights; the rights available to “natural persons” attach at birth. While the constitutional rights afforded “natural persons” are subject to change, whatever constitutional liberties are available, “natural persons” are entitled to them. In short, “natural persons” are alive and breathing people with all of the rights that one normally associates with being an alive breathing person.

“Juridical personhood,” on the other hand, refers to “artificial persons.” Juridical persons are legal fictions, and are granted by states certain rights normally associated with live, breathing persons. These rights are do not attach at birth, and whether or not juridical persons are afforded constitutional rights is subject to the whims of the state. There is no framework for determining what rights shall be granted to a juridical person, and generally, such rights are granted in an effort to accomplish a particular social goal.

The most common (and befuddling) example is corporate personhood. From Citizens United to the ongoing birth control benefit lawsuits, whether or not corporations are persons under the Constitution and to what extent corporations may avail themselves of the various constitutional protections afforded persons is a complex issue.

It is indisputable that corporations are not alive and breathing persons, but rights traditionally viewed as reserved for natural persons or human beings have been granted to corporations, by and large to accomplish a particular goal, i.e., to protect the collective rights of the human beings (shareholders) that comprise the corporation. Consequently, granting corporations free-speech rights is not about granting a brick-and-mortar building the right to participate in the electoral process, but about allowing the shareholders that comprise the corporation a right to use their money collectively to influence elections, just as persons can use their money individually to influence elections.

Accordingly, to the extent states confer personhood status upon fetuses, fetuses will be juridical persons, not natural persons. And whatever rights are conferred, such rights will not—or at least should not—translate into a broad “right to life.”

At the outset, states cannot grant fetuses rights that infringe women’s constitutional privacy rights. That’s Supremacy Clause 101. Most importantly, however, states that legislate an interest in protecting life do so in their own interest.

Both Roe and Casey establish that states have a “important and legitimate interest in potential life.” As a constitutional matter, therefore, fetuses don’t have any rights—states do. And in the abortion context, it is the right of the state to protect potential life that is legally significant—not the right of the fetus to grow from juridical personhood to natural personhood.

Personhood activists seem to be confused on this point. They believe that when states grant personhood rights to fetuses, those rights immediately take on constitutional importance at the federal level, such that fetuses are automatically granted the same constitutional rights to which natural persons are entitled. Those rights can then act as a counterweight to the federal privacy rights afforded to women by Roe v. Wade and, ultimately, be deemed paramount to those rights—or, at least, that’s what personhood activists think. But they are incorrect.

For example, in a paper entitled “Personhood: A Path to Victory,” Gualberto Garcia Jones J.D. notes (the capital letters are hers, not mine):

STATES POSSESS THE RIGHTS TO ENACT CONSTITUTIONS WITH RIGHTS THAT ARE MORE EXPANSIVE THAN THOSE THAT ARE CONTAINED IN THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION.​

Jones goes on to argue,

Itʼs a well established principle of law that states possess the rights to enact constitutions with rights that are more expansive than those that are contained in the federal constitution.​

Well, yes, that’s true. But states cannot enact rights that are more expansive than federal rights if such rights conflict with existing federal rights. Again, that’s Supremacy Clause 101.

Jones continues:

By adopting an expansive definition of the word person, which would include protection of the preborn, the states would be issuing a direct challenge to Roe v. Wade, which interpreted the 14th amendment to say that the right to privacy included a right to abortion which the states could not infringe upon. In deciding [a case arising from a conflict between state personhood laws and Roe v. Wade], the Court might very well find that the right to an abortion is nowhere to be found in the 14th amendment and that the states may regulate it as they wish.​

Actually, no, the Court would likely do no such thing. The Supreme Court did not predicate abortion rights on an explicit right to abortion in the text of the Constitution, but rather on the penumbra of rights implicit in the 14th Amendment. It is highly unlikely that the Supreme Court would vitiate Roe v. Wade, hold that there is no federal right to privacy for women, thus leaving women’s reproductive rights to the whims of the state.

Similarly, in an article entitled “The Personhood Strategy: A State’s Prerogative to Take Back Abortion Law,” Rita M. Dunaway asserts,

By enacting a statute or constitutional amendment specifically recognizing unborn children as human beings and clarifying that all human beings within the state are possessed of fundamental rights under the state‟s laws, states can provide unborn children with a source of fundamental rights independent from the Supreme Court‟s interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment.​

Again, no. The rights conferred by states cannot trump the rights conferred by the U.S. Constitution. Remember? Supremacy Clause? And even if fetuses were elevated to the status of person, they would remain juridical persons, and juridical persons are not natural persons.

The bottom line is this: even if states were to enact fetal personhood laws, states would simply be clarifying their interest in protecting potential life, not creating a fetal right to life. Under Roe, the only right that could trump a woman’s right to privacy is a state’s compelling interest in potential life, not some right to actual life held by the fetus itself. And, as Justice Kennedy explained in Gonzales v. Carhart, (citing Planned Parenthood v. Casey, which held that states may not impose an undue burden on a woman’s right to abortion), a balance must be struck between a woman’s right to abortion and a state’s right to “express profound respect for the life of the unborn.” This suggests that personhood activists will have a difficult time convincing the Court that the rights of the unborn are paramount to a woman’s constitutional right to privacy.

Ultimately, Roe and Casey pit state’s rights against women’s rights, not women’s rights against fetal rights. And, under the current constitutional framework, as between a woman’s federally-granted right to privacy and a state’s right to protect potential life, women’s rights are — or at least should be — paramount.



Although SCOTUS clearly overstepped its Constitutional authority by entering into the abortion debate, the flawed logic (juxtaposing fetal viability and medical risk of pregnancy) of its Roe v. Wade decision might have been acceptable if it had been left applicable to the first trimester of pregnancy. However, the radical Feminist Movement insisted that its diktat be expanded to provide federal protection of the most barbaric procedures imaginable. As a result, both sides have been forced to advocate and defend the most extreme positions on this issue, thus precluding the type of political resolution that can only occur at the state level.


You must know by now that I'm not going to respond to the content of this section of your post because it contains too many unsubstantiated qualifications/assertions:

  • You do not show that the SCOTUS "clearly" did anything, much less that the thing it did was "overstep" its authority.
  • You do not show how the logic is flawed, not even by citing the nature of the rational fallacy you see as being used.
  • You do not show that juxtaposing those two things (1) constitutes anything other than a mere abutting, or (2) that in juxtaposing them one inherently is making an argument on its own and what be that argument/claim, or (3) that there is some reason to think "juxtapose" is synonymous with "equate to" as goes the "rape exception."
  • You do not show that "radical" feminists are the only ones insisting on the federal protections noted.
  • You do not show that one must necessarily be a "radical" feminist, or a feminist of any stripe, to insist on the noted federal protections.

The faulty / flawed keystone in that entire diatribe is your assertion that rights and or personhood is "conferred" to human beings by the State.

I challenge you to show me where it is written in the Constitution of the U.S. - that any government has the right, power or the authority to "confer" personhood (or to deny personhood) to any living human being.
 
I challenge you to show me where it is written in the Constitution of the U.S. - that any government has the right, power or the authority to "confer" personhood (or to deny personhood) to any living human being.

The Constitution, as you correctly note, does not directly confer or deny personhood, which is part of precisely why the matter of deciding when personhood begins or doesn't begin should be left up to the persons who brought about the condition whereby a person is created. Constitution or no Constitution, I doubt anyone would today consider a born human anything other than a person, although, as I noted, there was a time when America did so classify born humans.
 
You must know by now that I'm not going to respond to the content of this section of your post because it contains too many unsubstantiated qualifications/assertions:

  • You do not show that the SCOTUS "clearly" did anything, much less that the thing it did was "overstep" its authority.
  • You do not show how the logic is flawed, not even by citing the nature of the rational fallacy you see as being used.
  • You do not show that juxtaposing those two things (1) constitutes anything other than a mere abutting, or (2) that in juxtaposing them one inherently is making an argument on its own and what be that argument/claim, or (3) that there is some reason to think "juxtapose" is synonymous with "equate to" as goes the "rape exception."
  • You do not show that "radical" feminists are the only ones insisting on the federal protections noted.
  • You do not show that one must necessarily be a "radical" feminist, or a feminist of any stripe, to insist on the noted federal protections.

What I do know by now is that you are ethically and/or emotionally challenged to engage in honest debate:

1. It is clear to me that the Constitution does not specify a right to privacy, much less any related right which would contravene the 10th Amendment. Even Justice Ginsberg agrees that the Court should not have intervened at that time.

2. The flawed logic was to protect the right to an abortion as long as it was medically safer than a full-term pregnancy (assumed to be during the first trimester) while protecting the child after fetal viability outside the womb (assumed to be in the third trimester). As medical science has pushed these two conditions closer together, Justice O'Connor aptly noted that Roe v. Wade was on a "collision course with itself."

3. See above re my juxtaposition reference.

4. I did not say that radical feminists were the "only" ones pushing this agenda.

5. Nor did I state that one had to be a radical feminist to support unfettered abortions.

Why do you throw such a hissy fit when challenged? Why don't you spell out your own position instead of hiding behind voluminous verbiage? Do you believe that late-term abortions should be legal with no restrictions? At what point in the birthing process does the child obtain a right to live? Are you afraid to address these issues?
 
I challenge you to show me where it is written in the Constitution of the U.S. - that any government has the right, power or the authority to "confer" personhood (or to deny personhood) to any living human being.

The Constitution, as you correctly note, does not directly confer or deny personhood, which is part of precisely why the matter of deciding when personhood begins or doesn't begin should be left up to the persons who brought about the condition whereby a person is created. Constitution or no Constitution, I doubt anyone would today consider a born human anything other than a person, although, as I noted, there was a time when America did so classify born humans.


Do you have a good reason for why "personhood" should not include a living human being of any age and in ANY stage of development?

As "persons" ourselves, how long can we intellectually get away with keeping the criteria for personhood both arbitrary and exclusive?
 
I challenge you to show me where it is written in the Constitution of the U.S. - that any government has the right, power or the authority to "confer" personhood (or to deny personhood) to any living human being.

The Constitution, as you correctly note, does not directly confer or deny personhood, which is part of precisely why the matter of deciding when personhood begins or doesn't begin should be left up to the persons who brought about the condition whereby a person is created. Constitution or no Constitution, I doubt anyone would today consider a born human anything other than a person, although, as I noted, there was a time when America did so classify born humans.


Do you have a good reason for why "personhood" should not include a living human being of any age and in ANY stage of development?

As "persons" ourselves, how long can we intellectually get away with keeping the criteria for personhood both arbitrary and exclusive?

The short answer to your question is "yes." If you're truly really for a very long essay (even by my standard of what a "long" web essay is), I'll give it to you. Just let me know for sure because I really don't have any interest in taking the time to do so only to have my response be chided as being some sort of misdirection or "whatever." There was a time when I though you wouldn't address my thoughts that way, but of late, I've gotten multiple responses from you that are, in nature, "what's the point," "it's not worth it," and similarly dismissive comments. So, I'm just checking to find out where you stand as goes reading what will amount to a 10 -20 page essay. I think that's a normal "hard copy" essay length, but I know folks on the WWW do not feel that way, in fact, most of them don't much care for more than two sentences.

P.S./Edit:
Yes, I'll put section headings in it to facilitate reading it.
 
I challenge you to show me where it is written in the Constitution of the U.S. - that any government has the right, power or the authority to "confer" personhood (or to deny personhood) to any living human being.

The Constitution, as you correctly note, does not directly confer or deny personhood, which is part of precisely why the matter of deciding when personhood begins or doesn't begin should be left up to the persons who brought about the condition whereby a person is created. Constitution or no Constitution, I doubt anyone would today consider a born human anything other than a person, although, as I noted, there was a time when America did so classify born humans.


Do you have a good reason for why "personhood" should not include a living human being of any age and in ANY stage of development?

As "persons" ourselves, how long can we intellectually get away with keeping the criteria for personhood both arbitrary and exclusive?

The short answer to your question is "yes." If you're truly really for a very long essay (even by my standard of what a "long" web essay is), I'll give it to you. Just let me know for sure because I really don't have any interest in taking the time to do so only to have my response be chided as being some sort of misdirection or "whatever." There was a time when I though you wouldn't address my thoughts that way, but of late, I've gotten multiple responses from you that are, in nature, "what's the point," "it's not worth it," and similarly dismissive comments. So, I'm just checking to find out where you stand as goes reading what will amount to a 10 -20 page essay. I think that's a normal "hard copy" essay length, but I know folks on the WWW do not feel that way, in fact, most of them don't much care for more than two sentences.

P.S./Edit:
Yes, I'll put section headings in it to facilitate reading it.

You can save your time.

Why?

Because the Constitution is not exclusive in the spirit of its writing.

While it is undeniably TRUE that the framers did not consider blacks, women and especially prenatal children all to be equal "persons" the Constitutional principle is clear (today) in spite of the atrocities in our past.

The Constitution clearly says that ALL persons are entitled to the EQUAL protections of our laws.

That is an INCLUSIVE statement.

There is nothing that you can put into an essay that will change the inclusive nature of that text.
 
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