Torture?

[Cold Fusion38]

This is a prime example, of Government doing things better. Billions wasted and walked away with, nobody taking responsibility, red flags and reason being ignored, and we continue to pay for it. Health Care will probably turn out worse, with us sneaking over the border to Mexico, and them building fences. I'm gonna check the Coast Guard Site for more on this.



“This is the fleecing of America,” said Anthony D’Armiento, a systems engineer who has worked for Northrop and the Coast Guard on the project. “It is the worst contract arrangement I’ve seen in all my 20 plus years in naval engineering.”

Insufficient oversight by the Coast Guard resulted in the service buying some equipment it did not want and ignoring repeated warnings from its own engineers that the boats and ships were poorly designed and perhaps unsafe, the agency acknowledged. The Deepwater program’s few Congressional skeptics were outmatched by lawmakers who became enthusiastic supporters, mobilized by an aggressive lobbying campaign financed by Lockheed and Northrop.

And the contractors failed to fulfill their obligation to make sure the government got the best price, frequently steering work to their subsidiaries or business partners instead of competitors, according to government auditors and people affiliated with the program.

Even some of the smaller Deepwater projects raise questions about management. The radios placed in small, open boats were not waterproof and immediately shorted out, for example. Electronics equipment costing millions of dollars is still being installed in the new cutter, even though it will be ripped out because the Coast Guard does not want it. An order of eight small, inflatable boats cost an extra half-million dollars because the purchase passed through four layers of contractors.

http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/09/us/09ship.html?_r=2

Pretty nasty stuff huh?

 

[Intense]

Hey I'm not saying the men and women of the Coast Guard aren't the best around I am saying that they are WOEFULLY underfunded and have out of date equipment.

The article is from 2006. However, all that I find on the subject is supportive of the claim. Wasted funds and resources, 8 necessary ships destroyed in retrofit. Government and Contractor screw ups with nothing to show for it.

This Report is more up to date 4/22/09. True Federalism was in part about starting out small with things. Damage control is so much more manageable. We gave up on that too soon. They do not even have the specs. right.

U.S. GAO - Coast Guard: Update on Deepwater Program Management, Cost, and Acquisition Workforce

 

[LibocalypseNow]

ZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZ! Another Hopey Changey Snooze Fest. Desperate times for the Hopey Changeys. Now they're actually resorting to dredging up old & stale "Hate Bush" talking points. Just another pathetic Hopey Changey distraction from the reality of this miserable Hopey Changey Malaise. "Torture! Torture! That damn BOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOSH!!" BOOOOOOOORING!

 

[PatekPhilippe]

This is a prime example, of Government doing things better. Billions wasted and walked away with, nobody taking responsibility, red flags and reason being ignored, and we continue to pay for it. Health Care will probably turn out worse, with us sneaking over the border to Mexico, and them building fences. I'm gonna check the Coast Guard Site for more on this.



“This is the fleecing of America,” said Anthony D’Armiento, a systems engineer who has worked for Northrop and the Coast Guard on the project. “It is the worst contract arrangement I’ve seen in all my 20 plus years in naval engineering.”

Insufficient oversight by the Coast Guard resulted in the service buying some equipment it did not want and ignoring repeated warnings from its own engineers that the boats and ships were poorly designed and perhaps unsafe, the agency acknowledged. The Deepwater program’s few Congressional skeptics were outmatched by lawmakers who became enthusiastic supporters, mobilized by an aggressive lobbying campaign financed by Lockheed and Northrop.

And the contractors failed to fulfill their obligation to make sure the government got the best price, frequently steering work to their subsidiaries or business partners instead of competitors, according to government auditors and people affiliated with the program.

Even some of the smaller Deepwater projects raise questions about management. The radios placed in small, open boats were not waterproof and immediately shorted out, for example. Electronics equipment costing millions of dollars is still being installed in the new cutter, even though it will be ripped out because the Coast Guard does not want it. An order of eight small, inflatable boats cost an extra half-million dollars because the purchase passed through four layers of contractors.

http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/09/us/09ship.html?_r=2

Pretty nasty stuff huh?

This is another whine fest by the NYT. If the specifications in the contract were written incorrectly then there is no one to blame but the agency writing the contract...if they specified certain equipment and it was not delivered then the agency has the right to go after the contractor. That's how it works.

 

[Intense]

Coast Guard: Update on Deepwater Program Management, Cost, and Acquisition Workforce
GAO-09-620T April 22, 2009
Highlights Page (PDF) Full Report (PDF, 21 pages) Accessible Text

Summary
The Deepwater Program is intended to recapitalize the Coast Guard's fleet and includes efforts to build or modernize five classes each of ships and aircraft, and procure other key capabilities. In 2002, the Coast Guard contracted with Integrated Coast Guard Systems (ICGS) to manage the acquisition as systems integrator. After the program experienced a series of failures, the Coast Guard announced in April 2007 that it would take over the lead role, with future work on individual assets to be potentially bid competitively outside of the existing contract. A program baseline of $24.2 billion was set as well. In June 2008, GAO reported on the new approach and concluded that while these steps were beneficial, continued oversight and improvement was necessary. The Coast Guard has taken actions to address the recommendations in that report. This testimony updates key issues from prior work: (1) Coast Guard program management at the overall Deepwater Program and asset levels; (2) how cost, schedules, and capabilities have changed from the 2007 baseline and how well costs are communicated to Congress; and (3) Coast Guard efforts to manage and build its acquisition workforce. GAO reviewed Coast Guard acquisition program baselines, human capital plans and other documents, and interviewed officials. For information not previously reported, GAO obtained Coast Guard views. The Coast Guard generally concurred with the findings.

The Coast Guard has assumed the role of systems integrator for the overall Deepwater Program by reducing the scope of work on contract with ICGS and assigning these functions to Coast Guard stakeholders. As part of its systems integration responsibilities, the Coast Guard has undertaken a fundamental reassessment of the capabilities, number, and mix of assets it needs; according to an official, it expects to complete this analysis by the summer of 2009. At the individual Deepwater asset level, the Coast Guard has improved and begun to apply the disciplined management process found in its Major Systems Acquisition Manual, but did not meet its goal of complete adherence to this process for all Deepwater assets by the second quarter of fiscal year 2009. For example, key acquisition management activities--such as operational requirements documents and test plans--are not in place for assets with contracts recently awarded or in production, placing the Coast Guard at risk of cost overruns or schedule slips. Due in part to the Coast Guard's increased insight into what it is buying, the anticipated cost, schedules, and capabilities of many of the Deepwater assets have changed since the establishment of the $24.2 billion baseline in 2007. Coast Guard officials have stated that this baseline reflected not a traditional cost estimate but rather the anticipated contract costs as determined by ICGS. As the Coast Guard has developed its own cost baselines for some assets, it has become apparent that some of the assets it is procuring will likely cost more than anticipated. Information to date shows that the total cost of the program may grow by $2.1 billion. As more cost baselines are developed and approved, further cost growth may become apparent. In addition, while the Coast Guard plans to update its annual budget requests with asset-based cost information, the current structure of its budget submission to Congress does not include certain details at the asset level, such as estimates of total costs and total numbers to be procured. The Coast Guard's reevaluation of baselines has also changed its understanding of the delivery schedules and capabilities of Deepwater assets. One reason the Coast Guard sought a systems integrator from outside the Coast Guard was because it recognized that it lacked the experience and depth in workforce to manage the acquisition internally. The Coast Guard acknowledges that it still faces challenges in hiring and retaining qualified acquisition personnel and that this situation poses a risk to the successful execution of its acquisition programs. According to human capital officials in the acquisition directorate, as of April 2009, the acquisition branch had 16 percent of positions unfilled, including key jobs such as contracting officers and systems engineers. Even as it attempts to fill its current vacancies, the Coast Guard plans to increase the size of its acquisition workforce significantly by the end of fiscal year 2011. While the Coast Guard may be hard-pressed to fill these positions, it has made progress in identifying the broader challenges it faces and is working to mitigate them. In the meantime, the Coast Guard has been increasing its use of support contractors.

U.S. GAO - Coast Guard: Update on Deepwater Program Management, Cost, and Acquisition Workforce

 

[PatekPhilippe]

Thank you Intense. This shows the processes and laws do work to the benefit of the tax payer.

 

[Intense]

Structured Liberty and Rule of Law work. Growth through Amendment preferred to Revolutionary change.