sudan
Senior Member
- Oct 17, 2012
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Justice Denied
âImagine if there were a criminal court in Britain which only ever tried black people, which ignored crimes committed by whites and Asians and only took an interest in crimes committed by blacks. We would consider that racist, right? And yet there is an International Criminal Court which only ever tries black people, African black people to be precise, and it is treated as perfectly normal. In fact the court is lauded by many radical activists as a good and decent institution, despite the fact that no non-black person has ever been brought before it to answer for his crimes. It is remarkable that in an era when liberal observers see racism everywhere, in every thoughtless aside or crude joke, they fail to see it in an institution which focuses exclusively on the criminal antics of dark-skinned people from the âDark ContinentââŚ. Liberal sensitivity towards issues of racism completely evaporates when it comes to the ICC, which they will defend tooth and nail, despite the fact that it is quite clearly, by any objective measurement, racist, in the sense that it treats one race of people differently to all others.
Chapter Seven
Judges Elected by Vote-Trading
â[V]ote-trading, campaigning, and regional politicking invariably play a great part in candidatesâ chance of being elected than considerations of individual merit.â
Professor Philippe Sands QC
âUnqualified judgesâŚhave been appointed to key positions because of highly politicised voting systems and a lack of transparency.â
The Guardian
The simple fact is that with a few exceptions the judges at the ICC have been lackluster political appointees, very much the result of the very âvote tradingâ about which Human Rights Watch and others have so long warned. Yet these are the same people who are tasked with making very difficult decisions about some of the most complex situations in the world, decisions that quite literally affect life and death in Africa. They are manifestly not up to the task. There is a related concern. Just as was the case in the ICTY and other projections of international âjusticeâ, the ICC is making things up as it goes along. Human Rights Watch has pointed to âa creeping discord in the interpretations and solutions offered by the courtâs Chambers to the issues before them. Differences in approach are evident from decisions (and dissents) on fundamental issues including victimsâ participation, witness protection, and disclosure practices in connection with a defendantâs fair trial rights.â The ICC is perfectly willing to argue the case for universal jurisdiction but not for its own trial chambers. The Rome Statute does not make the decisions of chambers binding on one another. Human Rights Watch has rationalised this: âAs the Chambers confront various country situations with unique requirements, different approaches in the application of the law to the facts may be both expected and necessary.â Yet when peace advocates and peace negotiators within various African conflicts try to advance the same sort of argument by way of suggesting a more nuanced peace first approach because of âuniqueâ circumstances, the ICC and Human Rights Watch are their most vocal critics. In September 2010, The Guardian reported that ânqualified judges, in some cases with no expertise on international law and in one case no legal qualifications, have been appointed to key positions because of highly politicised voting systems and a lack of transparencyâ. The newspaper also stated that â[c]ritics sayâŚthe practices threaten the future of the international criminal courtâ. Geoffrey Robertson was unusually restrained when he described the ICCâs judicial appointments as âproblematicâ. He drew a very clear link between the quality of the court and the quality of those people appointed as judges: The viability of the ICC ultimately depends more on the calibre and experience of its judges and prosecutors than on the fine print of its statute. International appointment systems are prone to thrown up mediocrities trusted to toe the line of their nominating governments⌠. Often missing are persons of real independence with first-class minds and imagination⌠. In this respect, the statutory arrangements for appointing the Courtâs eighteen full-time judges leave much to be desired.
The relationship between international judicial appointments, and âdeal-makingâ between states is an open secret. The quality of such appointments has also been the subject of sometimes abrasive criticism. In 2008, for example, The Economist explored the issue of whether the selection processes to the international courts led to the appointment of âgovernment hacks and lickspittles, with little or no judicial experienceâ. The ICC has no shortage of either. The distinguished British judge Iain Bonomy has noted that â[t]o many judicial minds, that system is basically unsoundâ. A central criticism of the ICC is that the prosecutor and judges are unaccountable to anyone. It goes without saying that the allocation of such unqualified power is based on the belief that the ICC prosecutor and judges are beyond reproach, by way of qualifications, professionally, ethically and personally. This sadly is quite clearly not the case in respect of the ICC Chief Prosecutor or a number of the people appointed as ICC judges. Selecting International Judges: Principle, Process, and Politics, a groundbreaking study of international judicial appointments, written by Philippe Sands QC, Professor Kate Malleson, Ruth Mackenzie and Penny Martin as part of Oxford University Pressâ International Courts and Tribunals Series, concluded that âthe evidence leads unequivocally to the conclusion that merit is not the main driving factor in the election processesâ. The study notes that ârules are meant to insulate nominations from political influence. In practice, a recurring theme across the interviews was the strong vested interest of governments in strictly controlling the nomination process in order to influence the composition of international courts.â The study recorded that â[t]he picture that emerges from the interviewsâŚhighlights the important, if not central, role played by political factors that are unrelated to the merits of any candidateâ. The study also noted that âthe majority of the states studied used informal or semi-structured procedures. These processes were marked by their lack of transparency and accountability and a stronger likelihood of being informed by extraneous political considerationsâŚpolitical factors, rather than the individual selection criteria, could determine nominations.â The study also revealed that â[m]any individuals who participate in the ICC process believe it to be even more politicized than other international judicial electionsâ.
Benjamin Schiff, in his book Building the ICC, documented the role played by an unelected non-governmental organisation, the Coalition for the International Criminal Court, in selecting ICC judges: âDuring the 2003 process of nominating and electing judges (and during the 2006 second round of elections) the CICC organized meetings between NGOs and those running for judgeshipsâŚquite likely influencing the votes that were eventually cast.â He provides a telling example of the election of the only male ICC judge in 2003: âThe single victorious male candidate described his campaigning as having been focused largely on NGO meetings, in contrast to some other competitors who spent no time with the NGOs. He believed that his selection was also aided by his experience in his home country as the head of a childrenâs welfare-oriented NGO.â
The danger of vote-trading for judicial appointments to the ICC bench was obvious from the inception of the court. There was an attempt to discourage the practice of votetrading in the election of judges before the first bench was even elected. At the first session of the ASP to the Rome Statute, on 9 September 2002, the President of the Bureau, Zeid Raâad Zeid Al-Hussein, appealed to assembly members to refrain from vote trading. He clearly stated that ân order to ensure the integrity of the electoral process, the Bureau⌠appealed to States Parties to refrain from entering into reciprocal agreements of exchange of support in respect of the election of judges of the Courtâ. Selecting International Judges confirmed that â[n]onetheless, vote-trading took place from the outsetâ. An early Centre for International Courts and Tribunals study of the election noted: The practice of ICC elections indicates that states have actively engaged in vote trading and have not responded to the appeal of the Bureau. This suggests that the practice of vote trading is considered by states to be integral to elections in political bodies. In general, it appears that most states are not willing to consider judicial posts to be qualitatively different to other expert and political posts.
Sudan Vision Daily - Details
âImagine if there were a criminal court in Britain which only ever tried black people, which ignored crimes committed by whites and Asians and only took an interest in crimes committed by blacks. We would consider that racist, right? And yet there is an International Criminal Court which only ever tries black people, African black people to be precise, and it is treated as perfectly normal. In fact the court is lauded by many radical activists as a good and decent institution, despite the fact that no non-black person has ever been brought before it to answer for his crimes. It is remarkable that in an era when liberal observers see racism everywhere, in every thoughtless aside or crude joke, they fail to see it in an institution which focuses exclusively on the criminal antics of dark-skinned people from the âDark ContinentââŚ. Liberal sensitivity towards issues of racism completely evaporates when it comes to the ICC, which they will defend tooth and nail, despite the fact that it is quite clearly, by any objective measurement, racist, in the sense that it treats one race of people differently to all others.
Chapter Seven
Judges Elected by Vote-Trading
â[V]ote-trading, campaigning, and regional politicking invariably play a great part in candidatesâ chance of being elected than considerations of individual merit.â
Professor Philippe Sands QC
âUnqualified judgesâŚhave been appointed to key positions because of highly politicised voting systems and a lack of transparency.â
The Guardian
The simple fact is that with a few exceptions the judges at the ICC have been lackluster political appointees, very much the result of the very âvote tradingâ about which Human Rights Watch and others have so long warned. Yet these are the same people who are tasked with making very difficult decisions about some of the most complex situations in the world, decisions that quite literally affect life and death in Africa. They are manifestly not up to the task. There is a related concern. Just as was the case in the ICTY and other projections of international âjusticeâ, the ICC is making things up as it goes along. Human Rights Watch has pointed to âa creeping discord in the interpretations and solutions offered by the courtâs Chambers to the issues before them. Differences in approach are evident from decisions (and dissents) on fundamental issues including victimsâ participation, witness protection, and disclosure practices in connection with a defendantâs fair trial rights.â The ICC is perfectly willing to argue the case for universal jurisdiction but not for its own trial chambers. The Rome Statute does not make the decisions of chambers binding on one another. Human Rights Watch has rationalised this: âAs the Chambers confront various country situations with unique requirements, different approaches in the application of the law to the facts may be both expected and necessary.â Yet when peace advocates and peace negotiators within various African conflicts try to advance the same sort of argument by way of suggesting a more nuanced peace first approach because of âuniqueâ circumstances, the ICC and Human Rights Watch are their most vocal critics. In September 2010, The Guardian reported that ânqualified judges, in some cases with no expertise on international law and in one case no legal qualifications, have been appointed to key positions because of highly politicised voting systems and a lack of transparencyâ. The newspaper also stated that â[c]ritics sayâŚthe practices threaten the future of the international criminal courtâ. Geoffrey Robertson was unusually restrained when he described the ICCâs judicial appointments as âproblematicâ. He drew a very clear link between the quality of the court and the quality of those people appointed as judges: The viability of the ICC ultimately depends more on the calibre and experience of its judges and prosecutors than on the fine print of its statute. International appointment systems are prone to thrown up mediocrities trusted to toe the line of their nominating governments⌠. Often missing are persons of real independence with first-class minds and imagination⌠. In this respect, the statutory arrangements for appointing the Courtâs eighteen full-time judges leave much to be desired.
The relationship between international judicial appointments, and âdeal-makingâ between states is an open secret. The quality of such appointments has also been the subject of sometimes abrasive criticism. In 2008, for example, The Economist explored the issue of whether the selection processes to the international courts led to the appointment of âgovernment hacks and lickspittles, with little or no judicial experienceâ. The ICC has no shortage of either. The distinguished British judge Iain Bonomy has noted that â[t]o many judicial minds, that system is basically unsoundâ. A central criticism of the ICC is that the prosecutor and judges are unaccountable to anyone. It goes without saying that the allocation of such unqualified power is based on the belief that the ICC prosecutor and judges are beyond reproach, by way of qualifications, professionally, ethically and personally. This sadly is quite clearly not the case in respect of the ICC Chief Prosecutor or a number of the people appointed as ICC judges. Selecting International Judges: Principle, Process, and Politics, a groundbreaking study of international judicial appointments, written by Philippe Sands QC, Professor Kate Malleson, Ruth Mackenzie and Penny Martin as part of Oxford University Pressâ International Courts and Tribunals Series, concluded that âthe evidence leads unequivocally to the conclusion that merit is not the main driving factor in the election processesâ. The study notes that ârules are meant to insulate nominations from political influence. In practice, a recurring theme across the interviews was the strong vested interest of governments in strictly controlling the nomination process in order to influence the composition of international courts.â The study recorded that â[t]he picture that emerges from the interviewsâŚhighlights the important, if not central, role played by political factors that are unrelated to the merits of any candidateâ. The study also noted that âthe majority of the states studied used informal or semi-structured procedures. These processes were marked by their lack of transparency and accountability and a stronger likelihood of being informed by extraneous political considerationsâŚpolitical factors, rather than the individual selection criteria, could determine nominations.â The study also revealed that â[m]any individuals who participate in the ICC process believe it to be even more politicized than other international judicial electionsâ.
Benjamin Schiff, in his book Building the ICC, documented the role played by an unelected non-governmental organisation, the Coalition for the International Criminal Court, in selecting ICC judges: âDuring the 2003 process of nominating and electing judges (and during the 2006 second round of elections) the CICC organized meetings between NGOs and those running for judgeshipsâŚquite likely influencing the votes that were eventually cast.â He provides a telling example of the election of the only male ICC judge in 2003: âThe single victorious male candidate described his campaigning as having been focused largely on NGO meetings, in contrast to some other competitors who spent no time with the NGOs. He believed that his selection was also aided by his experience in his home country as the head of a childrenâs welfare-oriented NGO.â
The danger of vote-trading for judicial appointments to the ICC bench was obvious from the inception of the court. There was an attempt to discourage the practice of votetrading in the election of judges before the first bench was even elected. At the first session of the ASP to the Rome Statute, on 9 September 2002, the President of the Bureau, Zeid Raâad Zeid Al-Hussein, appealed to assembly members to refrain from vote trading. He clearly stated that ân order to ensure the integrity of the electoral process, the Bureau⌠appealed to States Parties to refrain from entering into reciprocal agreements of exchange of support in respect of the election of judges of the Courtâ. Selecting International Judges confirmed that â[n]onetheless, vote-trading took place from the outsetâ. An early Centre for International Courts and Tribunals study of the election noted: The practice of ICC elections indicates that states have actively engaged in vote trading and have not responded to the appeal of the Bureau. This suggests that the practice of vote trading is considered by states to be integral to elections in political bodies. In general, it appears that most states are not willing to consider judicial posts to be qualitatively different to other expert and political posts.
Sudan Vision Daily - Details
