The Iranian regime between legality and legitimacy

Discussion in 'Iran' started by yahia, Oct 26, 2009.

  1. yahia
    Offline

    yahia Rookie

    Joined:
    Jul 9, 2008
    Messages:
    33
    Thanks Received:
    2
    Trophy Points:
    1
    Ratings:
    +2
    The Iranian regime between legality and legitimacy
    bouzidi yahia

    Comments reform leaders, headed by Mir-Hossein Moussavi, which refused to turn the page on the elections, and the second man as well as statements in the system <<Rafsanjani>>, which he regarded what happened was not of the principles of the revolution and not approach the imam, led to the continuation of the Iranian crisis and the topic of legitimacy of the regime and in particular the mandate Faqih, especially, with a lot of references to congratulate Ahmadinejad won custody of the new and some called for a re-run the other, led by Ayatollah Montazeri, who earlier called for young people to continue demonstrations and warned of the loss of legitimacy.
    Legitimacy to broach the subject
    Considered by many to raise this issue, such as the rhetoric of information is far from objective and some go even further by saying that such matters come within the framework of the Western campaign, particularly the American project aimed at changing the Iranian regime.
    But in reality there are many signs give legitimacy to put this issue most notably the following:
    - Parties to the crisis are not only sons of the revolution but of the greatest leaders and symbols, such as Rafsanjani and Moussaoui, in addition to the Khmnaii
    - Entry of scholars in the line, although this is not new and has already signed a hundred scholars, a statement supported by Mohammad Khatami in the 1997 elections and the most important events and crises in Iran, where he played an important role of religious scholars from the constitutional crisis through crisis certified to the 1979 revolution, leading to the current crisis.
    - Exit Demonstrations against election fraud after the Friday sermon delivered by Khamenei, demanding the suspension of the demonstrations, which means that the image of Khamenei as Supreme Leader and the Deputy Wali al-Faqih of the Hidden Imam has been so affected and the loss of halo surrounding him in the Shiite ideology
    - To overcome some of the symbols of reform and religious scholars of fraud in the elections to talk about the clerical rule, despite the controversy around it is not new did not settle the dispute around the Shiite ideology on the one hand and on the other hand, the dispute over Khamenei, was the largest since it had not reached the level of tradition when many references Shi'ites.
    - Do the Iranian regime were represented by the Leader and the Revolutionary Guards (generally conservative) and the extent of repression and arrests of protesters and media campaigns against Rafsanjani and the reformists in the latest development, spoke of a local news agency the arrest of four groups of MKO infiltrated into Iran via Iraq, was aimed at the assassination of Mir Hossein Mousavi and Karrubi to accuse the Revolutionary Guard that the source and talked about the escape of a fifth set is seen by many analysts warning messages to Moussaoui and Karroubi All these developments demonstrate that the regime felt threatened.
    Sources of legitimacy of the regime
    Different sources of legitimacy of the political system from one country to another depending on factors arose and factors affecting it and Voolh, in the case of Iran, the system derives its legitimacy from the revolution of 1979, including that the revolution was in the totality of religious, despite the participation of all political parties of various orientations in which they add to the revolutionary legitimacy legitimate religious centered on the thought leader of the revolution of Imam Khomeini, especially as we give to the Shiite doctrine of scientists greater value than it is when the Sunnis and the community as Vice scholars is the Imam and have many characteristics of Kalasmp hence the mandate of the jurist, which was restricted by the prosecution of the imam in the earlier stages of the things jurisprudence only Khomeini came to complete another view was seen along the prosecution to political matters (on behalf of general) and to create conditions for the emergence of the Hidden Imam.
    In addition to the position of the guide and powers embodied the mandate of the jurist is reflected Khomeini as a leader of the revolution as a source of legitimacy in the political orientations of the Iranian regime internally and externally, for example, there was a fatwa issued by Khomeini to shed the blood of author Salman Rushdie, author of The Satanic Verses have knocked out the European-Iranian relations in general, and despite the effects this negative opinion on Iran, the system only after sending the pledge of assassinating Salman Rushdie has been unable to withdraw the fatwa, and also some political organizations that bear his name Calcairin at the line of the Imam, for example, and also in Khmnaii remarks about the legacy of Khomeini and his vision for the nation and the Secretariat, bearing left to the Iranians at the same time find Rafsanjani criticizing what is going on his exit from the approach of the Imam Khomeini, who stressed that the people are the source of legitimacy, does not go out bombing in the tomb of Khomeini from this framework as the system tries to send the message that the ongoing unrest goal of the Islamic Republic founded by Khomeini and the targeting of the tomb of Sun link.
    In addition to the sources of legitimacy of this source is the nuclear issue as the system tries to employ in order to strengthen its legitimacy by describing Iran's access to the ranks of botched nuclear technology that is of great importance as it gives legitimacy to the system locally and give Iran more weight on the international level, what would also lends legitimacy to the system, and on this nuclear issue became the basis for some point of the University that all can agree, such as around the sacred defense of the country against Iraq in the words of an Iranian paper ([1]).
    Another approach to the crisis
    But most analysts agree that the dispute is between the joints on the sharing of power and led by Rafsanjani and Khmnaii, who were warring over the position of leader after Khomeini's death and almost the situation to explode, ending the dispute to assume the presidency Rafsanjani, as a result of this the real explanation is trying to limit the crisis in the sharing of power away from all dimension of the legitimacy of clerical rule, but such analysis sometimes overlook or ignore the perspective of individual sense of Wilayat al-Faqih see the individual Shi'ite Wali al-Faqih as a deputy imam is infallible to some extent the inauguration of the divine guide, which can in no way be mistaken in the social imaginary resolved legitimacy Faqih replace semi-divine right of the King ([2]) and Rafsanjani is the closest of close to Khamenei, they are companions in the revolution and after, as well as the Mir-Hossein Mousavi and others and all those around Supreme Leader, who follow what is happening within the system and guide the decisions and policies as the highest body in the system strives to maintain the existence of competing interests (real or potential) There is no doubt that all this will lead to abuses and Krqat not worthy of a vendor as leader, as happened with the first leader Khomeini ([3]) from here, the closest that he did not understand the reality of infallibility, this is what led to the intensification of the differences between them to float to the surface and then Go to the street which was suffering from practices of the Revolutionary Guard organization affiliated with the guide and thus the image of the leader is no doubt shaken when the Iranian people, has already been in other crises that the demonstrators chanted slogans against Khamenei, the faqih perhaps the most prominent student demonstrations in 1999, and support for this is Ikilha accusations that the parties to each other of corruption Kadtham Rafsanjani and the reformists employment by conservative talk On the other hand reformists from incumbents in the elections and not to bow to the demands of Khamenei, who is (Vice-Imam) and his call for moderation and not to side without the other, referring them to support each of Ahmadinejad Guide to the charges of bias and vote-rigging, although coated polite terms confirm this fact.
    In all of this must evoke pious because such methods are of political realism or Almikiavlip in different systems in the Iranian regime is the same dimensions of the religious it is a pillar of the pillars of a genuine belief Shiite. In general, corruption in the religious community of Iran is nothing new to be excluded in this crisis has risen voices from within the seminaries called for the separation of the bazaar of the clergy.
    _ The Iranian revolution revolutions painted like the rest of the Iranians a better future and promised prosperity was short and utopian promises, this is why all the sacrifice for it, but while maintaining the revolution and its slogans, the rhetoric of Iranian society in constant evolution influenced by what is happening in the world like in all societies, then the observer to monitor the the effects of globalization for all its manifestations especially the youth, which tend to become the Western lifestyle, which made the gap is widening between the Authority and the people, young people have been found in the letter the embodiment of the hopes of reform and this explains gather around him, on the other slogans the revolution led to the emergence of a strange phenomenon in the community Iranian Darius described Chigan saying <<on a large Asamyin learn from the Iranians themselves, each one wants to grow up and we educate and tomorrow is the culture of rejection, as defined in the absence of the means to defend merely the way to win, and saw a huge sales versions of books and the number of copies printed has limits unprecedented ... Everybody wants to stay in touch with world events, and everyone is struggling in their own way against the dominant dark and everyone wants to know the reasons for the slide. And emerging lived in proportion to the bitterness and humiliation Stoic spirit of the cash and look clearly re-evaluating the system past the current system alike, as well as skepticism Alolterep spirit that animated the most daring of the people, taking most of them complain about the belief of religious beliefs, which has become very stressful and confusing>> ([4 ])
    Illegality of the regime
    The legitimacy of the political system in the response of people with the power of voluntary acceptance of her interaction with them through political participation and indicators of the turnout in the elections, for example, if we start from the latter any turnout perhaps may reflect participation in the election (forty million voters according to official statistics) and demonstrate the legitimacy of the Iranian regime, but we must stop to see the nature of Iranian society is a special kind of diverse, strong, intelligent, vibrant and interconnected to each of these five qualities indications and corroborating reports monitored by Nevine Abdel Moneim Massad indicators and measuring its impact on decision-making and the formation of trends, and enough to reflect the fact of hostage-taking by students at the beginning of the revolution or get out 80 percent of the labor vote and the electorate to choose, or the student uprising in 1999 and other indicators ([5]) Thus, the broad participation in elections are not evidence of legitimacy to the Iranian regime, and is emphasized by the lineup of voters and the led by young people behind the reform movement, which found expression in its hopes and a path to change and often exceed the demands of the reformist movement itself, as happened in the demonstrations of students who sent a letter to President Mohammad Khatami, asking him to resign and was entitled <<out of the silence or take and leave us facing a power >> ([6]) and normal to make such attitudes of university students, whose number exceeded one million students of a generation that is far from the revolution and the slogans, ideology and even in the era of globalization and the satellites, the system could not reconcile the external and internal policy and its emphasis on the principle of exporting the revolution and the foreign policy is far from the daily concerns of the Iranian people, so the focus in the recent campaign on the economic situation and improving living standards.
    Indicates a lot of statistics that the proportion of the Persians in Iran does not exceed 52 percent of the Iranian people are not comfortable for the majority of national control of the reins of power, exercised the Iranian regime of repression and persecution of other minorities: Arabs most of the more than seven million people, Baluchis, Kurds, Turks and all of those who voted to the reformists and the Sunnis in Iran (and many of them Baluchis, and Turkmen as well as Persians), who most of the statistics indicate that the number exceeds 22 percent of the Iranian people voted in favor of the reformists has opined that there are scholars participate in the elections so as not to argue the Iranian regime and exercise them further injustice and oppression.
    _ The Iranian regime also employs oil in order to give legitimacy to his authority through various means, Fbaattabar Iran is a rentier state living on the proceeds from the outside (the sale of oil) are, regardless of such proceeds to the community (as if the Governor spent money out of pocket) for the purchase of political loyalties It seems the ruling from the viewpoint of praise praise (Kasaba and hapa) ([7]) and the problem in this case lies in the recruitment of social work can also be serious inflation proceeds from the purchase of large numbers of intellectuals, and of those ways is as follows:
    - Create a bureaucratic machine that is aimed on the one hand to reduce unemployment on the other hand to maintain order on political power (wrongfulness) of Iranian society and especially where there are a large proportion of young people there is a need to 800 thousand new jobs or so to absorb all those who finish their education ( [8]) have allowed the huge oil revenues to the regime in Tehran to provide jobs for more people than they need him, and facilities are state bureaucracy, which employs hundreds of thousands of civil servants one of the main forms of government spending as numbered in 2005 about 2,3 million employees, according to figures official issued by the Management and Planning Organization ([9]) and this system can show the functions of a century of political loyalty (do what you ask - say the system for his staff always - or lose your job), and Howard was hit, for example, many people who go to demonstrations not be freely their will, but simply because they work in different organs of the State and had been instructed to participate and this strengthens the grip on power to grant ordinary Iranians and outside observers the impression that he enjoyed more support than it is the fact ([10])
    - Spending on projects employ a large number of people such as construction projects, the government ministers quit a lot of serious industrial disputes and to avoid the emergence of serious political differences to bring them with material aid would not be possible if the price of oil fell dramatically, and support the prices of basic foodstuffs and oil derivatives, which fears that such high prices to disturbances destabilize the system.
    - Add to recruit an army of bureaucrats is the Iranian regime to expand the size of its security forces special Basij forces associated with the Revolutionary Guards, which First Deputy Commander, on 25 September 2005 on the establishment of 2000 a new battalion within the forces, and due to the role of the Basij during the presidential campaign in securing votes for Ahmadinejad But the main reason lies in tightening the regime's grip on power that is entrusted to the troops that are increasing the size of a special task to contain the riots and urban unrest ([11]) and this is what appears in the current crisis of the basij, where he was a great role in the suppression of the demonstrators reformers.
    Despite the regime's attempts to recruit the nuclear issue for its legitimacy (and this also was for Iran to make them without oil), but the <reality on the ground is completely different, ordinary Iranian citizen in general is far from foreign policy, including the nuclear issue, what is bothering more is employment, inflation and self-development opportunities, although most Iranians would prefer to be independent and Iran feared, but they do not want to be the price of seeking to acquire nuclear fuel cycle is the confrontation with the international community and referral to the Security Council and sanctions>> ([12])
    All these indicators show that the legitimacy of the Iranian regime is at stake, no one can deny that the image affected by the guide and through the mandate of the jurist, this system will lead to deflation itself more and use force, including killings if he felt more threatened, as will try to raise the number of cyclones with the West to draw attention away from the crisis within, and if the reformists are still working the same way (try to change the Constitution in the window), the crisis on its way to the end and this is the likely outcome after the recent developments because the demands of reformers retreated to demand the detainees &#1589;&#1585;&#1575;&#1581; and requested permission from the authorities to do Bmatm commemorations for the victims and, on the last regime continues to close the field on their activities, without this means that the system has become as invisible as it quickly Sttjd confrontations between the parties to the crisis on other fronts or other benefits.



    ________________________________________
    ([1]) Shahram Chubin, Iran's nuclear ambitions, the first edition, Beirut, 2007, p. 58
    ([2]) Darius Shaygan, illusions of identity, Saqi Books, First Edition, Beirut 1993, p. 104
    ([3]) Musa al-Musawi said in his book Revolution miserable many of the abuses carried out by Khomeini.
    ([4]) Darius Chigan, ibid, p. 58.
    ([5]) NM Abdel-Moneim Massad, decision-making in Iran and the Arab-Iranian relations, Center for Arab Unity Studies, 2 nd edition Beirut 2005, p. 140.
    ([6]) Talal TA, Republic of the difficult, i 1, Beirut 2006, p. 203
    ([7]) Azmi Bishara, the issue of democracy is provided to illustrate a democratic Arab Center for Arab Unity Studies, First Edition, Beirut, 2007, p. 74.
    ([8]) Howard Rogerd, Iran's oil and its role in challenging American influence, Arab Scientific Publishers, First Edition, Beirut 2007, p. 194
    ([9]) Rogerd Howard, ibid, p. 195
    ([10]) Rogerd Howard, ibid, p. 196
    ([11]) Rogerd Howard, ibid, p. 201
    ([12]) Chopin Eram, ibid, p. 60
     
  2. rdean
    Offline

    rdean rddean

    Joined:
    Aug 9, 2009
    Messages:
    60,204
    Thanks Received:
    6,905
    Trophy Points:
    1,840
    Location:
    chicago
    Ratings:
    +15,044
    I can't read this. The letters are too big.
     
  3. yahia
    Offline

    yahia Rookie

    Joined:
    Jul 9, 2008
    Messages:
    33
    Thanks Received:
    2
    Trophy Points:
    1
    Ratings:
    +2
    Not my problem
     
  4. The_Halfmoon
    Offline

    The_Halfmoon Member

    Joined:
    Aug 25, 2009
    Messages:
    300
    Thanks Received:
    22
    Trophy Points:
    16
    Location:
    Cana-duh
    Ratings:
    +22
    I think the iranian government has very many competent bureaucrat within it, as well as shady characters who were placed into positions of power through ol' fashioned deceit, nepotism, and corruption.

    the ISLAMIC portion of the regime is obvioulsy the problem. It gained power after the revolution only thanks to Saddam's invasion. They do get credit for mobilizing 14 year old boys into the front lines of the war, and essentially saving Iran's oil supply. However, their actions during and after the war clearly remove any legitimacy they may have had. This goes for any other group that consistently murders Iranians.

    And I would like to correct the assumption that only 52% of Iran is Persian. This is correct in a sense, but groups like the Lurs, Bakhtiaris, and even Kurds consider themselves Iranian (though the Kurds want separation in turkey and Iraq, they are less inclined to do so in iran). Azeris which make up another big chunk of Iran (Northwestern Iran) are really just Persians that became "turkified" linguistically. They are equally represented in government (actually perhaps over-represented). It's just the non-Iranic people that are repressed (the same ones you mentioned, i.e. arabs and turcomans). So I would say in reality well over 70% of Iranians consider themselves "Irooni" and not just the Persians (and in fact Lurs, Bakhtiaris, and Azeris are almost more socially powerful than Persians federally).

    Your article brings up an important issue, and that is the corrupt flow of oil money... it's ironic, but the revolution was basically a way to get oil into the hands of the people. In the end, it just moved the proceeds from the hands of American companies (much of which flowed back into Iran as investment capital), to the hands of the nutjobs in the government, which are basically using it to fund Lebanese and Palestinian anti-Israel groups.
     

Share This Page