Dr. Michael Rubin was interviewed on Bill Bennett Show, October 7, 2010
His major research area is the Middle East, with special focus on Iran, Iraq, Turkey, and Kurdish society. He also writes frequently on transformative diplomacy and governance issues. At AEI, Mr. Rubin chaired the "Dissent and Reform in the Arab World" conference series.
This is what he said:
1. As a result of the Obama Administration voicing a timeline, and a point at which American troops will leave Afghanistan, President Karzai has been said to be negotiating with the Taliban
a. Karzai is concerned that President Obamas anxiousness to flee from what he once called the good war, will entail the a deal with Pakistan that will sell out his country and his presidency.
b. The U.S. needs to send supplies through Pakistan, and is therefore, giving Pakistan a seat at the table involving any negotiations with the Taliban. It must not be forgotten that the Pakistani ISI created and supported the Taliban.
c. Karzai sees the necessity of making his own deal. A Karzai deal with the Taliban will not leave Afghanistan as a secure American ally.
2. Dr. Rubin explained the long-standing antipathy between Pakistan and Afghanistan:
a. 1919- Afghanistan invaded what is now Pakistan
b. 1947- Afghanistan voted against letting Pakistan into the UN.
c. Between 1951-1961, Afghanistan sent troops into Pakistan several time.
3. History is a narrative through which ordinary people interpret events. The history of Afghanistan casts the negotiations proposed by the Obama Administration into a far different scenario than that believed by the administration.
a. In the Anglo-Afghan War of 1842, the British military occupation of Kabul was in support of a weak ruler, Shuja Shah Durrani, against the emir of Afghanistan, Dost Muhammad.
b. Deciding to evacuate, negotiations produced an agreement that provided for the safe exodus of the British garrison and its dependants from Afghanistan. Five days later, the withdrawal began. The departing British contingent numbered around 16,000. Men, women and children. They were massacred as they marched. One Brit reached Jalalabad.
So much for negotiations.
4. This history is what most Afghanis view as negotiations, and not understanding this history is why the Obama Administration is making a huge mistake.
a. The Taliban leader, Mullah Omar, has proclaimed, I am Dost Muhammad, Karzain is Shuja Shah. And, of course, this makes General Petraeus the British general, Elphinstone.
b. In the West, negotiations means the pacification of the Irish Republican Army, or the compromises with the former Baathists of Iraq.
c. Perception is more important than reality: negotiations, in Afghanistan, are seen as weakness.
5. The Pakistani ISI advises that engagement with the Taliban is based on a false idea that the Taliban is there for some cynical reasons, and can be bought off or compromised with. Wrong. Islamist ideology must never be allowed to believe they are winning.
As I see it, President Reagan's foreign policy is both succinct and correct: "We win, they lose."
His major research area is the Middle East, with special focus on Iran, Iraq, Turkey, and Kurdish society. He also writes frequently on transformative diplomacy and governance issues. At AEI, Mr. Rubin chaired the "Dissent and Reform in the Arab World" conference series.
This is what he said:
1. As a result of the Obama Administration voicing a timeline, and a point at which American troops will leave Afghanistan, President Karzai has been said to be negotiating with the Taliban
a. Karzai is concerned that President Obamas anxiousness to flee from what he once called the good war, will entail the a deal with Pakistan that will sell out his country and his presidency.
b. The U.S. needs to send supplies through Pakistan, and is therefore, giving Pakistan a seat at the table involving any negotiations with the Taliban. It must not be forgotten that the Pakistani ISI created and supported the Taliban.
c. Karzai sees the necessity of making his own deal. A Karzai deal with the Taliban will not leave Afghanistan as a secure American ally.
2. Dr. Rubin explained the long-standing antipathy between Pakistan and Afghanistan:
a. 1919- Afghanistan invaded what is now Pakistan
b. 1947- Afghanistan voted against letting Pakistan into the UN.
c. Between 1951-1961, Afghanistan sent troops into Pakistan several time.
3. History is a narrative through which ordinary people interpret events. The history of Afghanistan casts the negotiations proposed by the Obama Administration into a far different scenario than that believed by the administration.
a. In the Anglo-Afghan War of 1842, the British military occupation of Kabul was in support of a weak ruler, Shuja Shah Durrani, against the emir of Afghanistan, Dost Muhammad.
b. Deciding to evacuate, negotiations produced an agreement that provided for the safe exodus of the British garrison and its dependants from Afghanistan. Five days later, the withdrawal began. The departing British contingent numbered around 16,000. Men, women and children. They were massacred as they marched. One Brit reached Jalalabad.
So much for negotiations.
4. This history is what most Afghanis view as negotiations, and not understanding this history is why the Obama Administration is making a huge mistake.
a. The Taliban leader, Mullah Omar, has proclaimed, I am Dost Muhammad, Karzain is Shuja Shah. And, of course, this makes General Petraeus the British general, Elphinstone.
b. In the West, negotiations means the pacification of the Irish Republican Army, or the compromises with the former Baathists of Iraq.
c. Perception is more important than reality: negotiations, in Afghanistan, are seen as weakness.
5. The Pakistani ISI advises that engagement with the Taliban is based on a false idea that the Taliban is there for some cynical reasons, and can be bought off or compromised with. Wrong. Islamist ideology must never be allowed to believe they are winning.
As I see it, President Reagan's foreign policy is both succinct and correct: "We win, they lose."
