The afghan national army failure of nato in afghanistan

[longknife]

by Omnibus Dubitandum at Understanding Each Other [Indian] blog

*The original AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY *plan required an annual expenditure of Billions. The plan now has reconciled with an Army of 150000 as opposed to 450000. Other compromises are traınıng, equıpment and quality. The budget still depends on internatıonal funding.*

The result is that in my assessment ANA will dissolve when the US leave

Pashtuns may desert to Talıban or to theır homes.

Non Pashtuns would desert to Northern Allıance Forces.

Agha H Amın @ Understanding Each Other, Diversity and Dissent: THE AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY FAILURE OF NATO IN AFGHANISTAN

 

[RoccoR]

longknife, et al,

Your assessment is probably correct. It is not reasonable to assume that the ANA will hold together given that the general indigenous population is not behind the government; self sustaining; and that the Western Governments are reaching a breaking point in what they are willing to militarily and monetarily support.

by Omnibus Dubitandum at Understanding Each Other [Indian] blog

*The original AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY *plan required an annual expenditure of Billions. The plan now has reconciled with an Army of 150000 as opposed to 450000. Other compromises are traınıng, equıpment and quality. The budget still depends on internatıonal funding.*

The result is that in my assessment ANA will dissolve when the US leave

Pashtuns may desert to Talıban or to theır homes.

Non Pashtuns would desert to Northern Allıance Forces.

Agha H Amın @ Understanding Each Other, Diversity and Dissent: THE AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY FAILURE OF NATO IN AFGHANISTAN

(COMMENT)

One of the issues that is seldom ever discussed is that analysis of the number of security forces needed to maintain a US vision of the government, versus, what kind of force structure the Afghan government can support based on its revenue generating programs.

The US based programs that have been in place for more than a decade, have been the product of a very traditional brain trust of largely 20th Century Army and Political Support System that has not proven successful anywhere in the last half century. These are programs that required a a fast, hard, forced infusion of cash (over a sustained period) to buy forces to achieve stability. Once there is an interruption in the ability to fund the forces, the region or state seeks an equilibrium that will balance what the surviving population wants against what it is willing to fight for and defend.

Over the last decade, US leadership never sought out the point of equilibrium. Its policy did not care what the equilibrium point was. It had a vision of what the US wanted to see in an ideal Afghan Government. And that pursuit has brought us and the Afghan people to this point.

It is, for many Americans, hard to believe what went wrong in the liberation efforts of both Iraq and Afghanistan. But the facts are pretty clear that the American style government and the intervention plans were not compatible with the wants and needs of the people of those countries. And it is a wake-up call on the economic level, the political level and the military. The US should not intervene in the internal development of any nation.

Most Respectfully,
R