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Syria's weapons of mass destruction (chemical) from Iraq's old regime under Sadam ?
- Thread starter beagle9
- Start date
Was Bush and his team right, only that Sadam out foxed them all by sending these weapons into Syria ? Now Syria might use them ?
You might have something there...
Was Bush and his team right, only that Sadam out foxed them all by sending these weapons into Syria ? Now Syria might use them ?
No.
Um, no.
The shelf life of these chemicals together is a few weeks. Kept separate, 5 years max.
Saddam died 10 years ago guys. Move on.
The shelf life of these chemicals together is a few weeks. Kept separate, 5 years max.
Saddam died 10 years ago guys. Move on.
The shelf life of Sarin, which is the chemical weapon being discussed is a few weeks. The chemicals before being mixed, 5 years.
Sarin - New World Encyclopedia
Dictionary - Definition of Sarin
Sarin Nerve Gas
^^bunch of links that say "no more than 5 years"
Dictionary - Definition of Sarin
Sarin Nerve Gas
^^bunch of links that say "no more than 5 years"
Sarin - New World Encyclopedia
Dictionary - Definition of Sarin
Sarin Nerve Gas
^^bunch of links that say "no more than 5 years"
I'M sure we can get some of those experts in a room and open up one of those bad boys, hell maybe Peta will OK the use of a wabbit...
The story is based on a 2006 book "Saddam's Secrets" written by former Iraqi general Georges Sada who claimed that the Iraqi Revolutionary Guard moved weapons of mass destruction into Syria in advance of the Iraq war but Syria has amassed huge supplies of mustard gas, sarin nerve agent and cyanide over the past four decades on its own and it did not have to rely on Iraq's WMD which had reportedly been transferred to Syria just before the invasion by unmarked trucks that mysteriously crossed the border into Syria.
Many Of Syria's Chemical Weapons May Have Come From Saddam Hussein's Iraq - Investors.com
Many Of Syria's Chemical Weapons May Have Come From Saddam Hussein's Iraq - Investors.com
Last edited:
American_Jihad, et al,
This report was finalized prior to the invasion. It was purposely written to suggest that there was such weapons.
The actual search of the finding say something else entirely.
To clarify some of the implied Chemical Weapons (CW) myths, I offer the following key findings based on the actual experiences of the Iraqi Survey Group (ISG). I was in Iraq in 2004 when the bulk of the ISG work was finished; but when Ambassador Negroponte tried to keep the myth alive through creative writing. This is what the ISG Chief meant when he said: "We were almost all wrong!"
Additional Key findings on CW included:
Don't make the same mistake that the administration made using misleading, bogus, and dated intelligence.
Most Respectfully,
R
This report was finalized prior to the invasion. It was purposely written to suggest that there was such weapons.
(COMMENT)
The actual search of the finding say something else entirely.
ISG uncovered information that the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) maintained throughout 1991 to 2003 a set of undeclared covert laboratories to research and test various chemicals and poisons, primarily for intelligence operations. The network of laboratories could have provided an ideal, compartmented platform from which to continue CW agent R&D or small-scale production efforts, but we have no indications this was planned. (See Annex A.)
ISG has no evidence that IIS Directorate of Criminology (M16) scientists were producing CW or BW agents in these laboratories. However, sources indicate that M16 was planning to produce several CW agents including sulfur mustard, nitrogen mustard, and Sarin.
Exploitations of IIS laboratories, safe houses, and disposal sites revealed no evidence of CW-related research or production, however many of these sites were either sanitized by the Regime or looted prior to OIF. Interviews with key IIS offi cials within and outside of M16 yielded very little information about the IIS activities in this area.
The existence, function, and purpose of the laboratories were never declared to the UN.
The IIS program included the use of human subjects for testing purposes.
ISG investigated a series of key pre-OIF indicators involving the possible movement and storage of chemical weapons, focusing on 11 major depots assessed to have possible links to CW. A review of documents, interviews, available reporting, and site exploitations revealed alternate, plausible explanations for activities noted prior to OIF which, at the time, were believed to be CW-related.
ISG investigated pre-OIF activities at Musayyib Ammunition Storage Depotthe storage site that was judged to have the strongest link to CW. An extensive investigation of the facility revealed that there was no CW activity, unlike previously assessed.
SOURCE: https://www.cia.gov/library/reports/general-reports-1/iraq_wmd_2004/Comp_Report_Key_Findings.pdf
To clarify some of the implied Chemical Weapons (CW) myths, I offer the following key findings based on the actual experiences of the Iraqi Survey Group (ISG). I was in Iraq in 2004 when the bulk of the ISG work was finished; but when Ambassador Negroponte tried to keep the myth alive through creative writing. This is what the ISG Chief meant when he said: "We were almost all wrong!"
Charles A. Duelfer, whom the Bush administration chose to complete the U.S. investigation of Iraq's weapons programs, said Hussein's ability to produce nuclear weapons had "progressively decayed" since 1991. Inspectors, he said, found no evidence of "concerted efforts to restart the program."
The findings were similar on biological and chemical weapons. While Hussein had long dreamed of developing an arsenal of biological agents, his stockpiles had been destroyed and research stopped years before the United States led the invasion of Iraq in March 2003. Duelfer said Hussein hoped someday to resume a chemical weapons effort after U.N. sanctions ended, but had no stocks and had not researched making the weapons for a dozen years.
SOURCE:
Additional Key findings on CW included:
ISG did not discover chemical process or production units confi gured to produce key precursors or CW agents. However, site visits and debriefs revealed that Iraq maintained its ability for reconfi guring and making-do with available equipment as substitutes for sanctioned items.
ISG judges, based on available chemicals, infrastructure, and scientist debriefi ngs, that Iraq at OIF probably had a capability to produce large quantities of sulfur mustard within three to six months.
A former nerve agent expert indicated that Iraq retained the capability to produce nerve agent in signifi cant quantities within two years, given the import of required phosphorous precursors. However, we have no credible indications that Iraq acquired or attempted to acquire large quantities of these chemicals through its existing procurement networks for sanctioned items. In addition to new investment in its industry, Iraq was able to monitor the location and use of all existing dualuse process equipment. This provided Iraq the ability to rapidly reallocate key equipment for proscribed activities, if required by the Regime.
One effect of UN monitoring was to implement a national level control system for important dual-use process plants.
ISG has uncovered hardware at a few military depots, which suggests that Iraq may have prototyped experimental CW rounds. The available evidence is insuffi cient to determine the nature of the effort or the timeframe of activities.
Iraq could indigenously produce a range of conventional munitions, throughout the 1990s, many of which had previously been adapted for fi lling with CW agent. However, ISG has found ambiguous evidence of weaponization activities.
Despite reported high-level discussions about the use of chemical weapons in the defense of Iraq, information acquired after OIF does not confirm the inclusion of CW in Iraqs tactical planning for OIF. We believe these were mostly theoretical discussions and do not imply the existence of undiscovered CW munitions.
Udayhead of the Fedayeen Saddamattempted to obtain chemical weapons for use during OIF, according to reporting, but ISG found no evidence that Iraq ever came into possession of any CW weapons.
ISG has no evidence that IIS Directorate of Criminology (M16) scientists were producing CW or BW agents in these laboratories. However, sources indicate that M16 was planning to produce several CW agents including sulfur mustard, nitrogen mustard, and Sarin.
Exploitations of IIS laboratories, safe houses, and disposal sites revealed no evidence of CW-related research or production, however many of these sites were either sanitized by the Regime or looted prior to OIF. Interviews with key IIS offi cials within and outside of M16 yielded very little information about the IIS activities in this area.
The existence, function, and purpose of the laboratories were never declared to the UN.
The IIS program included the use of human subjects for testing purposes.
ISG investigated pre-OIF activities at Musayyib Ammunition Storage Depotthe storage site that was judged to have the strongest link to CW. An extensive investigation of the facility revealed that there was no CW activity, unlike previously assessed.
ISG judges, based on available chemicals, infrastructure, and scientist debriefi ngs, that Iraq at OIF probably had a capability to produce large quantities of sulfur mustard within three to six months.
A former nerve agent expert indicated that Iraq retained the capability to produce nerve agent in signifi cant quantities within two years, given the import of required phosphorous precursors. However, we have no credible indications that Iraq acquired or attempted to acquire large quantities of these chemicals through its existing procurement networks for sanctioned items. In addition to new investment in its industry, Iraq was able to monitor the location and use of all existing dualuse process equipment. This provided Iraq the ability to rapidly reallocate key equipment for proscribed activities, if required by the Regime.
One effect of UN monitoring was to implement a national level control system for important dual-use process plants.
ISG has uncovered hardware at a few military depots, which suggests that Iraq may have prototyped experimental CW rounds. The available evidence is insuffi cient to determine the nature of the effort or the timeframe of activities.
Iraq could indigenously produce a range of conventional munitions, throughout the 1990s, many of which had previously been adapted for fi lling with CW agent. However, ISG has found ambiguous evidence of weaponization activities.
Despite reported high-level discussions about the use of chemical weapons in the defense of Iraq, information acquired after OIF does not confirm the inclusion of CW in Iraqs tactical planning for OIF. We believe these were mostly theoretical discussions and do not imply the existence of undiscovered CW munitions.
Udayhead of the Fedayeen Saddamattempted to obtain chemical weapons for use during OIF, according to reporting, but ISG found no evidence that Iraq ever came into possession of any CW weapons.
ISG has no evidence that IIS Directorate of Criminology (M16) scientists were producing CW or BW agents in these laboratories. However, sources indicate that M16 was planning to produce several CW agents including sulfur mustard, nitrogen mustard, and Sarin.
Exploitations of IIS laboratories, safe houses, and disposal sites revealed no evidence of CW-related research or production, however many of these sites were either sanitized by the Regime or looted prior to OIF. Interviews with key IIS offi cials within and outside of M16 yielded very little information about the IIS activities in this area.
The existence, function, and purpose of the laboratories were never declared to the UN.
The IIS program included the use of human subjects for testing purposes.
ISG investigated pre-OIF activities at Musayyib Ammunition Storage Depotthe storage site that was judged to have the strongest link to CW. An extensive investigation of the facility revealed that there was no CW activity, unlike previously assessed.
Don't make the same mistake that the administration made using misleading, bogus, and dated intelligence.
Most Respectfully,
R
- Nov 28, 2011
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- Thread starter
- #12
Explain why it couldnot be then, I mean if you will.....ThanksWas Bush and his team right, only that Sadam out foxed them all by sending these weapons into Syria ? Now Syria might use them ?
No.
- Nov 28, 2011
- 42,743
- 15,951
- 2,250
- Thread starter
- #13
Ok, so they were amassing before Sadam's chemicals were discovered by the world, and this by his actual usage of them, but wouldn't this even make more sense for them to have went there (to Syria), because Syria had the capability also of handling them or storing them for safe keeping until or when ever ?The story is based on a 2006 book "Saddam's Secrets" written by former Iraqi general Georges Sada who claimed that the Iraqi Revolutionary Guard moved weapons of mass destruction into Syria in advance of the Iraq war but Syria has amassed huge supplies of mustard gas, sarin nerve agent and cyanide over the past four decades on its own and it did not have to rely on Iraq's WMD which had reportedly been transferred to Syria just before the invasion by unmarked trucks that mysteriously crossed the border into Syria.
Many Of Syria's Chemical Weapons May Have Come From Saddam Hussein's Iraq - Investors.com
- Nov 28, 2011
- 42,743
- 15,951
- 2,250
- Thread starter
- #14
So Syria has been making new batches of Sarin Gas or keeps fresh new batches of chemical weapons, because it has no way of storing or keeping fresh the old batches or weapons ?The shelf life of Sarin, which is the chemical weapon being discussed is a few weeks. The chemicals before being mixed, 5 years.
- Nov 28, 2011
- 42,743
- 15,951
- 2,250
- Thread starter
- #15
The story is based on a 2006 book "Saddam's Secrets" written by former Iraqi general Georges Sada who claimed that the Iraqi Revolutionary Guard moved weapons of mass destruction into Syria in advance of the Iraq war but Syria has amassed huge supplies of mustard gas, sarin nerve agent and cyanide over the past four decades on its own and it did not have to rely on Iraq's WMD which had reportedly been transferred to Syria just before the invasion by unmarked trucks that mysteriously crossed the border into Syria.
Many Of Syria's Chemical Weapons May Have Come From Saddam Hussein's Iraq - Investors.com
Ok so my question is now, if these things have no shelf life hardly, then why would anyone amass them over the years or decades as you say ? Otherwise are they amassing the conponents of the weapons is what you mean, in which will last if they are not mixed for usage, and if so, couldn't it have been the conponents that they recieved from Sadam as well over that border ?
The story is based on a 2006 book "Saddam's Secrets" written by former Iraqi general Georges Sada who claimed that the Iraqi Revolutionary Guard moved weapons of mass destruction into Syria in advance of the Iraq war but Syria has amassed huge supplies of mustard gas, sarin nerve agent and cyanide over the past four decades on its own and it did not have to rely on Iraq's WMD which had reportedly been transferred to Syria just before the invasion by unmarked trucks that mysteriously crossed the border into Syria.
Many Of Syria's Chemical Weapons May Have Come From Saddam Hussein's Iraq - Investors.com
Ok so my question is now, if these things have no shelf life hardly, then why would anyone amass them over the years or decades as you say ? Otherwise are they amassing the conponents of the weapons is what you mean, in which will last if they are not mixed for usage, and if so, couldn't it have been the conponents that they recieved from Sadam as well over that border ?
I'll stick with post #9, maybe we can get some liberals to volunteer...
- Nov 28, 2011
- 42,743
- 15,951
- 2,250
- Thread starter
- #17
Firing scud missles now eh ? Wonder where they got them from ?Was Bush and his team right, only that Sadam out foxed them all by sending these weapons into Syria ? Now Syria might use them ?
You might have something there...
American_Jihad, beagle9, ThirdTerm, AmyNation, et al,
First, let me say, that I'm not a CHEM/BIO Weapons expert (if there is such a thing). There are designers, and handlers, disposals and transport/disposal experts, etc, but they all have limitations. I have looked at the threat.
There is no absolute hard and fast rule on "shelf-life." Chemical Weapons (CW) have a much longer shelf-life (storage stability and volatility) than do typical Biological Weapons (BW). What we are talking about here is in the broad category of CW.
The confusion about the "Shelf Life" of CW has to do more with a lack of understanding of how countries like Iraq invest in production, storage and transport of the material and the cost to maintain a program. Attempts to think like an American regarding this topic, invariably leads to incorrect outcomes; as the Iraq Survey Group (ISG) discovered in the post-Conflict investigation. An American produced product is going to have a longer shelf life than the chemical equivalent produced by a third-world nation. The production is easier if a third world country is basing its program on the level to produce a a high quantity but low-quality agent for immediate use, as Iraq did in its combat bid against Iran. There is equally a difference if the production is based on a purpose to develop countermeasures to the use of various CWs employed against the allied.
In the early 1990's immediately prior to the Iraqi discontinuance of its CW Programs, "Iraq's unitary agents are unstable with a shelf-life of 4-6 weeks."
I hope, in some way, this will help in understanding the issue, and what the pre-conflict belief was and what the post-conflict findings were.
Relative to Air Vice-Marshal Sada's claim; he is doing what all Flag Officers do when they are trying to sell their book. Do to the sensitivity of the Issue and the many who don't want to believe that Iraq was not a WMD Threat (or as David Kay said: "We were all wrong."). The ISG Final was written in political-ese. And the VAM took complete advantage of it.
Most Respectfully,
R
First, let me say, that I'm not a CHEM/BIO Weapons expert (if there is such a thing). There are designers, and handlers, disposals and transport/disposal experts, etc, but they all have limitations. I have looked at the threat.
There is no absolute hard and fast rule on "shelf-life." Chemical Weapons (CW) have a much longer shelf-life (storage stability and volatility) than do typical Biological Weapons (BW). What we are talking about here is in the broad category of CW.
Nerve Agents
- Tabun (GA),
- Sarin (GB),
- Soman (GD)
- Cyclosarin (GF)
- O-ethyl (VX),
- Levinstein mustard (HS),
- Pyro or Distilled Mustard (HD),
- Lewisite (HL),
- Nitrogen Mustard (HN)
- HN-1,
- HN-2,
- HN-3
- Sesquimustard (HQ),
- Runcol or Mustard T (HT),
(COMMENT)The story is based on a 2006 book "Saddam's Secrets" written by former Iraqi general Georges Sada who claimed that the Iraqi Revolutionary Guard moved weapons of mass destruction into Syria in advance of the Iraq war but Syria has amassed huge supplies of mustard gas, sarin nerve agent and cyanide over the past four decades on its own and it did not have to rely on Iraq's WMD which had reportedly been transferred to Syria just before the invasion by unmarked trucks that mysteriously crossed the border into Syria.
Many Of Syria's Chemical Weapons May Have Come From Saddam Hussein's Iraq - Investors.com
Ok so my question is now, if these things have no shelf life hardly, then why would anyone amass them over the years or decades as you say ? Otherwise are they amassing the conponents of the weapons is what you mean, in which will last if they are not mixed for usage, and if so, couldn't it have been the conponents that they recieved from Sadam as well over that border ?
I'll stick with post #9, maybe we can get some liberals to volunteer...
Sarin - New World Encyclopedia
Dictionary - Definition of Sarin
Sarin Nerve Gas
^^bunch of links that say "no more than 5 years"
I'M sure we can get some of those experts in a room and open up one of those bad boys, hell maybe Peta will OK the use of a wabbit...
The confusion about the "Shelf Life" of CW has to do more with a lack of understanding of how countries like Iraq invest in production, storage and transport of the material and the cost to maintain a program. Attempts to think like an American regarding this topic, invariably leads to incorrect outcomes; as the Iraq Survey Group (ISG) discovered in the post-Conflict investigation. An American produced product is going to have a longer shelf life than the chemical equivalent produced by a third-world nation. The production is easier if a third world country is basing its program on the level to produce a a high quantity but low-quality agent for immediate use, as Iraq did in its combat bid against Iran. There is equally a difference if the production is based on a purpose to develop countermeasures to the use of various CWs employed against the allied.
In the early 1990's immediately prior to the Iraqi discontinuance of its CW Programs, "Iraq's unitary agents are unstable with a shelf-life of 4-6 weeks."
Page 58 FAS Link 3 - SIMPLICITY V. SHELF-LIFE said:The sophistication of the production technology required to manufacture agents depends on
the urgency of a countrys military requirements. If a country has no immediate need to use CW agents and plans to stockpile them for several years, the agents will require along shelf-life and must therefore be produced with high purity. If a country is producing nerve agents for immediate use in battle, however, it can afford to make a less pure product by eliminating the distillation step or the use of stabilizing additives.
ISG Key Findings CW LINK 6 said:Reflecting those perceptions, and in a bid to create a strategic deterrent, MSE turned immediately after the Iran-Iraq war to a strategy for maintaining an offensive CW capability in peacetime. With the end of the war in August 1988, MSE stopped CW agent production, and focused on production of marketable products while continuing research to improve production techniques, agent purity, and shelf life, although it restarted production in 1990.
- Al Muthannas CW nerve agents contained impurities that affected agent stability and thus limited the shelf life of stored filled munitions and bulk agent. This had not mattered during the Iran-Iraq War, when Iraq was using agent as fast as it could produce it, but given Iraqs intent to use chemical weapons as a strategic deterrent, some stockpiling was essential.
I hope, in some way, this will help in understanding the issue, and what the pre-conflict belief was and what the post-conflict findings were.
Relative to Air Vice-Marshal Sada's claim; he is doing what all Flag Officers do when they are trying to sell their book. Do to the sensitivity of the Issue and the many who don't want to believe that Iraq was not a WMD Threat (or as David Kay said: "We were all wrong."). The ISG Final was written in political-ese. And the VAM took complete advantage of it.
Most Respectfully,
R
References:
Subject: STABILITY OF IRAQ'S CW STOCKPILE
Not Finally Evaluated Intelligence
LINK 1: Subject: STABILITY OF IRAQ'S CW STOCKPILE
Not Finally Evaluated Intelligence
LINK 1: Subject: STABILITY OF IRAQ'S CW STOCKPILE
Muthanna State Establishment, Samarra
Chemical agents included mustard gas, Sarin, Tabun, and VX.
LINK 2: https://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/iraq/facility/muthanna.htm
Chemical agents included mustard gas, Sarin, Tabun, and VX.
LINK 2: https://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/iraq/facility/muthanna.htm
Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction
December 1993
LINK 3: http://www.fas.org/ota/reports/9344.pdf
December 1993
LINK 3: http://www.fas.org/ota/reports/9344.pdf
Subject: SHELF LIFE OF IRAQ'S CW AGENTS
Not Finally Evaluated Intelligence
LINK 5: Subject: SHELF LIFE OF IRAQ'S CW AGENTS
Not Finally Evaluated Intelligence
LINK 5: Subject: SHELF LIFE OF IRAQ'S CW AGENTS
CIA: Iraq Survey Group Final Report
Chapter 5: Iraqs Chemical Warfare Program
LINK 6: https://www.cia.gov/library/reports/general-reports-1/iraq_wmd_2004/chap5.html
Chapter 5: Iraqs Chemical Warfare Program
LINK 6: https://www.cia.gov/library/reports/general-reports-1/iraq_wmd_2004/chap5.html
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