In a recent post, I said that I thought that the courts would find against the Arizona bill...
looks like I, and those who felt the same way, was wrong.
It seems that the Supreme Court has actually found that reasonable suspicion is not required to question about immigration status, so the Arizona bill is actually more stringent than federal law...
Who knew.
And the Arizona law doesn't determines who should or should not be admitted or the conditions under which a legal entrant may remain...so no Constitutional impact.
"The Court of Appeals also determined that the officers violated Menas Fourth Amendent rights by questioning her about her immigration status during the detention. 332 F.3d, at 12641266. This holding, it appears, was premised on the assumption that the officers were required to have independent reasonable suspicion in order to question Mena concerning her immigration status because the questioning constituted a discrete Fourth Amendent event. But the premise is faulty. We have held repeatedly that mere police questioning does not constitute a seizure. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991); see also INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 212 (1984).
[E]ven when officers have no basis for suspecting a particular individual, they may generally ask questions of that individual; ask to examine the individuals identification; and request consent to search his or her luggage. Bostick, supra, at 434435 (citations omitted). As the Court of Appeals did not hold that the detention was prolonged by the questioning, there was no additional seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendent. Hence, the officers did not need reasonable suspicion to ask Mena for her name, date and place of birth, or immigration status.
Our recent opinion in Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. ___ (2005), is instructive. There, we held that a dog sniff performed during a traffic stop does not violate the Fourth Amendent. We noted that a lawful seizure can become unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete that mission, but accepted the state courts determination that the duration of the stop was not extended by the dog sniff. Id., at ___ (slip op., at 23). Because we held that a dog sniff was not a search subject to the Fourth Amendent, we rejected the notion that the shift in purpose from a lawful traffic stop into a drug investigation was unlawful because it was not supported by any reasonable suspicion. Id., at ___ (slip op., at 34). Likewise here, the initial Summers detention was lawful; the Court of Appeals did not find that the questioning extended the time Mena was detained. Thus no additional Fourth Amendent justification for inquiring about Menas immigration status was required."
MUEHLER V. MENA
looks like I, and those who felt the same way, was wrong.
It seems that the Supreme Court has actually found that reasonable suspicion is not required to question about immigration status, so the Arizona bill is actually more stringent than federal law...
Who knew.
And the Arizona law doesn't determines who should or should not be admitted or the conditions under which a legal entrant may remain...so no Constitutional impact.
"The Court of Appeals also determined that the officers violated Menas Fourth Amendent rights by questioning her about her immigration status during the detention. 332 F.3d, at 12641266. This holding, it appears, was premised on the assumption that the officers were required to have independent reasonable suspicion in order to question Mena concerning her immigration status because the questioning constituted a discrete Fourth Amendent event. But the premise is faulty. We have held repeatedly that mere police questioning does not constitute a seizure. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991); see also INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 212 (1984).
[E]ven when officers have no basis for suspecting a particular individual, they may generally ask questions of that individual; ask to examine the individuals identification; and request consent to search his or her luggage. Bostick, supra, at 434435 (citations omitted). As the Court of Appeals did not hold that the detention was prolonged by the questioning, there was no additional seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendent. Hence, the officers did not need reasonable suspicion to ask Mena for her name, date and place of birth, or immigration status.
Our recent opinion in Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. ___ (2005), is instructive. There, we held that a dog sniff performed during a traffic stop does not violate the Fourth Amendent. We noted that a lawful seizure can become unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete that mission, but accepted the state courts determination that the duration of the stop was not extended by the dog sniff. Id., at ___ (slip op., at 23). Because we held that a dog sniff was not a search subject to the Fourth Amendent, we rejected the notion that the shift in purpose from a lawful traffic stop into a drug investigation was unlawful because it was not supported by any reasonable suspicion. Id., at ___ (slip op., at 34). Likewise here, the initial Summers detention was lawful; the Court of Appeals did not find that the questioning extended the time Mena was detained. Thus no additional Fourth Amendent justification for inquiring about Menas immigration status was required."
MUEHLER V. MENA
