SCOTUS: 2nd Amendment and what the majority said.

[AtlasShrieked]

here we go...
Text

The Second Amendment, as passed by the House and Senate, reads:
“A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”

The original and copies distributed to the states, and then ratified by them, had different capitalization and punctuation:
“A well regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the People to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed.”

Both versions are commonly used in official government publications. The original hand-written copy of the Bill of Rights, approved by the House and Senate, was prepared by scribe William Lambert and hangs in the National Archives.
​

Held:
1. The Second Amendment protects an individual right to possess a
firearm unconnected with service in a militia, and to use that arm for
traditionally lawful purposes, such as self-defense within the home.

Pp. 2–53.
(a) The Amendment’s prefatory clause announces a purpose, but
does not limit or expand the scope of the second part, the operative
clause. The operative clause’s text and history demonstrate that it
connotes an individual right to keep and bear arms.

Pp. 2–22.
(b) The prefatory clause comports with the Court’s interpretation of the operative clause.
The “militia” comprised all males physically capable of acting in concert for the common defense.
The Antifederalists feared that the Federal Government would disarm the people in
order to disable this citizens’ militia, enabling a politicized standing
army or a select militia to rule. The response was to deny Congress
power to abridge the ancient right of individuals to keep and bear
arms, so that the ideal of a citizens’ militia would be preserved.

Pp. 22–28.
(c) The Court’s interpretation is confirmed by analogous arms-
bearing rights in state constitutions that preceded and immediately
followed the Second Amendment.

Pp. 28–30.
(d) The Second Amendment’s drafting history, while of dubious
interpretive worth, reveals three state Second Amendment proposals
that unequivocally referred to an individual right to bear arms.

Pp. 30–32.
(e) Interpretation of the Second Amendment by scholars, courts
and legislators, from immediately after its ratification through the
late 19th century also supports the Court’s conclusion.

Pp. 32–47.
(f) None of the Court’s precedents forecloses the Court’s interpre-
tation. Neither United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542, 553, nor
Presser v. Illinois, 116 U. S. 252, 264–265, refutes the individual-
rights interpretation. United States v. Miller, 307 U. S. 174, does not
limit the right to keep and bear arms to militia purposes, but rather
limits the type of weapon to which the right applies to those used by
the militia, i.e., those in common use for lawful purposes.

Pp. 47–54.
2. Like most rights, the Second Amendment right is not unlimited.
It is not a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any
manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose: For example, con-
cealed weapons prohibitions have been upheld under the Amendment
or state analogues. The Court’s opinion should not be taken to cast
doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by
felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of fire-
arms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or
laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of
arms. Miller’s holding that the sorts of weapons protected are those
“in common use at the time” finds support in the historical tradition
of prohibiting the carrying of dangerous and unusual weapons.

Pp. 54–56.
3. The handgun ban and the trigger-lock requirement (as applied to
self-defense) violate the Second Amendment. The District’s total ban
on handgun possession in the home amounts to a prohibition on an
entire class of “arms” that Americans overwhelmingly choose for the
lawful purpose of self-defense. Under any of the standards of scru-
tiny the Court has applied to enumerated constitutional rights,
this prohibition—in the place where the importance of the lawful defense
of self, family, and property is most acute—would fail constitutional
muster. Similarly, the requirement that any lawful firearm in the
home be disassembled or bound by a trigger lock makes it impossible
for citizens to use arms for the core lawful purpose of self-defense and
is hence unconstitutional. Because Heller conceded at oral argument
that the D. C. licensing law is permissible if it is not enforced arbi-
trarily and capriciously, the Court assumes that a license will satisfy
his prayer for relief and does not address the licensing requirement.
Assuming he is not disqualified from exercising Second Amendment
rights, the District must permit Heller to register his handgun and
must issue him a license to carry it in the home.

Pp. 56–64.

478 F. 3d 370, affirmed.

SCALIA, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS,
C. J., and KENNEDY, THOMAS, and ALITO, JJ., joined. STEVENS, J., filed a
dissenting opinion, in which SOUTER, GINSBURG, and BREYER, JJ.,
joined. BREYER, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which STEVENS,
SOUTER, and GINSBURG, JJ., joined.

 

[AtlasShrieked]

no dissenting opinions online yet?

I have two: Stevens and Breyer.

 

[jillian]

This is the entire decision if you don't have it already

http://www.supremecourtus.gov/opinions/07pdf/07-290.pdf

I know Scalia said the above, but he also said:

the court held that the individual right to possess a gun “for traditionally lawful purposes, such as self-defense within the home” is not unlimited. “It is not a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose,” Justice Scalia wrote.

The ruling does not mean, for instance, that laws against carrying concealed weapons are to be swept aside. Furthermore, Justice Scalia wrote, “The court’s opinion should not be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.”

http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/27/washington/27scotuscnd.html?_r=2&oref=slogin&oref=slogin

 

[RetiredGySgt]

The decision is a good one. It establishes that the 2nd is an Individual right while also establishing it has limits.

 

[AtlasShrieked]

The decision is a good one. It establishes that the 2nd is an Individual right while also establishing it has limits.

I will have to agree, tentatively to reading and trying to absorb the whole document and it's meaning.

 

[AtlasShrieked]

This is the entire decision if you don't have it already

http://www.supremecourtus.gov/opinions/07pdf/07-290.pdf

I know Scalia said the above, but he also said:



http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/27/washington/27scotuscnd.html?_r=2&oref=slogin&oref=slogin

thanks. I was looking for a PDF file of the decision to read at my leisure. I have it.

I have a feeling this decision will not look so good after reading it all. I can see holes wide enough to drive a semi through already...maybe it gets tied up later.

I'll have to then see what Stevens and Breyer had to say.

 

[AtlasShrieked]

uh oh!

Houston, we have a problem...​

Cite as: 554 U. S. ____ (2008) ​

BREYER, J., dissenting

Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the
right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be
infringed.” In interpreting and applying this Amendment,
I take as a starting point the following four propositions,
based on our precedent and today’s opinions, to which I
believe the entire Court subscribes:

(1) The Amendment protects an “individual” right—i.e.,
one that is separately possessed, and may be separately
enforced, by each person on whom it is conferred. See,
e.g., ante, at 22 (opinion of the Court); ante, at 1 (STEVENS,
J., dissenting).

(2) As evidenced by its preamble, the Amendment was
adopted “[w]ith obvious purpose to assure the continuation
and render possible the effectiveness of [militia] forces.”
United States v. Miller, 307 U. S. 174, 178 (1939); see
ante, at 26 (opinion of the Court); ante, at 1 (STEVENS, J.,
dissenting).

(3) The Amendment “must be interpreted and applied
with that end in view.” Miller, supra, at 178.

(4) The right protected by the Second Amendment is not
absolute, but instead is subject to government regulation.
See Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U. S. 275, 281–282 (1897);
ante, at 22, 54 (opinion of the Court).


My approach to this case, while involving the first three
points, primarily concerns the fourth. I shall, as I said,
assume with the majority that the Amendment, in addi-
tion to furthering a militia-related purpose, also furthers
an interest in possessing guns for purposes of self-defense,
at least to some degree. And I shall then ask whether the
Amendment nevertheless permits the District handgun
restriction at issue here.

Although I adopt for present purposes the majority’s
position that the Second Amendment embodies a general
concern about self-defense, I shall not assume that the
Amendment contains a specific untouchable right to keep
guns in the house to shoot burglars. The majority, which
presents evidence in favor of the former proposition, does
not, because it cannot, convincingly show that the Second
Amendment seeks to maintain the latter in pristine, un-
regulated form.

To the contrary, colonial history itself offers important
examples of the kinds of gun regulation that citizens
would then have thought compatible with the “right to
keep and bear arms,” whether embodied in Federal or
State Constitutions, or the background common law. And
those examples include substantial regulation of firearms
in urban areas, including regulations that imposed obsta-
cles to the use of firearms for the protection of the home.

Boston, Philadelphia, and New York City, the three
largest cities in America during that period, all restricted
the firing of guns within city limits to at least some de-
gree. See Churchill, Gun Regulation, the Police Power,
and the Right to Keep Arms in Early America, 25 Law &
Hist. Rev. 139, 162 (2007); Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of
Census, C. Gibson, Population of the 100 Largest Cities
and Other Urban Places in the United States: 1790 to
1990 (1998) (Table 2), online at Census Bureau Home Page
population/documentation/twps0027/tab02.txt (all Inter-
net materials as visited June 19, 2008, and available in
Clerk of Court’s case file).

Boston in 1746 had a law pro-
hibiting the “discharge” of “any Gun or Pistol charged with
Shot or Ball in the Town” on penalty of 40 shillings, a law
that was later revived in 1778. See Act of May 28, 1746,
ch. 10; An Act for Reviving and Continuing Sundry Laws
that are Expired, and Near Expiring, 1778 Massachusetts
Session Laws, ch. 5, pp. 193, 194.

Philadelphia prohibited,
on penalty of 5 shillings (or two days in jail if the fine were
not paid), firing a gun or setting off fireworks in Philadel-
phia without a “governor’s special license.” See Act of
Aug. 26, 1721, §4, in 3 Mitchell, Statutes at Large of
Pennsylvania 253–254.

And New York City banned, on
penalty of a 20-shilling fine, the firing of guns (even in houses)
for the three days surrounding New Year’s Day.
5 Colonial Laws of New York, ch. 1501, pp. 244–246 (1894);

see also An Act to Suppress the Disorderly Practice of
Firing Guns, & c., on the Times Therein Mentioned, 8
Statutes at Large of Pennsylvania 1770–1776, pp. 410–
412 (1902) (similar law for all “inhabited parts” of Penn-
sylvania).

See also An Act for preventing Mischief being
done in the Town of Newport, or in any other Town in this
Government, 1731, Rhode Island Session Laws (prohibit-
ing, on penalty of 5 shillings for a first offense and more
for subsequent offenses, the firing of “any Gun or Pistol
. . . in the Streets of any of the Towns of this Government,
or in any Tavern of the same, after dark, on any Night
whatsoever”).


Furthermore, several towns and cities (including Phila-
delphia, New York, and Boston) regulated, for fire-safety
reasons, the storage of gunpowder, a necessary component
of an operational firearm.

See Cornell & DeDino, A Well Regulated Right,
73 Fordham L. Rev. 487, 510–512 (2004).
Boston’s law in particular impacted the use of firearms in
the home very much as the District’s law does today.
Boston’s gunpowder law imposed a £10 fine upon “any
Person” who “shall take into any Dwelling-House, Stable,
Barn, Out-house, Ware-house, Store, Shop, or other Build-
ing, within the Town of Boston, any . . . Fire-Arm, loaded
with, or having Gun-Powder.”

An Act in Addition to the several Acts already
made for the prudent Storage of Gun-
Powder within the Town of Boston, ch. XIII, 1783 Mass.
Acts 218–219; see also 1 S. Johnson, A Dictionary of the
English Language 751 (4th ed. 1773) (defining “firearms”
as “[a]rms which owe their efficacy to fire; guns”).

Even assuming, as the majority does, see ante, at 59–60, that
this law included an implicit self-defense exception, it
would nevertheless have prevented a homeowner from
keeping in his home a gun that he could immediately pick
up and use against an intruder.

Rather, the homeowner

wow, there's more and who has the better argument---the majority or the minority?

 

[AtlasShrieked]

The New York City law, which required that gunpowder
in the home be stored in certain sorts of containers, and
laws in certain Pennsylvania towns, which required that
gunpowder be stored on the highest story of the home,
could well have presented similar obstacles to in-home use
of firearms. See Act of April 13, 1784, ch. 28, 1784 N. Y.
Laws p. 627; An Act for Erecting the Town of Carlisle, in
the County of Cumberland, into a Borough, ch. XIV,
§XLII, 1782 Pa. Laws p. 49; An Act for Erecting the Town
of Reading, in the County of Berks, into a Borough, ch.
LXXVI, §XLII, 1783 Pa. Laws p. 211.

Although it is unclear whether these laws,
like the Boston law, would have prohibited the storage
of gunpowder inside a firearm, they would at the very
least have made it difficult to reload the gun to fire
a second shot unless the homeowner happened
to be in the portion of the house where the extra gunpow-
der was required to be kept. See 7 United States Encyclo-
pedia of History 1297 (P. Oehser ed. 1967) (“Until 1835 all
small arms [were] single-shot weapons, requiring reload-
ing by hand after every shot&#8221. And Pennsylvania, like
Massachusetts, had at the time one of the self-defense-
guaranteeing state constitutional provisions on which the
majority relies. See ante, at 28 (citing Pa. Declaration of
Rights, Art. XIII (1776), in 5 Thorpe 3083).

The majority criticizes my citation of these colonial laws.
See ante, at 59–62. But, as much as it tries, it cannot
ignore their existence. I suppose it is possible that, as the
majority suggests, see ante, at 59–61, they all in practice
contained self-defense exceptions. But none of them ex-
pressly provided one, and the majority’s assumption that
such exceptions existed relies largely on the preambles to
these acts—an interpretive methodology that it elsewhere
roundly derides. Compare ibid. (interpreting 18th-century
statutes in light of their preambles), with ante, at 4–5, and
n. 3 (contending that the operative language of an 18th-
century enactment may extend beyond its preamble). And
in any event, as I have shown, the gunpowder-storage
laws would have burdened armed self-defense, even if they
did not completely prohibit it.

This historical evidence demonstrates that a self-
defense assumption is the beginning, rather than the end,
of any constitutional inquiry. That the District law im-
pacts self-defense merely raises questions about the law’s
constitutionality.

But to answer the questions that are
raised (that is, to see whether the statute is unconstitu-
tional) requires us to focus on practicalities, the statute’s
rationale, the problems that called it into being, its relation
to those objectives—in a word, the details.

There are no purely logical or conceptual answers to such questions.
All of which to say that to raise a self-defense question is
not to answer it.

yep. may be trouble down the road.

the devil is in the details

 

[AtlasShrieked]

Cite as: 554 U. S. ____ (2008)

STEVENS, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 07–290

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, ET AL., PETITIONERS v.DICK ANTHONY HELLER

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

[June 26, 2008]

JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom JUSTICE SOUTER, JUSTICE
GINSBURG, and JUSTICE BREYER join, dissenting.

The question presented by this case is not whether the
Second Amendment protects a “collective right” or an
“individual right.” Surely it protects a right that can be
enforced by individuals. But a conclusion that the Second
Amendment protects an individual right does not tell us
anything about the scope of that right.

Guns are used to hunt, for self-defense, to commit
crimes, for sporting activities, and to perform military
duties. The Second Amendment plainly does not protect
the right to use a gun to rob a bank; it is equally clear that
it does encompass the right to use weapons for certain
military purposes. Whether it also protects the right to
possess and use guns for nonmilitary purposes like hunt*
ing and personal self-defense is the question presented by
this case. The text of the Amendment, its history, and our
decision in United States v. Miller, 307 U. S. 174 (1939),
provide a clear answer to that question.

The Second Amendment was adopted to protect the
right of the people of each of the several States to main*
tain a well-regulated militia. It was a response to con*
cerns raised during the ratification of the Constitution
that the power of Congress to disarm the state militias
and create a national standing army posed an intolerable
threat to the sovereignty of the several States.

Neither
the text of the Amendment nor the arguments advanced
by its proponents evidenced the slightest interest in limit*
ing any legislature’s authority to regulate private civilian
uses of firearms. Specifically, there is no indication that
the Framers of the Amendment intended to enshrine the
common-law right of self-defense in the Constitution.

In 1934, Congress enacted the National Firearms Act,
the first major federal firearms law.1 Upholding a convic*
tion under that Act, this Court held that, “n the absence
of any evidence tending to show that possession or use of a
‘shotgun having a barrel of less than eighteen inches in
length’ at this time has some reasonable relationship to
the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia,
we cannot say that the Second Amendment guarantees the
right to keep and bear such an instrument.”

Miller, 307
U. S., at 178.

The view of the Amendment we took in
Miller—that it protects the right to keep and bear arms
for certain military purposes, but that it does not curtail
the Legislature’s power to regulate the nonmilitary use
and ownership of weapons—is both the most natural
reading of the Amendment’s text and the interpretation
most faithful to the history of its adoption.

Since our decision in Miller, hundreds of judges have
relied on the view of the Amendment we endorsed there;
we ourselves affirmed it in 1980. See Lewis v. United
States, 445 U. S. 55, 65–66, n. 8 (1980).3 No new evidence
has surfaced since 1980 supporting the view that the
Amendment was intended to curtail the power of Congress
to regulate civilian use or misuse of weapons. Indeed, a
review of the drafting history of the Amendment demon*
strates that its Framers rejected proposals that would
have broadened its coverage to include such uses.

The opinion the Court announces today fails to identify
any new evidence supporting the view that the Amend*
ment was intended to limit the power of Congress to regu*
late civilian uses of weapons. Unable to point to any such
evidence, the Court stakes its holding on a strained and
unpersuasive reading of the Amendment’s text; signifi*
cantly different provisions in the 1689 English Bill of
Rights, and in various 19th-century State Constitutions;
postenactment commentary that was available to the
Court when it decided Miller; and, ultimately, a feeble
attempt to distinguish Miller that places more emphasis
on the Court’s decisional process than on the reasoning in
the opinion itself. ​

 

[BrianH]

This is the entire decision if you don't have it already

http://www.supremecourtus.gov/opinions/07pdf/07-290.pdf

I know Scalia said the above, but he also said:



http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/27/washington/27scotuscnd.html?_r=2&oref=slogin&oref=slogin

All their doing IMO is making sure that the gun owning crazies that are out their (AKA Dale Gribble) don't start toting a gun around without the proper licensing. The SC is upholding to right to own guns while insisting that citizens still follow the current gun-laws in place. (I.E. Concealed Carry License, etc...) They're basically saying that it is unconstitutional to band people from owning guns like the D.C. ban suggests. It is unconstitutional to inact gun laws that prohibit people from owning a certain type of gun, much less direct people what they may or may not do in their own home. Basically, the SC doesn't want people to start wearing guns on their hips like the Old West just because the SC said it was ok to own guns...

 

[AtlasShrieked]

All their doing IMO is making sure that the gun owning crazies that are out their (AKA Dale Gribble) don't start toting a gun around without the proper licensing. The SC is upholding to right to own guns while insisting that citizens still follow the current gun-laws in place. (I.E. Concealed Carry License, etc...) They're basically saying that it is unconstitutional to band people from owning guns like the D.C. ban suggests. It is unconstitutional to inact gun laws that prohibit people from owning a certain type of gun, much less direct people what they may or may not do in their own home. Basically, the SC doesn't want people to start wearing guns on their hips like the Old West just because the SC said it was ok to own guns...

While you are right on some things, this is a doozie "They're basically saying that it is unconstitutional to band people from owning guns like the D.C. ban suggests."

The court said much more than that.

I'm still digesting it. I suggest you do some homework too before you start acting like you deserve some kind if respect for uninformed posts posing as informed advice/opinion.

good day
8)

 

[BrianH]

While you are right on some things, this is a doozie "They're basically saying that it is unconstitutional to band people from owning guns like the D.C. ban suggests."

The court said much more than that.

I'm still digesting it. I suggest you do some homework too before you start acting like you deserve some kind if respect for uninformed posts posing as informed advice/opinion.

good day
8)

I'm not addressing "much more" now am I? The Court ruled against the D.C. gun ban...correct? However, they do not rule against individuals right to own a fire-arm for law-abiding purposes--which includes hunting. You also posted, in another thread, that mental patients would be in line to sign up for guns, then posted above an excerpt that address mental patients. The SC is against the D.C. gun ban, but still upholds current gun-laws and regulation there of.

 

[AtlasShrieked]

I'm not addressing "much more" now am I? The Court ruled against the D.C. gun ban...correct? However, they do not rule against individuals right to own a fire-arm for law-abiding purposes--which includes hunting. You also posted, in another thread, that mental patients would be in line to sign up for guns, then posted above an excerpt that address mental patients. The SC is against the D.C. gun ban, but still upholds current gun-laws and regulation there of.

um, you have it wrong. that would be SnowGums. he is unclear after all his time here on how to use the quote feature.

you're welcome
8)

 

[indago]

From the Opinion of the Court in District of Columbia v Heller:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
There seems to us no doubt, on the basis of both text and history, that the Second Amendment conferred an individual right to keep and bear arms.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------

Now, that's scary! We all know that the Second Amendment didn't confer any rights at all, but recognized an already existing right. The Supreme Court recognized this over a hundred years ago: "The right there specified is that of 'bearing arms for a lawful purpose.' This is not a right granted by the Constitution. Neither is it in any manner dependent upon that instrument for its existence." — US v Cruikshank, 1875

It's amazing, sometimes, what the POWERS will try to shove down our throats and up our ass...

 

[AtlasShrieked]

From the Opinion of the Court in District of Columbia v Heller:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
There seems to us no doubt, on the basis of both text and history, that the Second Amendment conferred an individual right to keep and bear arms.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------

Now, that's scary! We all know that the Second Amendment didn't confer any rights at all, but recognized an already existing right. The Supreme Court recognized this over a hundred years ago: "The right there specified is that of 'bearing arms for a lawful purpose.' This is not a right granted by the Constitution. Neither is it in any manner dependent upon that instrument for its existence." — US v Cruikshank, 1875

It's amazing, sometimes, what the POWERS will try to shove down our throats and up our ass...

The more I go over Stevens' and Breyer's dissenting opinions I am of the opinion that the court got it right for all the wrong reasons.

I disagreed with the D.C. law and it's enforcement by the authorities.

 

[AtlasShrieked]

maybe we can link this to the blowhardo thread?

Ratification



The 13 colonies in 1775
It was within the power of the old Congress to expedite or block the ratification of the new Constitution. The document which the Philadelphia Convention presented was technically only a revision of the Articles of Confederation. But the last article of the new instrument provided that when ratified by conventions in nine states, it should go into effect among the States so acting. In effect, Congress was asked to sanction a secession of nine States from the old Union which had been declared perpetual. Congress eventually yielded and passed the Constitution on to the States.

Then followed an arduous process of ratification of the Constitution by specially constituted conventions. The need for only nine states was a controversial decision at the time, since the Articles of Confederation could only be amended by unanimous vote of all the states. Despite this, the new Constitution was ratified by all 13 states within two and a half years.

Three members of the Convention—Madison, Gorham, and King—were also Members of Congress. They proceeded at once to New York, where Congress was in session, to placate the expected opposition. Aware of their vanishing authority, Congress on September 28, after some debate, unanimously decided to submit the Constitution to the States for action. It made no recommendation for or against adoption.[4]

Two parties soon developed, one in opposition (Antifederalists), and one in support (Federalists), of the Constitution, and the Constitution was debated, criticized, and expounded clause by clause. Hamilton, Madison, and Jay, under the name of "Publius," wrote a series of commentaries, now known as the Federalist Papers, in support of the new instrument of government.

These commentaries on the Constitution, written during the struggle for ratification, have been frequently cited by the Supreme Court as an authoritative contemporary interpretation of the meaning of its provisions. The closeness and bitterness of the struggle over ratification and the conferring of additional powers on the central government can scarcely be exaggerated. In some states, ratification was effected only after a bitter struggle in the state convention itself.

Delaware, on December 7, 1787, became the first State to ratify the new Constitution, the vote being unanimous. Pennsylvania ratified on December 12, 1787, by a vote of 46 to 23 (66.67%), a vote scarcely indicative of the struggle which had taken place in that State. New Jersey ratified on December 19, 1787, and Georgia on January 2, 1788, the vote in both was unanimous. In New York, fully two thirds of the convention were at first opposed to the Constitution. Hamilton led the Federalist campaign, including the fast-paced appearance of the Federalist Papers in New York newspapers.

An attempt to attach conditions to ratification almost succeeded, but on July 26, 1788, New York ratified, with a recommendation that a bill of rights be appended. The vote was close—yeas 30 (52.6%), nays 27—due largely to Hamilton's forensic abilities and his reaching a few key compromises with moderate anti-Federalists led by Melancton Smith. Opposition to ratification was led by Governor George Clinton.

The Continental Congress—which still functioned at irregular intervals—passed a resolution on September 13, 1788, to put the new Constitution into operation.

<*thh>

 

[nomdeplume]

I'm just blown away this is only a 5-4 victory for the contitution and the rights of Americans.

The "People" clearly refers to all people. A militia can be created at any given instance by drawing upon the "People", but only if the "People's" rights to own guns have not been taken away, hence no weapons. No guns, no militia. You don't even need to dive into the history it. It's simple logic, even though the history clearly demonstrates the obvious interpretation of the wording.

Do law schools require formal logic courses?? They need to start.

 

[Annie]

I'm just blown away this is only a 5-4 victory for the contitution and the rights of Americans.

The "People" clearly refers to all people. A militia can be created at any given instance by drawing upon the "People", but only if the "People's" rights to own guns have not been taken away, hence no weapons. No guns, no militia. You don't even need to dive into the history it. It's simple logic, even though the history clearly demonstrates the obvious interpretation of the wording.

Do law schools require formal logic courses?? They need to start.

Yep, if the court reflected the American people, the decision would have been 7-2. They don't. With that said: McCain should use this as a linchpin towards election. Obama will certainly use the war. May the best argument win.

 

[jillian]

Yep, if the court reflected the American people, the decision would have been 7-2. They don't. With that said: McCain should use this as a linchpin towards election. Obama will certainly use the war. May the best argument win.

Why should the court reflect the American people? If it did, Plessy v Ferguson would still be law.

And I'd argue strenuously with your 7 to 2 characterization and I'd suggest, strongly, that you'd find dramatic disparities between rural and urban populations.

 

[Annie]

Why should the court reflect the American people? If it did, Plessy v Ferguson would still be law.

And I'd argue strenuously with your 7 to 2 characterization and I'd suggest, strongly, that you'd find dramatic disparities between rural and urban populations.

Last I saw, over 70% of populace agreed with the individuals right argument.