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http://www.slate.com/id/2135343/
Rumsfeld Surrenders
The QDR dashes his dreams of military transformation.
By Fred Kaplan
Updated Friday, Feb. 3, 2006, at 6:19 PM ET
If Donald Rumsfeld were more likable, he might be a tragic figure. Consider the Quadrennial Defense Review, a 90-page document that the Pentagon issued today. Rumsfeld has lived for this moment these last two years. Amid the scandal of Abu Ghraib and the disastrous lack of planning for the war in Iraq, he has resisted calls for his resignation in order to solidify what he sees as his "legacy"the "transformation" of the U.S. military, which he hoped the QDR would embody and galvanize. And yet the document, in its finished form, is a muddle at best, an assortment of interesting ideas with no scheme for translating them into reality.
The report's preface attempts to disguise this failing. "The QDR is not a programmatic or budget document," it reads. "Instead, it reflects the thinking of the senior civilian and military leaders of the Department of Defense." This just isn't so. Here is the congressionally ordered mandate for this report:
The Secretary of Defense shall every four years conduct a comprehensive examination (to be known as a "quadrennial defense review") of the national defense strategy, force structure, force modernization plans, infrastructure, budget plan, and other elements of the defense program and policies of the United States with a view toward determining and expressing the defense strategy of the United States and establishing a defense program for the next 20 years. [Italics added.]
In other words, lawmakers weren't interested in learning about the secretary's "thinking." They wanted to know how his ideas and policies were related to actual programs and budgets. Rumsfeld knows this; he felt the same way and saw the QDR as the instrument through which he would overhaul the Pentagon's policies and practices. This is what he has failed to accomplish.
The document envisions a world where the U.S. military's main missions are homeland defense, the war on terrorism, and "irregular" or "asymmetric" warfare (i.e., wars against enemies that are not nation-states or that use weapons and strategies, such as roadside bombs, that make the most of their relative weaknesses). Much ink is spilled in discussing these new kinds of wars and the new kinds of soldier and command structures that they require. But look at what the Pentagon is really doing, how it's spending its vast sums of money (close to $500 billion next year, not including the cost of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan). With a few notable exceptions (most of them inexpensive), you'd think that we were still fighting the Soviet Union and that the Cold War were still raging on.
Rumsfeld intended to make lots of changes. Back in 2001, when he wrote his first (far more ambitious) QDR, he observed that military transformation required major changes in the budget; that new technologies couldn't be developed, built, or maintained unless many of the weapons geared to old-style warfare were dropped. In preparation for this new QDR, one of his chief aidesAndrew Marshall, the Pentagon's longtime director of net assessment, who coined the term "military transformation"recommended cutting the budget for tactical fighter planes by one-third. The newsletter InsideDefense.com recently quoted one senior official as saying, "Some people went into the QDR thinking that 'tac air' was going to be the piggy bank to pay for a lot of things."
But it was not to be. The fiscal year 2007 military budgetwhich Rumsfeld will present next weekimposes no cuts on the Air Force and Navy's Joint Strike Fighter program (a total of 2,443 planes over the next several years). It slightly boosts the number of F-22 stealth fighter planes to be built by 2010 from 178 to 183. And even the QDR touts a plan to deploy an additional aircraft carrier and to resume building two nuclear-powered submarines each year. What these (and many other) big-ticket items have to do with the new kinds of threats, or new kinds of warfare, is unclear.
The QDR does spell out a fourth military mission, beyond defending the homeland, fighting terrorism, and engaging in asymmetrical warfare"shaping the choices of countries at a strategic crossroad." This is Pentagon-speak, these days, for countering the potentially looming threat of China. This mission provides the intellectual gloss for the top brass to keep demanding the multibillion-dollar weapons systems that they've championed throughout their careersand for the powerful congressional leaders to keep funding these same systems, which bring so much money and jobs to their districts. (A case could be made for hedging against the possibility of an emergent, aggressive Chinabut not for doling out such a vast share of the military's procurement budget in its name, especially at the cost of more pressing and real threats.)
In the case of the generals and admirals, it's an insistence not so much on expensive weapons as on particular kinds of expensive weapons. The Air Force is run mainly by former fighter pilots, so they want to buy new tactical fighter planes like the F-22 and the JSF. The Navy is run by former carrier and submarine captains, so they want more carriers and submarines. This is perfectly natural; to their way of thinking, these sorts of weapons define what their branches of the armed forces is all about. Rumsfeld made a go at forging a new vision; but he's never had more than an abstract notion of this vision, he's had no sense of how to push it through, politically, bureaucratically, or strategically; and, in the end, he was outgunned by experienced officers who do know how to push their vision through, who have been around for a long time, and who will still be on the scene after Rumsfeld has moved back to Chicago.
At one point, the QDR reads: "Based on the Operational Availability analysis, other related assessments, and extensive senior leader discussions, the Department concluded that the size of today's forcesboth the Active and Reserve Components, across all Military Departmentsis appropriate to meet current and projected demands." This is Rumsfeld's ultimate surrender: the concession that, fundamentally, all's well; there's no need for structural changes.
The QDR does contain some important ideas that can be implemented, in part because they don't cost much money, in part because they've proved their worth in the last few wars: more Predator and Global Hawk drones; converting a few Trident submarine-launched missiles from nuclear to conventionally armed warheads; modernizing B-1 and B-52 bombers to enhance the U.S. ability to strike targets from long distances; continuing to break down the Army's combat units into more flexible, self-sustaining brigades.
There are other proposals whose fate we'll have to await: boosting the number of special operations forces; training future warriors to be as skilled in counterinsurgency as they are today in conventional combat; offering higher pay scales to those trained in foreign languages and cultures. These goals require moneyand a larger, better-educated pool of recruits. The money is lacking (Rumsfeld couldn't crack open the tac-air piggy bank), and the recruit base is diminishing in size and aptitude. The higher ranks are depleting as well. The QDR calls for rewarding "performance rather than longevity." Yet officer ranks are depleting so badly these days that nearly all captains are promoted to majors and nearly all majors are promoted to lieutenant colonels. There aren't enough people to demand good people. It's another example of a nice idea without a solid foundation.
For the last four and a half years, the checkbook has been wide open for anything called "national security." Rumsfeld and the chiefs got all the money they could wish for. Rather than use the opportunity to set priorities, they gorged. Now the well's run dry, the budget has to be cut, the priorities are set by those with the staying powerand that's one thing Rumsfeld doesn't have.
Fred Kaplan writes the "War Stories" column for Slate. He can be reached at [email protected].
CSM said:NATO, NATO, NATO....
Did you read anything I posted? Have you seen the QDR? I have and I can tell you that it is being totally misrepresented by those opinionists.
Does the defense industry make money? You betcha. Do they sometimes sell a pig in a poke? You betcha. Do retired generals (and all other ranks) get jobs with defense contractors after they retire? You betcha. Do contracotrs sometimes have to support and even operate the complex systems that are curretnly fielded? You betcha.
I will say this...I would rather have retired military joining the defense contractor teams out there than some college kid who doesn't know crap. At least the retired military guy has a glimmer of an idea of what the troops need and what works. There is no doubt that some of the systems cost a lot of money and there are good reasons for this.
Let us take the F-22. What makes it so special? It is not that it can fly higher and faster or carries a whole lot more firepower. What makes it really unique is that it is network enabled. What does that mean? Currently, most aircraft have voice communications only. That means when a soldier calls for an air strike, request has to go from the soldier, up through comm channels and over to the aircraft...alll by voice. In order to assure the ordnance is dropped in the right place (correct coordinates) at the right time, the data has to be repeated NINE times over that comm channel. This process can take anywhere from 20 minutes to a couple of hours.....not very efficient either. With network enabled aircraft the process takes seconds or at most a couple of minutes. Being networked enabled means the pilot can download imagery of the target, the GPS positions of friendly troops near the target and just about any other information he needs to reduce fratricide and have good effects on the enemy. Being networked enabled allows ground crews to monitor aircraft and pilot status too. It means reconnaissance data can be sent back to ground bases and soldiers in real time, giving them critical situational awareness as it happens and not having to wait until the aircraft lands, the recon data is downloaded to a computer from a pod, and the pilot is debriefed.
You cannot imagine (most people can't) the amount of research and development that goes in to this. It sounds simple..."Just put a computer in the plane" but what folks fail to realize is that you have to get a signal to the plane somehow that is capable of carrying encrypted digital traffic (two way). Things like antenna placement on the aircraft can cause the signal to be lost when the plane banks in a turn because the wings shadow the antenna....this is equivalent to your computer crashing at home and having to reboot...not good in combat. Things like co-site interference need to be addressed (for example, the plane's radar interfering with its radio). These are just a couple of the many many technical challenges that have to be resolved. Guess what. All that costs money.
People yelll and scream that he troops should have the right equipment when we send them to war. Those same people scream when they have to pay for it. They also think they are qualified to tell the military what they need when most of them have never experienced anything like combat. The closest they come is an overnight camping trip at a state park.
I sincerely wish that those who bitch about defense contractors and the defense industry would spend a few weeks on the ground in a combat environment. Then come back, tell us what they need. I would send them to WalMart, Radio Shack and any other commercial retailer to find it. I would wish them good luck with it. The military's needs are dynamic, they change with situation.
I guess we will have to agree to disagree. Here are some points that the talking head you cite did not get around to....NATO AIR said:Per "big" defense contractors responding to troops' needs:
http://www.strategypage.com/dls/articles/2005416010.asp
These firms have been bilking the military for so long they're scared to death of new competition that actually offers a better product for a good price.
Our military-industrial complex is out of control. Bilking the military should become a crime punishable by death. That might stop the hijinks of firms from Boeing to Lockheed who have ripped off the AF, Navy and Marines for years with nothing more than a slap on the wrist. Worst of all has been the collusion of several of our retired officers in this matter and others, does Duke Cunningham ring a bell?
In the end though, I agree that we need their experience and expertise in these firms. The present system however is unsustainable, not to mention very unseemly. The lines between patriotism and personal profit are far too blurred.
I agree the F-22 is a magnificent machine with wonderful capabilities. Heck, we actually need some of those. The problem is that it perfectly represents the problem with these "big weapon" purchases the Pentagon is obssessed with. The program was dreadfully overbudget, behind and should have been killed years ago in favor of something more timely. Instead we stuck with it, at a tremendous price that drains necessary funds from other needed areas, like replacing all the Army and Marines gear that's been torn up and worn out in Iraq, as well as addressing serious manning issues in critical areas like intelligence, civil affairs and our foreign languages areas.
The Navy's obsession with nuclear subs is more galling to me. Why the hell aren't we building diesel subs that can compete in both silence and firepower capabilities with the Chinese, Iranians, Russians and others? We could get to work on a new class of diesel subs for the price of ONE nuclear sub that will be easily taken out by the Chinese in any conflict. The Navy's building sitting ducks, not lethal warships.
As Kaplan points out, its not always "big purchases" that are the problem, its "which" "big purchases" are approved where the problem lies. The AF does not need a new fighter, the Army needs more troops with better gear and better skills in critical areas. The Navy doesn't need a new aircraft carrier, it needs a UAV fighter and a new class of mid-tech, durable and versatile ships to be a platform for them. It doesn't need nuclear subs, it needs several classes of diesel subs and ships that can go "upriver" or "on the coast" in a place like Algeria or Indonesia.
Look at all of Rumsfeld's statements from the past five years, with the exception of diesel subs, he's called for all of these platforms to be the future weaponry of the services. He wasn't boosting the F-22, he was trying to kill it. But now he's lost to the military-industrial complex, Congress and the uniformed officers soon to be making money at Lockheed and Boeing, and instead of any of these worthy new programs that fit the true needs of the 21st century military, we have the F-22, nuclear subs, more easily sinkable aircraft carriers and very few "new" programs of interests, except for the cheap and the already successful rookies on the block.
