Ralph Nader for President

[Unkotare]

Moderate fiscal conservative republicans will vote for Nader. .

Yeeeeaaaahhhhh.......maybe not...

 

[Crackerjack]

JUAN GONZALEZ: Well, what about that big meeting that you talk about — I think it was October 12th — the nine big banks? Eight of those banks, as you reported, ended up getting two-thirds of all of the money, 67 percent. How did that meeting come about, and who was there?

JAMES STEELE: Paulson actually called that meeting. He called the heads of those banks the night before and said, “I want you here tomorrow in Washington.” He was very vague as to what the purpose of the meeting was. But once they got there, he told them, “You are taking money. We are going to buy stock in your banks. And we need to get this economy going again.” Some bankers objected, saying by accepting this money it would look like they were weak. Others simply said they didn’t need it.

The fact of the matter is, one of the things we concluded very early on in this whole process is that while Treasury was trying to create the image that there was widespread weakness in these banks — and then there was a credit freeze, there’s no doubt about that — the way they went about this, just throwing the money out there in hopes that that would get the economy going, is not really what this was all about. There were just a handful of institutions that were terribly weakened. AIG the insurer, Bank of America, Citigroup, those three were clearly in very weakened form. So, many of the other big banks were not. And the best example that they didn’t need this money in the beginning was that many of them, within just a very few months, paid everything back.

AMY GOODMAN: Don Barlett, this meeting of the big nine, with Vikram Pandit of Citigroup, Jamie Dimon of JPMorgan Chase, Kenneth Lewis of Bank of America, Richard Kovacevich of Wells Fargo, John Thain of Merrill Lynch, John Mack of Morgan Stanley, Lloyd Blankfein, who succeeded Paulson as head of Goldman Sachs, Robert Kelly of the Bank of New York Mellon and Ronald Logue of State Street Bank, went to the secretary’s conference room. It was even difficult to find this information out. But what did he lay out for them there? And how does Paulson, who was former head of one of these banks, fit into it, as well?

DONALD BARLETT: Well, reduced to its simplest terms, he laid in front of them, each of them, a sheet of paper and saying, “Write on this the amount of money you’re going to take, and you are going to take it. Otherwise,” the implication was, “regulators will be looking at you and finding something wrong there. This is one of those areas in which you have no choice. By the end of the day, you will sign that you’re taking this amount of money. You know, call your boards, do whatever you need to do, but you will take the money.”

JAMES STEELE: Amy, this is one of the most astonishing things to us as part of this whole investigation. Here you have these people signing by hand their names, the date of the meeting, and filling in with a felt-tip pen how much money they wanted: $25 billion in one case, $15 billion in another, $10 billion. A one-page piece of paper. Wouldn’t we all like that the next time we take out a mortgage or a car loan or anything like that?

Not sourcing your quotes is plagiarism. You're welcome.

 

[merrill]

JUAN GONZALEZ: Well, what about that big meeting that you talk about — I think it was October 12th — the nine big banks? Eight of those banks, as you reported, ended up getting two-thirds of all of the money, 67 percent. How did that meeting come about, and who was there?

JAMES STEELE: Paulson actually called that meeting. He called the heads of those banks the night before and said, “I want you here tomorrow in Washington.” He was very vague as to what the purpose of the meeting was. But once they got there, he told them, “You are taking money. We are going to buy stock in your banks. And we need to get this economy going again.” Some bankers objected, saying by accepting this money it would look like they were weak. Others simply said they didn’t need it.

The fact of the matter is, one of the things we concluded very early on in this whole process is that while Treasury was trying to create the image that there was widespread weakness in these banks — and then there was a credit freeze, there’s no doubt about that — the way they went about this, just throwing the money out there in hopes that that would get the economy going, is not really what this was all about. There were just a handful of institutions that were terribly weakened. AIG the insurer, Bank of America, Citigroup, those three were clearly in very weakened form. So, many of the other big banks were not. And the best example that they didn’t need this money in the beginning was that many of them, within just a very few months, paid everything back.

AMY GOODMAN: Don Barlett, this meeting of the big nine, with Vikram Pandit of Citigroup, Jamie Dimon of JPMorgan Chase, Kenneth Lewis of Bank of America, Richard Kovacevich of Wells Fargo, John Thain of Merrill Lynch, John Mack of Morgan Stanley, Lloyd Blankfein, who succeeded Paulson as head of Goldman Sachs, Robert Kelly of the Bank of New York Mellon and Ronald Logue of State Street Bank, went to the secretary’s conference room. It was even difficult to find this information out. But what did he lay out for them there? And how does Paulson, who was former head of one of these banks, fit into it, as well?

DONALD BARLETT: Well, reduced to its simplest terms, he laid in front of them, each of them, a sheet of paper and saying, “Write on this the amount of money you’re going to take, and you are going to take it. Otherwise,” the implication was, “regulators will be looking at you and finding something wrong there. This is one of those areas in which you have no choice. By the end of the day, you will sign that you’re taking this amount of money. You know, call your boards, do whatever you need to do, but you will take the money.”

JAMES STEELE: Amy, this is one of the most astonishing things to us as part of this whole investigation. Here you have these people signing by hand their names, the date of the meeting, and filling in with a felt-tip pen how much money they wanted: $25 billion in one case, $15 billion in another, $10 billion. A one-page piece of paper. Wouldn’t we all like that the next time we take out a mortgage or a car loan or anything like that?

Not sourcing your quotes is plagiarism. You're welcome.

If you would take time to actually read the information put forth in a previous post or two the source for this would have been obvious...

Meanwhile:
"Good Billions After Bad" - One Year After Wall Street Bailout, Pulitzer Winners Barlett and Steele Investigate Where All the Money Went

 

[merrill]

The fact of the matter is, one of the things we concluded very early on in this whole process is that while Bush/Cheney Treasury was trying to create the image that there was widespread weakness in these banks — and then there was a credit freeze, there’s no doubt about that — the way they went about this, just throwing the money out there in hopes that that would get the economy going, is not really what this was all about. There were just a handful of institutions that were terribly weakened. AIG the insurer, Bank of America, Citigroup, those three were clearly in very weakened form. So, many of the other big banks were not. And the best example that they didn’t need this money in the beginning was that many of them, within just a very few months, paid everything back.


"Good Billions After Bad" - One Year After Wall Street Bailout, Pulitzer Winners Barlett and Steele Investigate Where All the Money Went

 

[Meister]

JUAN GONZALEZ: Well, what about that big meeting that you talk about — I think it was October 12th — the nine big banks? Eight of those banks, as you reported, ended up getting two-thirds of all of the money, 67 percent. How did that meeting come about, and who was there?

JAMES STEELE: Paulson actually called that meeting. He called the heads of those banks the night before and said, “I want you here tomorrow in Washington.” He was very vague as to what the purpose of the meeting was. But once they got there, he told them, “You are taking money. We are going to buy stock in your banks. And we need to get this economy going again.” Some bankers objected, saying by accepting this money it would look like they were weak. Others simply said they didn’t need it.

The fact of the matter is, one of the things we concluded very early on in this whole process is that while Treasury was trying to create the image that there was widespread weakness in these banks — and then there was a credit freeze, there’s no doubt about that — the way they went about this, just throwing the money out there in hopes that that would get the economy going, is not really what this was all about. There were just a handful of institutions that were terribly weakened. AIG the insurer, Bank of America, Citigroup, those three were clearly in very weakened form. So, many of the other big banks were not. And the best example that they didn’t need this money in the beginning was that many of them, within just a very few months, paid everything back.

AMY GOODMAN: Don Barlett, this meeting of the big nine, with Vikram Pandit of Citigroup, Jamie Dimon of JPMorgan Chase, Kenneth Lewis of Bank of America, Richard Kovacevich of Wells Fargo, John Thain of Merrill Lynch, John Mack of Morgan Stanley, Lloyd Blankfein, who succeeded Paulson as head of Goldman Sachs, Robert Kelly of the Bank of New York Mellon and Ronald Logue of State Street Bank, went to the secretary’s conference room. It was even difficult to find this information out. But what did he lay out for them there? And how does Paulson, who was former head of one of these banks, fit into it, as well?

DONALD BARLETT: Well, reduced to its simplest terms, he laid in front of them, each of them, a sheet of paper and saying, “Write on this the amount of money you’re going to take, and you are going to take it. Otherwise,” the implication was, “regulators will be looking at you and finding something wrong there. This is one of those areas in which you have no choice. By the end of the day, you will sign that you’re taking this amount of money. You know, call your boards, do whatever you need to do, but you will take the money.”

JAMES STEELE: Amy, this is one of the most astonishing things to us as part of this whole investigation. Here you have these people signing by hand their names, the date of the meeting, and filling in with a felt-tip pen how much money they wanted: $25 billion in one case, $15 billion in another, $10 billion. A one-page piece of paper. Wouldn’t we all like that the next time we take out a mortgage or a car loan or anything like that?

Not sourcing your quotes is plagiarism. You're welcome.

If you would take time to actually read the information put forth in a previous post or two the source for this would have been obvious...

Meanwhile:
"Good Billions After Bad" - One Year After Wall Street Bailout, Pulitzer Winners Barlett and Steele Investigate Where All the Money Went

Merrill, the point of the matter is that you need to link your source when you do a cut and paste. It's a copywrite violation if you don't, leaving this board open for legal actions. I hope this clarifies everything for you.

 

[merrill]

Absolutely...

 

[Remodeling Maidiac]

A Federal Budget that Puts Human Needs Before Corporate Greed and Militarism

The United States needs a redirected federal budget that adequately funds crucial priorities like infrastructure, transit and other public works, schools, clinics, libraries, forests, parks, sustainable energy and pollution controls.

The budget should move away from the deeply documented and criticized (by the US General Accounting Office, retired Admirals and Generals and others) wasteful, redundant "military industrial complex" as President Eisenhower called it, as well as corporate welfare and tax cuts for the wealthy that expand the divide between the luxuries of the rich and the necessities of the poor and middle class.

Federal Budget -- Ralph Nader for President in 2008



Ralph Nader for President in 2012

This sounds just like Obamas rhetoric.

 

[merrill]

The Wasteful and Redundant Defense Department Budget Needs to Be Cut

Half of the operating costs of the U.S. federal budget is spent on the military. The federal budget should move away from the wasteful, redundant "military industrial complex." Wasteful spending on expensive military equipment and post World War II deployments that we do not need makes the U.S. less secure in many other neglected ways.

The Task Force on A Unified Security Budget for the United States, drawing on the knowledge of analysts with expertise in different dimensions of the security challenge, made recommendations in March 2004 that would cut defense spending by $51 billion. The Task Force was organized by the Center for Defense Information, Foreign Policy in Focus, and Security Policy Working Group. In addition, they recommend a unified approach to fighting terrorism and increasing security that includes increases in non-military expenditures, noting that in a 2002 speech President Bush identified development assistance as a security tool, linking the desperate resort to terrorism with the hopelessness of persistent poverty.

The Task Force report is excerpted for your information. Our views go beyond these positions.

Federal Budget -- Ralph Nader for President in 2008